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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyse the economic policy preferences and political 
influence of a sample of German and Swiss pharmaceutical multinationals and banks. Put 
differently, the goal is to examine whether these MNEs have the will, and the political clout, 
to promote a liberal economic order or whether they seek to distort, or even suspend, the free 
formation of prices. In a sense, this study is thus a two-step procedure: first, it will analyse 
the formation of MNEs' preferences and then, second, it will examine how these preferences 
translate into political influence and policy outcomes. The focus of the analysis will be on the 
home country and the EU level of policy-making during the period from 1985 to 1995. 
Economic policy preferences will be explained as the result of the interaction of three factors: 
the extent and nature of MNEs' internationalisation process, their business focus and sectoral 
characteristics. With regard to policy outcomes and MNEs' influence over them, it will be 
argued that also three factors need to be considered: interests, institutions that link MNEs to 
the policy-making process and changing economic and political circumstances, which affect 
perceptions of self interest and institutions. Particular focus will be on the impact of 
circumstances on the preferences of the government, the degree of opposition from other 
domestic groups and the extent to which MNEs can use their internationalisation process for 
political leverage.
Regarding MNEs’ economic policy preferences, it will be pointed out that both the six 
pharmaceutical MNEs and the six banks were generally supportive of free markets, although 
there were also a few grey areas. When it came to their political influence, the picture was 
less clear cut since the extent to which MNEs could shape policy outcomes varied not only 
between pharmaceutical MNEs and banks, but also across policy issues within the two 
sectors. In general, the proposed explanatory framework could explain many of these 
complexities, although there were a few exceptions and qualifications.
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1Introduction: 
The Economic Policy Preferences and 
Political Influence of Multinational Enterprises
Whenever something goes amiss in the economy it is usually a safe bet that multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) will feature prominently in the inevitable rounding up of the usual 
suspects. The experience of the last decade has shown that commentators are often quick to 
link the activities of MNEs to contemporary economic and social ills. MNEs, so the argument 
often goes, cynically play off governments against each other in order to extract favourable 
concessions and have thereby caused a race to the bottom in environmental and social 
standards, depressed wages, caused unemployment and deprived states from providing 
adequate welfare services. Hence, the often-reached conclusion of these studies that MNEs 
must be at the centre of most of the world’s economic and social problems1. But is it really 
true? Can MNEs really be accused of seeking preferential treatment and trying to shape the 
playing field to their advantage? Or could it be that they are instead actually more often 
interested in a rule-based liberal economic order, which is predictable and free from arbitrary 
political intervention? This study seeks to provide some answers. It is an enquiry into the 
nature of MNEs" economic policy preferences and their ability to influence economic policy 
making - both in their home countries and at the EU level. Put differently, this study seeks to 
analyse whether MNEs have the will, and the political clout, to promote a liberal economic 
order, or whether they seek to distort, or even suspend, the free formation of prices. It intends 
to achieve this goal by analysing and comparing the economic policy preferences and political 
influence of a sample of German and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and banks in the period 
from 1985 to 1995.
MNEs’ economic policy preferences have often been analysed in the literature with regard
1 See for example Forrester (1996) and Glunk (1998).
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to traditional, "at-the-border" trade policy issues, such as tariffs and quotas. These studies 
explain MNEs’ preferences as the result of the extent to which they are exposed to the 
international economy - both through sales and cross-border production networks. The more 
MNEs are exposed to the international economy, so the argument goes, the less likely it is that 
they will seek market closing trade policies. The logic seems impeccable. After all, it would 
hardly make sense for a company with considerable international sales and internationalised 
production to support restrictions on international trade. From there, many studies swiftly 
predict that as the number of firms with international ties continues to increase, the free trade 
lobby will become so strong that policy makers will have little choice but to press on with 
liberalising trade policies2. Although this is certainly a very parsimonious framework of 
analysis with seemingly a great deal of explanatory and predictive power, it will be argued 
that for the purpose of this study both hypotheses are overly narrow and potentially 
misleading.
First, this study does not intend to limit the analysis merely to MNEs’ policy preferences 
with regard to “at the border” trade policy issues. The goal is to examine MNEs’ policy 
preferences with regard to the price mechanism in more general terms and while trade policies 
certainly affect the functioning of price competition, clearly domestic economic policies also 
do so as well. Moreover, even if one were to devote a study merely to trade policy issues in 
the 1980s and 1990s, domestic policies could not be excluded from the analysis. With the 
reduction of average tariffs to low, if not negligible levels (at least in the industrialised world), 
the obstacles to free trade are increasingly found "behind the border" in the domestic policies 
of states, i.e. competition policies, labour regulations, trade-related investment measures, 
intellectual property rights, environmental laws, safety and technical standards and other 
domestic practices that distort the free formation of prices at the national level and are thus 
difficult to reconcile with an open international economy3. Hence there is a strong case for 
broadening the scope of the analysis to include domestic economic policies.
However, it will be shown that in a number of cases MNEs' preferences with regard to 
these issues cannot be explained by the degree and nature of their internationalisation process; 
it will be argued that often MNEs’ business focus and sectoral characteristics were more 
important explanatory factors. To prove this hypothesis, this study will analyse the selected 12 
MNEs’ internationalisation processes, their business focus and sectoral characteristics of the
2 See for example Milner (1988). See also footnote 31.
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pharmaceutical and financial services sector. Building on this analysis, it will then examine 
how these three factors have interacted to shape MNEs’ preferences with regard to a sample of 
economic policy issues that the interviewed executives identified as the most important ones 
facing the pharmaceutical and financial services industry during the last decade.
Second, sweeping generalisations about MNEs’ political influence are hardly convincing. 
While it may sound plausible to argue that increasing levels of internationalisation have given 
firms highly visible incentives to lobby for a continued liberalisation of international trade, it 
does not follow automatically that MNEs preferences will always translate neatly into policy 
outcomes4. Different, country-specific institutions give MNEs different degrees of access to 
policy-making circles and hence may prove to be important intervening factors that either 
enhance or dilute the effectiveness with which MNEs can bring their preferences into the 
policy-making process. Moreover, it does not appear plausible to rely only on interests and 
institutions to explain policy outcomes and MNEs" political influence. While they are 
certainly important explanatory factors and represent a useful point of departure for the 
analysis, it will be shown that in many cases changing economic and political circumstances 
had an important impact on perceptions of self-interest and the institutions of the economic 
policy-making process, and hence on policy outcomes. The importance of circumstances for 
analysing MNEs" political influence will be illustrated by examining their impact on the 
preferences o f the government, the degree of opposition from other organised interests and 
the extent to which MNEs can use their internationalisation process for political leverage. It 
will be shown that in many cases, circumstances relating to these three factors significantly 
shaped the political influence that MNEs were capable of exerting.
Certainly such a framework of analysis is unlikely to lead to a neat and parsimonious 
theory. However, it will at least shed some light on two important sets of issues, which the 
analytically more rigorous studies have difficulty explaining: first, how MNEs’ preferences 
are formed and second, how these preferences are translated into political influence over 
policy outcomes. It is hoped that the gains in explanatory power and range of this study's 
framework of analysis will make up for the loss of parsimony. In order to illustrate the 
findings, this study will occassionally draw on interviews with public servants, industry and 
trade association executives and journalists.
3 The distinction between domestic economic policy issues and “behind the border” trade policy issues is not 
entirely clear-cut, not least because the latter category appears to be open-ended and very much in flux. It shall 
not be the task of this study to attempt to draw a boundary between the two.
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The focus of the analysis will be on six German and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs 
(Hoechst, Bayer, BASF and Roche, Sandoz, Ciba-Geigy) and six German and Swiss banks 
(Deusche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and Credit Suisse, Swiss Bank Corporation, 
Union Bank of Switzerland) (see table 1.1). Although four of these twelve MNEs have 
merged since the beginning of the project -  Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy to form Novartis in 1995 
and Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of Switzerland to form United Bank of 
Switzerland in 1998 -  there have been no indications that the combined entities' preferences 
or political influence differ in any meaningful way from those of their predecessors. Hence 
these developments do not affect the findings of this study.
Germanv Switzerland
Pharmaceutical MNEs Hoechst, Bayer, BASF Roche, Ciba-Geigy, 
Sandoz
Banks Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank, Commerzbank
Credit Suisse, SBC, UBS
Table 1.1: The selected German and Swiss Pharmaceutical MNEs and Banks
Analysing and comparing the economic policy preferences and political influence of German 
and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and banks is relevant for a number of reasons. First, both 
sectors occupy a central place in their national economies. Second, MNEs from the two 
sectors differ considerably in their exposure to foreign markets, and third, the pharmaceutical 
and financial services industry are unique in the sense that due to sectoral characteristics 
markets in both sectors are considerably regulated -  something that might encourage MNEs to 
pursue political strategies to tilt the playing field in their favour (see final section of this 
chapter). MNEs from Germany and Switzerland were chosen for the analysis since firms in
4 Milner (1988) has argued that increasing exposure to international markets was likely to give firms such strong 
interests in an open international economy that these interests could be expected to translate into policy 
outcomes.
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both countries are part of an institutional structure that decentralises policy-making and 
awards considerable influence to private actors and especially to the business community (see 
Chapter 4). Hence comparing the political influence of MNEs from these two countries should 
yield important insights about the extent to which institutions are a source of political leverage 
for MNEs. One might certainly object that it is a bit odd to analyse the political influence of 
highly internationalised firms in their home countries and not in host countries. But, arguably, 
it is the home country that continues to be the most important production location -  even for 
the most international of firms. Domestic sales may pale in significance when compared to 
international sales, but still it has become accepted wisdom in the international business 
literature that the home country retains a special role and is an important source of 
competitive advantage. In fact, Michael Porter concluded his seminal thirteen-nation 
comparative study arguing that MNEs’ competitive advantage significantly depends on the 
competitiveness of the nation in which they are headquartered5. Moreover, MNEs’ political 
ties are likely to be strongest in their home countries. As Sally has argued,
"the home country is where MNEs are most strongly linked in historically conditioned
relationships with external actors such as local, regional and governments, banks, industry
associations, trade unions, suppliers and customers"6.
To be sure, it seems plausible to assume that as MNEs strengthen their market position in 
foreign markets they also increasingly embed themselves in the institutional structures of their 
host countries. It is by no means the implicit argument of this study that MNEs only play a 
political role in their home country. Unfortunately, however, it is beyond the manageable 
scope of this study to address this additional aspect.
Finally, an early word of caution seems to be in order. Clearly MNEs can influence the 
functioning of price competition not only through their economic policy preferences with 
regard to public policies but also through their business strategies. A number of studies - most 
notably the theory of contestable markets - have shown that incumbent firms often have 
substantial means at hand to pursue market-closing policies through their business strategies7. 
Covering this additional aspect is, however, unfortunately beyond the scope of the present
5 Porter (1990).
6 Sally (1994), p. 172.
7 See for example Baumol et al. (1983) and Spence (1977).
study. The focus here will be exclusively on MNEs' preferences with regard to public 
policies.
MNEs and the Study of International Political Economy
Before reviewing the literature on MNEs’ economic policy preferences and outlining the 
explanatory framework, this study should first be placed within a larger context since focusing 
on MNEs is not always common practice in the International Political Economy literature. A 
major strand in IPE has the state as its central unit of analysis and tends to focus on the nature 
of interstate bargaining to explain policy outcomes8.
One school, the realists, sees an international system of states that is essentially anarchic 
and places substantial constraints on the ability - and willingness - of states to reach 
international agreements on anything from trade to security affairs. The other school, the neo- 
liberal institutionalists, argues that the constraining effects of anarchy can be mitigated, even 
overcome, with the help of international regimes -  sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors4 expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations9. By providing information and structuring state 
interactions, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that international regimes can overcome 
problems of international economic and political market failure10.
While both approaches can, at times, yield important insights, it still remains very difficult 
to explain contemporary international politics solely as the result of the nature of interstate 
bargaining. After all, it is a bit difficult to find a geopolitical strategic interest in the textile 
and clothing sector that could explain why trade in these two sectors is so heavily restricted. 
Similarly it is not convincing to explain trade policies solely by the existence of international 
regimes. While it is certainly convenient from an analytical point of view to rationalise trade 
policies ex post as the result of the existence or non-existence of an international regime, such 
an explanatory logic fails to address the important question of why states managed to co­
operate in the first place to set up the regime. To be sure, there is much to learn from studying 
state interaction, but there is also a fundamental problem with it: to be able to study
8 See for example Gilpin (1975) and (1986), Keohane and Nye (1971) and (1977), Krasner (1982) and Strange 
(1984).
9 See for example Krasner (1982).
analytically the interaction of states, system level-theories make ad hoc assumptions about the 
interests of states, thereby excluding the important process of preference formation at the 
national level from the analysis. There are merits in doing so, but one can nevertheless 
question the usefulness of this simplifying assumption since, as Susan Strange (1988) has 
observed, by making these starting assumptions system level theories already determine the 
answer to the question they seek to address.
•  11An alternative and somewhat more plausible approach has been put forward by Ruggie . 
Trying to make sense of the mix of free trade and protectionist policies in the international 
economy, he argued that this mix was not so much the result of the nature of interstate 
bargaining, but rather reflected a desire of governments to reap as many economic gains from 
international trade as possible while at the same time minimising structural adjustment 
pressures exerted by international trade on uncompetitive domestic industries. In other words, 
protectionist policies in his analysis are not the result of the effects of an anarchical 
international state system or of the absence of an international regime, but rather an attempt by 
governments to restrict and manipulate market forces so as to slow down the process of 
structural change that might otherwise have socially destabilising consequences. The central 
insight of Ruggie’s analysis is thus that states are not only embedded in international society 
but also in domestic civil society and government policy is therefore also constrained by 
interests of individuals and groups who pressure decision-makers to pursue policies consistent 
with their preferences12.
Within a different context, this point has recently been taken up again in the IPE literature. 
As national economies have become increasingly integrated, it has become popular to 
speculate about a perceived decline of state authority and a growing diffusion of authority to 
other institutions and associations13. In fact, more recently even leading proponents of system- 
level explanations seem to concede that state policies are largely determined by the balance of 
political forces within countries14.
10 See for example Keohane (1984).
11 See Ruggie (1982).
12 For a similar view see Putnam (1988).
13 See for example Strange (1996) and Horseman and Marshall (1994).
14 See for example Keohane and Milner (1996). It should, however, be said that the trend to focus on the role of 
domestic actors in the policy-making process is by no means a novelty. Public choice explanations of policy 
outcomes have been applied to studies in International Political Economy since the 1980s. See for example Frey 
(1984). Particularly trade economists have used this approach for some time. See footnote 51. Similarly, the role 
of ideas and their impact on policy-making has featured prominently in a number of studies. See for example Hall 
(1989) and Goldstein and Keohane (1993).
This trend has also been echoed by developments at the theoretical level. In a recent article, 
Andrew Moravcsik pointed to the importance of societal ideas, interests and institutions in 
influencing state behaviour by shaping state preferences15. Building on this observation, he 
elaborated what he called a liberal theory of international relations based on the insight that 
state-society relations -  the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social 
context in which they are embedded -  have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in world 
politics. As he put it,
“Liberal theory rests on a bottom-up view of politics in which the demands of individuals 
and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics. Political action is embedded 
in domestic and transnational civil society, understood as an aggregation of boundedly 
rational individuals with different tastes, social commitments, and resource endowments. 
Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests 
independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and 
collective action"16.
In other words, Moravcsik rejects the claim of realists and neoliberal institutionalists that 
states can and should be regarded as unitary actors -  black boxes -  and shifts the focus of 
attention from the configuration of capabilities (realism) and information (neo-liberal 
institutionalism) to the configuration of state interests. The state, in his view, has become less 
of an actor, but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, 
construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors17. While one does not 
necessarily have to agree with all of the above conclusions -  i.e. that states have become 
virtually powerless -  one can still accept a point common to all of them: the importance of 
organised domestic groups for policy-making. It is this assumption that provides the starting 
point for this study. It is an investigation into the public policy preferences and the political 
influence of one particular domestic actor: the multinational enterprise (MNE), which can be 
defined as an economic unit that operates across national boundaries, producing in at least one 
other foreign country as well as in its home market18.
MNEs were selected for the analysis for a number of reasons. First, they are important 
economic actors and one of the main conduits through which the globalisation of business
15 See Moravcsik (1997).
16 Ibid., p. 517. For a similar view see also Milner (1992) and (1997).
17 Moravcsik (1997), p. 517.
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takes place. Despite the fact that multinationals number only in the thousands, they account 
for about half the world's trade in goods, with about two thirds of their trade taking place 
between related units of the same enterprise19. Their significance is, however, not only 
confined to international trade. In 1997, it was estimated that MNEs' sales through their 
foreign affiliates totalled $9.7 trillion - an amount considerably larger than the size of world's 
total exports (see table 1.2).
Year Sales Exports Ratio of sales to 
exports
1984 2.581 1.632 158.2%
1987 3.492 1.941 179.9%
1990 5.089 2.797 181.9%
1993 6.022 3.175 189.7%
1997 9.728 6.710 145%
Table 1. 2: World Sales of MNEs’Foreign Affiliates and World Exports, 1984 -1993 (US$ bn).
Source: Adapted from World Investment Report (1995), p. 37. See also UNCTAD, FDI-TNC data base
E. 99. II. D.3, table 1.2, p. 9.
Moreover, MNEs have been growing at a rapid rate during the last decades. One manifestation 
of their rapid growth has been the persistent increase in the flows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) around the world (see table 1.3). In fact, between 1980 and 1995 alone, according to 
United Nations data, the stock of FDI around the world increased over six times, to $3.2 
trillion20. Other measures also reflect the rapid growth of multinational 
enterprises. One source, for instance, estimates that the number of jobs in the world's MNEs 
increased from 40 million in 1975 to 73 million in 199221. Finally, MNEs also play a key role 
in disseminating technology around the globe. The UN's 1997 World Investment Report
18 For definitions of the MNE and international production, see Rugman (1986), p. 7 and Dunning (1988), p. 1.
19 See Lipsey (1995), pp. 8.
20 See World Investment Report (1996), p. 239.
21 See World Investment Report (1994), p. 175.
estimated that 70 per cent of all international royalties on technology involve payments 
between parent firms and their foreign affiliates22.
Developed
Countries
Developing
Countries
Central and 
Eastern Europe
Year Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows
1983-87 58.7 72.6 18.3 4.2 0.02 0.01
1988-92 139.1 193.3 36.8 15.2 1.36 0.04
1990 169.8 225.5 33.7 17.8 0.30 0.04
1991 114.0 201.9 41.3 8.9 2.45 0.04
1992 114.0 181.4 50.4 21.0 3.77 0.10
1993 129.3 192.4 73.1 33.0 5.59 0.20
1994 132.8 190.9 87.0 38.6 5.89 0.55
1995 203.2 270.5 99.7 47.0 12.08 0.30
Table 1.3: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Outflows, 1983-1995 (US$ bn).
Source: World Investment Report (1996), p. 4
Second, due to the size and the scale of their business operations, MNEs have emerged as 
important political actors23. While certainly all large enterprises -  as big employers, 
producers, suppliers and taxpayers -  cannot avoid making political waves, their actions take 
on a special dimension when they are also multinational. In contrast to companies whose 
facilities are located in a single country and have no alternative but to comply with that 
country's laws and social norms, MNEs can move production to other countries24. In other 
words, their scanning horizon will ordinarily be regional or global, not only national. If need 
be, therefore, the multinational may shift from local production to imports, or from imports to
22 Quoted in The Economist School’s Brief on Globalisation, Nov. 22 1997.
23 On of the first major studies to puzzle over the political and economic consequences of the growing number of 
MNEs was Vernon (1971).
24 Vernon (1998, p. 22) has noted that MNEs commonly see the world as a chessboard on which they are 
conducting a wide-ranging campaign. The chessboard's squares are nation-states, and an enterprise can consider 
entering any one of them by a number of different means - by trading with independent firms in the country, by 
developing alliances with enterprises already operating in the country, or by establishing a subsidiary of its own 
in the country.
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local production . Conceivably, this flexibility may give MNEs disproportionate political 
influence compared with other domestic actors. In fact, by comparison with earlier decades, 
the 1980s and 1990s have been distinctive for the efforts that governments have made to bring 
foreign-owned enterprises onto their national turf. A UN agency, keeping track of the changes 
that governments have made in their rules regarding FDI, identified hundreds of such changes 
between 1991 and 1995 involving many different countries, and found that practically all were 
aimed at presenting a friendlier face to foreign firms26. Tax reductions or exemptions of 
various kinds have been especially common. A UN survey covering the early 1990s identified 
103 countries, situated in all areas of the world and representing all stages of development, 
whose national governments were offering such incentives in various forms (see table 1.4). 
Apart from the incentives listed in the table, these countries offered a variety of lesser fiscal 
concessions, including accelerated depreciation on their depictable assets and exemptions 
from national sales taxes27.
Finally, the emergence of MNEs as political actors can also be traced in the international 
business literature . John Dunning, for example, has suggested that focusing on the 
interaction of governments and MNEs may provide the basis for one of the next advances in 
the theory of international production29. In similar vein, Grosse and Behrmann have argued 
elsewhere that MNE-govemment bargaining should be placed at the centre of international 
business scholarship30. In short, there seems to be a good case for devoting an analysis to the 
preferences and political influence of MNEs.
However, a final word of caution seems to be in order. This study does not intend to 
elaborate a theory of policy-making based on the preferences of domestic actors. An 
appreciation of the problems surrounding interstate bargaining continues to be important for a 
well-rounded analysis. Despite strong domestic support for international agreements, political 
leaders may often still find it impossible to strike a deal -  be it either for reasons resulting 
from the dynamics of the international state system or because each party to the negotiation 
wants to secure a disproportionate share of the joint gains for its country. Hence
Developing Developed Central and
25 See for example Rangan (1998).
26 See World Investment Report (1996), p. 132
27 See Vernon (1998), p. 32.
28 To be sure, MNEs as political actors have also featured in the Marxist/dependency theory literature from the 
1960s. See for example Hymer (1978).
29 See Dunning (1992), p. 135.
30 See Grosse and Behrmann (1990) and (1992).
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Countries Countries E. Europe Total
Number of 
Countries
52 26 25 103
Incentives: Reduction in 
Income Tax
43 20 20 83
Tax
Holiday
37 11 19 67
Exemption 
from import 
duties
29 11 13 63
Refunding of 
import duties 
For exports
28 9 12 49
Table 1.4: Selected Fiscal Incentives Offered Foreign Investors in the early 1990s.
Source: Adapted from United Nations, Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment 
(New York: United Nations, 1996), Table III.2, adapted from Vernon (1998), p. 32.
this study should by no means be seen as an attempt to outline a general theory of policy­
making based on the preferences of one particular domestic actor. It is merely argued here that 
system- and domestic-level explanations are not mutually exclusive and that the explanatory 
power of the former could certainly be enhanced by a better understanding of the policy 
preference formation at the domestic level. After all, one should know the preferences of the 
states involved before one can study inter-state bargaining.
Having distinguished between system- and domestic-level explanations of policy outcomes 
-  and having placed this study into the second category -  this study will now review the 
existing literature on MNEs and economic policy. Building on this review, the following 
section will then outline the argument and framework of this study.
MNEs and Economic Policy
12
For the purpose of this study -  analysing MNEs’ economic policy preferences and their 
political influence -  three sets of questions are of relevance: first, how can one explain MNEs’ 
policy preferences? Second, what kind of different preferences are there and how can one 
analytically distinguish between them? And third, how can one analyse MNEs’ political 
influence over policy outcomes? All three questions have featured in a number of studies, 
albeit more or less in isolation from each other.
As has already been mentioned, MNEs’ economic policy preferences are often analysed 
within the narrower category of trade policy and are explained as the result of the nature and 
extent of MNEs’ exposure to the international economy. In its crudest form, the argument is 
that high levels of dependence on international markets will create free trade preferences 
among MNEs31. Since tariffs and other restrictions of international trade only complicate and 
disrupt MNEs' international business activities, it is only rational for firms to be in favour of 
open markets. However, it is also well recognised in the literature that this straightforward 
formulation is not always tenable since it rests on a rather narrow conception of MNEs* 
international business activities; in most of the quoted studies, export dependence is the only 
link of firms to the international economy. Clearly, however, there is also another important 
link: intra-firm trade resulting from cross-border production networks. As has been pointed 
out in the previous section, two thirds of MNEs' trade has during the last years been taking 
place between related units of the same enterprise. In fact, when other studies incorporated 
MNEs1 internal organisational structure as an additional explanatory variable, the picture that 
emerged became more blurred and cast doubt on the hypothesis that there was a direct and 
straightforward link between the foreign operations of firms and their free trade preferences. 
For example, it became apparent that for MNEs without integrated international production 
networks it may well be "rational" to be selectively protectionist in their policy preferences. If 
a firm has production facilities in a protected market, then trade barriers can constitute a 
convenient edge over other foreign rivals. Also, the nature of free trade preferences resulting 
from export dependence is likely to be different from the nature of free trade preferences 
resulting from firms' organisational structures. Firms that are dependent on exports can, no 
doubt, be expected to resist protectionist policies. These firms, however, will primarily be 
interested in opening markets abroad and only secondarily in opening the home market. Firms
31 See for example Baldwin (1982), Baldwin (1986), Aggarwal, Keohane and Yoffie (1987), Ray (1981), 
Lavergne (1983).
32 See for example Helleiner (1979), Lipson (1982), Bhagwati (1991), p. 330.
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with integrated international production networks, on the other hand, are likely to favour 
equally a further opening of both the home market and markets abroad33.
One study that incorporated all these caveats is Helen Milner’s "Resisting Protectionism"34. 
Building on the insights of earlier studies, her explanation of MNE’s trade policy preferences 
focuses on two variables linking firms to the international economy: export dependence and 
intra-firm trade resulting from cross-border production networks. Each of these is explicitly 
recognised as constituting a different aspect of a firm's integration into the world economy, 
and hence each is viewed as giving rise to a distinct set of preferences relating to trade 
policy35. By distinguishing between four different types of firms - firms that are lacking 
international ties and are primarily oriented to the domestic market, firms with extended 
exports but little multinationality, firms with significant export dependence and sizeable, 
integrated multinational operations, and firms with little export activity and little integrated 
international operations but with substantial foreign production to service host markets36 - her 
analytical framework can account for much of the complexity surrounding the trade policy 
preferences of MNEs that is missing in other studies. Her conclusions, however, are similar to 
the ones of the previous studies: firms with more extensive exports and multinationality 
should be less likely to demand protection, and more likely to resist it actively, even when 
facing serious import competition. The more important foreign operations are for firms, the 
less protectionist they will be, since demands for protection may spark retaliation abroad, 
which will in turn hurt their own foreign operations. In short, her argument is that there is a 
strong positive correlation between the degree of firms' internationalisation and the intensity 
of their free trade preferences37.
With regard to the second question -  how one can analytically distinguish between 
different types of preferences -  the literature has identified a broad range of possibilities. On 
one end of the spectrum is Anne Krueger's view of the firm as a mere rent-seeker. In her 
article "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society"38, she analysed one specific type
of firm political behaviour: rent-seeking triggered by quantitative restrictions on international 
trade, under which the right to import depends on the possession of government licenses. She 
argued that under such restrictions, firms could be expected to enter the political arena to
33 See Milner (1988), p. 25.
34 Milner (1988).
35 Ibid., p.18.
36 Ibid., pp. 24f.
37 Ibid., pp. 18,19, 222.
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lobby government officials for a favourable allocation of import and export licenses and the 
windfall gains associated with the ownership of them. In other words, in her framework of 
analysis, firms’ political strategies were confined to price mechanism suspending rent-seeking 
activities and governments were the only other domestic actors with which MNEs could be 
expected to interact.
On the other end of the spectrum, one can point to the already described free trade 
promoting MNEs of Milner* s analysis, which, due to their exposure to the international 
economy, have a strong interest in open markets. A similar view can be found in the 
corporatist and neo-corporatist literature, which also, by and large, argues that MNEs’ 
political efforts are aimed at keeping markets open39. Moreover, in the cases analysed in this 
strand of the IPE literature, firms’ political activities are not merely confined to lobbying 
activities but rather encompass a whole range of activities. In fact, firms actively - and 
legitimately - participate in the economic policy-making process, almost as joint decision­
makers, and thereby interact not only with governments but also with a whole range of other 
domestic actors over a large number of issues.
In between those two polar ends one can then find a number of studies suggesting a 
somewhat more differentiated nature of MNEs’ political strategies. Although undoubtedly 
being closer to Krueger's framework of analysis, these studies show that lobbying for 
preferential treatment does not necessarily entail the kind of suspension of the price 
mechanism that Krueger assumes. Firms may also choose to work through the price 
mechanism, while at the same time trying to distort it. In fact, Bhagwati and Srinivasan have 
argued that it was not sufficient to be merely concerned with lobbying activities triggered by 
different government licensing practices and that by focusing exclusively on quantity 
restrictions and the rents thereon, Krueger's model excluded other sources of lobbying 
activities from the analysis, such as for example activities triggered by price distortion and 
distortion-triggering activities40. In their article, they paid particular attention to one such price 
distortion triggered activity, which they labelled revenue seeking - a situation in which firms 
lobby for a slice of tariff revenues resulting from the adoption of protective tariffs41. Baldwin 
has noted that this case was conceptually somewhat different from the rent-seeking analysed 
by Krueger: when quantitative restrictions are applied to international trade, governments
38 Krueger (1974).
39 See for example Schmitter (1982), Katzenstein (1984) and (1990), Streeck (1992). For the distinctive features 
of neo or meso corporatism see Cawson (1985) and Grant (1985). See also footnote 58.
40 Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), p.1000.
41 Ibid.
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must devise a system to allocate the rights to import or export among producers, which 
amounts to a de facto suspension of the price mechanism. As a result, competition will shift 
from the economic to the political sphere, as producers will compete for export and import 
licenses. Under a tariff arrangement, however, the allocation of imports and exports is still 
carried out via the price mechanism - however distorted - with the tariff revenue usually going 
automatically into the public treasury in the same way as any tax revenue42.
Finally, firms cannot only be expected to respond to a distorted environment, but they are 
also likely to try to shape it to their advantage, thereby triggering distortions. The obvious 
example is tariff seeking where producer lobbies seek protectionist trade tariffs43.
All of these different types of firm lobbying activities have been neatly grouped into a 
general concept by Bhagwati, which he dubbed directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) 
activities44. He pointed out that such diverse activities as lobbying for protection, competing 
for a share of industrial output or import licenses or inducing legislatures to enact 
monopolistic barriers to entry have the unifying characteristic that they:
“represent ways of making a profit by undertaking activities which are directly 
unproductive; that is, they yield pecuniary returns but do not produce goods or services 
that enter a utility function directly or indirectly via increased production or availability to 
the economy of goods that enter a utility function... for example, tariff seeking or premium 
seeking for given import licenses are all privately profitable activities. However, their 
direct output is simply zero in terms of the flow of goods and services entering a 
conventional utility function"45.
Taken together, the reviewed literature is quite unequivocal in two ways. First, MNEs trade 
policy preferences can be explained by the degree and nature of their exposure to the 
international economy, and second, MNEs preferences may promote, suspend or distort the 
price mechanism. With regard to the third question -  how to account for firms’ influence over 
policy outcomes -  the literature is, however, split into two camps. One camp focuses on
42 Baldwin (1988), p. 131.
43 See for example Brook and Magee (1978), Bhagwati (1980), Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982), Findlay and 
Wellisz (1982) and Bhagwati (1991).
44 See Bhagwati (1982).
45 Ibid., pp. 999-1000.
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interests and incentives -  the rational choice literature -  and the other on institutions -  the 
corporatist and neo-corporatist literature46.
The rational choice literature is essentially an application of economic methods and 
concepts to politics; it explains policy outcomes in terms of individuals’ (or groups’) narrowly 
defined incentives and interests47. The approach employs the psychological assumptions of 
homo oeconomicus - the rational utility-maximising actor, who chooses optimally with given 
means and ends and given constraints under conditions of stable equilibrium in perfectly
A O
competitive markets . The basic economic model of politics that has been developed - 
commonly referred to as public choice theory - models the political process as an implicit 
market with demanders (voters or interest groups) of government policies exchanging votes 
for desired policies. Government (politicians and bureaucrats) will supply policies that 
maximise the governing party's prospects of re-election49. Decision-making is perfectly 
rational, and there are no transaction and information costs. Moreover, implicit in the public 
choice approach is the view that the intent of most government policies is not to advance the 
common good, but rather to construct minimum winning coalitions, often through re­
distributional policies50.
In fact, this theory of political economy is often used to explain protectionist policies: those 
who stand to gain from free trade, especially consumers, have little incentive to organise and 
become politically active since the benefits of free trade are widely spread and diffuse. 
However, the costs from free trade to import-competing industries are visible and 
concentrated. Therefore, the latter have an incentive to organise collective action and 
participate in the political process51. An interesting variation of this argument is found in 
Milner’s analysis. Employing the same logic, but giving it a new twist, she argues that high 
exposure to the international economy makes the otherwise diffuse gains from free trade 
highly visible to producers who thus have strong incentives to organise collective action and 
lobby for free trade.
46 Baldwin has identified various other models of the policy process which centre on other factors: long-run 
pursuit of self-interest by economic agents and political actors, autonomous behaviour by public officials who are 
not simply intermediaries acting on the wishes of the electorate or some part of it, and altruism on the part of 
public and private actors. See Baldwin (1985), Chapter 1. The difficulty with these models is that their 
assumptions are so vague as to be largely untestable and are likely to provide a positive rationalisation for almost 
any conceivable set of policies. See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 17.
47 In fact, a number of scholars have defined political economy as no more than the application of economic 
methods to politics. See for example Frey (1984).
48 Mueller (1982) has argued that the basic behavioural postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man 
is an egoistic, rational, choice-maximiser.
49 See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 15.
50 Ibid.
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While rational choice theories are certainly capable of offering parsimonious explanations 
of complex realities, there are, however, a number of problems with this approach. The first 
problem centres on the objectives of actors and rational choice’s definition of rationality. As 
Herbert Simon, among others, has convincingly argued, rationality is bounded - it depends on 
the information that actors have about the world around them52. In fact, cognitive psychology 
has shown convincingly that people frame information in ways that depart significantly from 
ideal typical rationality53. Within this context, Goldstein and Keohane have argued that ideas, 
defined as beliefs held by individuals, help to explain political outcomes, since such ideas 
help to clarify principles and conceptions of causal relationships54. It is, however, not only 
ideas that affect perceptions of self-interest. Henderson, for example, has argued that in 
addition to ideas, particular allowance has to be for the influence of events. Trying to explain 
the liberalisation measures in a large number of countries during the 1980s and 1990s, he has 
argued that
“in causing attitudes to change, it is the influence of events -  of new developments, and the 
constructions placed on them -  that has often been the main determining factor, 
particularly when those events were unforeseen and posed problems”55.
In other words, by excluding factors relating to actors' perceptions of a situation from the 
analysis, rational choice explanations severely limit their explanatory and predictive power. 
Second, by focusing only on interests and incentives, rational choice explanations have 
problems to explain policy outcomes where the antagonists had equally strong interests and 
incentives. In fact, Destler and Odell have argued that the weakness of the public choice 
model is its simplistic assumption that, on the one hand, producer interests were uniform and 
easily organised and on the other, consumers were politically disabled56. Moreover, while it is 
true that consumers may face information costs and other transaction costs that make effective 
group mobilisation difficult, as individuals they still possess votes, which constitute a resource 
that firms, whatever their other political resources, do not possess. In other words, the
51 See for example Downs (1957) and Olson (1965).
52 See Simon (1982).
53 See for example Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
54 See Goldstein and Keohane (1993).
55 Henderson (1998), p. 92.
56 See Destler and Odell (1987).
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determinants of the political rate of exchange between various political currencies (for 
example, votes and financial resources) are not well addressed in the public choice model57.
The corporatist and neo-corporatist literature, on the other hand, avoid some of these 
shortcomings. These approaches explain policy outcomes in terms of institutions that link the 
major domestic actors (i.e. industry associations, labour unions and other organised interest 
groups) and structure policy-making in certain ways, thereby awarding different incentives
C O
and degrees of power to domestic actors . In other words, institutions -  the formal and 
informal rules of the game59 -  are recognised as crucial intervening variables that create 
information, define the range of options that are contemplated by the actors and shape 
political influence in the economic policy-making process60.
However, this explanatory approach is also not problem-free. Most importantly, like public 
choice theories, it is overly narrow. Economic developments, changing political priorities, 
new interest groups and other external factors can all change the circumstances under which 
policy-making is taking place, and by focusing the analysis strictly on institutions, corporatist 
explanations of policy outcomes are unable to account for the impact of such developments. 
Second, and this is less a conceptual problem than an empirical shortcoming, the focus of 
most corporatist and neo-corporatist studies has not been on individual MNEs but on industry 
associations. This appears, however, not to be sufficient. Viewing an industry as some unified 
whole leads one to overlook differences between individual MNEs. After all, the MNEs 
within an industry are the real actors. They are the ones developing ties to the international 
economy, interacting with other domestic actors and voicing demands. As Sally has argued,
"the MNE is not only the key economic and commercial actor in structures of international 
production, but it is also implanted in the institutional arrangements of nation states, as 
well as sub-national and supra-national regions. Within these national and regional 
political economies it is at the vortex of myriad relationships with constellations of
57 See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 16.
58 See for example Katzenstein (1977), (1984), (1985) and (1989), Streeck (1988), Zysman (1983) and Wilks 
and Wright (1987). Pryor (1988, p. 317) has defined corporatism as "a type of organised or coordinated 
capitalism where power to make important economic policies is transferred from the parliament and government 
to semi-private organisations". More recently Woldendrop (1997, pp.49-50) has noted in similar vein that "the 
term neo-corporatism is used to denominate any form of cooperation between the government and the relevant 
socio-economic interest groups of employers’ associations and trade unions, aimed at forging a consensus over 
the formulation and implementation of socio-economic government policies...".
59 See North (1990).
60 Peter Hall, for example has argued that institutions are structural inasmuch as they set parameters for the day- 
to-day processes that go on within them, leaving individuals and groups with a certain range of decisional 
manoeuvre. See Hall (1986), Chapter 1.
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external actors - suppliers and clients, but also different tiers of government, financial 
institutions, trade unions, industry associations, research institutes and universities"61.
The Argument of the Study
The reviewed literature is, no doubt, helpful in a number of ways for constructing an 
explanatory framework to analyse the selected MNEs’ economic policy preferences and their 
political influence. First, Milner’s study identifies an important source of MNEs trade policy 
preferences: the degree and nature of MNEs’ exposure to the international economy. Second, 
for the purpose of analytical clarity, one can identify three different types of preferences in the 
literature: suspension, distortion and promotion of the price mechanism. And third, the 
rational choice and corporatist literature offer two different ways of explaining policy 
outcomes: one by emphasising utility maximisation and the other by drawing attention to the 
institutions that link MNEs to other domestic actors. Nevertheless, there appear to be 
important gaps in the literature that become apparent when one tries to pull the various threads 
together in order to explain the economic policy preferences and political influence of German 
and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and banks.
First, the scope of economic policy preferences that can be explained by the degree and 
nature of MNEs’ internationalisation process appears to be limited to "at-the-border" trade 
policy issues. If one, however, seeks to analyse whether MNEs policy preferences are price 
mechanism promoting, distorting or suspending, it is not sufficient to be merely concerned 
with trade policies. Clearly domestic economic policies also have an impact on the 
functioning of the price mechanism. For example, health care policies and biotechnology 
regulations in the pharmaceutical sector clearly influence supply and demand conditions. 
Similarly, capital market regulations in the banking sector significantly affect the functioning 
of financial markets. Moreover, as successive GAIT rounds have succeeded in reducing 
tariffs -  in the developed countries to almost negligible levels -  obstacles to freer trade have 
increasingly shifted to policy issues that are found "behind the border” in the domestic 
policies of states . As was mentioned earlier, labour and technical standards, competition 
policies, environmental and safety regulations, protection of intellectual property, investment
61 Sally (1994), p. 162.
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measures, procurement policies -  all policies and practices that were once considered to be 
purely domestic matters have begun to feature prominently on international trade agendas. In 
fact, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations reflected these changes in the nature of trade 
and trade barriers. The treaty to seal the Round enormously increased the scope of trade rules: 
the WTO not only took over the old GATT, which dealt with trade in goods, but also took on 
new agreements on services, investment, intellectual property, technical barriers to trade, 
sanitary measures and plant health. Since the end of the Uruguay Round, agreements have 
been reached on trade in telecommunications sevices , financial services and information 
technology. Consequently, even if one were just concerned with an analysis of MNEs’ trade 
policy preferences during the 1980s andl990s, it would be somewhat anachronistic and 
incomplete to confine the analysis merely to tariffs and quotas.
However, it will be shown that if one broadens the scope of the analysis to include 
domestic economic policies, one also has to broaden the explanatory framework, since MNEs’ 
extent and nature o f internationalisation do not always plausibly explain their policy 
preferences with regard to domestic policy issues. Instead, MNEs’ business focus and sectoral 
characteristics are in many cases important explanatory factors. In order to prove this 
hypothesis, Chapter 2 will analyse the extent and nature of the 12 MNEs’ internationalisation 
processes and examine their business focus. Chapter 3 will then analyse how these two factors 
have interacted with sectoral characteristics to shape MNEs’ economic policy preferences 
with regard to the selected policy issues (see figure 1.1).
This study, however, is not only about MNEs’ preferences but also about their political 
influence. It is, in a sense, a two-step procedure. First, it will determine how preferences are 
formed, and then, second, it will analyse how preferences translate into political influence. As 
has been pointed out earlier, the literature offers two principal ways of explaining policy 
outcomes: a rational choice and an institutional approach. It was argued that while both
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Figure 1.1: Explanatory Framework for MNEs’Economic Policy Preferences
approaches can yield valuable insights, both of them are not entirely problem-free. Particularly 
problematic from the perspective of this study is their neglect of the circumstances under 
which policy-making is taking place. By excluding external events from 
the analysis such as, for example, a depression, the overthrow of a government or factors 
relating to the business cycle, both approaches cannot explain how changing circumstances 
affect perceptions of self-interest and institutions. However, it appears plausible to assume 
that changing circumstances can have an important impact on policy outcomes. Goldstein, for 
example, has argued that contemporary variations in the treatment of industries in U.S trade 
policy are not fully explained by variations in their economic positions or political resources. 
Different laws apply to antidumping and escape-clause issues, and, according to her, we can 
understand these laws only by exploring the circumstances under which they were first 
enacted64. In similar vein - and as noted above - Henderson has argued that the liberalisation 
measures that have been enacted in a large number of countries during the last 20 years cannot 
primarily be explained by the activities of organised interests, but rather can be largely 
attributed to the combined impact of events and ideas on the prevailing climate of opinion. In 
his view, in many if not most of the reforming countries, the main single impulse to change 
has been reactive, rather than (or as well as) affirmative: reforms have resulted, not so much 
from an endorsement of liberal principles as such, but rather from perceptions of failure, 
malfunctioning or ineffectiveness within the system, perceptions which themselves arose from 
events and what were seen as the lessons to be drawn from them65.
In view of these findings, it seems clear that an explanatory framework that seeks to 
explain policy outcomes and the influence of MNEs over them, should include an analysis of
64 See Goldstein (1993).
65 See Henderson (1998), pp. 91ff.
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the circumstances under which policy-making took place. This does by means imply that 
changing circumstances rather than interests (as interpreted by human beings) move the world. 
Certainly the rationalist, or for that matter, the institutional approach are often valuable 
starting points for an analysis. However, the existence of empirical anomalies suggests that 
circumstances as well as interests and institutions have causal weight in explanations of policy 
outcomes. Hence this study will supplement public choice and institutional explanations of 
MNEs political influence with an analysis of the circumstances under which policy-making 
took place in order to unravel the various interacting causal relationships involved, and to 
identify the one that seems to bear most weight (see figure 1.2). Particular emphasis will be on 
the impact of changing circumstances on the preferences of the government, the extent of 
opposition from other organised interests and the degree to which MNEs‘ internationalisation 
process was a source o f political leverage.
Interests
MNEs’ Political InfluenceEconomic and Political 
Circumstances
Institutions
Figure 1.2: Explanatory Framework for MNEs’Political Influence
It might seem somewhat anachronistic in an age of globalisation to assign so explicitly 
explanatory power to the preferences of governments. Conventional wisdom often has it that 
markets have become all-powerful and states have been condemned to eternal retreat. 
Certainly, markets have been in steady assent during the last decades: in the half century 
following the end of World War n, political leaders around the world have been engaged in a 
nonstop process of negotiating for the reduction of tariffs and other protective barriers that 
surrounded their national economies. This has led to an increasing integration of national 
economies, a process that greatly accelerated during the 1980s and 1990s through the growing
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importance of intra-industry trade, inter- and intra-firm trade, the increasing integration of 
developing and newly industrialising countries in the global economy, global capital markets 
and technological changes (see next section). Moreover, since the 1980s governments in 
virtually all industrialised countries have been shifting their roles as economic actors in their 
national economies by reducing their activities as owners and managers of factories, banks 
and public utilities, and giving more rein to the private sector in the operation of productive 
facilities. In John Dunning's words, "governments have been shifting their activities from an 
intrusive operational role in their national economies to a role directed at the systemic aspects 
of those economies"66. While these shifts have certainly varied substantially in detail from one 
country to the next, the overriding shift has nevertheless been unmistakeable67.
However, there has also been a countervailing trend during the same period. While 
governments around the world seem to have accepted the desirability of assigning a greater 
role to market forces, they have also lamented the apparent loss of control over the economy 
and have in the process tried to devise other ways of salvaging some elements of their former 
control. A common consequence has been that the governmental sector of rich industrialised 
economies has grown persistently since the end of World War II (see table 1.5). In a recent 
survey of the state’s role in the economy, The Economist concluded that far from being dead, 
big government is flourishing mightily . In fact, a review of economic developments in 
Germany and Switzerland during the last decades will show strongly increased government 
activities. It will be pointed out that as a structurally changing world economy began to 
threaten domestic employment and wage levels, governments in both Germany and 
Switzerland became more keen to micromanage economic outcomes in order to engineer 
socially desirable market results69. These developments suggest that MNEs' political 
influence is likely to be conditioned by the degree to which their preferences are congruent 
with those of governments.
A second factor shaping the political influence of MNEs, which is likely to be conditioned 
by circumstances relating to a specific policy area, is the degree of opposition from other 
organised groups. The process of globalisation appears to have been particularly significant in 
this context. Vernon has argued that the basic adjustments demanded by globalisation cannot
66 Dunning (1997), p. 8.
67 See Vemon (1998), p.178.
68 See "The Future of the State: A Survey of the World Economy", The Economist, Sept. 20 1997.
69 Indeed, the survey in The Economist noted that in most Western countries, the most expensive government 
programmes were nowadays the middle class entitlement programmes, which were noted intended to provide a 
safety net for the poor but to deliver elaborate services to all (i.e. pensions, health care and plethora of transfers 
and subsidies). Ibid.
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take place without political struggle since too many interests in the nation states see the 
economic risks and costs of the adjustments involved as unfairly distributed and deeply 
threatening. In his view, MNEs are especially vulnerable in this debate since they are so 
closely associated with the forces of globalisation70. This observation fits in well with this 
analysis: Chapter 4 will point out that over the last decade interest groups proliferated in both 
Germany and Switzerland that viewed the activities of MNEs with great scepticism or even 
downright hostility. This development induced an element of uncertainty into traditionally 
close government-industry relationships in both countries and made policy outcomes less 
predictable from the viewpoint of the business community.
A final explanatory factor of MNEs* political influence is their internationalisation process. 
As has been pointed out earlier, MNEs have the option to shift business activities between 
various production locations -  something that might give them additional political leverage 
and might enhance their bargaining power vis-a-vis other actors. It has, for example, often 
been pointed out that the threat to move production abroad was likely to discourage workers 
from demanding wage rises71. However, while the threat to shift production abroad is 
certainly real in some cases, it seems nevertheless not plausible to assume that it is equally 
real across different sectors and policy areas. For example, moving production abroad can in 
some cases involve substantial sunk costs and thus discourage MNEs from further 
internationalising their production networks. Moreover, not all policy issues with which 
MNEs are confronted relate to production conditions. Many issues are likely to concern 
market conditions (e.g. health care regulations in the pharmaceutical sector) and here the 
“threat” to shift production abroad is hardly credible. After all, it would hardly make sense for 
MNEs to pull out of a market in protest against certain market regulations. As a result of these 
complexities, the extent to which internationalisation is a source of political influence for 
MNEs is likely to vary across different sectors and policy issues.
Country 1960 1980 1990 1996
Austria 35.7% 48.1% 48.6% 51.7%
Belgium 30.3 58.6 54.8 54.3
70 Ibid., p.219.
71 See for example Vernon (1998), p. 175.
25
Canada 28.6 38.8 46.0 44.7
France 34.6 46.1 49.8 54.5
Germany 32.4 47.9 45.1 49.0
Italy 30.1 41.9 53.2 52.9
Japan 17.5 32.0 31.7 36.2
Netherland 33.7 55.2 54.0 49.9
Norway 29.9 37.5 53.8 45.5
Spain 18.8 32.2 42.0 43.3
Sweden 31.0 60.1 59.1 64.7
Switzerland 17.2 32.8 33.5 37.6
Britain 32.2 43.0 39.9 41.9
Austria 35.7 48.1 48.6 51.7
United States 27.0 31.8 33.3 33.3
Australia 21.2 31.6 34.7 36.6
Ireland 28.0 48.9 41.2 37.6
New Zealand 26.9 38.1 41.3 47.1
Average 27.9 42.6 44.8 45.9
Table 1.5: Government Spending as Percent of Gross National Product.
Source: Adapted from The Economist, September 20,1997, p. 58; based on IMF 
data.
In short, it is argued here that the explanatory power of interest-based and institutions-based 
explanations can be significantly enhanced by supplementing both approaches with an 
analysis of the specific circumstances under which policy-making was taking place. The 
objective is not to disprove interest- or institutions-based explanations, but rather to go 
beyond them and to analyse how changing circumstances interact with institutions and 
interests to shape the political influence of MNEs.
In order to prepare the ground for such an analysis, Chapter 4 will map out the institutions 
of the German and Swiss economic policy-making process and provide an overview of the 
circumstances under which policy-making was taking place during last decade. Chapters 5 
(pharmaceutical MNEs) and 6 (banks) will then focus on a selection of policy issues and
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analyse the extent to which MNEs’ political influence can be explained by institutions, 
interests and the impact of circumstances.
Although this is a study about the political influence of MNEs in their home countries, the 
analysis would be somewhat incomplete without mentioning the European level of policy­
making. Chapters 5 and 6 will show that over the last decade an increasing extent of decision­
making competence has been shifted to European institutions and that Switzerland, despite 
not being a member of the EU, has also been affected by EU policies. Hence Chapter 7 will 
analyse the 12 MNEs’ political strategies at the EU level.
Before a justification for the empirical focus is advanced, a final caveat relating to the 
definition of political power needs to be addressed. While there is a large literature on the 
subject, there seems to be remarkably little consensus about semantics. As Susan Strange has 
pointed out,
“on the semantics, political theorists have argued endlessly about words -  about whether 
power is a large generic term, which encompasses everything from direct coercion by 
violent means to the influence exerted through the subtle arts of persuasion; or whether the 
word should be more narrowly defined so that power is distinguished from authority or 
influence and is only present when those on whom power is exerted have little or no option
79but to give in -  when, in the Mafioso's words, they are given an offer they can’t refuse” .
Although there are certainly circumstances when such discussions are necessary, this study is 
foremost an empirical analysis and hence does not intend to get involved in such theoretical 
debates. Power or political influence in this study is simply the ability of MNEs to affect 
policy outcomes so that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of other 
domestic actors.
Empirical Focus
Finally, a number of issues relating to the empirical focus of this study need to be clarified. 
More precisely, a case needs to be made for the choice of MNEs from Germany and
72 Strange (1996), p. 17.
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Switzerland, the period from 1985 to roughly 1995, pharmaceutical MNEs and banks, and the 
selected policy issues.
Why MNEs from Germany and Switzerland?
As has been stated earlier, one of this study’s goals is to analyse the extent to which 
institutions are a source of political influence for MNEs. Principally this can be done by 
comparing MNEs from countries that differ in their institutions or from those that show 
significant similarities in their institutions. By choosing Germany and Switzerland, this study 
has opted for the latter option. In both countries, MNEs are part of an institutional structure 
that decentralises decision-making and awards considerable influence to private actors and 
especially to the business community. Chapter 4 will show that economic policies in Germany 
and Switzerland are not simply imposed by the executive but rather reached through 
regularised, plurilateral bargaining between the key domestic actors -  employers’ associations, 
trade unions and the state. In both countries, this form of policy-making is made necessary by 
the limited capacities of federal, Lander and Cantonal authorities, which to varying degrees 
rely on the ability of industry and labour to organise themselves coherently and to cooperate 
with each other 73. In this sense the German and Swiss federal governments sit rather uneasily 
in the conventional strong state-weak state schema. They are both weak and strong at the same 
time. They are weak because they lack the necessary instruments to impose industrial policies, 
but they are also strong states because they represent a stable set of institutions, which link the 
private sector strongly to the public sector. In other words, in both countries institutions can 
be expected to be a source of political influence for MNEs.
However, while the similarities between the German and Swiss economic policy-making 
process are significant, there are also important differences. Chapter 4 will point out that 
decentralisation and consensus-orientation go a lot further in Switzerland and, as a result, 
policy networks are more tightly knit. Moreover, in contrast to Germany, economic policy­
making in Switzerland has in the past often been cartel-friendly. Finally, Germany, as a 
member of the EU, is in many policy areas bound by supranational law, whereas Switzerland 
is, at least nominally, free of such constraints.
73 See Sally (1993) and (1995) and Katzenstein (1984) and (1989).
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Why the period from 1985 to 1995?
The period from 1985 to roughly 1995 seems to be particularly relevant for an analysis of 
MNEs’ political influence. As has already been pointed out before, the period is characterised 
by an increasing integration of hitherto largely national economies - a phenomenon often 
discussed under the term globalisation - which is often seen as a source of additional political 
leverage for MNEs. By selecting this period for the analysis, this study will try to shed some 
more light on this hypothesis.
While the current, on-going process of economic integration is certainly not as new as it is 
often assumed74, one can, however, still identify certain novel elements that might indeed 
have resulted in increased political leverage for MNEs. Essentially the conclusion that MNEs 
have become politically more powerful in recent years is the result of four separate, yet 
related, developments. First, during the last four decades governments around the world have 
been engaged in a non-stop process of dismantling trade barriers within the framework of 
various GATT rounds, which greatly expanded international trade flows. Second, in the last 
two decades many developing countries, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
embarked on market reforms and began to integrate themselves in the international economy. 
East Asian emerging markets embarked on this course somewhat earlier and more gradually, 
accelerating their pace from the early 1980s. Not least due to the increasing outward 
orientation of these countries, the world has become smaller economically and the number and 
heterogeneity of countries involved in the international economy have increased 
substantially75. Third, the composition of international trade has changed significantly. While 
nineteenth century exchanges consisted largely of the sale of food and raw materials from 
developing countries in return for manufactured goods from developed countries, most of 
today's trade takes place between developed countries and consists of specialised intra­
industry exchanges of manufactured goods and services. In other words, whereas trade a 
century ago was mostly composed of non-competing products, much of today's trade is in the
74 Freytag and Sally have pointed out that high levels of economic integration could also be observed in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. International trade and capital flows were very intense, reaching their 
zenith in the years immediately preceding World War I. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the UK, 
France and Germany, net capital outflows, as a proportion of GDP, were twice as high in 1913 as by the end of 
the twentieth century. Relative to GDP, balances on the current account in the UK were higher than those of 
Japan or the US in the 1990s. For similarities and differences between the two periods see Freytag and Sally 
(2000), p. 2f. See also The Economist "One World?" Schools Brief, 18th October 1997, pp.l03f., Rodrik (1997), 
pp. 8f.; Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin (1999) and Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1998) and Henderson (1998).
75 Freytag and Sally (2000), p. 3.
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form of head-on competition in like or similar products76. Finally, technological advances in 
transport and communication technology and the globalisation of capital markets provided 
further momentum to these developments.
One of the most tangible effects of these processes was increased pressure on companies to 
find new ways to improve efficiency and stimulate innovation. Usually this involved “re­
engineering" various business activities with the purpose of creating cross-border networks 
(i.e. in finance, investment, R&D, production) in which each element is carried out in the 
best-suited location. Ultimately this resulted in extending competition beyond firm-level 
characteristics to include characteristics of whole production locations, even whole social 
systems77. In the final analysis, it was this development that led to the argument that the 
increasing integration of national economies has increased the political power of MNEs vis-a- 
vis states78. After all, a company whose facilities are located in a single country has no 
alternative but to comply with that country’s laws and regulations, whereas a MNE can move 
production to other countries. Governments, in this view, have little choice but to give in to 
the demands of MNEs or otherwise face rising unemployment and declining tax revenues. 
This study will try to shed some more light on this hypothesis.
In some cases the cut off date, 1995, was extended by one or two years since some of the 
policy issues selected for this analysis began to be debated in the early 1990s but the final bills 
were only ratified in 1996 or 1997. Since, however, these policy issues were of critical 
importance for the selected MNEs and the main policy bargaining took place in the first half 
of the 1990s, it appears legitimate in these cases to have stretched the cut off date a bit.
Why pharmaceutical MNEs and banks?
Analysing and comparing the economic policy preferences and political influence of German 
and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and banks is relevant for a number of reasons. First, the two 
sectors occupy a central place in their national economies. The pharmaceutical sector in both 
countries contributes substantially to exports. In 1994, the German pharmaceutical industry 
was the world’s leading exporter followed by Switzerland (see figure 1.3). In Switzerland 
more than 90 per cent of drugs were exported in 1994, while for Germany the figure was 30
76 Ibid.
77 Recent studies analysing differences in the domestic institutions of market economies include Albert (1993), 
Garten (1992) and Soskice (1993) .
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per cent. Moreover, in both countries the pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in 
the upgrading of the national technology infrastructure and in providing high quality- 
employment. Due to their research-intensive nature, the pharmaceutical industry’s spending 
on R&D is significantly larger than in other sectors. In fact, the next chapter will point out that 
it is not unusual for pharmaceutical MNEs to spend between 15 and 20 per cent of sales on 
R&D.
Similarly, the financial services sector is also of great importance in the two countries and 
particularly in Switzerland. In an international comparison, the contribution of the banking 
sector to the Swiss GDP is large. Between 1988 and 1993 it averaged 8.6 per cent, compared 
with a corresponding figure of between 3 and 4 per cent in Germany. In 1995 the proportion 
of the total workforce employed in the Swiss banking sector was 3.8 per cent, roughly a third 
higher than in Germany79. Like the pharmaceutical industry, the financial services sector 
contributes importantly to exports in both countries (see table 1.6).
Second, MNEs from the two sectors differ considerably in their exposure to foreign 
markets. While the pharmaceutical industry in both has historically been highly 
internationalised, banks were much less so - at least until the early 1990s. A comparison of the 
economic policy preferences of MNEs that differ in the degree of their internationalisation
78 See for example Strange (1996) and Horseman and Marshall (1994).
79 See Swiss Bankers'Association (1996a), p. 7f.
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Figure 1.3: Pharmaceutical Exports of Selected Countries (DM bn), 1995.
Source: VCI Foreign Trade Statistics, adapted from VFA Annual Report (1996), p. 32.
Country 1985 1990 1995
France - - 8.1
Germany 0.3 4.5 11.1
Japan 0.0 0.1 0.6
Switzerland 1.8 4.2 6.9
United Kingdom 7.3 6.1 9.1
United States 3.0 5.0 7.5
Table 1.6: Financial Services’Exports of selected Countries (US$ bn).
Source: Adapted from Kono (1997), p. 13, based on IMF data.
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should shed more light on the extent to which exposure to international markets is relevant for 
an explanation of MNEs’ economic policy preferences.
Finally, the pharmaceutical and the financial services sector are unique in the sense that, 
due to sectoral characteristics, markets in both sectors are considerably regulated -  something 
that might encourage MNEs to pursue political strategies to tilt the playing field in their 
favour. In fact, a number of authors have pointed out that regulation can easily become a 
means for incumbent firms to limit competition and raise their income at the expense of 
politically weak consumers and potential entrants80. Chapter 3 will analyse these sector- 
specific regulations and examine whether the 12 MNEs used them as an opportunity for rent- 
seeking policies.
Which Policy Issues?
Undoubtedly the functioning of competition in the pharmaceutical and financial services 
industry is affected by numerous factors. However, in both sectors there was a clear consensus 
among interviewed executives from the 12 MNEs and their trade associations regarding the 
policy issues that were of greatest significance. In the pharmaceutical sector these were 
intellectual property rights issues, health care policies, regulations pertaining to the production 
and approval of drugs derived from the application of biotechnology and, in the German case, 
parallel imports from other EU member countries. In the financial services sector, issues 
centred around liberalisation of market access conditions and regulatory issues pertaining to 
the efficient functioning of the German and Swiss capital markets. Moreover, in Germany the 
issue of state-sanctioned privileges for public sector banks has been important. The following 
chapters will now analyse the 12 MNEs' preferences and political influence with regard to 
these issues.
The Plan of the Study
80 See for example Stigler (1971). In fact, a number of authors have pointed out that regulation and prudential 
supervision in the financial services sector can be a fertile ground for protectionism. See Walter (1985), p. 1 and 
(1988), pp. 2-4 and Huang (1992), p.3.
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Having outlined the main argument of the study and justified the empirical focus, a brief word 
is in order about how this analysis will now proceed. Chapters 2 and 3 will be concerned with 
the formation of the 12 MNEs’ economic policy preferences. As a first step, Chapter 2 will 
analyse their business focus and the extent and nature of their internationalisation processes. 
Chapter 3 will then examine how these factors have interacted with sectoral characteristics to 
shape the preferences of the 12 MNEs with regard to the selected policy issues. The stage is 
then set for the analysis to move from the formation of preferences to actual political 
influence. Chapter 4 will prepare the ground for such an analysis by mapping out the 
institutions of the German and Swiss policy-making process, and by providing an overview of 
the economic and political circumstances under which policy-making was taking place during 
the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Chapters 5 (pharmaceutical 
MNEs) and 6 (banks) will then focus on the selected policy issues and analyse the causal 
relationships between interests, institutions and circumstances in shaping the selected MNEs' 
political influence over actual policy outcomes. Chapter 7 will analyse the 12 MNEs' political 
influence at the EU level of policy-making and Chapter 8 will summarise the findings of the 
study and attempt to draw some wider lessons.
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2Business Focus and Internationalisation Processes 
of the 12 MNEs
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for an analysis of the 12 MNEs’ 
economic policy preferences. To this end, it will examine the business focus and the 
internationalisation processes of the selected pharmaceutical MNEs and banks. Chapter 1 has 
pointed out that the literature was unanimous in its finding that MNEs’ trade policy 
preferences were shaped by the extent and nature of their internationalisation process. 
However, it was argued that if one sought to categorise MNEs’ policy preferences as free 
market, rent-seeking or somewhere in between, it was not sufficient to be merely concerned 
with trade policies. Domestic economic policies clearly also affected the functioning of price 
competition and should therefore be incorporated into the analysis. Chapter 1 argued that 
such a broadening of the analysis required, however, also a broadening of the explanatory 
framework, since the extent and nature of MNEs’ internationalisation processes were unlikely 
to explain their preferences with regard to domestic policy issues. It was suggested that 
MNEs’ business focus and sectoral characteristics were likely to be important explanatory 
factors. This chapter will now take the first step towards testing this hypothesis by analysing 
the business focus and the internationalisation processes of the 12 MNEs. Chapter 3 will then 
focus on a number of specific policy issues and examine how these two factors have 
interacted with sectoral characteristics to shape the preferences of the six pharmaceutical 
MNEs and the six banks.
The Six German and Swiss Pharmaceutical MNEs
The three German MNEs Hoechst, Bayer and BASF are all, or at least used to be in the case 
of Hoechst, considerably diversified MNEs that are represented across the spectrum of
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chemical activities - from bulk to intermediate to speciality chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Moreover, each one has a proven record of using capital intensity and science-based 
innovation to diffuse specialisation and value-added to the whole range of its portfolios1. 
Although the three are roughly similar in size (see table 2.1), the scale of their pharmaceutical 
business varies considerably. In 1994, only Hoechst’s pharmaceutical division Hoechst 
Marion Roussel (HMR) was with annual sales of $5.2bn among the world’s ten largest 
pharmaceutical MNEs; in the same year Bayer occupied the 13th place and BASF the 34th 
(with annual sales of $3.7bn and $2bn respectively)2.
Group Sales Employees R&D Spending
Hoechst 52.2 (42.7) 161.818 (180.561) 2.9 (2.1)
Bayer 43 (45.9) 146.700 (176.080) 2.6 (2.2)
BASF 46.3 (47.7) 106.565 (130.173) 2.1 (1.9)
Table 2.1: Sales, Employment and R&D Figures for the three German Pharmaceutical MNEs in 1995 (DM 
bn). 1985 Figures in Brackets. Source'. Annual Reports.
The three Swiss MNEs Roche, Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy are considerably smaller than the 
German MNEs (see table 2.2) and are also more focused on the high value-added 
differentiated product areas of chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In fact, despite being smaller 
than their German rivals in terms of group sales and employees, their pharmaceutical 
divisions are all among the world’s leading pharmaceutical MNEs. In 1994, Roche was the 
world’s 8th largest pharmaceutical MNE with annual sales of $4.6bn followed by Ciba-Geigy 
($4.3bn) and Sandoz ($4bn) which occupied places 9 and 103. After Ciba's and Sandoz's 
merger in 1995, the new entity - Novartis - was the world's third largest pharmaceutical 
MNEs. However, given the rapid pace of consolidation in the sector, these rankings changed 
frequently during the last decade.
1 See Sally (1995), p. 30f.
2 Quoted in “Pharmaindustrie auf Einkaufstour”, Borsenzeitung, Jan. 24 1995.
3 Ibid.
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Group Sales Employees R&D Spending
Roche 14.7 (8.9) 50.497 (45.477) 2.3 (1.2)
Sandoz 15.2 (8.5) 49.882 (40.166) 1.5 (0.7)
Ciba-Geigy 20.7 (18.2) 84.077 (81.012) 2.0 (1.8)
Table 2.2: Sales, Employment and R&D Figures for the three Swiss Pharmaceutical MNEs in 1995 (Sff. bn). 
1985 Figures in Brackets. Source: Annual Reports
The Six Pharmaceutical MNEs’ Business Focus
At a general level, all six MNEs essentially followed a similar strategy during the last decade: 
no matter their size or degree of diversification, all of them expanded their pharmaceuticals 
business, focused on the development of innovative drugs and upgraded their R&D capacities 
by embracing biotechnology (see next section) 4. In fact, all of them spent more than 15 per 
cent of their annual pharmaceutical sales on R&D during the 1990s; Roche, the extreme case, 
spent 23 per cent on R&D in 19945. Nevertheless there were, however, important differences 
in the scale and scope with which the six MNEs pursued this strategy.
These differences were particularly visible among the three German MNEs. On one end of 
the spectrum was Hoechst, which most visibly and strongly subscribed to the concept of the 
life sciences -  the hypothesis that advances in biotechnology resulted in similarities at the 
research level between human, animal and plant health6. Starting in the early 90s, under the 
new CEO Dormann, Hoechst radically re-structured its business operations, began selling 
large parts of its traditional industrial chemicals business and started to expand its
4 Sharp (1996) has pointed out that Europe’s major pharmaceutical companies have been taking vigorous steps 
to exploit the potential of biotechnology. See also “1896-1996: Die ersten 100 Jahre”, Roche Magazin Spezial, 
Nr. 53 (January), 1996, pp. 52-53; “Pharma mehr denn je”, Schweizersiche Handels Zeitung, May 7 1992; “Des 
Wundermanagers Strategic”, Busier Zeitung, May 11 1994; “Die Biologen haben das Wort”, Scheizerische 
Handels Zeitung, April 23 1992; “Weg vom Nieschengeschaeft”, Interview with Ciba-Ceigy’s chairman Alex 
Krauer in Schweizerische Handels Zeitung, Dec. 14 1989; “Immer mehr Spezialmeniis statt Einheitskost in der 
Grosschemie”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec.21 1996 and “Die Branche blickt wie gebannt auf den 
Pharmamarkt”, Handelsblatt, May 15 1996.
5 Annual Reports. See also “1896-1996: Die ersten 100 Jahre”, Roche Magazin Spezial Nr.53 (January) 1996, 
pp. 56ff.
Combinatorial chemistry, for example, allows companies to test hundreds of thousands of new compounds 
against known targets -  in bacteria, animals, plants or human tissue; Genomics explores the role of genes in 
causing illness in living organisms; Bio-informatics allows scientists to cross-reference biological data.
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pharmaceuticals division. According to Dormann, Hoechst will soon no longer be known as a 
diversified chemicals group, but rather as a tightly focused life sciences company7.
On the other end of the spectrum was BASF, which has traditionally been heavily 
involved in bulk chemicals, and is integrated up-stream into raw materials and energy. In 
contrast to Hoechst, BASF is still focused on chemicals and has stuck to its Verbund strategy: 
integrated chemical sites where the by-products from each process are saved and fed back 
into the plant to create a variety of other products8. However, although BASF did not 
significantly change its group strategy, it nevertheless expanded and up-graded its 
pharmaceutical operations (see next section).
Bayer’s strategy has been somewhere in between: unlike Hoechst and BASF, it has large 
activities in both chemicals and pharmaceuticals and has repeatedly stated its intention to 
remain a diversified chemical MNE. Chairman Schneider believes that there are important 
synergies between the two areas and has been sceptical about the fashion for de-mergers9. 
Nevertheless, Bayer steadily expanded the life sciences part of its business portfolio during 
the last decade. While in 1989 pharmaceuticals accounted for 20 per cent of annual sales, 
their share had climbed to 26 per cent in 199510.
In contrast to the German MNEs, the differences were less pronounced among the three 
Swiss MNEs: all of them strongly expanded their pharmaceuticals business, albeit in slightly 
different in ways. Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz followed a similar strategy to that of Hoechst. Both 
spun off their chemical operations and merged in 1995 to form Novartis. With Ciba strong in 
human health and Sandoz in nutrition and agriculture, Novartis is often seen as the archetypal 
life science company. As CEO Vasella put it,
“the common denominator of our business is biology. The research and technology is 
applied to discover, develop and sell products that have an effect on biological systems, be 
they human beings, plants or animals”11.
7 Dormann (1996). See also “Going Public via Clariant” borsenzeitung, Dec. 11 1996; “So schon ist Marion”, 
Borsenzeitung, Nov. 8 1996; “Der grosse W u r fFrankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 18 1996 and “Im 
Pharmageschaeft bleiben grosse Aufgaben”, Handelsblatt, Nov. 13 1996.
8 Interview.
9 See “Standortfrage verscharft”, Interview with Manfred Schneider in Borsenzeitung, April 27 1995. See also 
“Restrukturierung einmal anders”, Handelszeitung, Dec. 12 1996 and “Fehlt der Bayer Fuhrung der Wagemut”, 
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, March 19 1997.
10 See Annual Report (1996).
11 Quoted in “The facts of life”, Financial Times, Dec. 9 1998.
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While biotechnology has certainly also played a central role in Roche’s strategy during the 
last decade - in the early 1990s Roche was the first of the big pharmaceutical companies to 
take a billion dollar stake in the then still small biotechnology industry (see next section) -  
the emphasis has nevertheless been somewhat different. Rather than focusing primarily on 
synergies at the research level, Roche began during the 1990s to increasingly focus on 
diagnostics - a development that culminated in 1997 with the acquisition of Boehringer 
Mannheim, the world’s largest diagnostics firm. The former head of R&D, Prof. Drews, 
noted that this strategy was based on advances in molecular biology. According to him, 
increasing knowledge of the human genetic code will make it increasingly possible to 
recognise and quantify illnesses in the human body before they become visible and to 
develop preventive drugs12.
With these strategies the six MNEs essentially responded to two challenges that the 
pharmaceutical industry was facing during the last decade. First, pharmaceutical MNEs came 
during the last decade under increasing financial pressure. As a result of strongly increasing 
health care costs in industrialised countries, governments virtually everywhere started to put 
pressure on drug prices13. While the business with innovative drugs remained lucrative, 
increasingly cost-conscious national health services and managed care organisations became 
increasingly unwilling to pay for "me-too" drugs - new pills that offer only slight 
improvements -  and the margins for out of patent generic drugs became also narrower14. As a 
result, MNEs came under intense pressure to develop more innovative drugs15. However, it 
should be noted in this context that financial pressure came also from somewhere else; in 
fact, just at a time when it became ever more important to bring innovative products to the 
market, research and development costs strongly increased. While in 1976 it cost on average 
$116m to develop a drug, this figure had by 1987 risen to $287m, and by 1996 to $500m16.
12 See Drews (1998).
13 While in the 1960s most Western European countries spent roughly 4 per cent of GDP on health care, this 
share had increased by the 1990s to between 8 and 11 per cent. In the US it is 14.2 per cent. See Sommer 
(1997), p. 9.
14 See “Nicht mehr die Apotheke der Welt”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 5 1996; "The Alchemists", 
The Economist, Feb. 21 1998 and "Globale Fusionitis in der Pharmaindustrie", Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Oct.
25/26 1997.
15 Anderson Consulting estimated that to maintain current annual growth rates of on average ten per cent, 
pharmaceutical MNEs will have to increase their productivity tenfold, which will require them to launch five 
new compounds a year, each with an annual sales potential of $350m. However, in the first half of the 1990s, 
the world’s top ten drug companies launched an average of only 0.45 truly new drugs a year - half of them with 
sales of less than $100m annually. See "The Alchemists", The Economist, Feb. 21 1998.
16 See Drews (1998), p. 186. Moreover, it should be pointed that the R&D process in the pharmaceuticals 
industry is highly uncertain. By one estimate, for every approved drug that comes out of a “pipeline” -  the range 
of compounds firms have in various stages of development in their laboratories -  about 10,000 molecules have 
gone in and lost somewhere on the way. See “The Alchemists", The Economist, February 21 1998.
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As a result, pharmaceutical MNEs were forced to look for ways to cut costs and enlarge their 
R&D budgets. Obviously mergers were frequently perceived to be the way forward in this 
"new strategic environment”17.
The second challenge for pharmaceutical MNEs came from technological advances in 
biotechnology, which promised vastly increased opportunities for the discovery and 
development of new drugs18. Drews has argued that these advances represented a quantum 
leap in the way drugs were discovered and were holding out the promise of a whole new class 
of drugs19. As has already been argued above, and will be shown in more detail below, all six
0C\MNEs strongly embraced biotechnology during the last decade . However, the impact of 
biotechnology was not only restricted to the possibility of increased innovation. By 
concentrating on molecular biology (proteins and DNA) rather than traditional chemistry, 
advances in biotechnology paved the way for a whole new industry of small and medium 
sized companies which specialised in moving lots of molecules along short segments of the 
pipeline for other companies. This, in turn, provided opportunities for the large 
pharmaceutical companies to increasingly outsource business activities . In fact, as will be 
shown below, all of the selected MNEs became increasingly keen during the last decade to 
acquire or forge alliances with small and medium-sized biotechnology companies. The 
challenge, so it seemed, had become one of being big and small at the same time.
Having examined the six pharmaceutical MNEs' business focus and located them in their 
sectoral context, the study can now move on to analyse their internationalisation processes.
17 Mergers and acquisitions amounted to more than $100bn in the first half of the 1990s. Prominent examples 
included the acquisition of American Cyanamid by American Home Products, the mergers of Glaxo and 
Wellcome, Ciba Geigy and Sandoz, the acquisition of Marion Merrerl Dow by Hoechst and the acquisition of 
Boehringer Mannheim by Roche. See for example "Globale Fusionitis in der Pharmaindustrie", Neue Ziircher 
Zeitung, Oct. 25/26 1997.
18 Biotechnology encompasses a multitude of research and production methods comprising all techniques which 
use living organisms or parts of living organisms for the production of agricultural or pharmaceutical products 
or the development of micro-organisms for a variety of purposes. In this sense it is not a new technology, but 
rather encompasses techniques, which have been used for centuries in the production of bread, wine, beer or 
cheese or in the breeding of animals or plants. Contemporary discussion focuses typically on one aspect of 
biotechnology: gene technology, which refers to processes intended to isolate, analyse, describe and recombine 
DNA See Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 58.
19 Drews (1998), p. 113. Traditionally illnesses were analysed as distortions of the chemical balances in the 
human body. Molecular biology, however, is based on information analysing life as a programme embodied or 
codified in genes. As a result, illnesses can be interpreted as either information deficits or information surpluses 
thereby offering a new, universally applicable entry to medicine - a sort of a master key. See Drews (1998), p. 
111.
20 See for example “Auf die richtigen Gene kommt es an”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Dec.30/31 1995 and “Die 
Branche blickt wie gebannt auf den Pharmamarkt”, Handelsblatt, May 15 1996.
21 Big drug companies have, for example, increasingly started to outsource clinical trials - the last and most 
expensive part of the development process -  as specialised companies came up with innovative ways of 
extracting the maximum of information from the minimum number of trials. See “The Alchemists”, The 
Economist, Feb. 211998.
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The Three German Pharmaceutical MNEs: Hoechst, Bayer and BASF
All three German MNEs share a history of extensive internationalisation. Sally has pointed 
out that all three had a long record of multinational investment in the last century, which was 
only punctured by forced divestment during both World Wars. During the interwar period 
Hoechst, Bayer and BASF formed the IG Farben cartel, which was broken up into its original 
constituents after 194522. During the following decades, the three MNEs build up substantial 
international business operations, first in their main regional market, the European 
Community, but also in the US and more recently in Asia (see below). However, it should be 
noted that while the three MNEs’ sales have long been highly internationalised (see table 2.3), 
their production networks used to be a lot less so. In fact, until the late 1980s all three MNEs 
were following a similar strategy of concentrating high value added production and R&D 
activities in Germany23.
Hoechst Bayer BASF
Germany - (25.3) 18.6 (25.7) 27.2 (32.7)
EU 51.8a (34.0) 32.6 (33.1) 37.1 (32.4)
US 29.4 (21.2) 27.9 . (24.3) 19.4 (19.3)
Asia 9.2 (8.9) 12.6 (8.2) 10.0 (7.4)
South America 7.4 (7.6) 7.0 (6.1) 4.9 (5.6)
Table 2.3: International Sale Figures for Hoechst, Bayer and BASF in 1995 (as % of total sales). 1985 Figures in 
Brackets. Source: Annual Reports, own calculations, 
includes Germany
Turning now to the three MNEs’ pharmaceutical divisions, Hoechst’s pharmaceuticals 
business is not only the largest of the three German MNEs, but also the most 
internationalised. While all of the selected Swiss and German MNEs sell a substantial amount 
of their products in the triad economies, Hoechst’s pharmaceutical division HMR is the only
22 See Sally (1995), p. 30.
23 Interviews.
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one which is almost equally strongly represented in all triad economies. In the US it has a 
market share of almost 4 per cent, only slightly higher than in Europe and the Pacific region 
where it has 3 per cent. HMR’s most important market is the US, which in 1995 generated 
sales of almost DM 2bn followed by France (1.5bn), Japan (1.4bn) and Germany (1.3bn)24.
Hoechst mainly internationalised and expanded its pharmaceuticals business through two 
major acquisitions. In 1974 it bought the French pharmaceutical MNE Roussel Uclaf and in 
1995 the American pharmaceutical MNE Marion Merrel Dow. The latter acquisition was 
particularly significant for the size and internationalisation of Hoechst, since it raised its 
market share in the US from one to four per cent25. In 1998, Hoechst decided to merge HMR 
with the pharmaceuticals division of the French MNE Rhone-Poulenc. Despite being a 
strongly research-oriented pharmaceutical MNE that focuses on the development of 
prescription drugs, HMR has recently also diversified into generic products. In 1993, it 
acquired a majority stake in the American generic products producer Copley Inc. and by 1996 
HMR was the fourth largest producer of generic products worldwide26.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Hoechst also started to internationalise high-value 
added business activities which used to be carried out in Germany. While by 1990 the 
production of high-value added drug ingredients used to be carried out pre-dominantly at 
headquarters in Germany, the German share of the production network had by 1996 dropped 
to 40 per cent27. During this period, R&D activities were also increasingly decentralised away 
from headquarters. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hoechst set up R&D facilities in 
France, Japan and the US and signed a number of co-operation arrangements with small 
American biotechnology companies and universities (i.e. with Massachusetts General 
Hospital, a teaching hospital belonging to Harvard University). In 1995, less than a third of 
the total R&D budget was allocated to the German research locations and in 1996, HMR 
announced that the worldwide centre of drug development would be moved to Sommerville 
in the US where HMR would also concentrate its genetic research28. Commenting on the 
increasing internationalisation during the 1990s, Dormann likes to refer to HMR as no longer 
a German company with a lot of subsidiaries abroad, but rather as a company "on the way of 
becoming a globally operating pharmaceutical multinational headquartered in Germany”29.
24 See “Die Fakten iiber HMR”, Hoechst (1996).
25 See Dormann (1996).
26 See “Der grosse Wurf”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 18 1996.
27 See Dormann (1996).
28 See “Die Fakten iiber HMR”, Hoechst (1996).
29 See Dormann (1996) and “The lazy man in Europe”, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18 1997.
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Similar to Hoechst, Bayer was already by the mid-1980s highly internationalised and 
conducted about 80 per cent of its business abroad . Unlike Hoechst, however, Bayer started 
early to establish a presence in the US market. In 1973 it acquired Cutter Inc. and in 1978 
Miles laboratories, which became its main US subsidiary. By 1995, Miles had 50 production 
locations -  in the US and abroad - and 80 per cent of the products sold by Miles were 
produced in the US; sales in the US market in the same year accounted for 24 per cent of 
overall sales31. During the early 1990s, Bayer started to strengthen its position in Asia. 
Particular focus was on Japan, where by 1995 Bayer’s sister company Bayer Yakuhin was 
among the country’s ten largest pharmaceutical companies32.
The 1990s saw also a steadily increasing internationalisation of Bayer’s R&D activities. 
CEO Schneider argued that the globalisation of R&D activities had become a primary goal of 
Bayer since it was essential to have access to the innovation potential of the leading scientific
'X'Xcountries” . Apart from a handful of European locations, Bayer has a research facility in the 
US (established in 1988) and in 1995 it opened one in Japan. Research involving 
biotechnology is largely carried out through Miles in the US. During the early 1990s, Bayer 
also acquired two small biotechnology companies in the US (Diamond Inc. and Scientific 
Inc.) and the diagnostics business of Chiron34. However, despite this increasing 
internationalisation, R&D activities are still relatively concentrated in Germany. In 1995, 60 
per cent of the R&D budget was allocated to the German facilities35. However, Schneider has 
repeatedly argued that the majority of new investments were shifting towards foreign 
markets36.
BASF started to diversify into pharmaceuticals in 1968 with the acquisition of Nordmark 
Werke in Germany. This step was followed by two further acquisitions: in 1971, BASF 
acquired 50 per cent of Laboratoire Biosedra in France and, in 1975, the German Knoll AG. 
In 1983 the three companies were merged under the name of Knoll AG, which henceforth 
carried out all of BASFs pharmaceuticals business. By 1992, Knoll had 30 foreign 
subsidiaries, three quarters of its sales came from abroad and more than half of its workforce 
worked outside of Germany37. However, until the mid-1990s, the pharmaceuticals business
30 “Namen, Zahlen, Fakten”, Bayer (1996).
31 See “Bayer hisst die Flagge in den USA”, Borsenzeitung, Jan. 13 1996.
32 See “Bayer ordnet Pharmageschaeft neu”, Borsenzeitung April 1 1995.
33 See “Standortfrage verschaerft”, Inteview with Manfred Schneider in Borsenzeitung, April 27 1995.
34 See “Bayer Forschung wird intemationaler", Bor sen Zeitung, May 23 1995 and “Bayer entwachst dem 
Standort Deutschland”, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, March 22 1995.
35 See “Namen, Zahlen, Fakten”, Bayer (1996).
36 See “Bayer ordnet Pharmageschaeft neu”, Borsenzeitung, April 1 1995.
37 See Knoll AG Information Brochure, July 1994.
43
played a relatively low profile role in BASF’s operations. In 1994, however, BASF decided to 
upgrade and further internationalise Knoll’s operations. In the same year Knoll diversified 
into generic drugs by acquiring the Austrian drugs company Sagitta Arzneimittel, followed 
by a joint venture with the American drugs company Ivax for the marketing of generic 
products in Europe. In 1995, BASF made its so far biggest step towards expanding its 
pharmaceuticals business with the acquisition of the British pharmaceuticals MNE Boots. 
After the acquisition, Germany's share of sales dropped to less than 20 per cent and the US 
share rose to almost 35 per cent. Europe, without Germany, accounted for 30 per cent. The 
acquisition also raised BASPs market share in the US, Great Britain and France to over 1 per 
cent. In Germany, Italy and Spain, BASF has 2 per cent38. In 1996 BASF took a first step 
towards increasing its presence in Asia by acquiring a majority stake in the Japanese 
pharmaceuticals company Hokuriko Seiyaku.
Similar to its two German rivals, BASF has also started, albeit slowly, to internationalise 
its research activities. In 1988, BASF set up a research facility in Worcester, MA. and over 
the following years it signed a number of co-operation arrangements with small American 
biotechnology companies. More recently, BASF has set up research facilities in Japan, 
France and Great Britain and has voiced intentions to develop an international division of 
labour for its R&D activities39. Despite this recent, expansion, however, BASF's 
pharmaceuticals' business remains considerably smaller than that of Bayer and Hoechst.
The Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs: Roche, Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy
Similar to the German MNEs, but even more so, the three Swiss MNEs have long been 
highly internationalised. Due to the diminutive size of their Swiss home market, they had 
little choice but to expand internationally. Already by the mid-1980s, the starting point of this 
analysis, home market sales at all three MNEs accounted for only a tiny fraction of annual 
sales: 2 per cent at Ciba-Geigy, 3.3 per cent at Roche and 3.7 per cent at Sandoz (table 2.4 
summarises international sales figures for 1985 and 1995). However, again similar to the 
German MNEs, their production networks used to be a lot less internationalised. In fact, all 
three MNEs used to concentrate high value-added research and production activities in
38 “Das Mauerbliimchen soil zur guten Fee werden”, Interview with Knoll’s CEO Thorsten Spickschen in 
Chemische Industrie 5/1995.
39 Knoll AG Information Brochure, July 1994.
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Switzerland and export semi-finished products to foreign subsidiaries for the final stages of 
(lower value-added) production, packaging and marketing40.
Roche Sandoz Ciba-Geigy
Switzerland 2.0 (2.9) 2.7 (4.2) - (2.0)
EU 35.2 (34.0) 43.4 (45.6) 41.4a (39)
US 39.7 (40.4) 41.4b (40.6)b 40.6b (35)
Asia 12.6 (10.4) 10.5 (7.0) 15.8 (11)
South America 8.9 (9.7) - - - (10)
Table 2.4: International Sales Figures for Roche, Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy in 1995 (in % of total sales).
1985 Figures in Brackets. Source’. Annual Reports, own calculations.
aincludes Switzerland 
bincludes South America
Turning now to the three MNEs’ pharmaceuticals’ business, Roche was clearly the most 
acquisitive of the three during the last decade. In 1990, it acquired a majority stake in the US 
firm Genentech, one of the world’s largest biotechnology firms, and in 1994, it acquired the 
American pharmaceutical MNE Syntex. With production locations in 30 countries, Syntex 
not only significantly expanded Roche’s international production network, but its annual 
sales of $2.1bn also significantly increased Roche’s market share in the US; in fact, the 
acquisition turned Roche into the 6th largest pharmaceutical MNEs in the US (before the 
acquisition it was the 15th largest)41. In the early 1990s, Roche also further internationalised 
its OTC business through acquiring Nicholas Corporation and the OTC division of the British 
pharmaceuticals group Fisons42. In 1997, Roche acquired Boehringer Mannheim -  the 
worlds’ largest diagnostics firms -  in what was to date Roche’s largest acquisition. By 1995
40 See Bauer (1981), p. 236, quoted in Sally (1993), p. 564.
41 See “Roche jetzt weltweit Nummer vier”, Basler Zeitung, May 10 1995.
42 See “Roche jetzt weltweit Nummer vier”, Basler Zeitung, May 10 1995; “Regenschutz unter Schweizer 
Dach” Scheizerische Handelszeitung, May 5 1994 and “Die Pharmabranche in einer Fusionstherapie” Neue 
Ziircher Zeitung, May 7/8 1994.
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domestic sales had shrunk to 2 per cent of overall sales; Europe and North America both 
contributed 37 per cent, while Asia accounted for 14 per cent43.
Starting in the late 1980s, Roche also began to increasingly internationalise its research 
activities. During the early 1990s, it opened research facilities in Britain, France and the US 
and signed a number of co-operation arrangements with small American biotechnology 
companies. In 1991, Roche started to concentrate its biotechnology research at its research 
facility in Nutley, New Jersey. By 1994, the US facilities consumed half of Roche’s R&D 
budget with Britain and Japan accounting for 10 per cent44. Moreover, Roche also 
significantly decentralised its R&D activities by organising them into semi-autonomous units, 
while trying to maintain cross-fertilisation through frequent travel and meetings between 
researchers45. Genentech, for example, operates absolutely independently despite Roche's 
majority stake, and Roche Bioscience in Palo Alto works as a de facto independent 
company46. Roche also appeared to be the fastest of the six MNEs to discover outsourcing . 
Protodigm, for example, its UK-based sister company, is a ten-employee “virtual company” 
which acquires new molecules from, for example, university laboratories and then contracts 
several other companies to conduct the various clinical tests, production processes, 
registration procedures and marketing and sales activities. Since Protodigm can select for 
each phase the most qualified partner, Roche hopes that this will reduce costs and shorten 
development periods47. Alongside this increasing internationalisation during the early 1990s, 
Roche’s investments in its home market diminished significantly. While in 1986 Switzerland 
accounted for 40 per cent of all new investments, this percentage had by 1992 dropped to 27
48percent .
Similar to Roche, Sandoz's major markets are the triad economies, and particularly the US 
where sales have been growing fast during the early 1990s. While in 1989 the US market 
accounted for 25 per cent of sales, this figure had by 1995 risen to 33 per cent49. In the same 
year, home market sales accounted for a mere 3 per cent.
Sandoz's business focus shifted during the first half of the 1990s strongly towards the life 
sciences: the chemical business was sold in 1995 and pharmaceutical and nutrition operations
43 Annual Report 1996.
44 “1896-1996: Die ersten 100 Jahre” Roche Magazin Spezial, Nr. 53 (January) 1996, p. 61.
45 Interview.
46 See footnote 44.
47 Interview. See also "Das virtuelle Untemehmen", Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Oct. 25/26 1997.
48 “Der Roche-Konzern hat Erfolg und Gluck gepachtet”, Basler Zetung, April 23 1993.
49 See “Fur Ciba und Sandoz ist die Schweiz ein kleiner Markt”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, March 11 1996 and 
“Sandoz: Die Haelfte der Pharma wird verlagert”, Basler Zeitung, Aug.13 1994.
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were expanded -  the latter particularly in 1994 through the acquisition of the American baby 
foods company Gerber. By 1995, the life science division accounted for 70 per cent of annual 
sales50.
During the 1990s, Sandoz also started to increasingly internationalise its high-value added 
production activities, which had hitherto been largely concentrated at headquarters in Basle51. 
In 1990 Sandoz's chairman, Marc Moret, announced that he aimed to reduce the Basle share 
in the production of pharmaceuticals to 60 per cent52. An important step towards this goal 
was Sandoz's decision in 1990 to build a large pharmaceutical factory in Ireland for the 
production of, among other things, 20 per cent of the active ingredients in drugs. In 1994, 
Sandoz went a step further and announced that half of its entire pharmaceutical production 
would be moved to its new production facility in Ireland .
While Sandoz did not acquire a major pharmaceutical producer, it acquired two medium­
sized American biotechnology companies ( SyStemix in 1991 and Genetic Therapy in 1995) 
and signed a number of co-operation arrangements with biotechnology companies (i.e. 
Biotransplant) and American universities (e.g. the Deaconess Hospital of Harvard 
University)54. Shortly before merging with Ciba to form Novartis, Sandoz also acquired the 
German generic drugs firm Azupharma, making the merged Sandoz-Ciba generic drugs 
operations the world’s largest55. During the late 1980s, Sandoz also made first steps to 
internationalise its research activities, which had hitherto been largely concentrated at 
headquarters in Basle. By 1992, Sandoz had set up research locations in the US, Japan and 
Great Britain56. Similar to Roche, Sandoz’s investments in Switzerland markedly decreased 
during the 1990s. While in the late 1980s around 30 per cent of all new investments were 
undertaken in the Basle region, this proportion had sunk to 20 per cent in 1992 and 15 per 
cent in 1994 and consisted largely of mere maintenance and rationalisation investments57.
Like its two Swiss rivals, Ciba-Geigy was also already highly internationalised by the 
mid-1980s. As noted earlier, already inl985 Ciba only sold 3 per cent of its products in its
50 See “Sandoz konzentriert sich kiinftig auf Pharma und Emahrung”, Basler Zeitung, March 24 1995.
51 See “Wir haben zu grosse Ballungen”, Interview with Marc Moret in Schweizerische Handels Zeitung, Feb. 
15 1990.
52 Ibid.
53 See “Sandoz: Die Haelfte der Pharma wird verlargert”, Basler Zeitung, Aug. 13 1994.
54 See “Sandoz ubemimmt US Forschungsinstitut”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, July 11 1995.
55 See “Von Ciba und Sandoz zu Novartis”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, March 8 1996.
56 See “Sandoz zieht Ausland vor” Schweizerische Handelszeitung March 5 1992 and “Neue Strukturen bei 
Sandoz Pharma”, Basler Zeitung, Dec. 10 1993.
57 See “Sandoz: Standort Basel verliert laufend an Gewicht”, Basler Zeitung, April 19 1994.
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home market (by 1995 the figure that had dropped to 2 per cent) and employed less than a 
quarter of its workforce in Switzerland58.
During the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, Ciba took further steps to increase its 
internationalisation. In Europe, where Ciba sells 45 per cent of its products, it upgraded its 
production facilities in Italy, Spain, France and the UK and built a new facility in Spain59. In 
1992, Ciba bought the British pharmaceutical MNE Fison. In the US, where Ciba sells 30 per 
cent of its products, Ciba added in 1985 diagnostics to its life science portfolio through the 
establishment of the Ciba Coming Diagnostics Corporation - a joint venture with the US 
pharmaceutical MNE Coming Glass. In 1987 Ciba upgraded its US operations through a new 
production facility in New Jersey60. Also in the mid-1980s, Ciba started to increasingly 
expand in Asia - a region where it had hitherto lacked a significant presence. In 1988, Ciba 
started to transform its facility in China to a full-scale manufacturing location and, by 1994, 
China was the country receiving most of Ciba’s investments61. Contrary to its two Swiss 
rivals, Ciba did not acquire an American biotechnology company but preferred co-operation 
arrangements and minority stakeholdings. Examples include a joint venture with Biocine in 
California and minority stakes in Chiron, one of the world leading biotechnology companies, 
and Myriad Genetics. In 1994, Ciba raised its stake in Chiron to 49.9 per cent - an investment 
worth $2.1bn62.
Similarly to its two Swiss rivals, Ciba also started to increasingly internationalise its R&D 
activities, which used to be largely concentrated in Basle. By the early 1990s, Ciba had 
established facilities in the US, Japan, England, Germany, France and Italy and new research 
projects involving biotechnology were increasingly carried out in foreign locations63. A 
particularly significant decision in this respect was made in 1991, when Ciba, after long and 
highly politicised negotiations with the Basle cantonal administration, decided to abandon its 
plans for a new biotechnology research facility in Basle, and instead built the facility just 
across the French border in the Alsace. Ciba’s chairman, Alex Krauer, commented that "the 
political climate was not right for expanding biotechnology research in Basel"64. Nevertheless 
Ciba continued to spend slightly more than 50 per cent of its R&D budget in Switzerland and,
58 See “Fur Ciba und Sandoz ist die Schweiz ein kleiner Markt”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, March 11 1996.
59 See “Ciba-Geigy und der Standort Schweiz”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, April 23 1994.
60 Ibid.
61 See “Ciba-Fabrik in China eingeweiht”, Basler Zeitung, Oct. 21 1993 and “Ciba auf Expansionskurs in 
China”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Sept. 8 1994.
62 See “Die Perlenfischer vom Rhein“, Cash, Nr. 37, Sep. 15 1995.
63 Interview.
64 Quoted in Finanz und Wirtschaft, Dec. 18 1991.
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in 1994, Ciba invested Sfr. 40m in a new research facility in Basle. Overall, however, new 
investments were predominantly abroad in the 1990s65.
The Extent and Nature of the Six Pharmaceutical MNEs’ Internationalisation Process
The analysis has shown that all six MNEs’ international sales considerably exceeded their 
domestic sales. In fact, in the Swiss case, domestic sales were as low as two per cent. 
Moreover, this has not been a recent phenomenon. Already by the mid-1980s -  the starting 
point of this analysis -  the six MNEs were highly internationalised (see table 2.5). As Alex 
Krauer has put it, “the pharmaceuticals industry was already globalised before the term was 
invented66”. If anything, the extent of six MNEs’ internationalisation further increased during 
the last decade. It was shown that, with varying degrees, all six MNEs further increased their 
market share in foreign markets. Indeed, if one believes the extent of a firm’s international 
sales to be a reliable indicator for its trade policy preferences, one would be hard put not to 
expect the six MNEs to be among the worlds’ most free trade minded companies.
Foreign Sales 
(%)
Employees
abroad
% of total 
Employees
R&D 
Abroad (%)
Hoechst 81.2 (74.7) 80.765 (76.383) 49.9 (42.3) 58.6 (28.5)
Bayer 81.4 (74.3) 70.875 (-) 48.3 (-) 39.5 (-)
BASF 72.8 (67.3) 42.987 (41.658) 40.4 (32.0) 33.3 (-)
Roche 98.0 (97.1) 40.422 (35.865) 80.0 (78.9) - (-)
Sandoz 97.3 (95.8) 35.689 (33.143) 71.6 (82.5) 46.6 (35.6)
Ciba-Geigy 97.8 (98.0) 61.432 (58.097) 73.1 (71.7) 45.8 (-)
Table 2.5: Figures relating to the Six Pharmaceutical MNEs Internationalisation Process in 1995.1985 Figures 
in Brackets. Source: Annual Reports, own calculations.
65 See “Ciba-Geigy und der Standort Schweiz”, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, April 23 1994.
66 See Interview with Alex Krauer in Schweizerische Handelszeitung, Dec. 14 1989. See also “Die Branche 
blickt wie gebannt auf den lukrativen Pharmamarkt”, H andelsblatt, May 15 1996.
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With regard to the nature of the six MNEs’ internationalisation processes, there have been 
significant changes under way during the 1990s. It was noted earlier that while the six MNEs’ 
sales had always been highly internationalised, their production networks were a lot less so. 
In fact, MNEs in both countries followed a similar strategy of concentrating high value-added 
production activities in their home countries. Only low-value added activities, such as 
packaging or marketing activities, tended to be carried out from production locations abroad. 
Sandoz, the extreme case, had by 1990 still 95 per cent of its pharmaceutical production 
located in Basle67. However, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, this strategy began to 
change. Responding to the need for greater innovation, all six MNEs started to increasingly 
internationalise their R&D activities in order to tap the research potential of different regions. 
It was shown that all six set up research locations abroad - particularly in the San Francisco 
bay area and New England68 - and began to collaborate with small and medium-sized US 
biotechnology companies, either through strategic partnerships, minority shareholding or 
outright acquisitions69.
The increasing internationalisation of R&D activities had also implications for MNEs’ 
production arrangements, since new drugs tend to be produced at the location where they 
were discovered and developed70. Consequently, a significant amount of production activities 
followed -and is about to follow -  the internationalisation of R&D. Moreover, with the 
increasing internationalisation of production networks, it also became easier for firms to 
compare production costs across different locations, which led to yet more 
internationalisation as a result of cost-optimising strategies. One Swiss executive remarked 
that “cross-subsidisation became increasingly visible and intolerable”71.
Using Bartlett and Goshal's often quoted terminology to locate these developments within 
a larger conceptual context, it appeared that the six MNEs were firmly on the way towards 
becoming integrated production networks -  the authors’ organisational concept with the 
highest degree of internationalisation. Integrated production networks are characterised by a 
cross-border organisational structure in which sister companies or subsidiaries do not play 
uniform roles, but rather according to the importance of their contribution to operations72.
67 See Sally (1993), p. 564.
68 “Die Perlenfischer vom Rhein”, Cash, Nr. 37 Sep. 15 1995.
69 The German Ministry of Science estimated that in 1993, 75 per cent of the German pharmaceutical industries’ 
new investments went to the US. Quoted in Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 65.
70 See Boston Consulting Group (1995). See also “Roche: Ohne Forschung keine Produktion”, Basler Zeitung, 
Aug. 20 1994.
71 Interview.
72 Bartlett and Goshal (1989), p. 60.
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To be sure, the internationalisation of R&D activities and production networks was not 
equally advanced at all six MNEs; Bayer, and certainly BASF, appeared to be somewhat 
behind when compared to the other four. However, it appears unlikely that these differences 
should become visible in the six MNEs’ trade policy preferences; clearly, all six are 
internationalised to a degree that makes it highly unlikely that they will support market- 
closing trade policies.
The Six German and Swiss Banks
Similar to the three German pharmaceutical MNEs, the three German banks Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank are considerably "diversified MNEs". All of them are 
commonly referred to as universal banks, in the sense that they are active in all business 
segments of the banking sector. Nevertheless - and in stark contrast to the pharmaceutical 
MNEs - all three banks’business focus has traditionally been strongly on the domestic market 
or, more precisely, on.the channelling of savings to domestic industry. In return, banks often 
acquired not insignificant stakes in their client companies and obtained seats on their 
supervisory boards. As will be pointed out in the following chapter, this role was part and 
parcel of Germany’s system of organised capitalism.
The three banks’ size differs, however, considerably (see table 2.6). Measured by balance- 
sheet size73, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank were in 1995 Germany’s 
three biggest banks, yet in an international comparison only Deutsche Bank could be found 
among the worlds’ leading banks. After taking over Bankers’ Trust in 1998, Deutsche was 
estimated to be the world’s biggest bank by assets. By an earlier estimate, Dresdner Bank and 
Commerzbank ranked 24th and 37th respectively74.
Although Credit Suisse, SBC and UBS are also referred to as universal banks with a 
traditional focus on channelling customers’ savings to domestic industry, their securities 
business has always been more substantial than that of the German banks. Also, unlike the
73 Balance sheet size is, however, not an entirely reliable indicator for the size of a bank, since with 
securitisation a lot of banks’ business has been pushed off-balance sheet.
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Balance Sheet Size Employees
Deutsche Bank 721.7 (243) 74.119 (48.851)
Dresdner Bank 484 (192) 46.890 (33.098)
Commerzbank 404 (137.2) 29.615 (24.154)
Table 2.6: Balance Sheet Size in DM bn and Employees of the Three German Banks in 1995.1985 Figures in 
Brackets. Source: Annual Reports.
German banks, the Swiss banks were always more internationalised, mainly due to the 
attractiveness of Switzerland as a financial centre. Chapius has noted that this allowed the 
Swiss banks to do a substantial amount of international business from Switzerland75. They 
were particularly benefiting from their tradition of portfolio managers, the stringent 
upholding of banking secrecy laws, a well functioning financial system and the stability and 
of the Swiss franc76.. One Swiss executive remarked that “these factors combined to 
encourage a large number of affluent foreigners to travel to Switzerland for the management 
of their assets”77. Chase Manhattan has estimated Switzerland’s share of the international 
portfolio management business with private customers at around 35 per cent78.
Moreover, in contrast to the German banks, the difference in size was less pronounced 
among the three Swiss banks, which together accounted for half of Switzerland’s banking 
assets79. Although the three banks’ balance sheet size was comparable to that of Dresdner 
Bank and Commerzbank (see table 2.7), all three were generally considered to be among the
world’s leading banks. In 1991, the Wall Street Journal predicted that all three would be
£ 0among the dozen or so major global players by the end of the century - an assessment that 
was apparently, however, not shared by SBC and UBS, which decided to merge in 1997 in 
order to cut costs and increase their financial clout.
74 See “Japan hat the grdssten Banken der Welt”, Frankfurter Allgem eine Zeitung, July 16 1993 and “Die 
starksten Investmentbanken der Welt”, Frankfurter A llgem eine Zeitung, Oct. 27 1993.
75 See Chapuis (1985), p. 86.
76 See UBS International Finance, Winter 1991 and Braillard (1987).
77 Interview.
78 See Swiss Bankers' Association  (1996).
79 See "New Challenges for Switzerland’s Banking Industry", Economic and Financial Prospects, No. 1, 
February/March 1996.
80 Quoted in "SBG, SBV, SKA ganz vome dabei", B asler Zeitung, March 26 1991.
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Balance Sheet Size Employees
Credit Suisse 244.6 (88.7) 26.164 (12.743)
SBC 288.3 (127.9) 27.237 (14.825)
UBS 386.8 (139.5) 29.071 (18.677)
Table 2.7: Balance Sheet Size in Sfr. bn and Employees of the three Swiss Banks in 1995.1985 Figures in 
Brackets. Source: Annual Reports.
The Business Focus of the Six Banks
Seen from a general level, all six banks developed their business during the last decade in 
essentially the same direction. While timing and scale of the major strategic moves may have 
varied (see next section), the underlying objectives were largely identical. Apart from 
Germany’s Commerzbank, all six banks internationalised their commercial banking activities 
selectively and defensively, and pushed aggressively into the securities business. Except for 
Commerzbank, all of them built up substantial investment banking and asset management 
capacities and strongly internationalised these businesses from the start. Lately, however, 
Commerzbank has also increased its efforts to build an international investment banking 
business.
At a basic level, these strategies were a response to two challenges that were confronting 
the financial services sector during the 1980s and 1990s. One concerned commercial banking 
(banks’ traditional loan and retail business) and the other investment banking and asset 
management. In commercial banking, the challenge came from rapidly internationalising 
domestic corporate customers, which began to demand an increasingly sophisticated array of
o i
financial services in their host countries . Ultimately, this presented banks with the choice of 
either setting up international branches themselves, or otherwise risk losing their clients to 
foreign banks -  something, which might eventually have negative implications for long-term 
client relationships in banks’ home countries82.
81 See OECD (1985), p.15. See also Fieleke (1977), Khoury (1980), Goldberg and Saunders (1981) and Sabi
L1988)-
See for example “Wir verlagem nicht ins Ausland -  wir folgen unseren Kunden” Interview with Credit 
Suisse’s former Board President Robert Jeker in Badener Tagblatt, July 25 1992. See also Weiss (1990) and 
Buschgen (1992).
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The second challenge concerned the securities business of banks - investment banking and 
asset management. Change resulted primarily from structural deregulation policies pursued 
by a large number of countries during the 1970s and 1980s and from the increasing 
popularity of credit instruments that can be traded in financial markets -  a phenomenon often 
referred to as securitisation or disintermediation83. During the last two decades, securitisation 
became widely perceived to be a better technique than bank lending, since by spreading the 
risk of a loan among many borrowers and by providing traded markets (so that lenders can 
adjust their risks more easily) it lowered the costs of borrowing84. As a result, the capacity to 
trade shares, place them in the market and provide technical expertise of how to raise funds in
OC
the financial markets became ever more important for banks . A number of authors have 
observed that this development - together with vast improvements in information technology 
- led to the emergence of global capital markets and forced banks wishing to participate in
Q /r
these markets to establish subsidiaries in the world’s major financial centres .
However, securitisation changed the rules of the game also in another way. As investment 
and commercial banks began suddenly to compete in the same market, competition increased 
significantly, which in turn led to the development of innovative and ever more efficient 
financial products87. Miihlemann has pointed out that this development ultimately resulted in 
the blurring of yet another traditional demarcation line in the financial services sector - that 
between banking and insurance88. Encouraged by the increasing popularity of mutual funds 
as savings vehicles (and by structural deregulation polices), insurers increasingly entered the 
asset management industry and set up their own capital market divisions. Banks for their part 
became increasingly interested in the insurance market as improved information technology 
systems opened up new possibilities of cross-selling insurance services through banks' branch
OQ
networks, e.g. offering home insurance products to mortgage owners .
83 The key difference between finance raised from capital markets and loans provided by banks is that capital 
markets cut out the middlemen (hence “disintermediation”). While in the traditional loan business, banks stand 
between savers and investors, directing the flow of resources, capital markets bring the two parties face to face 
and thereby promote an efficient allocation of capital. See Biischgen (1992), p. 34.
84 Kono has noted that the value of securities issues increased from about US$ lOObn in 1987 to over US$ 
500bn in 1996. See Kono (1997), p. 10.
85 Edey and Hviding (1995) reported that banks have started making more money from securities trade relative 
to traditional bank credits.
86 See for example Biischgen (1989), p. 6 and Schmitz (1991).
87 Derivatives transactions, for example, have over the last decade increased more than ten-fold. At the end of 
1996, outstanding futures and options in interest rates, currencies and stock market indices amounted to US$ 10 
trillion. This amounted to almost twice the total value of world trade in 1996. In the same year the value of 
outstanding swaps and swap-related derivatives reached US$ 25 trillion. See BIS (1997).
88 See Miihlemann (1998).
89 All of the six banks also diversified into the insurance sector, albeit only on a national scale. Deutsche Bank, 
for example, established a co-operation with Deutscher Herold, Dresdner Bank with Allianz and
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In short, as the markets for all kinds of different financial services became more integrated 
and banks began to lose their traditional role as intermediary between savers and borrowers 
as a result of securitisation, all six banks began to broaden and re-focus their business 
portfolios. One Swiss executive remarked that
“the underlying rationale for this strategy is the belief that the future belongs to the 
diversified financial conglomerate with its ability to meet all of its customers’ needs”90.
Having reviewed sectoral developments in the financial services sector and analysed the 
business focus of the six banks, the study can now move on to analyse their 
internationalisation processes.
The Three German Banks: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank
Unlike the three German pharmaceutical MNEs, the three banks do not share a history of 
long internationalisation. In fact, it seems fair to argue that by the mid-1980s -  the starting 
point of this study -  the German banks were hardly internationalised at all. International 
business activities were limited and largely confined to basic commercial banking activities 
(i.e. loans and project financing) carried out from headquarters in Germany. Internationally 
expanding corporate customers were provided with rudimentary financial services in selected 
host countries, mostly through representation offices or co-operation arrangements with 
foreign banks. Often this reluctance to internationalise business activities is explained by 
psychological reasons: all three banks had lost their entire international operations twice 
within only a few decades - after World War One and Two - and thus approached 
internationalisation with extreme care91. However, as a response to the challenges analysed 
above, internationalisation got slowly under way during the 1980s and strongly accelerated 
during the 1990s.
Deutsche Bank has been without doubt the most the most aggressive “intemationaliser” of 
the German trio. In terms of pace, scale and scope, its internationalisation process has clearly 
been in a class of its own when compared to that of Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank.
UBS with the Swiss Rentenanstalt. Credit Suisse went a step further and acquired in 1997 Winterthur, a leading 
Swiss insurer.
90 Interview.
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In order to quickly build up a substantial securities business, Deutsche pushed during the 
second half of the 1980s aggressively into investment banking and asset management92. 
Apart from acquiring medium-sized securities houses in Austria and the Netherlands in the 
late 1980s93, the most significant step in this strategy was Deutsche’s acquisition of the 
British Morgan Grenfell Group in 1990, a highly internationalised securities house with 
branches and sister companies in more than 20 countries. It was Deutsche’s largest post-war 
investment and turned it literally overnight into a major global force in investment banking 
and asset management94. Also during the late 1980s, Deutsche established a large presence in 
Asia with two newly set up sister companies in Hong Kong and Singapore and a greatly 
expanded presence in Tokyo95. However, it was not Asia or Europe where Deutsche Bank 
concentrated its internationalisation and expansion efforts, but the US. Until the mid-90s, 
Deutsche Bank concentrated its efforts largely on trying to penetrate the US market, the 
world’s largest market for investment banking and asset management, and at best 
simultaneously expanded its European operations. Schmitz has remarked that
"in the years from 1990 to 1994, we [the management board] talked eight times about 
North America before we talked one time about Europe. At that stage, we were probably 
devoting more executive time to North America than we were to Europe".96
However, Deutsche Bank did not buy a major American bank until 1998 but rather relied on 
organic growth. In 1990, Deutsche Bank North America had estimated assets of about 
$3.5bn, revenues of around $200 and employed 300-350 people. By 1997, Deutsche had 
4500 employees, assets of $80bn and revenues of $1.2bn97. Starting in mid-1990s, however, 
Deutsche Bank re-shifted its focus somewhat more towards the European market. As Schmitz 
has put it,
91 See Biischgen (1995), p. 725.
92 It is often argued that there are important synergies between these two businesses: a strong position in asset 
management increases a banks’ placing power of newly issued equity and asset management, in turn, benefits 
from privileged access to investment banking products.
93 In 1988 Deutsche acquired H.Albert de Bary, Amsterdam and in 1989 it acquired Antoni, Hacker & Co, 
Vienna. See Biischgen (1995), pp. 845f.
94 Ibid., p. 788.
95 See “Die Deutsche Bank im Angriff”, Bilanz 2/1997, pp. 40-45.
96 See “New role for US as Europe moves to centre stage”, Interview with Ronaldo Schmitz in Financial Times, 
May 13 1998.
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"The emergence of a monetarily unified Europe has created new perspectives in this bank
that have to be addressed It took us quite some time to understand what the euro would
mean."98.
While clearly being a global force in the securities business, Deutsche has, however, still 
not managed to enter the premier league of global investment banks, the so-called “bulge 
bracket”. In global M&A advice, one of the most lucrative bits of the investment banking 
business, Deutsche Bank is not among the world’s top ten banks, and even in its European 
“home market” its market share amounted to only 5.5 per cent in 1998".
In contrast to investment banking and asset management, Deutsche Bank did not seek to 
become a global force in commercial banking and expanded these services only selectively to 
the economically most important regions. However, in contrast to the other five banks, 
Deutsche Bank offers retail banking services abroad, albeit only in two countries. Through 
acquiring Banca d’America e d’ltalia (BAI) in Italy, and Banco Comercial Transatlantic© and 
Banco do Madrid in Spain, Deutsche Bank entered the retail market in these two countries100.
Dresdner Bank, took a markedly more careful approach towards expanding and 
internationalising its business activities. The most significant steps occurred in 1995 with the 
acquisition of the British merchant bank Kleinwort Benson and the New York-based fund 
manager RCM. Before that, Dresdner relied in the US on its two securities vehicles ABD 
securities and ABDI fund managing, set up in the mid-1980s. In Europe, Dresdner Bank 
established sister companies in Luxembourg and Ireland and acquired in 1992 a majority 
stake in the medium-sized British merchant bank Thornton. In Asia, Dresdner Bank is 
represented mainly through the branches of Thornton (and later of Kleinwort Benson)101. 
While considerably strong in asset management, Dresdner does not come close to Deutsche
109Bank in international capital market prowess . Nevertheless it managed to build up an
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 See "Top 10 investment banks take 77% of market", Financial Times, March 1 1999.
100Between 1988 and 1992 Deutsche Bank raised its stake in BCT from 39 per cent to 97 per cent. See Biischgen 
(1995), p. 845. See also “Der lange Weg zur Europa-Bank”, Frankfurter Allgem eine Zeitung, July 23 1991.
101 See “Individual Approaches to the same goal”, Financial Times, Oct. 30 1989; “Dresdner Bank: beavering 
away at building a reputation on the quiet”, Financial Times, Aug. 24 1988 and “Die Dresdner Bank verfolgt fur 
Europa Strategie der Selektion”, Borsenzeitung, Nov. 3 1989.
102 See “Die starksten Investmentbanken der Welt”, Frankfurter Allgem eine Zeitung, Oct. 7 1994 and 
“Mangelnde Koordination”, Wirtschaftswoche, Feb. 29 1996.
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international network of sister companies in investment banking and asset management that 
covers the triad economies and offers the full range of investment services and products103. 
With regard to commercial banking activities, Dresdner’s approach is significantly more low 
key and selective than that of Deutsche Bank and is centred on co-operation arrangements 
with foreign banks -  the most significant one being with Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), 
signed in 1991104.
Commerzbank, the smallest of the three German banks, is significantly less 
internationalised than Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank. Compared to the latter two, 
Commerzbank’s investment banking activities lag considerably. By 1995, corporate finance 
activities were still largely limited to the home market and the focus of its securities business 
continued to be almost exclusively on German titles105. For asset management, 
Commerzbank established sister companies in Luxembourg, Singapore, Tokyo and New 
York. In 1995, however, Commerzbank somewhat stepped up its international expansion 
with the acquisition of a French (CCR) and British (Jupiter International) asset management 
group106. Additionally it started to build up investment banking capacities through a sister 
company headquartered in Frankfurt (Commercial Financial products) with branches in 
London, New York, Paris and Tokyo. However, despite this recent expansion, 
Commerzbank’s chairman Martin Kohlhaussen has made it clear that control over business 
operations will remain in Frankfurt107.
With regard to commercial banking, Commerzbank relies heavily on a number of 
cooperation arrangements with foreign banks. Until 1991, this strategy centred around the 
EuroPartners Group through which a number of European banks (i.e. Credit Lyonnais, 
Banco Hispano Americano) pooled organisational resources. However, in 1992 this loose 
grouping of banks broke up and Commerzbank established a patchwork of strategic 
partnerships with other European banks for specific business activities, e.g. a partnership for
10ftcross-border payments with NatWest and Societe Generate .
103 See “Dresdner Bank Investment Services in a New Europe”, Euromoney, September 1990.
104 See “Dresdner Bank setzt auf Kooperationen”, Borsenzeitung, Dec. 7 1991.
105 See “Es gibt keine Ubemahmekandidaten”, Borsenzeitung, March 27 1996.
106 See “Die Commerzbank will ihr Geschaft im Ausland verstarken”, Frankfurter Allgem eine Zeitung, March 
31 1995.
107 See “Es muss nicht immer London sein”, Commerzbank’s chairman Martin Kohlhaussen in Borsenzeitung 
April 27 1996.
1 See “Intensiv Kooperieren”, Interview with Kohlhaussen in Wirtschafts Woche, Feb. 22 1996. See also “Die 
sperrrigen Europartner”, Frankfurter A llgem eine Zeitung, June 21 1991 and “Das Standing der Commerzbank”, 
Borsenzeitung, Feb. 17 1995.
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The Three Swiss Banks: Credit Suisse, Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of
Switzerland
Although the three Swiss banks were by the mid-1980s more internationalised than the 
German banks, they were -  with the notable exception of Credit Suisse -  just as reluctant as 
their German counterparts to respond to the challenges that were facing the financial services 
industry during the last two decades. In fact, similar to the German banks, major strategic 
moves did not occur before the late 1980s and early 1990s. Establishing which of the Swiss 
banks internationalised most rapidly and extensively is not as clear-cut as in the German case. 
Certainly Credit Suisse was the pioneer, but during the 1990s, SBC was clearly the most 
acquisitive of the three banks -  a strategy that culminated in the 1997 merger with UBS, its 
larger Swiss rival, which was often seen as a take-over in disguise. UBS, in contrast, was 
clearly the slowest of the three banks to expand internationally.
Credit Suisse began building up investment banking capacities in 1978 through a 
partnership with the American investment bank First Boston, which manifested itself in a 
jointly set up sister company (Credit Suisse First Boston) that rapidly built up an international 
network of subsidiaries covering the triad economies. Asset management capacities were 
added in the mid-1980s through additional subsidiaries in New York, London and Tokyo. In 
1989, Credit Suisse First Boston acquired the British brokerage house Buckmaster & Moore 
and in 1990, it acquired a majority stake in BEEA Associates109. In 1988, the joint venture 
with First Boston was put on a new organisational footing as Credit Suisse turned itself into 
CS Holding and increased its stake in First Boston, first to 44.5 per cent and one year later to 
60 per cent - an important step in Credit Suissse's internationalisation process, which in the 
words of chairman Rainer Gut, “effectively established a Swiss universal bank and globally 
operating investment bank under the control of CS Holding”110.
The next major step in Credit Suisse’s internationalisation process occurred in 1996 with 
the internal restructuring that established the Credit Suisse Group and resulted in four clearly 
separated business divisions. Two of these four divisions - Credit Suisse First Boston and 
Credit Suisse Asset Management - are headquartered in London and New York and can be
109 See Annual Report 1990, pp.27-28 and “Flucht ins Ausland”, Bilanz 2/90, pp. 52-59.
110 See "Mit der CS Holding in eine faszinierende Zukunft", Rainer Gut in SKA Bulletin April 1989 p. 6-11. See 
also "Kontrolle der CS Holding fiber First Boston", Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Nov. 14 1990.
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regarded as globalised111. The other two - Credit Suisse and Credit Suisse Private Banking - 
continue to be run from group headquarters in Zurich.
Of all the selected banks, Credit Suisse has by a significant margin the largest investment 
banking business. With Credit Suisse First Boston it owns an investment bank that is 
generally considered to be among the world’s largest, though not in the same league with 
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter -  the “bulge bracket”. In
1998, CSFB was the world’s’ 5th largest advisor on M&As with a global market share of
11'}almost 14 per cent . In contrast, Credit Suisse's commercial banking activities are a lot less 
internationalised. Not only do they continue to be run from Zurich, but their 
internationalisation was also confined to single branches in economically important regions.
Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) began to tentatively internationalise business activities 
during the 1980s with the establishment of an investment banking subsidiary in London 
(SBCI), which quickly set up off-shoots in the major international financial centres. In 1987, 
SBC acquired the British brokerage house Savory Milln. Asset management began to be 
internationalised in 1983 with the establishment of a sister company in New York, followed 
by sister companies in Frankfurt, London and Dublin (all in 1987). In response to the single 
market, SBC set up corporate finance units in the Netherlands, Italy and Spain geared 
towards providing M&A advisory services113. These initiatives were, however, dwarfed by a 
number of acquisitions during the first half of the 1990s. In 1991, SBC acquired the Chicago- 
based derivatives firm O'Connor & Associates and in 1995 the US fund manager Brinson 
Partners and the corporate finance and equities business of S.G.Warburg, a leading British 
merchant bank. The scale of these last two transactions had a visible effect on SBC's balance 
sheet: it grew from SFr. 212bn in 1994 to SFr. 360bn in 1996114. In contrast to the securities 
business, SBC did not aspire to become a global player in commercial banking activities and 
internationalisation in this business segment remained limited and confined to single 
branches in economically important countries.
In 1995, SBC restructured its business operations into four clearly divided and largely 
independent business divisions - a move that was a year later copied by Credit Suisse (see 
above). Similar to Credit Suisse, SBC's investment banking and asset management divisions 
are headquartered outside Switzerland (in London and Chicago) and operate on a global 
basis, while commercial and private banking activities continue to be run from headquarters
111 Interviews. See also “Big Shake-Up at Credit Suisse”, Financial Times, July 3 1996.
112 See "Top 10 investment banks take 77% of market", Financial Times, March 1 1999.
113 See “Flucht ins Ausland”, Bilanz 2/90, pp. 52-59.
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in Basle. One executive remarked that “Swiss Bank Corporation can be thought of as a Swiss 
holding company consisting of two Swiss, one British and one American bank".
Compared to its two Swiss rivals, the internationalisation process of UBS was 
significantly more low-key, and focused on establishing substantial presences in London, 
New York and Tokyo - the world’s major financial centres. In London, UBS expanded its 
presence in 1985 by acquiring a stake in the British brokerage house Philips & Drew, which 
led to a full take-over in 1989115. In New York, UBS acquired in 1991 the fund manager 
Chase Investors Management, subsequently re-named UBS Asset Management Inc116. In 
Tokyo, UBS relied on organic growth. While UBS was generally regarded to be less 
internationalised than Credit Suisse or SBC, it was still considered to be global force in 
investment banking and asset management117. Similar to its two Swiss rivals, UBS showed no 
ambitions to significantly internationalise its commercial banking activities.
The Extent and Nature of the Six Banks’ Internationalisation Process
Although the internationalisation process in the financial services industry started in the 
1960s and greatly increased during the 1970s and 1980s when new financial instruments and 
structural deregulation policies established a worldwide market for financial services, the six 
German and Swiss banks were latecomers to this development and -  with the exception of 
Credit Suisse - were by the mid-1980s considerably less internationalised than their American 
and Japanese counterparts. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, both the three 
German and the three Swiss banks made strong strategic moves to become major European 
and global players. However, unlike as in the pharmaceutical sector, the six banks' 
internationalisation processes were very selective. It was shown that none of the selected 
banks embarked on an “across-the-board” internationalisation of its complete service range.
In commercial banking, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, SBC and UBS limited their 
internationalisation strategies to setting up single branches in the major cities of economically 
important regions -  mostly the triad economies. Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank did not 
even go that far and continued to rely on co-operation arrangements with foreign banks.
114 Annual Report 1997.
115 See “Flucht ins Ausland” Bilanz, 2/90, pp. 52-59.
116 See “UBS snaps up Chase Investors”, Global Investor 1991.
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Moreover, internationalisation in this sub-sector was confined to services for corporate 
customers118. Except for Deutsche Bank, none of the selected banks showed any enthusiasm 
for internationalising their retail banking activities, and even Deutsche Bank explicitly stated 
that its purchase of retail banks in Italy and Spain were “one-off* acquisitions, rather than 
first steps towards an international branch network119. It should also be pointed out that 
internationalisation in this sub-sector was largely defensive, in the sense that the primary 
objective was not to gain new customers, but rather not to lose old ones -  the internationally 
expanding corporate clients from banks’ home countries, which began to demand 
increasingly sophisticated financial services in host countries120.
For the internationalisation of investment banking and asset management activities the 
opposite was true. Here banks’ internationalisation strategies were everything but defensive. 
As was shown in the previous section, all of the selected banks, except Commerzbank, made 
major strategic moves to expand and internationalise these two businesses, and all efforts 
were geared towards winning new and international customers. In the words of one 
interviewee,
“all of the selected banks (with the exception of Commerzbank) transformed themselves 
from universal banks into international investment banks with a substantial domestic 
commercial business on the side”121.
Supporting this analysis with numbers is, however, difficult. Banks’ do not publish 
detailed data about the geographical spread of their loan portfolios or their market share in 
foreign countries. Moreover, their annual reports still do not explicitly distinguish between 
their domestic and international business, or between on-balance and off-balance sheet 
activities122. Due to the absence of such data, this study was left with comparing the number
117 See “Deutsche Bank -  Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft: Die Deutsche Bank im Angriff”, Bilanz 2/1997, pp. 
40-45. In 1993, the B asler Zeitung estimated that UBS will soon earn every second franc abroad. See B asler  
Zeitung, Aug. 13 1993.
118 See for example “Der lange Weg zur Europa-Bank”, Frankfurter Allgem eine Zeitung, July 23 1991.
119 As Deutsche Bank’s former chairman Hilmar Kopper has put it, “ ..it is completely unrealistic that Deutsche 
Bank will become a worldwide universal bank offering its whole domestic service range abroad”. Interview 
with Hilmar Kopper in Industriemagazin  Nr. 2 1991 pp. 25-28. See also “Insel der Seeligen” Interview with 
Kopper in Wirtschaftswoche 44 (1990), Nr. 39, pp. 226-230.
120 See “Wir verlagem nicht ins Ausland -  wir folgen unseren Kunden” Interview with Credit Suisse’s former 
board president Robert Jeker in Badener Tagblatt, July 25 1992. See also Schmitz (1991).
121 See also UBS International Finance, Winter 1991, pp. 2-4.
122 See Krueger (1989), p. 320. See also Annual Report 1989 by the Swiss Association for Financial Analysis, 
quoted in "Information der Banken: Konsolidierung als Ziel", Schweizerische Handelszeitung, Feb. 22 1990.
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of the six banks’ foreign subsidiaries and employees abroad (see table 2.8). Clearly, however, 
this data is not sufficient to make predictions about banks’ trade policy preferences. 
Nevertheless by drawing on sectoral characteristics it should be possible to judge whether the 
six banks’ international business was significant enough to give them a strong interest in open 
international markets123.
Foreign Branches 
And Subsidiaries
Employees
Abroad
% of total 
Employees
Deutsche Bank 803 (66) 22.162 (3.759) 29.9 (7.7)
Dresdner Bank 54 (34) 6.385 (666) 13.6 (2.0)
Commerzbank 50 (33) 2.174 (732) 7.3 (3.0)
Credit Suisse 106 (47) 4.611 (1.062) 17.6 (8.3)
SBC 76 (52) 9.154 (1.877) 33.6 (12.6)
UBS 69 (40) 7.101 (905) 24.4 (4.8)
Table 2.8: Figures relating to the Six Banks’Internationalisation Processes (1995). 1985 Figures in Brackets. 
Source: Annual Reports, own calculations.
In commercial banking, as executives from the six banks pointed out, sectoral characteristics
discouraged banks from internationalising business activities on a scale comparable to that of
the securities business124. Two characteristics specific to banks’ lending and retail business
were mentioned. First, commercial banking services are generally what Boddewyn, Halbrich
and Pery have called “location-bound services”: they are usually specialised activities that are
tailored to the specific needs of the client and therefore require familiarity with particular
1locations, which -  bottom line -  makes the scope for global products very small . 
Moreover, commercial banking services are often plagued by what Hirsch has called “the 
factor of simultaneity” -  the need for the simultaneous interaction of producer and
Karsenty and Mattoo (1997) have pointed out that given the fundamental importance of financial service the 
current lack of reliable and detailed data was remarkable.
123 Kono, for example, has pointed out that the growing importance of commercial presence in foreign markets 
via subsidiaries, branch offices, or equity participation can be inferred to some extent from other indicators, 
without specific data on the modes of supply. See Kono (1997), p. 16.
124 Interviews.
125 See Boddewyn, Halbrich and Pery (1986).
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consumer126. Taken together, these characteristics act as a trade-retarding element and imply 
that foreign markets can only be served through branch networks -  an investment, which 
involves substantial sunk costs and thus put limits on the extent to which banks were willing 
to internationalise these services127.
Second, in contrast to investment banking and asset management, banks’ lending and 
retail business are characterised by significant natural barriers to entry. One German 
executive commented that “when it comes to commercial banking activities, price 
competition is virtually absent”128. Another executive conceded that “applications for 
business loans, in Germany and abroad, tend not to be looked at solely in economic terms”129. 
In other words, this sub-sector is characterised by highly personalised business relationships. 
As a result, it is generally held that indigenous banks have an inherent competitive advantage 
that makes it difficult for foreign banks to penetrate these markets130. In investment banking 
and asset management the picture almost reverses itself. First, fierce price competition makes 
these markets relatively contestable. In the words of one executive, “investment banking is 
about deals, not clients”131.
Second, these two sub-sectors can be relatively easily internationalised since the important 
bits of the investment banking and asset management business are highly concentrated -  or 
clustered -  in a few financial centres, mainly London, New York and Tokyo, and corporate 
customers travel to these centres for their business transactions132. As a result, the selected 
banks were able to internationalise, or even globalise, their business activities in these two 
sub-sectors with only a handful of international subsidiaries since, as Hanselmann has put it, 
“market proximity is more important than customer proximity”133.
126 See Hirsch (1987).
127 Interviews
128 Interview.
129 Interview.
130 See Gut (1989), Krumnow (1989) and Campayne (1992a).
131 Interview.
132 Analsying the locational choices of 61 multinational banks, Campayne (1992b) found that global investment 
banking and asset management activities tended to be highly concentrated. Essentially these businesses are 
clustered in a few financial centres for the same reason that the film industry is clustered in Hollywood and high 
technology industries in Silicon Valley: clusters create innovative -  and therefore competitive -  businesses. 
According to Michael Porter (1990), innovation is sparked partly through close working relationships with 
suppliers and rivalries with competitors, which are sharper if businesses are physically close to each other. For 
investment banks these suppliers are lawyers, accountants and management consultants and clusters make it not 
only easier to coordinate them, but also to transfer skills and ideas: in New York investment banks routinely 
poach credit analysts from their rating agency neighbours and in London investment banks’ corporate finance 
divisions often recruit staff from the City’s law firms. See “Capitals of capital”, The Economist, May 9 1998
133 Hanselmann (1990), p. 62.
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Moreover, unlike in commercial banking, not all of the securities business is "location-
bound". In fact, some financial services - e.g. bond sales - generate a product separable from
the production process that can then be transferred across national boundaries by means of
communications technology. Other services, such as financial futures and traded options, are
only partly location-bound, while the other part of the process is tradable134. Hence these
services were relatively easy to internationalise since banks could use their presences in
financial centres as export platforms135.
With regard to the nature of the six banks’ internationalisation process, one has again to
distinguish between commercial banking on the one hand, and investment banking and asset
management on the other. In commercial banking the case was relatively straightforward. At
all six banks, internationalisation was essentially a case of conducting international
operations from the home country and supplying services through outlets abroad -  either
1through branches or co-operation arrangements with foreign banks . In Bartlett and 
Goshal’s terminology, this modus operandi corresponded to their concept of an international 
company - a company characterised “by a focus on its home market with exports as a 
necessary appendage and whose strategy is based primarily on transferring and adapting the 
parent company’s knowledge and expertise to foreign markets”137.
This concept was also characteristic of the Swiss banks’ private banking business, in the 
sense that the Swiss banks used their long expertise in this sub-sector to service affluent 
foreign customers who travel to Switzerland for their financial transactions. However, the 
Swiss banks’ private banking business is far from being just a "necessary appendage", but 
rather a core business, often referred to as the “jewel in the crown”. While annual reports of 
banks have hitherto provided only scanty information about assets under management, it is 
estimated that Switzerland’s share of the international portfolio management business with 
private customers amounts to as much as 35 per cent138. Blattner has estimated that portfolio 
management accounts for almost 40 per cent of employment in the banking sector and 
accounts for 23 per cent of Switzerland’s total export surplus139.
In investment banking and asset management the picture was less clear cut. At first sight 
there appeared to be significant differences between the six banks. It was pointed out that 
Credit Suisse and SBC turned themselves into holding companies while the others preferred
134 See Boddewyn, Halbrich and Perry (1986).
135 Interviews.
136 Interviews.
137 Bartlett and Goshal (1989), p. 14.
138 See Swiss Bankers Association Annual Report 1996, p. 33.
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an integrated approach. However, when one rises beyond these labels one finds a lot of 
similarities. Essentially all banks used two models to structure their businesses in these two 
sub-sectors. One executive likened the first model to the hub and spokes of a wheel. Hub 
activities included strategic planning, product development, project management and trading 
and all of the selected banks (except Commerzbank) concentrated these activities either in 
London or New York, since cluster effects favoured their physical concentration. Spoke 
activities -  usually sales, marketing and company analysis -  keep the business in touch with 
customers and good information and were thus decentralised away from financial centres140.
In parallel, however, banks employed a second model that used cost as its organising 
principle. In the words of one executive,
“concentrating businesses in financial centres is expensive and not all activities 
necessarily benefit from cluster effects. For example, M&A work requires close personal 
negotiations between a company, its bankers and its lawyers, so it is clearly best done in 
financial centres. The same is true for the business of raising capital for companies and 
governments, such as floating initial public offerings (IPOs) and new bond issues”141.
On the other hand, however, administrative tasks, such as clearing and settling trades or 
handling a company’s cash payments can be done anywhere, and banks have moved these 
activities out of financial centres142.
As a result of these complexities, banks’ investment banking and asset management 
business did not fit neatly into Bartlett and Goshal’s typology: the strategy of using financial 
centres as export platforms had elements of their global company, which “centralises a 
company’s business activities in a few locations and seeks to standardise products and 
production processes in order to increase efficiency”143. The hub and spoke approach, on the 
other hand, had elements of Bartlett and Goshal’s integrated production networks, in which 
sister companies or subsidiaries do not play uniform roles, but rather according to the 
importance of their contribution to operations144.
139 See Blattner (1996).
140 Interviews. See also Bumbacher (1993) and “Uber die Zeitalter im Banking”, Borsenzeitung, Feb. 16 1995. 
For the need to devise an international division of labour among subsidiaries see Krueger (1989), p. 325 and 
Sarrazin (1987), p. 273.
141 Interview.
142 Interviews.
143 Bartlett and Goshal (1989), p. 51.
144 Ibid., p. 60.
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To be sure, similar to the six pharmaceutical MNEs, the process of devising an 
international division of labour among subsidiaries is not equally advanced at all six banks. 
Certainly Commerzbank lagged considerably when it came to shifting managerial 
responsibilities abroad. With respect to the other five banks, interviewees frequently argued 
that UBS and Dresdner Bank had been more reluctant than Credit Suisse, SBC and Deutsche 
Bank to decentralise decision-making authority to foreign offshoots. Having said that, 
however, it appears unlikely that these differences should become visible in the six banks’ 
trade policy preferences. As a result of the concentration of the securities business in a few 
financial centres, all six banks can be expected to have a strong interest in open international 
markets. Even if a bank’s securities business is largely focused on the home market (as in the 
case of Commerzbank) the bank can still be expected to favour open international markets, 
since the securities business is best carried out in an international financial centre and thus 
requires as a prerequisite an open international financial system145.
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the business focus and internationalisation processes of the selected 
12 MNEs as a first step towards examining their economic policy preferences. With regard to 
the MNEs' business focus, it was noted that in both sectors the selected MNEs pursued 
broadly similar objectives. In the pharmaceutical sector it, was shown that all six MNEs were 
highly research-intensive firms with a strong focus on the development of innovative drugs. 
In the financial services sector, all banks, with the exception of Germany's Commerzbank, 
responded to the structural changes sweeping through the financial services industry by 
turning themselves into international investment banks with a substantial domestic business 
on the side. During the second half of the 1990s, Commerzbank also increasingly expanded 
its securities business.
With regard to the extent and nature of the 12 MNEs’ internationalisation process, there 
have been significant differences between the two sectors. First, while the six pharmaceutical 
MNEs all share a long history of multinational investment and were already highly 
internationalised by the mid-1980s, the six banks were much less so. In fact, in the mid- 
1980s, the German banks were hardly internationalised at all. Although the Swiss banks were
145 Interviews.
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also strongly focused on their domestic market, they were able to do a substantial amount of 
international business from Switzerland due to the attractiveness of Switzerland as a financial 
centre. However, when it came to expanding abroad, the Swiss banks were as reluctant as the 
German banks.
Second, it was shown that although all six banks have taken important steps during the last 
decade to internationalise their business activities, these processes were a lot more selective 
than those of the six pharmaceutical MNEs. In fact, the six banks only took decisive steps to 
internationalise their investment banking and asset management business while commercial 
banking activities remained primarily focused on the home market. In contrast, the six 
pharmaceutical MNEs not only further increased their foreign sales, but also started to 
internationalise high value-added production and R&D activities, which had hitherto been 
largely concentrated in their home countries.
Does this then mean that the six banks can be expected to be less supportive of free trade 
than the six pharmaceutical MNEs? On the basis of this analysis, this appears to be unlikely, 
at least when it comes to the six banks" investment banking and asset management 
operations. Given that a significant amount of this business is highly concentrated in a 
relatively small number of international financial centres, the six banks can be expected to 
have a strong interest in an open international financial system that allows them to do 
business across national jurisdictions, even if their domestic business operations continue to 
be large. With regard to banks commercial banking activities the picture is, however, less 
clear. With the exception of Deutsche Bank, none of the six banks took decisive steps to 
internationalise this business segment, and hence it remains an open question whether the 
banks have a strong interest in promoting open international markets in this sub-sector.
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3Economic Policy Preferences of the Six Pharmaceutical 
MNEs and the Six Banks
Chapter 2 has analysed the business focus and internationalisation processes of the six 
German and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and banks. The purpose of this chapter is now to 
explain how these factors have interacted with sectoral characteristics to shape the 
preferences of the 12 MNEs with regard to the selected policy issues.
Chapter 1 has pointed out that policy preferences can be price mechanism promoting, 
distorting or suspending. It was argued that while the literature on these three types of 
preferences was quite extensive, there were comparatively few attempts that sought to link 
these preferences to MNEs. So far, the most notable efforts were made within the context of 
trade policy. These studies led to the finding, most eloquently expressed by Milner, that 
MNEs’ trade policy preferences could be explained as the result of the extent and nature of 
their internationalisation processes1. This study has no quarrel with this finding as far as it 
goes. The argument here is merely that it does not go very far if one seeks to analyse MNEs’ 
preferences with regard to price competition in more general terms. Clearly, the functioning 
of competition is not only affected by trade policies, but also by a whole range of domestic 
policy issues. It was argued that broadening the analysis to include such policies requires, 
however, two additional explanatory factors: MNEs’ business focus and sectoral 
characteristics. This chapter will now examine this hypothesis. Building on the analysis of 
the previous chapter, the following sections will examine how MNEs’ internationalisation 
processes and business focus have interacted with sectoral characteristics to shape the 
economic policy preferences of the six pharmaceutical MNEs and banks.
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The Six German and Swiss Pharmaceutical MNEs
Trade in the German and Swiss pharmaceutical sector is largely free, in the sense that there 
are no significant border restrictions preventing or distorting the flow of pharmaceuticals 
across national boundaries. This does, however, not mean that an undistorted price 
mechanism matches supply and demand in the sector. In fact, the price mechanism in the 
pharmaceutical sector is strongly affected by a number of domestic policies: intellectual 
property rights, health care policies, regulations for products derived from the application of 
biotechnology and, in the German case, drug re-imports from other European countries where 
governments keep drug prices artificially lower than in Germany (the so-called parallel 
imports). While certainly domestic in nature, three of those four issue areas have acquired an 
international dimension in recent years. Most clearly this has been the case with intellectual 
property rights as witnessed by the TRIPs (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) agreement of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. However, biotechnology regulations 
have also already sparked transatlantic rows2 and parallel imports have emerged as a serious 
problem within trading blocs. Only health care policies have remained a purely national 
policy issue. The following sections will now analyse the six MNEs’ policy preferences with 
regard to these four policy issues and examine the extent to which they can be explained by 
MNEs’ internationalisation process, their business focus and sectoral characteristics.
Intellectual Property Rights
The protection of intellectual property is of crucial importance for the six MNEs. In the 
words of one executive, “intellectual property rights are the actual capital of pharmaceutical 
companies” . This is hardly surprising. The previous chapter has pointed out that it takes on 
average 12 years to develop a new drug and costs about $500m. Moreover, unlike as in the 
electronics or car sector, drugs can be easily split into their components and put together
1 See Milner (1988).
2 Fears about future trade conflicts were, for example, voiced by Stuart Eizenstat who complained about the 
unwillingness of the EU to analyse biotechnology products on the basis of scientific evidence available, as is 
required by the WTO. In his view European procedures for the testing and approving of biotechnology products 
often involve a long search for the "right" scientific evidence to support a political prejudice. See “Why we 
should welcome biotechnology”, Financial Times, April 16 1999. See also Chapter 7.
3 Interview.
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again - in other words, they can be easily replicated4. All interviewed executives linked their 
preference for “state of the art” intellectual property protection to these sector-specific 
characteristics. As an executive from Interpharma, the association grouping the 
pharmaceutical divisions of the Swiss MNEs, argued, “intellectual property rights are 
absolutely essential to recover the enormous costs for the development of new drugs”5. 
Moreover, all interviewees strongly advocated the harmonisation of patent laws on a global 
scale. A Hoechst executive pointed out that
“the immense costs of R&D can be recovered only if there is a limited but reasonable 
period of patent protection. Thus far, many countries have insufficient patent laws with no 
protection for new products, with the consequence that local companies make use of the 
most successful inventions made in other countries by counterfeiting and without
investing in R&D The business community desires far-reaching harmonisation of
patent laws, as world business is impeded by significant differences between national 
patent laws”6.
While sectoral characteristics were clearly the most important factor behind MNEs' 
preferences in this policy area, business focus and internationalisation were also significant. 
Chapter 2 has pointed out that all six MNEs strongly focused on research-intensive drugs. It 
appears unlikely that a business focus on generic drugs would have given them an equally 
strong interest in the protection of intellectual property. Moreover, the high exposure of the 
six MNEs to foreign markets has clearly also been a factor behind their preference for 
worldwide protection of intellectual property7.
Judging whether this preference for a maximum of intellectual property protection and 
worldwide harmonisation of patent laws is competition promoting, distorting or suspending 
is, however, difficult. Several factors need to be considered. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that by permitting the innovator to bar imitators, patent protection conveys potential 
monopoly power for the duration of the patent. Seen from this perspective, the preference for
4 See Zweifel (1982), pp. 45ff and Wartenweiler (1988), p. 37.
5 Interview. For a similar view see Humer (1997), SGCI Annual Report (1989), pp. 23f and VFA (1997).
6 See Schulze-Steinen (1996), p. 52. For a similar view see VFA Annual Report (1996), p. 16 and Interpharma 
(1990). Trebilcock and Howse have pointed out that many developing countries, including some NICs, have 
often afforded a shorter period of patent protection (and in some cases more narrowly defined protection) to 
products such as pharmaceuticals than do the US and Europe. In addition, the patent granting process and the 
enforcement of patent protection in many developing countries has been viewed as lacking in transparency and 
legal security. See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 307.
71
intellectual property protection can be regarded as rent-seeking behaviour. On the other hand, 
however, it is argued that functioning markets require this kind of protection. Arrow has 
pointed out that in the absence of patent protection, the market would underinvest in the 
production of new knowledge, because imitators could immediately copy new inventions. 
Competition would force prices down to marginal production costs and the innovator could 
not recover the costs of R&D. By granting innovators the exclusive rights to commercialise 
their intellectual assets over a certain period of time, intellectual property rights offer an 
incentive for the production of knowledge8. In fact, most industrialised countries grant patent 
protection as a means of recognising the legitimate claim of innovators to receive a 
reasonable return on their R&D investments9.
However, even if one accepts the need for patent protection in principle, one still needs to 
consider the actual length of protection periods (currently 20 years). Judging whether this 
period is adequate, is difficult. Danzon has pointed out that “whether or not actual patent 
duration is adequate, excessive or insufficient to encourage an optimal rate of innovation is 
theoretically indeterminate and varies across industries and products, depending in part on the 
speed of entry and extent of competition from substitute products”10.
Moreover, there are also trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights that need to be 
considered. First, the overall effect of intellectual p'roperty rights on trade flows is 
ambiguous. While it is certainly true that many nations deny patent protection to 
pharmaceuticals and as a result, some pharmaceutical companies face foreign competitors 
who misappropriate information to produce inexpensive imitations11, it is not entirely clear 
whether worldwide harmonisation of intellectual property rights would increase international 
trade flows. On the one hand, it is often pointed out that a firm may be deterred to export its 
patented good into a foreign market, if potential "pirates" can diminish the profitability of the 
firm’s activity in that market because of a weak intellectual property rights regime. 
Accordingly, a strengthening of a country's patent regime would tend to increase imports as 
foreign firms would face increasing net demand for their products reflecting the displacement 
of pirates12. On the other hand, however, differing levels of intellectual property rights 
protection may affect a firm's decision on its preferred mode of serving a foreign market. A
7 Interviews.
8 See Arrow (1962). See also Doane (1996), p. 469 and Fink and Primo Braga (1992), p. 2.
9 See Danzon (1994), pp. 14f.
10 Ibid., p. 15.
11 See Dam (1987) and Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property, Statement of Views of 
the European, Japanese and US Business Communities (1988), quoted in Doane (1996), p. 470.
12 See for example Fink and Primo Braga (1999), p. 2.
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firm may choose to serve a foreign market by foreign direct investment or by licensing its
intellectual asset to a foreign firm instead of exporting the product in an environment
characterised by strong intellectual property rights. Thus, strengthened patent protection may
1 ^have a negative effect on trade flows . In view of these caveats, Maskus and Penubarti have 
argued that the overall effect of intellectual property protection on trade flows is theoretically 
ambiguous14.
Second, from a trade theory perspective it is far from clear that all countries should be 
required to maintain the same level of intellectual property protection. While intellectual 
property rights certainly provide incentives for innovation, they may also entail at least short­
term consumer welfare losses and discourage imitation and adaptation by competitors, which 
themselves constitute valuable economic activities. Hence the level of intellectual property 
protection each country chooses will be rationally related to whether its comparative 
advantage resides more in innovation or imitation and adaptations of innovations made 
elsewhere, and the relative weight it gives to the interests of consumers, imitators and 
innovators15. In other words, it is not clear whether global welfare is enhanced by worldwide 
harmonisation of patent laws. In fact, a number of studies have tried to analyse whether the 
economic welfare gains to countries, which benefit from stricter protection outweigh the 
losses to those countries, which lose by it. The conclusions have been ambiguous: from a 
static welfare point of view, intellectual property rights can be viewed as a rent transfer 
mechanism, which deteriorates the international allocation of production. Most studies 
conclude that the destination country loses from tighter protection whereas the source country 
is usually better off as it can capture increased monopoly profits from the sale of its goods 
abroad16. However, the case is not entirely straightforward since benefits of a dynamic nature 
can be identified for both trading partners. A number of authors have argued that the 
introduction of intellectual property rights can be expected to stimulate innovation in the 
source country and thus will increase future trade flows. This will be beneficial for both 
trading economies assuming that the social returns on these innovations exceed private 
returns. In this view, worldwide harmonisation of intellectual property rights will lead to
13 See for example Ferrantino (1993).
14 Maskus and Penubarti (1995).
15 See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), pp. 307f.
16 See for example Chin and Grossman (1988), Deardorff (1991), Helpman (1993) Maskus (1991) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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continued technological progress and economic growth, and from a dynamic point of view, 
will be beneficial for both leaders and followers17.
In short, while intellectual property rights can be seen as an adjustment mechanism that 
promotes the functioning of dynamic competition between countries, they clearly also 
introduce static distortions in the sense that access to proprietary knowledge is sold above its
1 ftmarginal cost . In view of this caveat, and the ones mentioned before, it appears difficult to 
classify MNEs’ preference for strong intellectual property protection and worldwide 
harmonisation of patent laws as either market conforming or non-conforming. It is a grey 
area, which requires the weighing of a number of factors.
Health Care Policies
Chapter 1 has pointed out that health care markets in all countries are subject to high levels of 
regulation. Indeed, a report by the National Health Care Associates (NERA) has noted that all 
European governments intervene substantially in their health care markets through, for 
example, direct control of drug prices, indirect price control by limiting the reimbursement 
level and mandatory price cuts or freezes19. In other words, health care policies not only 
determine the extend, to which the price mechanism is allowed to function in the health care 
sector, but also directly affect MNEs’ profits and are thus of critical importance for the 
pharmaceutical industry.
Before, however, turning to the six MNEs’ policy preferences, it is first necessary to 
define free market preferences within the context of health care policy. Problems arise 
because it is virtually universally acknowledged that some government regulation is both 
necessary and desirable in order to guarantee health care coverage that is available to and 
affordable by all citizens20. In fact, Danzon has argued that the competitive approach to 
health care recognises that governments should provide subsidies to ensure coverage is
<11
affordable for low income and high-risk individuals . Additionally, regulations in the form 
of national health services or social insurance programmes are required, since it is generally 
acknowledged that individual consumers are not in a position to weigh a medical service
17 See for example Diwan and Rodrik (1991) and Fish and Speyer (1995).
1 ft See Fink and Primo Barga (1992), p. 2, Fink and Primo Braga (1999), p. 4 and Primo Braga (1996).
19 NERA (1994), pp. 2ff.
20 See Danzon (1994), p. 3.
21 Ibid.
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against its price. Sommer has argued that this would require a level of professional expertise 
that could not be expected of an average consumer22.
However, it is still possible to distinguish between market-conforming and non- 
conforming health care policies. The difference has mainly to do with the effects of 
regulations on problems of moral hazard that in the case of health care have the potential to 
significantly distort supply and demand conditions. Danzon has observed that insurance 
programmes tend to make consumers indifferent to costs, because “someone else is paying” 
and thereby encourage over-consumption23. Moreover, because insurance tends to make 
demand inelastic, it raises the profit maximising price that suppliers of insured services and 
products (e.g. pharmaceutical MNEs) would seek to charge. In other words, health care 
regulation has the potential to encourage overuse and higher prices, or, to put it differently, 
the moral hazard effect implies that health care regulations can entail a deadweight loss or 
excess burden24. Economic theory thus concluded that market-conforming insurance 
programmes should include some constraints. If well designed, such constraints are in the 
long run in the interests of consumers, who ultimately pay for overuse through higher 
insurance premiums or higher taxes. These constraints may include consumer incentives such 
as co-payments, and provider incentives such as capitation and other risk-sharing forms of 
reimbursement . Moreover, while government subsidies may be essential to guarantee that 
health care coverage is affordable for everyone, these subsidies should not extend beyond 
basic health care services, and consumers should be left free to purchase more comprehensive 
care with their own income and without additional subsidies .
In practical terms this means that in competitive health care markets, patients can choose 
between various insurance plans and insurers compete by trying to design plans that provide a 
mixture of choice, quality and out-of-pocket and premium cost that most appeals to 
consumers. Drug prices should be free and governments should not intervene in prescribing 
practices of physicians or in the patients’ choice of a physician27. A number of authors have
22 Sommer (1997).
23 Danzon (1994), p. 3. The positive relationship between insurance and utilisation has been demonstrated 
scientifically in the RAND health insurance experiment. See Manning (1987).
24 See Danzon (1994), pp. 15f.
25 See Zeckhauser (1971) and Ellis and McGuire (1993). See also Danzon (1994), p. 17.
26 Danzon has argued that as soon as consumers face the full costs, if they choose to spend more on health 
insurance, there is no reason for the government to control these choices. Governments have no 
superior insight into the appropriate level of health care spending, and any limit other than one derived 
from consumer choices is as arbitrary when applied to health care as it would be for automobiles or 
videocassette recorders. Such arbitrary limits reduce consumer well-being since, by definition, they force 
consumers from their preferred consumption patterns. See Danzon (1994), pp.4f.
27 See Danzon (1994), p. 5.
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argued that if consumers face the full cost of their choices, there is no reason why 
competition in health insurance markets should not hold health insurance premiums and 
prices for medical services at appropriate levels. In fact, there is ample evidence that 
competing health insurance plans are innovative in designing strategies to control insurance- 
induced excess spending28.
The health care policy preferences of the six MNEs’ preferences have been unambiguous 
and straightforward. Through their trade associations, they have been advocating policies 
aimed at increasing competition in the sector through measures to ensure the physician’s 
freedom to prescribe, the patient’s free choice of the physician and the promotion of 
innovation and technological progress through a market-based order29. In the words of one 
Swiss executive,
“industry supports policies that aim to embed all market participants in a market order 
with incentives for cost-consciousness”30.
In similar vein, executives from the German MNEs argued that promoting competition in the 
in the health care market by giving doctors and patients more choice in the selection of drugs 
had always been a priority for them31. Far from seeing government’s inevitable involvement 
as an opportunity for rent-seeking, all six MNEs advocated free prices, a maximum of 
competition and a system in which consumers faced the full costs of their drug purchases. All 
of them, for example, advocated co-payments as a means to foster cost-consciousness among 
consumers32.
For an explanation of these preferences, MNEs' business focus and sectoral characteristics 
were decisive. In fact, all interviewed executives linked their preference for competition- 
promoting measures to their business focus - the development of new and innovative drugs -  
since, in their view, free health care markets were the best mechanism to reward innovation . 
One German executive commented that
28 Ibid. See also Sommer (1997).
29 See for example Interpharma  (1990) and Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie  (BPI) Annual
Report (1996), pp. 16ff.
30 Speech by SGCI President Andres Leuenberger at the Annual General Meeting of the SGCI in 1992.
31 Interviews.
32 See for example Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie (BPI) Annual Report (1996), p. 17, Sommer 
(1997), p. 14, Interpharma (1990), and Humer (1997), p. 65.
33 For the argument that innovation is best rewarded by giving consumers a maximum of choice and by an 
incentive structure that fosters cost-consciousness among all participants in the health care market see Danzon 
(1995), Sommer (1997), Humer (1997), p .62 and Leuenberger (1992).
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“since we are in the business of developing innovative drugs - drugs that are superior to 
existing ones - we believe that giving consumers more choice is ultimately the best 
strategy to promote our products. After all, given free choice, consumers are unlikely to 
select second-best products"34.
In similar vein, a Swiss executive added that
“our strategy to focus on the development of new and innovative drugs implies that we 
strongly support policies that give consumers a maximum of choice. In our view, this is 
best done through a market-oriented health care system."
Interpharma’s general-secretary pointed out that the pharmaceutical industry asked for less 
rather than more state intervention in health care markets, since all research indicated that 
giving consumers more choice in the selection of drugs was the best way to reward 
innovation35. In other words, a business focus on innovative drugs led all six MNEs to 
support competition-promoting health care policies. However, sectoral characteristics were 
also important in this context in order to explain the actual policies through which this 
preference was expressed (e.g. co-payments). Clearly in other sectors, the preference for such 
a policy would not necessarily be considered as market conforming since it leaves a 
substantial role for the state to finance consumer needs. In the health care sector, however, it 
was shown that due to sectoral characteristics such a preference could indeed be considered 
market conforming.
Biotechnology Regulation
The previous chapter has pointed out that biotechnology has become highly important for the 
pharmaceutical industry and that all six MNEs strongly embraced this new technology. As a 
result, biotechnology regulations featured prominently on the six MNEs’ political agendas. 
For analytical clarity, it is useful to distinguish between two sets of regulations: one dealing 
with the approval for drugs derived from the application of biotechnology and one dealing
34 Interview.
35 Interview.
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with the approval of production facilities and research projects. Both sets of regulations can 
be price mechanism promoting, distorting or suspending. EuropaBio has pointed out that 
market conforming biotechnology regulations provide a level playing field and establish a 
regulatory framework that is characterised by a maximum of predictability, legal certainty 
and transparency. Moreover, regulations should be based on scientific principles, be flexible 
enough to facilitate technological change and ensure adequate consumer protection .
With regard to both sets of regulations, the preferences of the six German and Swiss 
MNEs’ were unambiguous. Rather than seeking government support or promotion 
programmes that would tilt the playing field in their favour, all six strongly supported 
framework-oriented regulations that were based on scientific principles and established 
predictability, legal certainty and transparency37. In the words of one German executive,
“our foremost aim has been the establishment of a regulatory regime that is predictable 
and free from political meddling”.
In similar vein, Interpharma has repeatedly argued that it supported a regulatory regime that 
was transparent, flexible and predictable38. Roche’s CEO Humer remarked that
“industry does not demand no regulations - we accept control mechanisms, but they have 
to be predictable and transparent”39.
How can one explain this preference? Clearly, the six MNEs’ business strategy of 
embracing biotechnology gave them a strong interest in the issue, and this interest was 
certainly further buttressed by the increasing number of economic opportunities from the 
application of this technology. However, it seems overly general to argue, as some authors 
have done, that this interest in the issue by itself explained MNEs’ preference for 
deregulation and a minimum of state involvement40. Rather interviewees emphasised the 
importance of being able to react swiftly to new scientific developments and argued that state 
involvement would only result in a loss of flexibility to adjust to the latest discoveries. As
36 See EuropaBio (1997), p. 81.
37 Interviews. See also interview with Andres Leuenberger in Basler Zeitung Jan. 5 1991. For a similar view see
Daniel Wagniere “Die Grenzen des Politisch Machbaren”, Basler Zeitung, June 7 1997.
38 See for example Interpharma (1990).
39 Humer (1997), p. 84.
40 See for example Gill (1997).
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one German executive has put it, “we want to stay flexible and we do not believe that the 
state has any superior insight into future scientific developments”41. A Swiss executive added 
that
“flexibility to react to new scientific discoveries in the way we see fit is of paramount 
importance for us. State involvement - be it through tight regulatory measures or 
promotion programmes - would only curtail our freedom of action”42.
In other words, the preferences of the six MNEs in this issue area cannot directly be linked to 
their internationalisation processes, their business focus or sectoral characteristics, but rather 
resulted from a general desire for a maximum of flexibility when it came to their R&D 
activities.
Parallel Imports
According to executives from the three German MNEs, the problem of parallel imports has 
emerged during the last decade as one of the most important issues facing the German 
pharmaceutical industry. Essentially parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is a consequence of the 
single European market, which on the one hand encourages the free flow of drugs across EU 
countries but, on the other hand, leaves member states free to regulate their health care 
systems as they wish. This regulatory freedom resulted in significant price differentials for 
patented medicines. Research conducted by NERA has pointed out that at the end of 1994, 
prices in the Netherlands were over 75 per cent higher than those in Spain and there was a 
range of prices in between. The consequence has been that private dealers discovered a 
lucrative trade reselling “cheap” drugs bought in low price regions to consumers in countries 
where prices are higher, such as Germany43.
The German MNEs were strongly opposed to parallel trade and advocated measures to 
segment European health care markets along national lines. Seen through the lens of the 
conventional wisdom that explains MNE’s trade policy preferences as a result of their 
exposure to international markets, this preference is surprising. Chapter 2 has pointed out that
41 Interview.
42 Interview.
43 NERA (1996), p. 4f.
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all three German MNEs were highly internationalised and should not be expected to advocate 
any border restrictions to international trade. Sectoral characteristics can provide an 
explanation for this anomaly. Executives from the three MNEs argued that they were opposed 
to parallel imports since price differentials only reflected the fact that some governments 
were more willing than others to contribute to the financing of R&D44. They argued that 
parallel trade would inevitably induce downward spillover pressure on prices and thereby 
undermine the adequacy of revenues to pay for R&D45. As one executive put it,
“in the long run it is not sustainable to have a European single market based on the 
principle of free movement of goods, while at the same time allowing individual countries 
to establish their own regulatory systems for health care, which is leading to different drug 
prices. Inevitably the result is going to be that prices will converge on the lowest price in 
the trading bloc and this will undermine the ability of pharmaceutical companies to set 
prices to cover the costs of R&D in the most efficient manner... If incentives for 
innovative R&D are to be preserved, there is a strong case for exempting from parallel 
trade pharmaceuticals that are subject to price regulation”46.
Judging whether this preference is market conforming or non-conforming is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. In fact, from the three MNEs’ point of view, the preference 
for market segmentation was not protectionist at all since, as all interviewed executives 
argued, free trade under these circumstances was neither fair nor welfare enhancing. They 
argued that it was not fair because lower prices did not reflect superior efficiency and lower 
input costs, but rather countries achieved low drug prices and became parallel exporters 
usually through denial of intellectual property protection or through stringent regulation47. 
Moreover, citing the theory of Ramsey pricing, the industry argued that the preference for 
market segmentation was actually welfare enhancing. Addressing the question of how a firm 
operating in several markets should most efficiently recoup sunk costs, which are common 
across these markets, the theory of Ramsey pricing suggests that relatively higher prices
44 Danzon and Kim (1995) have noted that in order to provide incentives for innovative R&D, governments in 
countries with successful domestic research-based pharmaceutical firms - such as for example Germany, 
Switzerland, the UK and Sweden - have traditionally been more willing to grant higher prices.
45 Interviews.
Afk For a similar view see Danzon (1994), p. 36 and NERA (1994), p. 28.
47 For a similar view see Danzon (1994), p.24. For the argument that high levels of price regulation actually 
reduce efficiency and productivity see Danzon and Percy (1996); for the negative effects on innovation see 
Thomas (1996).
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should be charged where the market can best bear them. This leads to welfare gains compared 
to uniform pricing, because more revenue is earned in those markets where the quantity 
demanded is relatively insensitive to the prices charged and thereby allows lower prices in 
markets where the quantity demanded is more price sensitive. The result is a higher overall 
level of output and an increase in social welfare48. Put differently, the three MNEs were 
arguing that their sales had to contribute to the costs of the overall R&D programme, which 
could be viewed as a sunk cost, and in a situation where sunk costs needed to be recouped 
from total sales to a number of markets, price differentiation could raise social welfare. As 
one executive has put it,
“allowing parallel imports lacks any efficiency rationale. On the contrary, by inducing 
downward spillover pressures on prices, such regulation tends to undermine optimal price 
differentials and undermine the adequacy of revenues to pay for R&D“.
Another interviewee added that
“in the pharmaceutical sector, welfare maximising prices require charging different prices 
to different users, based on their differing price sensitivity of demand and willingness to 
pay for innovative medicines”.
A cynic might, however, respond to these arguments that the motivation to prevent parallel 
imports simply comes down to a desire to protect monopoly privileges by keeping prices high 
and undersupplying the market. In short, similar to intellectual property rights, MNEs’ 
preferences with regard to parallel imports cannot easily be labelled market conforming or 
non-conforming, but rather occupy another grey area. While segmenting health care markets 
along national lines is certainly hardly compatible with the requirements for free price 
competition, it may nevertheless lead to superior results with regard to welfare. It may, 
however, also lead to unjustifiably high drug prices in some countries and monopoly rents for 
pharmaceutical MNEs.
48 See NERA (1996). The conclusion that uniform prices are generally not welfare enhancing for innovative 
pharmaceuticals is also reached by Danzon (1994). See also Ramsey (1927).
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The Economic Policy Preferences of the Six Pharmaceutical MNEs: An Analysis
Judging whether the six MNEs’ policy preferences promote, distort or suspend the price 
mechanism is not entirely clear-cut. Only with regard to biotechnology regulation has the 
case been relatively clear cut: all six MNEs strongly supported a regulatory framework that 
established legal certainty, ensured transparency and was based on scientific principles. In 
other words, a regulatory framework in which the price mechanism could fulfil its undistorted 
signalling function49.
Certainly the six MNEs’ policy preferences with regard to health care policies were also 
market conforming. However, the case here was slightly complicated by sectoral 
characteristics that rendered the meaning of free competition somewhat different to that in 
other sectors. It was shown that the competitive approach to health care recognised a 
legitimate role for government intervention and regulations, which in other sectors could be 
considered as price mechanism distorting. It was argued that market conforming policies in 
the health care sector distinguished themselves by the extent to which they included 
constraints to reduce problems of moral hazard resulting from regulations. All six MNEs 
strongly supported such constraints and advocated measures that gave consumers a maximum 
of choice and fostered cost-consciousness.
The picture became a bit muddier with regard to the six MNEs strong support for the 
protection of intellectual property and the worldwide harmonisation of patent laws. It was 
shown that the literature was not unanimous in its findings regarding the effects of 
intellectual property protection on the functioning of the market mechanism and overall 
economic welfare. With regard to worldwide harmonisation of patent laws, it appeared that a 
case could be made that the preferences of the six MNEs came more than close to rent- 
seeking.
Similarly, the three German MNEs preference for segmenting health care markets along 
national lines in order to prevent parallel imports from other EU member states was 
somewhat ambiguous. Clearly, in other sectors such a preference would be downright 
protectionist. In the pharmaceutical sector, however, it was shown that various factors 
complicated such a verdict.
49 If one, however, includes intellectual property rights for genetically engineered products, 
and processes, the case becomes less straightforward and is subject to the caveats discussed before.
82
Turning to an explanation of the six MNEs’ policy preferences, three of the four analysed 
policy issues fit in well with the argument of Chapter 1 that an analysis that sought to 
examine MNEs’ economic policy preferences needed to go beyond the extent and nature of 
MNEs’ internationalisation process, and also incorporate their business focus and sectoral 
characteristics as additional explanatory factors.
It was shown that MNEs’ preferences with regard to health care policies could be 
explained by the six MNEs' business focus on innovative drugs, which gave them a strong 
interest in free prices and in ensuring that consumers got a maximum of choice. Moreover, 
sectoral characteristics were important for an explanation of the actual policies through which 
this preference was articulated (e.g. co-payments).
Regarding intellectual property rights, sectoral characteristics -  long and expensive R&D 
periods and the fact that drugs can be easily replicated -  gave firms a strong interest in the 
protection of intellectual property. However, internationalisation and business strategies were 
also important. As a result of increasing international sales, the six MNEs became strongly 
interested in the global harmonisation of patent laws. Moreover, their preference for strong 
protection of intellectual property was further buttressed by their business focus on research­
intensive drugs.
With regard to parallel imports, it was again sectoral characteristics that gave the three 
German MNEs a strong interest in the segmentation of EU health care markets along national 
lines. All three MNEs argued that different, country-specific health care regulations rendered 
free trade in prescription drugs neither efficient nor welfare-enhancing. It was pointed out 
that this preference was somewhat surprising - at least when looked at through the lens of the 
conventional theories that explained MNEs’ trade policy preferences as a result of their 
exposure to international markets - since all three MNEs were highly internationalised and 
hence should not be expected to support restrictions on international trade.
The only preference that could not really plausibly be explained by MNEs’ 
internationalisation process, their business strategies or sectoral characteristics was the six 
MNEs’ preference with regard to biotechnology regulations. Although some authors have 
linked MNEs’ preference for a market conforming regulatory framework to their business 
strategy of embracing biotechnology, this appeared not entirely convincing - all interviewees 
linked this preference to a general desire for a maximum of flexibility with regard to their 
R&D activities.
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The Six German and Swiss Banks
Trade in the German and Swiss financial services sector is free in the sense that markets in 
both countries are only regulated to ensure the safety of individual banks and the financial 
system as a whole50. These regulations are, however, qualitatively different to those of goods 
markets due to the existence of problems of moral hazard, information asymmetries and other 
characteristics related to financial services (see below). Prior to the GATS Agreement in 
Financial Services, access to Germany’s and Switzerland’s banking sector was granted on the 
basis of bilateral reciprocity -  the principle that a country discriminated in its treatment of 
foreign firms by affording each of them exactly the same treatment that the country’s own 
firms received in its home country. In both countries there was no evidence that this principle 
had been abused for protectionist purposes51. That does, however, not mean that in both 
countries an undistorted price mechanism matched supply and demand in the most efficient 
manner. In fact, during the period from 1985 to roughly 1995, both the German and the Swiss 
financial service sector underwent important reforms. In both countries these reforms centred 
around market access conditions and regulatory issues. Moreover, in Germany, state- 
sanctioned privileges for public sector banks also became an increasingly contentious issue 
during the 1990s.
Market Access Issues
Market access issues varied slightly for the three German and Swiss banks. One policy issue, 
the GATS Agreement for Financial Services, was of relevance for both the German and 
Swiss banks. In addition, the German banks were strongly affected by financial liberalisation 
measures within the context of the Single European Act (SEA), and the Swiss banks by the 
controversy surrounding the banking conventions through which the Swiss Bankers’ 
Association administered competition in the banking sector. Before turning to these issues, 
however, a brief word about the nature of trade barriers in financial services is in order.
50 See for example Chapuis (1990), Niethammer (1990), Federal Association of German Banks (FAGB) Annual 
Report (1998), p. 37, Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) Annual Report (1995/96), p.102 and Eidegndssisches 
Finanzdepartment (1989)
51 See IMF (1989a) and Huang (1992).
84
At the level of general principle, the effects of free trade in financial services are similar to 
those in manufacturing. Numerous studies have found that free markets for financial services 
promote efficient investment and are better at allocating financial resources than 
bureaucracies52. A number of authors have argued that liberalisation of financial services has 
strong positive effects on income and growth53 and Kono has argued that the driving forces 
behind these effects have been the same as in other sectors: specialisation on the basis of 
comparative advantage, realisation of economies of scale and scope and dissemination of 
know-how and new technologies54. However, despite these similarities, market access issues 
are somewhat more elusive in the financial service sector. Essentially this is the result of the 
fact that trade in financial services often differs from trade in goods in terms of the linkages 
that exist between producer and consumer. Unlike international trade in goods, trade in 
financial services requires in many cases the simultaneous interaction of buyer and seller, and 
hence a commercial presence in the host country is often necessary to provide services in 
another country. Certainly this also occurs in trade in goods through FDI, but as Walter has 
argued, such a mechanism is much more important in the case of financial services55. As a 
corollary, controls and restrictions over the establishment and operation of foreign affiliates 
determines, in large measure, the degree to which a national market is open to foreign 
competition56. In other words, trade distortions in financial services do not take the form of 
border charges or qualitative trade controls, but rather restrictions in the ability of banks to 
operate on the ground in the target market itself57.
However, as has been pointed out in the previous chapter, financial services can also be 
traded through other modes of supply, such as for example through the movement of data and 
money across borders. In these cases, exchange and capital movement controls, as well as 
regulations or restrictions of trans-boundary data flows may constitute barriers to trade in 
financial services. However, one could go further and also include other regulations. For 
example, in cases where trade in financial services occurs through the movement of people, 
immigration restrictions that prevent temporary entry for purposes of providing a service, as
52 For the costs of financial repression see McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). For the strong positive
correlation between investment and financial liberalisation see King and Levine (1993).33Levine (1996,1997) and King and Levine (1993) have shown that countries with open financial sectors have 
typically grown faster than those with closed ones. Hoj, Kato and Pilat (1995) and Levine (1996) have pointed 
out that financial reform in OECD countries banking sectors has resulted in improvements in most indicators of 
operational efficiency.
See Kono (1997), p. 17. See also Zutshi (1995).
55 See Walter (1985), p. 13. Recent development in information technology and e-commerce may, however, 
soon challenge this assumption.
56 Ibid., p. 20. See also Walter (1988), p. 111.
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well as restrictive licensing and certification requirements, may constitute barriers to trade in 
financial services. Finally, trade in services can also occur through access to a network, e.g. 
telecommunications or payment systems. Hence the terms of access or interconnection with
ro
such networks may constitute barriers to trade . However, in order to keep the number of 
policy issues to a manageable number, this study will be only concerned with policy areas 
directly related to financial services59.
Turning now to policy issues, the major market access issue for both the German and 
Swiss banks during the last decade has been the GATS Agreement for Financial Services, 
which was negotiated during the Uruguay Round but only concluded in 1997 when the WTO 
had already come into effect. The aim of the agreement was to bring trade in financial 
services into the WTO framework and to extend the MFN principle (the principle that 
concessions awarded to one country must be automatically extended to all signatories of the 
agreement) to trade in financial services60. Although the agreement contained a large number 
of exceptions relating to natural treatment and market access issues, it was nevertheless 
expected to improve the international allocation of capital and risks61.
Despite their selective internationalisation processes, all six banks strongly supported this 
agreement and praised all efforts towards a liberal and open international order for financial 
services62. If anything, the six banks complained that the agreement was not far-reaching 
enough, in the sense that not all developing countries (and also some developed countries) 
agreed to the proposed liberalisation measures (see Chapter 7) . Interviewees particularly 
stressed the advantages of having financial services within the jurisdiction of the dispute 
settlement mechanism and all of them linked this preference to the increasing 
internationalisation of their business activities. In the words of one executive,
“with the increasing internationalisation of our business operations, we became
See Walter (1988), p. 112, Huang (1992), p. 258 and Smith and Walter (1990), pp. 752ff.
58 See Walter (1988), p. 193.
59 In fact, in a recent survey of financial liberalisation, Williamson and Ahar have argued that there are six 
dimensions of financial sector liberalisation: abolishing of credit controls, freeing of international capital flows, 
deregulation of interest rates, allowing free entry into the banking sector, making banks autonomous (that is, 
freeing them from ad hoc interference in day to day management) and putting banks in private ownership. See 
Williamson and Ahar (1998). For a similar view see Gelb and Sagari (1990), p. lOff.
60 Natural Treatment and Market Access principles were extended to financial services through Annex XXIII 
and Annex XVI.
61 See Kono (1997) and Sorsa (1997). See also Chapter 7.
62 Interviews. See also SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 106, Annual Report (1995/96), p. 102 and FAGB 
Annual Report (1996), p. 127.
63 Interviews. See also SBA Annual Report (1995/96), p. 102 and FAGB Annual Report (1996), p. 127.
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increasingly aware of the need to have some form of internationalised intermediation 
procedure”64.
In other words, with regard to the GATS Agreement in Financial Services there has been a 
clear and direct link between the internationalisation processes of the six banks and their 
preferences. There were no signs that the selective nature of banks internationalisation 
processes weakened their support for open international markets in financial services.
The second market access issue during the late 1980s and 1990s centred around European 
directives for the establishment of a single market in financial services within the context of 
the Single European Act. These directives primarily concerned the German banks, but 
Chapter 6 will show that the Swiss banks were also affected. The European directives went a 
lot further than the GATS Agreement with their liberalisation efforts, since they not only 
addressed market access issues, but also aimed to establish common regulatory and 
supervisory standards among member states (see Chapter 7).
The three German banks strongly supported the initiative for the establishment of a single 
European market in financial services65. However, this support was not so much based on 
improved market access opportunities -  Chapter 2 has noted that none of the six banks 
planned to establish a pan-European branch network -  but rather on the desire to overcome 
the fragmentation of Europe’s capital markets (see Chapter 7). All interviewees argued that 
European wholesale markets were considerably fragmented due to different regulatory 
frameworks -  something, which in their view, depressed market liquidity. Moreover, these 
regulatory differences between European countries made it difficult and expensive for banks 
to do business across national jurisdictions66. In the words of one executive,
“the European directives for the establishment of a single market in financial services 
corresponded to our general preference for a maximum of regulatory harmonisation 
between countries”67.
64 Interview.
65 See FAGB Annual Reports.
66 Interviews.
67 Interview.
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As will be elaborated in the next section, the preference for an international harmonisation of 
regulatory and supervisory standards can be explained by a combination of banks’ 
internationalisation processes and their business strategies.
A last market access policy issue concerns the Swiss banks. Although Switzerland’s 
banking sector has long been free from public policies or regulations that discriminated 
against foreign banks, the issue of market access was until the early 1990s far from clear cut. 
While both the three German and the three Swiss banks strongly supported a rule-based, open 
international trading system for financial services, their preferences diverged sharply -  at 
least prior to 1990 -  when it came to competition in the domestic banking sector. Although 
Credit Suisse, SBC and UBS competed fiercely against each other in international markets, 
they preferred “administered” competition in their home market. Through the Swiss Bankers ’ 
Association (SBA), they agreed on a number of “conventions”, which regulated a large 
number of business activities ranging from mortgage rates and deposit fees, to advertisements
i 'O
and the number of branches each bank was allowed to operate in Switzerland . In other 
words, the three banks supported a number of highly illiberal practices that suspended the 
market mechanism. From the three banks’ point of view, these conventions had, however, 
nothing to do with rent-seeking. The SBA’s chief economist argued that these measures were 
necessary for the smooth functioning of the Swiss financial centre and, in fact, “raised 
efficiency, enhanced transparency and allowed a soft adjustment process”69. What mattered, 
so the three banks, was not competition per se, but rather market outcomes and the 
contestability of the market70.
Analysing a number of performance indicators - such as returns on assets and equity, 
interest margins, foreign share in total banking assets or liabilities, relative shares of banking 
activities in the economy, concentration ratios, profit or intermediation margins - Bossard, 
Wirth and Blattner have argued that Switzerland’s banking sector was efficient and open71. 
However, Sorsa, among others, has noted that interpreting these indicators was difficult. 
Performance indicators can vary across countries for reasons such as perception of risk and 
size of market, with little relation to competition or openness as such. Moreover, prices can
68 It might be objected that these conventions amount to a private arrangement between Switzerland’s banks and 
hence do not fall into the category of public policies. However, Chapter 4 will argue that one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of Switzerland's policy-making system is its so-called private interest or militia 
government: a system of policy-making which relies on organised interests for the drafting and implementation 
of public policies. Hence it is entirely justifiable to include the banking conventions in an analysis of banks 
preferences with regard to public policies.
See Blattner (1991), p. 98.
70 Ibid. For a similar view see Graham and Lawrence (1996).
71 Bossard, Wirth and Blattner (1992).
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vary according to quality or differentiation of products. Finally, profits in some markets can 
be high because risk premiums are high, or concentration ratios of banks can depend on the 
economic size of the market or the firm72. In other words, the line that divided the three Swiss 
banks’ preference for administered competition from rent-seeking appeared to have been very 
thin. In fact, in 1990 the Swiss government abolished all conventions and introduced price 
competition for all financial services. Despite initial reservations, the three banks came round 
to accept the need for a market-based order and henceforth supported competition-promoting 
measures (see Chapter 6).
Explaining the three Swiss banks’ preference for administered competition through the 
explanatory framework of this study is difficult. First, it was noted that the Swiss banks were 
during the 1980s more internationalised than the three German banks. Hence, at least 
according to the conventional wisdom, they should be more supportive of free markets than 
the German banks. Clearly this has not been the case. Second, there have not been any major 
differences in the six banks' business focus and obviously all six were subject to the same 
sectoral characteristics. Yet the Swiss banks’ preferences in this issue area have been very 
different from the German banks. While the latter were supporting liberal framework 
conditions, the Swiss banks preferred policies that suspended the market mechanism.
This finding represents a significant anomaly and suggests that apart from the extent and 
nature of MNEs’ internationalisation process, their business focus and sectoral 
characteristics, other factors may also shape MNEs' preferences. One possible explanation in 
this case is Germany’s and Switzerland’s differing attitude towards competition policy. The 
following chapter will point out that many of Germany’s economic policies have over the last 
decades been characterised by stringent competition policies, whereas Switzerland has been 
more cartel-friendly. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to explore this issue 
further.
Regulatory Issues
Both the German and the Swiss financial service sector underwent important regulatory 
reforms during the last decade. In both countries these reforms centred around adjusting the 
domestic regulatory framework to securitisation and international norms and standards.
72 See Sorsa (1997), p. 23.
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Before, however, turning to these issues and the six banks’ preferences, a brief word about 
banking regulation is in order.
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, there is widespread consensus that the financial 
service sector should be subject to special regulations . Virtually everybody agrees that 
investors need to be protected due to information asymmetries74, that banks are inherently
'T C
unstable because of the promise they make to redeem deposits at par on demand , and that 
banking crises always carry with them negative externalities . Walter has noted that
“it is conventional wisdom that major banking crises can lead to severe damage to 
employment, income, economic growth and related goals of society”77.
In order to protect themselves against such adverse consequences and to ensure the safety and 
stability of national financial systems, countries have built elaborate regulatory systems and 
safety nets. Additionally -  and to cope with the inevitable problem of moral hazard78 - 
governments apply various techniques of financial surveillance and control. These range from 
reserve requirements, mandatory asset ratios, and maximum lending limits to risk-related 
deposit insurance premiums, disclosure provisions and securities laws79.
With the increasing integration of global capital markets, these regulatory and supervisory 
measures have taken on an additional importance. Kono has argued that adequate prudential 
regulation and supervision become particularly important in open financial markets, as 
liberalisation with its intensified competitive pressures reduced the ability of institutions to 
"survive” poor performance80. Moreover, it has often been pointed out that trade in services
73 See for example Spong (1990).
74 As with all services, the quality of financial services cannot be assessed a priori, but only while the service is 
consumed. As a result, producers know inevitably more about their product than consumers; hence the need for
regulation to assure consumers about the quality of the service they are purchasing. See Schenker (1996), p. 10.
75 A recent World Bank study identified banking crises in as many as 69 countries since the late 1970s. See 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996). A similar study by the IMF estimated that three quarters of IMF member 
countries experienced "significant bank sector problems" between 1980 and 1995. See Lindgren et.al. (1996).
76 See Walter (1985), p. 1 and Walter (1988), pp. 2ff.
77 See Walter (1988), p. 37.
78 Through underwriting banks’ debts - either explicitly (through deposit insurance) or implicitly (by letting it
be
understood that banks will not be allowed to fail) -  the existence of safety nets create potential “moral hazard” 
problems where management of financial institutions, knowing that they are likely to be bailed out, will behave 
in a less risk-averse manner and thus impose substantial contingent liabilities on those who hold up the safety 
net -  the taxpayers and the general public. See Walter (1988), p. 37 and BIS (1986).
79 See BIS (1986).
80 See Kono (1997), pp. 23, 27f. Commentators have often been quick to link banking sector problems to 
deregulation and liberalisation measures. However, a number of authors have noted that the key causes for
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allows countries to shift beyond their own borders some of the negative welfare effects of 
their regulatory approaches. The existence of such spillovers can lead to contagion effects 
where instability or regulatory failure in one market undermines market confidence
01
elsewhere . In short, due to a number of sectoral characteristics, the financial service sector 
needs to be considerably regulated.
However, this does not mean that price competition must necessarily be distorted or 
suspended. The OECD has noted that
“regulation does not necessarily restrict or distort competition, quite to the opposite, it can 
also improve allocative efficiency by levelling the playing field for all participants as well 
as through rules, which enhance market transparency, strengthen investor confidence, 
reduce transaction costs and allow the financial system the flexibility to adjust to new 
circumstances”82.
Transparency is often singled out as a particularly important requirement for market 
conforming banking regulations. Schenker has pointed out that investor insecurity regarding 
the reliability and completeness of information will lead them to demand a risk premium, 
which will artificially raise the cost of capital. Moreover, transparency is of crucial 
importance for the marking conforming protection of investors. Rather than prohibiting 
certain financial instruments -  something that is equal to saying that certain degrees of risk 
are not suitable for investors -  market conforming investor protection provides a maximum 
of transparency and information in order to allow investors to make well- informed choices .
Turning now to policy issues, the main policy initiatives in Germany and Switzerland 
centred around measures to adjust capital market regulations to securitisation, 
disintermediation and the growing integration of international capital markets. To this end,
financial sector problems usually lie in unsound macroeconomic policies, inappropriate government intervention 
and inadequate regulation and supervision. See Harris and Piggot (1997), Jacquet (1997) and BIS (1997a). It 
should also be noted in this context that the liberalisation of financial services requires a stable macroeconomic 
environment since the adverse effects of inflation, large budget deficits or unsustainable exchange rates can be 
compounded by international financial flows. See World Bank (1997), BIS (1997), UNCTAD (1996). In fact, it 
has became a widely held view that financial liberalisation should not be introduced prematurely in the reform 
process of countries. See Johnston (1994), World Bank (1997), BIS (1997), Helleiner (1997).
1 See for example IMF (1989), pp. 50-60 and Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 274.
82 OECD (1991), p. 21ff. See also “Cooke’s Medicine: Kill or Cure?“, Euromoney, July 1988, pp. 34-54 and
Schenker (1996), p. 22.
83 See Schenker (1997), p. lOff. Often cited in this context is the Royal Canadian Banking Commission’s 
comment of 1935 that "we should not take away from the citizen his inalienable right to make a fool of himself' 
(quoted in Schenker 1996, p. 12).
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governments in both countries ratified a number of reform acts (see Chapter 6). The six 
banks’ policy preferences with regard to these reforms have been unambiguous: all of them 
supported a regulatory framework, which was compatible with international norms and 
standards, provided for maximum of transparency and was conducive to the development of 
efficient capital markets . All six banks strongly advocated measures to broaden and deepen 
capital markets in their countries. As one Swiss executive put it,
"the goal has to be to open the Swiss capital market to foreign supply and demand, as well 
as to new financial products; of particular importance are measures to create markets for 
venture capital, to enhance information and transparency and to establish internationally 
recognised supervisory standards"85.
A German executive argued that
“what is needed are measures to make it easier for companies to obtain stock market 
listings, a quicker approval of new financial instruments and a broadening of the 
corporate bond market segment to include junk bonds or high yield bonds, which will
O /T
allow companies with low credit ratings to raise capital in the markets” .
Moreover, the six banks strongly advocated reforms to adjust the German and Swiss 
regulatory frameworks to internationally recognised norms and standards. Both the Federal 
Association of German Bank (FAGB) and the Swiss Bankers ’ Association (SBA) have been 
repeatedly stating their preference for the harmonisation of banking regulations on an 
international scale87. Finally, all six banks were strongly in favour of measures to enhance to 
the organisational efficiency of the German and Swiss stock exchanges.
For an explanation of these preferences both banks’ internationalisation processes and 
their business focus were of importance. All interviewed executives linked their preference 
for a deepening and broadening of capital markets - and for adjusting domestic regulation to 
internationally recognised norms and standards - to the increasing internationalisation of their 
business activities, and to a desire to operate in a domestic regulatory framework that is
84
Interviews. See also FAGB Annual Report (1988), pp. 36-37 and SBA Annual Report (1994/95), p. 58.
85 Interview.
86 Interview. See also “Kapitalmarktkultur entwickeln", Borsenzeitung December 4 1997.
on
See for example FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 18 and SBA Annual Report (1995/96), p. 39.
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similar to those in international financial centres.88. Moreover, since the important bits of the 
investment banking and asset management business are clustered in a few international 
financial centres from which they are exported to other countries, banks became strongly 
interested in being able to do business across national jurisdictions. However, stocks and 
future exchanges are in all countries regulated by national authorities and operate in national 
jurisdictions under national law -  something, which makes it often difficult and expensive for 
banks to do business across national boundaries. Hence the strong preference for regulatory 
harmonisation on an international scale.
The finding that all interviewees linked their banks' preference for a broadening and 
deepening of domestic capital markets and for adjusting domestic regulations to international 
standards to the increasing internationalisation of business activities, does not fit in well with 
the hypothesis raised in Chapter 1 that internationalisation was unlikely to explain MNEs’ 
preferences with regard to domestic policy issues. In the case of banking regulations, the six 
banks’ internationalisation processes were clearly of significance. However, executives 
acknowledged that their banks’ relatively new business focus on investment banking and 
asset management was also important. After all, the six banks internationalised business 
activities in order to expand their investment banking and asset management operations. In 
this sense, the strategic choice to embrace these two businesses gave the six banks by itself a 
natural interest in efficiently functioning capital markets. Since in this case 
internationalisation and business focus were closely intertwined, it is difficult to sort out 
which of the two factors came first and was in the end more important. As one interviewee 
noted, “it’s a bit like the chicken and egg problem”89.
Public Ownership of Banks
Public ownership of banks has been an important issue for the three German banks during the 
1990s90. Chapter 6 will point out that the German banking sector has a relatively large share 
of state owned banks, which enjoy generous privileges. Most importantly, they benefit from 
an implicit public guarantee, which allows them to raise capital cheaply.
88 Interviews.
89 Interview.
90 In contrast to Germany, public ownership of banks has not been a contentious issue in Switzerland.
Hirszowicz has noted that cantonal banks have stuck to their traditional role of accepting deposits and granting
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Although Germany’s commercial banks have long been complaining about what they 
regard as unfair competition, the issue acquired a new sense of urgency for them during the 
1990s as some of the public sector banks -  the Landesbanken -  started building up 
investment banking and asset management divisions. This move precipitated sharp criticism 
from the three banks, which argued that the activities of Germany’s state owned banks led to 
competition distortions and had negative ramifications for the single market91. In their view, 
the government should privatise the Landesbanken, or at least make them pay a market price 
for capital. In the word of one executive “public banks are a cancerous growth that had to be 
uprooted”92.
Explaining this preference through the explanatory framework of this study is, however, 
difficult, since it is hardly plausible to link the three commercial banks’ preference for a level 
playing field to their internationalisation processes, their business focus or sectoral 
characteristics. Rather bank executives explained this preference as a natural concern that one 
was likely to encounter in every firm, which was facing competitors with obvious unfair 
competitive advantages.
The Six Banks’ Economic Policy Preferences: An Analysis
Judged by their public policy preferences, the three German banks have been strongly 
supportive of competition. All of them supported the GATS Agreement for Financial 
Services, welcomed the single market programme to establish a common market for financial 
services, advocated measures to deepen and broaden Germany’s capital markets, and were 
relentlessly campaigning for a level playing field between Germany’s commercial and public 
sector banks.
The three Swiss banks’ preferences -  at least prior to 1990 - were less clear cut. While 
they were also supporting open international markets for financial services, the three banks 
preferred “administered” competition in their home market. Through the Swiss Bankers’ 
Association they operated a system of conventions which largely suspended the price 
mechanism. Citing a number of contestability and efficiency indicators, the three Swiss 
Banks and the SBA argued that these conventions actually enhanced the efficiency and the
loans in the local area and have not attracted criticism from Switzerland’s private banks. See Hirszowicz (1996),
p. 10.
1 See for example FAGB Annual Report (1998), pp. 44-47.
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functioning of the Swiss banking sector. However, it was pointed out that these indicators 
were far from universally accepted. In other words, there was only a very thin line that 
divided the Swiss banks’ preferences from rent-seeking. In fact, the Swiss government 
abolished the conventions in 1990 as they became increasingly incompatible with 
international norms and standards.
Turning now to an explanation of the six banks’ preferences, the hypothesis that 
internationalisation was unlikely to be an important explanatory factor behind MNEs' policy 
preferences with regard to domestic policy issues, did not hold up as well as in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Despite the fact that the six banks were less internationalised than the 
six pharmaceutical MNEs, banks' internationalisation processes turned out to be of 
significance for their policy preferences.
Certainly this was the case with regard to the six banks’ support for the GATS Agreement 
in Financial Services. It was pointed out that although the six banks internationalised their 
business operations only selectively, all interviewed executives nevertheless linked their 
support for the GATS Agreement to the increasing internationalisation of their business 
activities. All interviewees stressed the importance of bringing financial services within the 
jurisdiction of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism and extending the MEN, Natural 
Treatment and Market Access principles to financial services. The importance of banks' 
internationalisation process in this context was, however, hardly surprising, since the GATS 
Agreement was a clear-cut trade policy issue, while all of the policy issues in the 
pharmaceutical sector were primarily domestic policy issues.
What was surprising, however, was that internationalisation was also an important factor 
behind the six banks' policy preferences with regard to reforms of domestic regulatory 
frameworks. It was noted that all six banks supported measures to broaden and deepen 
domestic capital markets and to adjust regulatory frameworks to international best practices, 
and that these preferences could, at least partly, be linked to banks' internationalisation 
processes. As banks expanded their business activities in international financial centres with 
well-functioning capital markets, they became increasingly keen to benefit from the same 
regulations in their home countries. Moreover, since the main bits of the investment banking 
and asset management business are located in a few financial centres, global capital markets 
became increasingly important for the six banks. Hence all of them supported the 
harmonisation of banking regulations on an international scale.
92 Interview.
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A similar reasoning was also behind the three German banks’ support for European 
directives for the establishment of a single market in financial services. It was noted that it 
was not the desire of the selected banks to establish a pan-European branch network that led 
them to support this initiative by the European Commission - Chapter 2 has pointed out that 
none of the selected banks was such harbouring ambitions - but rather German bank 
executives linked their preference for a common market in financial services to their desire 
for the harmonisation of regulatory and supervisory standards in order to increase the 
efficiency of Europe’s capital markets93.
However, banks’ business strategies were also important for an explanation of these 
preferences. Indeed, it appears not entirely clear which of the two factors was more 
important. After all, it was the strategy to embrace the securities business that led the six 
banks to strongly internationalise their investment banking and asset management activities 
and clearly, this business focus gave the six banks by itself a strong interest in efficiently 
functioning capital markets.
Finally, and similar to the pharmaceutical sector, it must be said that the proposed 
explanatory framework could not explain all of banks' preferences. First, it could not explain 
the three German banks' preference for a level playing field between commercial and public 
sector banks. Rather than being the result of bank- or sector-specific characteristics, this 
preference could more plausibly be explained as a concern likely to be voiced by every firm 
that was facing competitors, which benefited from unfair competitive advantages. Second, the 
explanatory framework could also not explain the three Swiss Banks' (pre-1990) preference 
for administered competition. Although the Swiss banks had a more substantial international 
business than the German banks in the 1980s (something that should lead them to support 
open markets) and had a broadly similar business focus, they favoured a set of conventions 
which largely suspended the price mechanism, while the German banks supported price 
competition. The following chapter will point out that Swiss competition laws are not 
distinguished by their stringency and that Switzerland has in the past often displayed a cartel- 
friendly attitude. This seems to suggest that national characteristics can also have an impact 
on the policy preferences of MNEs. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to develop 
this point further.
93 Interview.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the economic policy preferences of the selected 
MNEs. In line with the argument made in Chapter 1 that high levels of regulation were likely 
to encourage rent-seeking policies, neither the pharmaceutical MNEs’ nor the banks’ policy 
preferences were entirely straightforward: in the pharmaceutical sector, the six MNEs 
supported competition-promoting health care policies and a market-conforming regulatory 
framework for biotechnology regulations. Yet all of them also supported a maximum of 
intellectual property protection and the worldwide harmonisation of patent laws. Moreover, 
the German MNEs advocated the segmentation of EU health care markets along national 
lines in order to prevent parallel imports. It was noted that theoretical ambiguities and 
sectoral characteristics rendered it somewhat problematic to label these preferences 
downright rent-seeking, but clearly they are difficult to accommodate with free price 
competition.
In the financial services sector, all six banks supported open international markets, the 
broadening and deepening of domestic capital markets and the adjustment of domestic 
regulatory frameworks to international norms and standards. Yet the Swiss banks, at least 
prior to 1990, supported a regime of conventions, which suspended the price mechanism for a 
number of banking services. While also not entirely free from ambiguities, it appears difficult 
to label this preference for administered competition anything but rent-seeking. Although it 
has often been argued that performance indicators showed that Switzerland’s banking sector 
was perfectly efficient, innovative and open, it has also been pointed out that the literature 
was far from unanimous when it came to the accuracy and reliability of these indicators. Only 
the German banks disproved the hypothesis that high levels of regulation were likely to 
encourage rent-seeking behaviour: all three unambiguously supported competition-promoting 
policies.
Turning to an explanation of these preferences, Chapter 1 argued that internationalisation 
was unlikely to explain MNEs' preferences with regard to domestic policy issues. While the 
traditional explanatory logic that explained MNEs' trade policy preferences as a result of the 
extent and nature of their internationalisation process certainly remained valid, it was 
suggested that an analysis of domestic policy issues required two additional explanatory 
factors: MNEs' business focus and sectoral characteristics. Put differently, the goal of the 
study was not to disprove existing theories about MNEs' trade policy preferences but rather to
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go beyond them. Pharmaceutical MNEs and banks appeared to make good case studies to 
explore the importance of internationalisation for MNEs’ policy preferences since MNEs 
from these two sectors differ significantly in the extent and nature of their exposure to 
international markets.
In the pharmaceutical sector the findings were largely consistent with the hypothesis that 
internationalisation was not important for MNEs preferences with regard to domestic policy 
issues. It was shown that the business focus of the six MNEs and sectoral characteristics went 
a long way towards explaining their policy preferences with regard to health care policies, 
intellectual property rights and parallel imports. Only with regard to the worldwide 
harmonisation of patent laws was the six MNEs’ internationalisation process of importance. 
Moreover, the analysis discovered one important anomaly: despite high levels of 
internationalisation - which according to the literature should lead MNEs to support free trade 
- the three German MNEs supported market-closing policies for drug re-imports from other 
European countries. It was shown that sectoral characteristics could explain this anomaly.
In the financial services sector, the findings did not entirely vindicate the study’s 
hypothesis. Although the six banks were less internationalised than the pharmaceutical 
MNEs, their internationalisation processes were an important factor behind their policy 
preferences. In the case of the GATS Agreement for Financial Services this could be 
expected, since this was a clear-cut trade policy issue. However, internationalisation also 
proved to be of importance for the six banks’ policy preferences with regard to reforms of the 
domestic regulatory frameworks. While banks’ business focus was also a significant factor in 
this context, the findings nevertheless showed that the argument that internationalisation was 
unlikely to be of importance for MNEs’ domestic policy preferences has been a bit premature.
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4Economic Policy-Making in Germany 
and Switzerland
This study is, however, not only about MNEs’ preferences but also about their political 
influence and, as has been argued earlier, the former is unlikely to provide by itself a reliable 
basis for explaining, let alone predicting, the latter. First, as Chapter 1 has argued, institutions 
matter. In many cases they determine the nature and degree of firms’ access to policy-making 
circles and thereby distribute power. Second, as has also been argued in Chapter 1, 
circumstances matter. Regardless of whether one relies on interests (as the rational choice 
literature does) or institutions (as the corporatist literature does) as the basis for explaining 
policy outcomes, the circumstances under which policy-making takes place cannot be ignored 
since they are likely to have an impact on governments preferences, the extent of opposition 
from other interest groups and the degree to which MNEs can use their internationalisation 
process for political leverage. In other words, they have an impact on institutions and 
perceptions of self-interest and are thus likely to condition the political influence of MNEs. 
What is thus needed is an analysis that brings the various explanatory approaches together -  a 
study that focuses on a selection of policy issues and then determines for each case separately 
whether it was MNEs’ interests, their institutional linkages to the policy-making process, the 
impact of circumstances or some combination of the three factors which best explains the 
actual policy outcome. On this basis, it should then be possible to suggest some broader 
conclusions about MNEs’ political influence. This chapter will provide the basis for such an 
analysis. It will examine the institutional structure of the German and Swiss economic policy­
making process and analyse the economic and political circumstances under which policy­
making took place during the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. 
Together with MNEs’ interests -  which were analysed in the previous chapter -  Chapters 5 
and 6 will then focus on a sample of policy issues in the pharmaceutical and the financial 
services sector and draw the various pieces together.
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Germany
Institutional Structure of the Economic Policy-Making Process
The institutional structure of the German economic policy-making process has featured in 
numerous studies, and the findings are well accepted in the literature. Essentially it is a 
system of economic policy-making, which includes a relatively large number of 
governmental and non-governmental actors and which is strongly geared towards consensual 
decision-making1. Writing in the 1960s, Andrew Shonfield coined the term “organised 
capitalism”.
The need for consensual decision-making arises from the limited executive powers of the 
German government and from the inclusion of numerous non-governmental actors in the 
economic policy-making process -  in other words, from high levels of decentralisation. 
While the German government is essential for bringing the various actors together, its 
executive powers are otherwise significantly constrained by numerous checks and balances.* 
These include the federal structure, which gives the Lander the right to participate in policy 
making through the Bundesrat (the upper house of parliament, which can block or even reject 
bills passed by the lower house, the Bundestag) and which leaves Lander governments 
significant scope for pursuing their own industrial policies -  something that, as Pohle has 
argued, can either undermine or reinforce federal economic policies . Scharpf has pointed out 
that this system of permitting the states to collectively exercise a degree of influence on 
federal policy was in an international comparison “absolutely extraordinary” .
Further checks on the executive include a number of semi-autonomous regulatory 
agencies, the federal constitutional court, which has acquired a reputation for stringent 
judicial reviews of government policies’ and a fiercely independent central bank. These 
parapublic institutions are often seen as an important factor behind Germany’s political 
stability. Groser, for example, has argued that they have provided a key to a quiet and
1 See for example Katzenstein (1987) and (1989), Berghan and Karsten (1987), Sally (1995) and Shonefield 
(1965). For a comparative analysis that contrasts German economic organisation to that found in other countries 
see Hart (1992) and Soskice (1990).
2 See Pohle (1995). Paterson and Webber (1986) have argued that Germany’s federal system has reinforced a 
comparatively low degree of political polarisation and a predominantly co-operative style of opposition, since in 
Germany’s political system no major party is ever completely out of office and devoid of political influence.
3 Scharpf (1990), p. 570.
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harmonious process of formulating policy, while Katzenstein has credited them with helping 
to reinforce the peace that has prevailed between the social forces of the Left and Right since 
19454.
However, German legislation not only confers restricted powers on public authorities, but 
also requires that these powers be only exercised in consultation with major societal interests. 
Accordingly, economic policy-making networks encompass not only various federal and state 
agencies, but also numerous non-governmental actors. Most prominent among them are the 
associations of business and labour.
In contrast to the dispersion of state power among competing institutions, power in 
Germany’s private sector is thoroughly centralised. The business community is organised into 
three peak associations. The Employers’ Association (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbande or BDA) represents employers in collective wage bargaining rounds, 
the Chamber of German Commerce (Deutscher Industrie-und Handelstag - DIHT) represents 
the interests of small interests and crafts on a regional basis and the Federation of German 
Industry (Bunbesverband der Deutschen Industrie - BDI) represents the overall economic 
policy objectives of German business. Additionally there are numerous sectoral associations, 
which deal with more technical and sector-specific issues. Similar to the business community, 
power is thoroughly centralised in the labour domain. .Seventeen unions organise workers 
along industry lines under the umbrella of the Federation of German Trade Unions 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund - DGB). In addition, there are independent unions for white- 
collar employees and civil servants.
These decentralising and centralising features of the German economic policy-making 
process are linked at various levels through numerous institutions. For example, the trade 
associations and unions are directly represented in parliamentary committees dealing with 
matters of interest to them and regulations and laws assure these groups access to the state 
bureaucracy. Katzenstein, among others, has observed that as a result, economic policy­
making is carried out through negotiations between the government and organised economic 
interests in a process of mutual give and take5. Moreover, he has noted that this system of 
government multiplied potential sources of veto and made large-scale departures from 
established policies an improbable occurrence. Instead, policy change was likely to be 
incremental even when a new government was voted into office6.
4 See Groser (1983) and Katzenstein (1987), p. 58.
5 See Katzenstein (1987) and (1989), pp. 307-353.
6 See Katzenstein (1987), pp. 15, 35, 81.
101
Another important component of Germany’s system of organised capitalism is the concept 
of social partnership: negotiated agreements between the employer associations and labour 
unions on issues ranging from wage bargaining to vocational training . In addition, German 
law provides for elected workforce representation on the supervisory boards of firms with 
five hundred or more employees and in the works councils for each workplace with five or 
more employees. Since in most cases works councillors and supervisory board members of 
the workforce are also union members, Germany's system of industrial relations provides also 
for a firm-based level of union influence and labour-management negotiations8.
A further component of Germany’s organised capitalism is the financial system, which 
was for decades dominated by a small number of universal banks, the three largest being 
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank. In order to rebuild rapidly after World 
War n, German policymakers re-established a banking system based on a nineteenth century 
model that could allocate large amounts of capital quickly and effectively. Unlike the 
American system, the German banking system is not restricted by detailed regulations that 
separate financial functions. German banks are free to own stock, sit on the boards of 
directors, vote large numbers of proxy shares, and make long-term loans to most firms, large 
and small9. Shonfield has pointed out that the link between great institutional power and the 
investment needs of individual firms has made the banks major actors in the maintenance of 
the country’s overall economic health. However, during the following decades, German 
industry increasingly evolved from the earlier “one firm -  one bank” (house bank) 
relationship toward a looser system of finance10.
It is often argued that the interests of German business feature prominently in economic
policy making networks11. Katzenstein has pointed out that German business was largely
credited for the economic miracle of the 1950s and, as result, irrespective of which party held
10the reins of power, business enjoyed a pre-eminent place Germany’s political life . Indeed, 
the linkages between business and the state appear to be particularly strong. While the trade 
associations certainly lobby on behalf of their members in order to extract favourable policies
7 See Turner (1997), p. 4.
8 See for example Turner (1997), p. 4f and Auer (1997), pp. 16-19. For the centrality of this "dual system" 
(co-determination at the plant level and industry-wide collective bargaining) to an understanding of German 
industrial relations see Thelen (1991).
9 See Allen (1997), p. 144.
10 See Oberbeck and Baethge (1989) and Esser (1989).
11 See for example Sally (1995).
12 Katzenstein (1987), pp. 24f.
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from the state, they also perform a number of other roles, which distinguish them from other 
interest groups. As an official from the BDI has argued,
“association staff often provide information and expert advice to the state, help 
implementing policies, offer self-regulation in order to fend off legal regulation by the 
state, conduct trial runs of proposed legislation in member firms, and make their members 
behave ‘responsibly’ in specific policy areas”13.
Streeck has pointed out that the peak associations help to compensate for the state’s lack of 
direct access to the complexities of economic realities. He has argued that by doing so, the 
trade associations perform an essentially public function without being formally part of the 
state apparatus14. Analysing German economic policy-making in the 1980s, Streeck 
concluded that
“the picture that emerged .. .was one of the state so continuously soliciting expert advice 
and other ‘auxiliary services’ from associations that this amounted to a ‘forcible 
devolution’ to them of what rightly should be public tasks and responsibilities, and in 
effect to an expropriation of their organisational resources"15.
This assessment appears to hold true in the 1990s. According to an official from the Ministry 
of Economics, it would be not be accurate to think of Germany’s trade associations as mere 
pressure groups; rather they devote much of their efforts to the assistance of government. In 
return, so the official, “there is a tendency on part of the state to confer on them public status 
and responsibilities”16.
It is often argued that unification did not alter in any substantial way these institutional
17arrangements . Webber, for example, has argued that the federal government has remained 
weak and was often forced to negotiate with state governments from a position of weakness. 
Although the new eastern states were dependent on financial transfers from the West, there 
has been no “hollowing out” of the co-operative federalist system18. Analysing economic
13 Interview.
14 See Streeck (1983), p. 269.
15 Ibid., p. 268.
16 Interview.
17 See for example Sally and Webber (1994).
18 Webber (1997), p. 247. In the immediate aftermath of unification it was often forecasted that the integration 
of five economically and financially weak eastern states would enable the federal government to play off a
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policy-making in the early 1990s, Sally and Webber have argued that the comparatively close 
and intensive relationship of government, business and labour continued to distinguish the 
post-unification republic from other big democratic capitalist states; in their view, co­
operation and compromise were likely to remain more pervasive in the politics of the unified 
Germany than confrontation and polarisation19. In similar vein, Auer has emphasised the 
capacity for continuing negotiated problem solving within the basic social partnership 
model20.
Indeed, there has been evidence for a renaissance of neo-corporatist initiatives. Citing the 
example of the newly set up employment companies (Beschaftigungsgesellschafen) to 
mitigate the effects of mass redundancies in the aftermath of unification, Webber has argued 
that within a year of unification, the traditional German pattern of neo-corporatist crisis 
management had begun to reassert itself21. Moreover, Turner has observed that the
institutions of social partnership were successfully established in Eastern Germany in an
00extraordinarily short period of time (1990-1994) . However, the most visible expression of 
continued corporatist activities were arguably the negotiations over a “Solidarity Pact” during 
the winter of 1992-1993. Through this pact, Chancellor Kohl hoped to persuade the unions to 
exercise wage moderation in the West - and to revise their policy of raising eastern wages to 
western levels - and the business associations to make sacrifices, on behalf of their members, 
which would enable the package to be sold politically as “equitable”23. Although the initiative 
failed to persuade the unions and the business associations to make substantial concessions, it 
has been interpreted as accelerating a trend toward neo-corporatist crisis management at the 
level of the states24. In fact, Webber has argued that
“four years after unification, there was not less but more neo-corporatist interaction among
majority of weak (western as well as eastern) states dependent on federal financial support against a minority of 
financially strong states and thus lead to a greater centralisation of power. See Scharpf (1990), pp. 579-587, 
Hesse and Renzsch (1990) and Leonardy (1991). According to Webber (1997, p. 236) this has, however, not 
happened. Rather the German states have displayed a strong capacity to maintain a common front against the 
federation. They have, for example succeeded in securing several changes in the Basic Law improving their 
policy-making powers.
19 Sally and Webber (1994), pp. 39f.
20 Auer (1997).
21 Webber (1994), p. 165.
22 Turner (1997), p. 113.
23 See Sally and Webber (1994).
24 See Webber (1994), p. 168. Saxony, for example, created multipartite committees containing government, 
business associations, and union representatives to identify “core” firms worthy of state financial support -  a 
model that has been emulated in all other eastern German states. See Webber (1994), pp. 168f.
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25government, business and labour than in the Federal Republic during the 1980s” .
In short, it appears that one can make a plausible case that Germany’s system of “organised 
capitalism” has been alive and well during the 1990s.
However, such an argument appears to be overly simplistic. In fact, the view that 
Germany’s institutional arrangements have not changed during the last decade has not been 
unchallenged. A number of authors have argued that German corporatism -  understood as the 
integration of the major producer interests in macro-economic policy formation -  has been 
already on the wane during the 1980s26. An often-cited example during the 1990s to support 
this hypothesis was the unification process, during which there was an abrupt decline in the 
government’s propensity to consult and integrate the major interest organisations27.
In addition one can point to a number of other developments that could be interpreted as 
first signs of cracks in Germany’s institutional structure. A number of interviewees, for 
example, argued that with the worsening of economic framework conditions many firms 
began to feel no longer adequately represented by their sectoral or peak associations and 
started to by-pass them28. Not only have companies like Veba, Daimler Chrysler or BMW set 
up their own offices in Bonn and Berlin, but as Kessler has noted, one can also observe a 
growing trend for head hunting current members of parliament, and for employing ex­
members, in order to use their contacts to lobby on behalf of the company. Moreover, he has 
pointed out that alongside the “traditional” representatives of commercial interests, 
independent professional lobbyists were establishing themselves in Bonn and Berlin who 
were hired by companies for specific projects .
Moreover, collective wage bargaining has become less comprehensive. The BDI has noted 
that while the peak associations tried for years unsuccessfully to make Germany’s wage 
bargaining process more flexible, individual firms negotiating directly with their workers and 
employees proved to be a lot more effective30. In many cases, factory councils began to 
ignore the one-size-fits-all collective wage agreements negotiated at the national level and 
accepted innovative pay and working-time deals that were specific to the particular
25 Webber (1997), p. 233.
26 See Esser (1986), Padgett (1992), p. 203 and Hancock (1989), pp. 134-141.
27 See for example Lehmbruch (1992), pp. 45f.
28 Interviews.
29 See Kessler (1996), pp. 35-39. Webber (1997, p. 248) has noted that starting in the mid-1990s, a growing 
number of firms were resigning from the employers’ organisations.
30 See BDI (1997). Herrigel (1997) has highlighted rigidities in work organisation that interfere with a necessary 
work reorganisation of German industry.
105
conditions of individual plants. For example, workers in the engineering and car industries 
have accepted longer working hours and more varied shift patterns. Several companies now 
use "credit time accounts" that allow managers to increase working hours during periods of 
strong demand, in return for time off later in the year. In fact, these agreements have proven 
so successful that several large companies have split their operations into smaller units to 
make it easier to negotiate plant-by-plant wage deals31. Several authors have linked these 
developments to a decline of the bargaining power of the unions’ vis-a-vis employers as a 
result of firms’ increasing internationalisation32.
In short, there appears to be both continuity and change in Germany’s institutions. Judging 
at a general level if and how these processes have affected firms' political influence appears 
to be, however, difficult. So rather than taking sides in the debate, this study will in the 
following chapters determine for each policy issue separately, whether and how institutions 
were important for an explanation of actual policy outcomes and the six MNEs’ political 
influence.
Finally, within the context of a comparison between economic policy-making in Germany 
and Switzerland -  two states with institutional structures more renowned for their similarities 
than their differences -  it should also be pointed out that German economic policies have iri 
the past been strongly guided by a liberal tradition. The roots of this tradition can be traced 
back to the concept of the “social market economy” - the term coined by Ludwig Erhard as 
the political label for the economic reform programme to rebuild the German economy after 
World War n. Central to this concept was the belief that the state ought to limit its role in the 
economy to setting up and maintaining the institutional framework of a free economic order 
and refrain from all interventions in the price mechanism through, for example, anti-cyclical 
policies, subsidies, or tax breaks33. The adjective "social" was used primarily to distinguish 
the concept from simple laissez-faire capitalism, which in the eyes of the founding fathers of 
German neo-liberalism, paid too little attention to government activity34. Tietmeyer has 
pointed out that the adjective "social" does, however, not legitimise the creation of an 
extensive welfare state. Rather it refers to a free economic order embedded in a legal and
31 On average, German factories now operate for 71.8 hours a week, compared with 60.6 in 1984. See 
“Germany's new shop window” Financial Times Nov. 20 1998. See also “Restructuring corporate Germany” 
The Economist Nov. 21 1998 and “The changing face of German unions” The Economist Dec. 5 1998.
32 See Mahnkopf (1991 and 1993), Streeck (1991 and 1997) and Mosley (1990). One official at the BDI has 
argued that as German companies have shifted production abroad to cut their wage bills, employers have been 
able to side step the unions and negotiate directly with their factory councils.
33 See Sally (1996).
34 A state of affairs popularly characterised by the term "night-watchman state".
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•  •  35 •institutional framework that ensures that competition is durably maintained . As Ludwig 
Erhard put it, "The concepts of free and social are congruent (...); the freer an economy is, 
the more social it is, and the greater will be the macroeconomic utility created”36. Although 
much of this liberal streak in German economic policy-making had disappeared by the 1990s 
(see below), its legacy continues to linger in certain policy areas, such as for example 
competition policy37.
Having outlined the main structural features of the German economic policy-making 
process, it is now time to analyse recent economic and political developments in order to 
provide the context in which policy-making took place during the second half of the 1980 and 
the first half of the 1990s.
Economic and Political Circumstances
Germany’s inclusive policy-making process has often been praised for its ability to combine 
economic growth with social cohesion. Particularly political scientists in the 1980s often 
proclaimed that Germany’s consensual economic policy-making system was capable of 
combining the dynamism of free markets with social stability by engineering an adjustment 
process that allowed for structural change while at the same time minimised social 
disruption38. Seen from this perspective, Germany’s economic performance over the last 
decades was usually a celebration of the virtues of an export-oriented economy with excellent 
industrial relations and reasonable macroeconomic policies39.
From a mid-1990s’ point of view, however, this interpretation does not look entirely 
convincing. In view of record unemployment and only modest growth rates (see below), a 
different interpretation appears to be also plausible. In fact, Giersch et al. have pointed out 
that Germany’s declining economic performance was not a recent phenomenon but rather a 
process that began three decades ago when underneath the surface of export surpluses and 
social cohesion, the largely liberal economic order that was established in the post-war years 
under Ludwig Erhard started to become increasingly incompatible with the German
35 Tietmeyer (1999), p. 6.
36 Erhard (1966), p. 320. For the complementary nature of economic laws and ethical postulates see Tietmeyer 
(1999), pp. 127-136.
7 See Paque and Soltwedel (1993).
38 See for example Katzenstein (1987), p. 45.
39 See for example Katzenstein (1989).
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government’s dependence on intermediary powers40. In this view, rather than acting 
impartially, the German government became increasingly interventionist in order to engineer 
economic outcomes that were deemed socially desirable and to satisfy a proliferating number 
of interest groups. Tietmeyer has argued that these interventions lowered the capacity of the 
German economy to adjust to a structurally changing world economy and, with the usual time 
lag, resulted in declining economic growth rates and rising unemployment41. Indeed, it seems 
that a plausible case can be made to show that government activities steadily increased over 
the last decades.
Tietmeyer has noted that the reconstruction boom of the 1950s and early 1960s was 
followed by a belief that the economy could be fine-tuned42. This manifested itself most 
visibly in the 1967 Law on Stability and Growth, which required the government to 
simultaneously achieve price stability, full employment and economic growth. It was also 
during this period that the state increasingly intervened in the economy to secure employment 
and a “just” distribution of income43. Farber has argued that these tendencies towards 
structural conservation became more pronounced during the 1970s. As a response to growing 
unemployment after the 1974-1975 recession, the government set up numerous subsidy 
programmes, particularly in coal mining, fisheries, agriculture, shipbuilding and steel44.
The change from a centre-left to a centre-right government in 1982 did not change this 
overall trend. Although some progress was made -  the tax burden fell as a share of output and 
the government reduced the scale of its ownership in state-owned enterprises - little was done 
to reduce public spending and to reform social security systems45. In the aftermath of 
German reunification in 1990, government interventions increased strongly as the German 
government responded to the challenges of re-unification with a historically unparalleled 
spending programme; transfers in the period from 1991 to 1995 have been estimated at DM 
986bn46. While much of this money was invested in the upgrading of East Germany’s
40 Giersch et al. (1992).
41 Tietmeyer (1999), p. 75.
42 Ibid., p. 25.
43 In its 1968 Principles of Sectoral and Structural Policy, the Economics Ministry gave for the first time 
consideration to the need to slow down the pace of some adjustment processes in order to secure jobs and 
income levels.
44 See Farber (1989).
45 See Tietmeyer (1999), p. 33.
46 See Heilemann and Rappen (1996).
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infrastructure, a large share was also spent on the modernisation of production structures and 
on creating investment incentives -  in other words, on second-guessing the market47.
Moreover, defying economic logic, the Kohl government pushed through a currency union 
at a rate primarily intended to preserve the savings of East Germans 48. The “side effect” was 
that East German goods became largely uncompetitive and the overall result was a large- 
scale industrial slump49. Despite substantial subsidies, industrial production in the former 
East Germany fell by more than 50 per cent in the six months after the currency reform and, 
by 1992, the official unemployment rate had risen to about 18 per cent50. Subsidies during 
this period increased strongly; while in 1989, subsidies amounted to 5.4 per cent of GDP, this 
figure had by 1993 risen to 9.2 per cent51. Moreover, tax breaks were increasingly substituted 
with cash handouts. While in 1985 some 40 per cent of subsidies were granted as tax breaks, 
this figure had by 1993 declined to 20 per cent. Klodt and Stehn have pointed out that this 
should be interpreted as a thoroughly negative development as it implied a further loss of 
impartiality on the part of the state (tax breaks are usually extended to sectors, while cash 
hand-outs centre on one specific company), likely to lead to higher opportunity costs as 
companies increased their lobbying efforts52.
A look at the numbers confirms the picture of a state that has gradually extended its reach 
over the economy. Public sector share of GDP fluctuated between the mid-1970s and mid- 
1990s between 45 and 50 per cent, after less than 30 per cent in the 1950s, and 30 to 40 per 
cent in the 1960s (see figure 4.1)53. Both personal income and corporate tax rates are among 
the world’s highest (the top rates are 53 and 45 per cent, respectively) and non-wage 
contributions amount to over 42 per cent of gross wages - up from 36 per cent in 1989 and 
26.5 per cent in 197054. Moreover, it has often been pointed out that regulations proliferated 
strongly during the last decades55. In the 1997 Economic Freedom Report published by the 
Fraser Institute, Germany ranked 25th (tied with Argentina, Bolivia and Chile), down from its
47 Giersch et al. have estimated that investment subsidy schemes and the like lowered the cost of investing in 
Eastern Germany by about 20 to 30 per cent. See Giersch et al. (1992), p. 270.
48 For the effects and objectives of the currency reform see Allen (1997), pp. 148f.
49 East German marks were exchanged for the D-mark at a one for one rate for wages, pensions and rents. Most 
other domestic financial assets and liabilities were converted at a rate of 2 East mark = 1 DM with the notable 
exception of the savings of GDR residents, which up to certain limits were converted at a one for one rate.
50 Including people on make-work schemes, the rate of unemployment was estimated to have been as high as 30 
per cent. See Giersch et.al. (1992), p. 270. For various extended measures of underemployment in Eastern 
Germany from 1990 to 1992 see Klodt and Paque (1993), pp. 14ff.
51 See Klodt and Stehn (1994), pp. 188f.
52 Ibid., p. 189.
53 See BDI (1997), p. 8.
54 Ibid., pp. 8-10.
55 See for example “Birth of the Berlin Republic” Financial Times Survey Nov. 10 1998; “Der Paragraphenwut
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14th place ranking in 1990 and 10th place finish in 198056. In short, while the last decade has 
certainly also seen important liberalisation measures (i.e. the Single European Act and the 
privatisation of a number of state owned enterprises) one can still make a case that German 
governments became increasingly keen to engineer economic outcomes. As Hans Tietmeyer
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Figure 4.1: Government Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
Source: World Economic Freedom Report 1997, p. 98.
has argued, “policy-makers have increasingly misused the concept of the Social Market 
Economy by emphasising the adjective ‘social’ in order to legitimise activities or demands 
that are incompatible with market requirements”57. Peters has pointed out that as structural 
change began to threaten jobs, framework oriented economic policies gave increasingly way
CO
to structural intervention policies with the aim of preserving the status quo , and Donges and
totet den Unternehmergeist”, D ieZeit, April 4 1997 and “Wirtschaftsblunder”, The Economist, Feb. 1 1998.
56 See Gwartney and Lawson (1997), p. 99. Sponsored by a network of research institutes around the world, the 
Economic Freedom of the World Project has since 1975 published economic freedom ratings for a growing 
number of countries around the world. The ratings for each country are arrived at by judging its performance 
under a set of 17 attributes which, when combined, make up an index of economic freedom. The attributes are 
grouped under four headings: money and inflation, government operations and regulations, takings and 
discriminatory taxation, and restraints on international exchange. For limitations and weaknesses o f the index 
see Henderson (1998), pp. 124f.
57 Tietmeyer (1999), Foreword.
58 Peters (1996), p. 189.
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Schmidt noted that these interventions almost always had the goal of securing the income and 
employment of particular groups against domestic or international competition59.
It should also be mentioned in this context that economic growth declined steadily over 
the last decades and was accompanied by increasing levels of unemployment (see table 4.1). 
In 1997, unemployment in the unified Germany stood at a post-war high of 4.8m, 
corresponding to 12.5 per cent of the German labour force.
1960-1973 1973-1980 1980-1989 1990-1997
Change in real 
GDP
4.4 2.2 1.9 2.1
Unemployment
Rate
1 4.9 8.5 9.5
Table 4.1: Economic Growth and Unemployment Rate in the period from 1960-1997.
Sources: Giersch et al. (1992), p. 2f, lOf; BDI (1997), pp. 8
The Sachverstandigenrat (the main group of economic advisors) has pointed out that since 
the 1970s an unemployment base has developed which has grown with every recession and 
which has not been significantly reduced even in periods of strong economic growth60. 
Consequently, as Klodt and Stehn have argued, cyclical measures to go back to full 
employment are unlikely to work. Instead the problems have their roots on the supply side in 
institutional impediments to competition, such as retarding regulations, high taxes and 
subsidies, which have prevented the German economy from adjusting and benefiting from a 
changing international division of labour61. Particularly negative has been the influence of 
Germany’s system of centralised pay bargaining under which unions and employers set 
wages across whole industries, thereby ignoring differences in productivity so that, for 
example, computer engineers and shipbuilders both get the same pay rise. This rigid wage
59 Donges and Schmitt (1993), p. 124.
60 Quoted in Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 204. See also Donges and Schmidt et al. (1988).
61 Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 202.
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structure made it difficult for the German economy to adjust to the economic re-evaluation of 
labour, a development driven not least by the process of globalisation. As a result, many 
workers were priced out of jobs62.
During the early 1990s, the deteriorating performance of the German economy began to 
lead to serious doubts about Germany’s attractiveness as a production location and its ability 
to compete for internationally mobile capital. Since the mid-1970s capital outflows have
f \Xsignificantly exceeded inflows of internationally mobile capital . Tietmeyer has pointed out 
that while for many years commentators frequently praised the German model as setting a 
good example for other countries, doubts have arisen as to whether Germany’s economic 
system is still competitive in the age of globalisation. As he put it,
“Beginning in the early 1990s, Germany began to be experience something new. While 
there have always been people who have doubted whether the German economic system is 
fair or humane, for decades there has been virtually no doubt about the performance of the 
German economy. Unfortunately this is no longer the case. As seldom before, doubts have 
arisen as to whether the current mix of market forces and government intervention is able 
to master the challenges facing Germany in an age of globalisation. Indeed, some foreign 
observers have already talked about the decline of ‘Rhineland capitalism’ and of the crisis 
besetting Germany's consensus society”64.
62 See Tietmeyer (1999), pp. 73-79. The conclusion that labour has been bearing an increasing share of the costs 
that are associated with increasing economic openness has become a common theme in the analyses of social 
scientists. See for example Boijas and Ramey (1995). Often in such analyses, the declining relative position of 
labour is explained by effects of international trade. Imports, so the argument often goes, embody the labour 
provided by the exporting country and - following a hallowed theorem of international trade - such imports 
inevitably pull the wage rates of the importer down toward that of the exporter. However, the proposition that 
foreign trade has been responsible for the declining relative position of labour has drawn sharp protests. See for 
example Wood (1995) and Lawrence (1994). Some point out that international trade by itself is not sufficient in 
volume to have created changes in the wage levels of the rich countries. See for example Krugman (1995). 
Others emphasise that the big shifts in income since the 1970s have taken their toll on blue collar labour rather 
than labour as a whole; and, basing their conclusions on US data, they attributed that shift to technological 
changes in production or to immigration from the poor countries to the rich. See for example Boijas, Freeman 
and Katz (1997).
63 See for example Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 2 and Kahrmann and Sauerland (1991). The debate about the 
competition between production locations is often discussed in terms of nations competing against each other in 
the same way as companies do. See for example Thurow (1993). This is misleading. The international economy 
does not pit states against each other, but rather locks them in an international division of labour that can benefit 
all countries. It is not a zero-sum game. See for example Krugman (1994). What is, however, true is that nations 
compete for internationally mobile capital. In any given year, there is only a fixed pool of FDI available and 
more FDI for one country means inevitably less for another. Competition in this area is highly relevant not least 
because new approaches in growth theory have shown that a nations’ long term growth rate is positively 
influenced by the amount of investment undertaken as increases in a country's capital stock raises the 
productivity of other production factors, which in turn also raises wages. See for example Romer (1986,1989).
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However, increasing state activities appear to be only half of the story, if one seeks to 
describe the circumstances under which German economic policy-making took place during 
the period from 1985 to 1995. While increasing government intervention has certainly been a 
major characteristic, there has also been another important development -  the proliferation 
of highly vocal and well-organised interest groups65. In line with Mancur Olson’s prediction 
that stable societies will over time produce an increasing number of distributional coalitions 
aligned against change66, Germany has seen over the last decades a proliferating number of 
organised interest groups whose main goal appears to have been the preservation of the status 
quo. Klodt and Stehn have pointed out that Germany’s problem was that its traditional 
advantages - monetary stability, a skilled workforce, social peace, well-developed 
infrastructure, political stability - could now be found in a lot of other countries while at the 
same time Germany failed to tackle and reform its well-known weaknesses -  high taxes, high
f\ 7labour costs, inflexible wages and high levels of regulation . It does not appear far-fetched 
to link this failure to adjust, at least partly, to the political activities of interest groups. In fact, 
a number of authors have noted that much needed structural reforms have often been stymied 
because of the stubborn unwillingness of large parts of society to relinquish acquired rights 
and privileges68. In similar vein, a BDI official observed that
“German interest and pressure groups these days operate on the premise that the fastest 
way to advance the well-being of their members is not to compete in the market but rather 
to lobby for transfers of various kinds from non-members. These may not always be in the 
form of cash or services, but increasingly these days manifest themselves as regulations. 
Usually under the banner of ‘fairness’, which has become an infinitely elastic principle, or 
perhaps in the name of ‘sustainable development’, or some other worthy cause, ever more 
people devote their best efforts to transfer-seeking rather than to economic production”.
Echoing this last point, interviewees often stressed the rise of strongly anti-market attitudes 
among a plethora of “new” interest groups. Particularly environmental groups were singled
64 Tietmeyer (1999), p. 55.
65 For an explanation of how interest groups come to be formed and why, once formed, they are extremely hard 
to disperse see Olson (1965).
66 See Olson (1982).
67 See for example Klodt and Stehn (1994) and Klodt and Schmidt (1989).
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out for their activities, which frequently involved the condemnation of or disregard for 
market processes and a bias towards collectivist ways of thinking and regulatory 
programmes69. Prominent examples for such activities from the last decade included 
regulations for food safety and genetic engineering (see Chapter 5). The result of these 
developments was that Germany’s quiet and consensual policy-making process turned during 
the 1980s and 1990s often into distributional conflicts and acrimonious discussions between 
the advocates of change and the advocates of the status quo.
This conflict has been particularly visible in the debate about the need for economic 
reforms in the face of globalisation. On one side, the business community - supported by 
most economists and think tanks -  have relentlessly stressed the need for deregulation and 
liberalisation to remain competitive in a structurally changing world economy and have 
emphasised the benefits of increased trade, cross-border investments and technological 
progress70. From their point of view, the cause of Germany’s economic problems has not 
been globalisation itself, but rather sclerotic structures that reduced flexibility and made it 
impossible for the German economy to benefit from a changing international division of 
labour. These preferences were, however, strongly opposed by a diverse group of organised 
interests ranging from labour unions, environmental groups and the church to self-styled 
economists and other vested interests. In their view, globalisation itself is the root cause of 
the problem since it inevitably will destroy more jobs than it creates, widen income 
inequality, reduce the ability of governments to provide welfare services and -  if not checked 
by various forms of government intervention -  exacerbate poverty and lead to social 
exclusion. The result of this increasing politicisation of economic policy-making has been
71large-scale political gridlock and somewhat cooler relations between industry and 
government as the business community grew increasingly impatient with Germany’s 
incapacity to adjust to changing economic realities72. Significant in this context has also been 
the corporate restructuring that was visible during the 1990s in many of Germany’s large 
export-oriented companies (and also in related small and medium-sized companies). While 
policy-makers were slow and cumbersome to react to a structurally changing world economy, 
many of Germany’s companies had to quickly restructure their business operations in order to
68 See for example Tietmeyer (1999), pp. 33f. and BDI (1997).
69 Interviews.
70 See for example BDI (1997).
71 Often cited in this context is a much-discussed speech by the German President, Roman Herzog, delivered in 
April 1997, in which he criticised the ossification of German society and called for internal renewal.
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remain internationally competitive. That a similar urgency for action was not visible at the 
political level (at least by the mid-1990s) added to a sense of frustration among the business 
community and a feeling that politicians were out of touch with reality .
Finally it should, however, be said that while the gloomy scenario painted in the analysis 
above was characteristic for the period up to the mid-1990s, the economic and political 
outlook became a bit more optimistic in the following years as an upswing in the business 
cycle and export-led growth (helped by a strong US dollar) led to growth rates between 2 and 
3 per cent and a reduction in unemployment. In fact, by the end of the decade unemployment 
had been reduced to just slightly over 10 per cent. Moreover, during the second half of the 
1990s, the outgoing government of Helmut Kohl and the new left of centre government of 
Gerhard Schroder, which came into office in 1998, managed to pass a number of small 
business-friendly reform acts, such as for example a further liberalisation of Germany’s 
shopping hours. Most significantly, in 2000 the Schroder government passed a reform act of 
Germany’s tax system, which reduced corporate tax rates and made it easier for companies to 
sell cross-shareholdings.
Implications for an Analysis of MNEs’ Political Influence
Chapter 1 has pointed out that institutions can be sources of political influence by structuring 
interactions between actors in certain ways. Indeed, a review of the institutional structure of 
Germany’s economic policy-making process has shown that private actors, and particularly 
the business community, enjoy prominent positions in economic policy-making networks. 
However, while one can find evidence that these institutional arrangements continued to 
function in the 1990s, one can also cite evidence that points to the opposite direction. In fact, 
there appears to be no consensus in the literature as to whether current developments indicate 
the beginning of a hollowing out of Germany’s institutions or simply a re-adjustment to new 
economic realities. As a result of this ambiguity, sweeping statements about the importance 
of institutions for the political influence of German MNEs are hardly convincing. In fact, as 
noted earlier, this study will remain agnostic regarding the general and long-term
72 Interviews
73 Interviews. See also Streeck (1997) and “Germany’s new shop window” Financial Times, Nov. 20 1998 and 
“Restructuring corporate Germany” The Economist, Dec. 5 1998.
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implications of these developments and will instead analyse in the following chapters on a 
case by case basis whether institutions were a source of political influence for MNEs or not.
Having said that, it seems nevertheless clear that political and economic circumstances are 
likely to be of importance. First, it was pointed out that over the last decades state activities 
increased substantially. Public sector share of GDP increased from 30 to 40 per cent in the 
1960s to roughly 50 per cent during most of the 1990s. It was noted that the principal 
motivation behind the increasing activities of the state appears to have been a desire to 
engineer “just” market outcomes. Hence it seems likely that MNEs’ political influence will 
be conditioned by the extent to which their preferences are compatible with those of the state.
Second, it was argued that Germany’s failure to decisively reform a number of economic 
policies and practices can, at least partly, be linked to the activities of organised interests 
more concerned with the preservation of the status quo than with adjusting to a changing 
international division of labour. In fact, interviewees frequently complained about an 
increasing “politicisation” of economic policy-making, which was preventing much needed 
economic reforms and hence slowed down the pace of structural adjustment74. In other 
words, the degree of domestic opposition is also likely to condition MNEs’ political 
influence.
Finally, it was pointed out that collective wage bargaining agreements -  a cornerstone of 
the German social partnership model -  became less comprehensive during the last decade 
and that a number of observers have linked this phenomenon to a relative decline of the 
political power of unions vis-a-vis employers as a result of globalisation. In other words, 
increasing levels of internationalisation can in certain policy areas constitute sources of 
political leverage.
In short, an analysis of Germany’s economic policy-making process has shown that 
institutions must certainly be part of any explanation of the political influence of German 
firms. It was pointed out that German firms were through a number of institutions tightly 
linked to the policy-making process, and that it was plausible to assume that these linkages 
enabled firms to wield considerable political influence. However, it was also noted that one 
should not take this argument too far. First, in recent years a number of authors have 
diagnosed cracks in Germany’s institutions that might make their importance less pervasive. 
Second, a macro-level review of political and economic circumstances suggested that it was 
entirely plausible to assume that these developments can have an impact on the preferences of
74 Interviews.
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the government, the extent of domestic opposition and the degree to which firms can use their 
internationalisation process for political leverage, and should thus be part of an analysis that 
seeks to explain MNEs' political influence.
Switzerland
Institutional Structure of the Economic Policy-Making Process
In many ways the institutional structure of Switzerland’s economic policy-making process is 
similar to the German one -  at least on a superficial level. Again, it is policy-making by 
consensus through continuous, institutionalised bargaining processes between the main 
domestic groups. And again, firms participate legitimately in the policy-making process 
through their sectoral and peak associations. Max Frisch, referring to the close links between 
business and government in Switzerland coined the term Schweiz AG (Switzerland Inc.). 
However, this is where the similarities end and important differences begin to emerge. These 
differences concern the process by which policies are normally devised and the political 
culture that lies behind much of Swiss economic policy making. Both aspects are relevant for 
an analysis of MNEs’ political influence.
In many ways, the Swiss policy making process is a showcase of decentralisation. Even 
when compared to a highly decentralised country like Germany, Swiss levels are quite 
extraordinary. In fact, as Meir and Marthinsen have argued, all political institutions and 
procedures are geared towards the diffusion of political power. This is particularly visible in 
the federal structure, which gives the cantons considerably more powers than the German 
Lander (e.g. cantons have the right to set tax rates and were until recently also in charge of 
health care policies) 75. Other prominent institutions that reflect the diffusion of political 
power are the “magic formula” under which the four largest political parties have been 
governing Switzerland for more than three decades76 and the referendum, the symbol of
75 Meir and Marthinsen (1996), p. 5.
76 The federal council (Bundesrat) is the executive arm of the government and is composed of seven members. 
For over 35 years, the composition of the FC has been shared by the four major political parties with the 
unwritten rule that the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Christian Democrats each get each two seats and 
the Swiss People’s Party gets one.
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Switzerland’s direct democracy, which stipulates that any law passed by parliament has to be 
submitted to a nation-wide vote if at least 50,000 voters or eight cantons request it77.
The possibility to relatively easily exercise political influence has not only led to the 
development of a thick net of organised interests78, but also to a particular decision-making 
process. In order to avoid referendums, draft pieces of new legislation go through two pre- 
parliamentary stages (Expertenkommission and Vernehmlassungsverfahren) which include all 
affected groups and whose task it is to come up with a compromise solution acceptable to all. 
Only then are policy drafts sent to parliament for deliberation. Borner et al. have argued that 
the actual parliamentary stage of the policy making process is of relatively little importance 
compared to the pre-parliamentary stages. Although bills have to be debated and passed by 
both houses of Parliament -  the National Council and the Council of States -  the scope for 
changes is minimal, since drafts already represent carefully negotiated compromises and any 
changes would risk a referendum. So although the Swiss executive (Bundesrat) is nominally 
very powerful - simplified it is president, prime minister and cabinet in one institution - this 
power is not reflected in a strong and active leading role. Rather than making policy, the 
Bundesrat’s main task has traditionally been to sanction agreements by the main domestic 
groups79. As has been pointed out many times, this policy-making structure is well suited to 
bring about incremental policy change and has thus often been credited as the main source of
OA
Switzerland’s famous political stability .
Similar to Germany, the decentralisation in the public sector contrasts strongly with the 
centralisation of the private sector. Swiss firms are organised into sector associations under 
the umbrella of their main peak association, the Schweizerischer Handels und 
Industrieverein, better known as the Vorort. In the labour domain the Trade Union 
Federation, the Christian National Trade Union and the Union o f Swiss Employees provide a 
united labour front for negotiations and discussions with the government. Wage and salary 
negotiations are handled at the industry or company level in Switzerland.
The decentralisation of the public sphere and the centralisation of the private sphere link 
up in one institutional structure, mainly through the institutions of Switzerland’s direct 
democracy, which require close co-operation between the public and the private sector for the
77 If at least 100,000 voters sign an initiative (or at least one of the two houses of the Federal Assembly votes 
affirmatively) a nationwide vote is held to change the constitution or federal laws.
78 For an overview of organised interests in Switzerland see Knopfel (1988).
79 See Borner et al. (1990), p. 68.
80 See for example Katzenstein (1984).
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formulation of policies81. Nevertheless it has often been argued that firms and their 
associations enjoy disproportionate influence82. In fact, a number of authors have argued that 
the political power of Swiss business is unparalleled in Europe . The sources of firms’ 
political power are plentiful. First, the trade associations are not mere lobby groups, which try 
to advance the interests of their members. Even more so than in Germany, they fulfil an 
essential function by providing the only modestly staffed cantonal and federal governments 
with important technical information and, again even more so than in Germany, there is a 
strong tendency on part of the state to transfer public duties to private actors84. In fact, 
Germann has argued that the refusal of the associations to implement policies is just as 
effective as the threat of a referendum85. Second, Borner et al. have pointed out that the 
political influence of the trade associations is further bolstered by the relative weakness of 
Switzerland’s political parties, which are relatively small, not well organised and poorly 
funded. According to them, “political parties’ main function is the recruiting of politicians 
and the organisation of political campaigns. On concrete political decisions, they have little 
influence”86. In contrast, the trade associations are better funded and command more 
technical expertise on questions of economic policy-making87. Moreover, Switzerland’s 
instruments of direct democracy guarantee the trade associations direct influence over policy 
outcomes and enable them to act as “quasi parties”88.
Apart from these features, there is, however, another element in the Swiss economic 
policy-making process which further buttresses firms’ political influence and which contrasts 
sharply with Germany’s economic policy-making process. While German economic policies 
are shaped by liberal ideology -  albeit to a declining extent - a number of Switzerland’s 
economic practices are notable for the absence of any such influence. As a result, this has 
opened the door for some firm lobbying and influence that would be quite unimaginable in 
Germany. To be sure, with regard to foreign economic policy, Switzerland has always 
followed a liberal policy. Being a small and resource poor state, Switzerland has had little 
choice but to support a multilateral free trade regime and it was probably this external side of 
trade policy, which has seduced many analysts to describe Switzerland’s economic policy
81 See for example “Anpacken stattt Jammem” Rudolf Walser, Secretary at the Vorort, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, March 25 1997
82 See Katzenstein (1984) and Sally (1993).
83 See for example Borner et.al. (1990), p. 74 and Neidhart (1988), p. 110.
84 See Borner et.al. (1990), p. 71, Sommaruga (1987) and Borner and Porter et al. (1991),p. 287.
85 Germann (1981).
86 Borner et al. (1990), p. 74.
87 See Winterberger (1980).
88 See Borner et al. (1990), p. 74.
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making system as liberal89. However, when one extends the term “open” to Switzerland’s 
domestic market and to the extent to which price competition allocates resources, doubts 
quickly emerge regarding the viability of the above judgement.
Although Switzerland’s free market economy is guaranteed through its constitution, 
market freedoms are rather poorly safeguarded. Petersmann has argued that the Swiss anti­
trust Commission -  a group of representatives from the business community, academia and 
consumer groups -  was never equipped with the necessary personnel and administrative 
resources to be an effective guardian of a free market order. Furthermore, Swiss competition 
law is largely toothless and shaped by a corporatist tradition and a cartel-friendly attitude. In 
fact, the cartel article in the constitution merely legitimises an ex post abuse control, but not, 
as in other countries, preventive rules or laws90. Moreover, the anti-trust commission may 
only interfere in extreme cases of abuse in which overall economic damage can be proven. As 
long as cartels merely distort competition they are not seen as damaging91. The result has 
been a widespread cartelisation of the Swiss economy with the trade associations 
“administering” competition in a number of sectors. Prominent examples include the 
insurance and banking sector during the 1980s, agriculture, car body shops and the
92construction sector .
Borner et al. have argued that Switzerland’s unparalleled tolerance for cartels is a 
reflection of Switzerland’s political culture. Being an extremely heterogeneous country -  
hardly any other nation displays so many different cultural characteristics in such a small 
geographical area (i.e. 4 languages) -  Switzerland needed special institutional mechanisms to 
solve conflicts in order to ensure long-term stability . The previous section has pointed out 
that virtually all decision-making processes involve extensive consultations, bargaining and 
compromises. Borner et al. have argued that the same pattern emerges in competition policy. 
According to them, there is widespread mistrust and fear to leave economic processes to 
uncontrolled competition where the results are not know and cannot be foreseen . Instead the 
acceptance of administered competition is very high. As they put it, “free rivalry between 
companies is rejected in the same manner as free rivalry between political parties for political
„94power .
89 See for example Katzenstein (1984).
90 Petersmann (1992), p. 298.
91 See Borner et al. (1990), p. 130.
92 See Petersmann (1992), p. 299.
93 Borner et al. (1990), p.129.
94 Ibid.
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Having outlined the main structural features of the Swiss economic policy-making 
process, the analysis can now turn to recent economic and political developments in order to 
provide the context in which policy-making took place during the last decade.
Economic and Political Circumstances
Similar to Germany, Switzerland’s inclusive economic-policy making process has often been 
praised for facilitating structural change while at the same time preserving social stability95. 
Indeed, for most of the second part of the twentieth century, this seems to have been the case. 
Per capita income and net wages have been among the world’s highest96 and despite its small 
size, Switzerland is a significant trading nation - in 1992 Switzerland was the world’s 14th 
largest exporter97. Moreover, these achievements have been accompanied by harmonious
QO
labour-industry relations , low inflation and unemployment had for a long time been 
virtually non-existent. However, again similar to Germany, economic developments during 
the 1990s -  a stagnating economy and rising unemployment (see below) -  cast a shadow of 
doubt upon the view that what was happening in Switzerland over the last decades was 
“controlled adjustment”. Instead it seems to have become plausible to argue that when 
confronted with structural change, Switzerland’s highly consensus-oriented policy-making 
arrangements led to political gridlock and gave way to increasing state intervention. 
Ultimately both developments lowered, with the usual time lag, Switzerland’s capacity to 
adjust to a changing international division of labour.
Petersmann has pointed out that over the last decades a number of articles were added to 
the Swiss Constitution which transferred considerable confidence to the state for fine-tuning 
economic processes and defining general economic interests99. Schwarz has pointed to fiscal
95 See for example Katzenstein (1984).
96 See Meier and Marthinsen (1996), p. 15 and Enright and Weder (1995), p. 1.
97 See Enright and Weder (1995), p. 5.
98 In the period from 1970 to 1988, the Swiss economy lost only 1.4 days per 1000 employees due to strikes. For 
Germany this figure was 43. In comparison, the UK, Spain and Italy lost more than 450 days. See Borner et.al. 
(1990), p. 50.
Petersmann (1992). An example is the federal trade policy law of 1982, which allows the Bundesrat -  as 
longs as circumstances require it -  to control, restrict or prohibit the import or export of goods and services. This 
has, in fact, put constitutionally guaranteed free trade under the discretionary power of the government of the 
day. See Petersmann (1992), p. 300.
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policies aimed at engineering outcomes100 and Vorort President Andres Leuenberger has 
observed, that
“the government has become more assertive and self-confident and does not shy away 
from handing out benefits which it must know should be rejected from an Ordnungspolitik 
point of view”101.
Moreover, Schwarz has argued that Switzerland’s market order has been increasingly 
distorted by a drastic expansion in the scope of welfare services, a lack of decisive
privatisation and deregulation measures and proliferating regulations, which reduced
102transparency .
Indeed, a look at the numbers points to a clear pattern: a steady, but continuous increase of 
the state’s involvement in the economy. While state spending is still below most European 
nations, it has increased during the 1990s to levels that are above the US and Japan and much 
closer to the OECD average. In 1994, federal government expenditures accounted for 37 per 
cent of GDP, up from 25 per cent in 1975 (see figure 4.2)103. Increases in welfare spending 
and subsidies'were also significant: since 1960 the share of social welfare spending of GDP 
increased from 9 to 21 per cent and by 1993 over half of the federal governments’ revenues 
were distributed as subsidies104. These developments had highly negative implications for 
fiscal policy, one of the traditional cornerstones of Switzerland’s stability. While the budget 
showed a surplus during most of the 1980s, there was a significant turn-around in the 1990s. 
In 1993, the budget deficit was approaching 5 per cent of GDP despite a rise in petrol taxes in 
that year. Reflecting on these developments, Leuenberger has argued that the Swiss State had 
become no longer a guarantor of order, but rather a distributor of welfare services and other 
benefits105.
Compared to Germany, however, this development is less advanced in Switzerland. While 
the Swiss State has certainly become more active in recent years, federal government 
spending has clearly not reached levels that were common in Germany during the last two
100 Schwarz (1990,1997).
101 See Leuenberger (1995).
102 Schwarz (1990,1997). Meir and Marthinsen have noted that by 1995 government ownership was still large 
relative to other OECD nations. See Meier and Marthinsen (1996), p. 25.
103 These figures include, however, only spending by the federal government. If one includes cantons the figure 
for 1994 is 45 per cent. See “Anpacken stattt Jammem” Rudolf Walser, Secretary at the Vorort, in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, March 25 1997.
104 See Meir and Marthinsen (1996), p. 5.
105 Leuenberger (1995).
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Figure 4.2: Federal Government Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP.
Source: World Economic Freedom Report 1997, p. 178.
decades. Moreover, while regulations have certainly been proliferating in recent years, the 
Swiss economy is still considerably less regulated than the German economy. The 1997 
Economic Freedom Report ranked Switzerland as the 6th freest economy in the world. Rating 
one-tenth of a point higher than the United Kingdom, it is the highest ranked country among 
the European nations. Moreover, Switzerland has sustained this position over a lengthy time; 
it has been ranked between 2nd and 6th place throughout the last two decades106.
However, similar to Germany, Switzerland saw a significant deterioration in its economic 
performance during the last decades and particularly during the 1990s. In the period from 
1973 to 1990, Swiss GDP grew by a meagre 1 per cent annually and economic activities in 
1996 were only marginally above those in 1990 -  in other words, there was zero growth 
during most of the 1990s (see table 4.2)107. Unemployment also increased. For years the 
Swiss unemployment rate was below 1 per cent and the envy of most OECD countries. 
However, during the recessionary years of the early 1990s, unemployment increased to 2.5 
per cent in 1992 and 4.7 per cent in 1994. By 1996, it stood at 5.1 per cent (see table 4.2). 
Meier and Marthinsen have noted that the rise in unemployment was significant as it grew at 
a faster rate than real GDP fell, indicating that structural and not only cyclical forces were at
106 See Gwartney and Lawson (1997), p. 179.
107 Vorort Annual Report (1995), p. 29.
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work. In fact, it has been estimated that Switzerland’s structural (natural) rate of 
unemployment increased during the early 90s from 1 to 3.5 per cent108.
1960-1973 1973-1980 1980-1989 1990-1997
Change in real 
GDP
3.7 1 1 0.5
Unemployment 0.1 0.3 0.5 3.9
Table 4.2: Economic Growth and Unemployment Rate in the period from 1960-1997.
Source: Bundesamt fiir Statistik, Quarterly Reports.
However, it must be said that while Switzerland’s economic performance as a whole has 
been rather dismal during the first half of the 1990s, the internationally-oriented sector of the 
economy has done remarkably well -  in the period from 1990 to 1995 value-added per 
employee in the manufacturing sector occupied the first place in an international comparison, 
ahead of the US and UK and significantly ahead of Germany and France109. This should, 
however, not be interpreted as a positive indicator for the quality of the Swiss production 
location. The vast majority of firms in this sector are highly internationalised (like for 
example Nestle, ABB or the three selected pharmaceutical MNEs) and a number of authors 
have argued that the reasons behind their success were more company-specific than Swiss- 
specific110.
In fact, since the late 1980s, a number of studies have been warning about Switzerland’s 
declining competitiveness, or more precisely, its capacity to attract internationally mobile 
capital111. Since 1990 capital outflows have significantly exceeded capital inflows. While it is 
certainly tempting to argue that as a small nation, Switzerland was somehow hit harder by a 
changing international division of labour than Germany, Borner and Porter have argued that 
even in the case of a small, internationally-oriented economy like Switzerland, such problems
108 See Meir and Marthinsen (1996), p. 19. See also IMF (1994), p. 127.
109 See Koellreuter (1997).
110 See for example Borner et.al. (1990), p. 44.
111 See for example Kneschaurek (1989).
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were usually home-made112. Indeed, one can point to a number of domestic problems, which
make the Swiss production location increasingly problematic for firms.
Overall levels of regulation have been increasing, protection of agriculture production has
proven costly (Switzerland’s farmers enjoy the world’s most generous subsidies) and the
governments’ reluctance to privatise monopolies on infrastructure services, such as
telecommunications, have delayed the modernisation of these services. In its 1996 Annual
Report, the Vorort explicitly warned about high domestic costs, taxes, social costs and
11^
proliferating regulations . Moreover, Koellreuter has argued that cartel-friendly Switzerland 
increasingly burdened companies both on the cost side -  since production inputs purchased 
from domestic suppliers were too expensive -  and on the selling side due to a lack of
114innovation pressure .
Differences in laws and regulations between cantons have been another important issue. 
While competition between different systems of organisation is certainly healthy, a line must 
be drawn where differences do not promote competition but rather impede it. In Switzerland, 
one finds a number of laws and regulations that do just that. Examples include the 
incompatibility of professional and high school certificates, state monopoly on certain types 
of insurance services and government and cantonal procurement policies, which openly 
prefer local suppliers and manufacturers. Moreover, a large number of civil servants and 
foreign workers cannot move freely between cantons without loosing their cantonal 
employment insurance115. All these factors have become a burden to the internationally- 
oriented sector of the economy.
Much is often made of the question whether Switzerland’s strategy of remaining outside 
the European Union is an economically viable one in an age of rapid economic integration. It 
seems, however, that the answer to this question depends on the perception one has about the 
nature of the EU. If one sees the EU as essentially a trade facilitating and competition 
promoting organisation of states, which have recognised that in an age of globalisation, the 
way forward is not to jealously guard national sovereignty but rather to pool it in order to 
speed up decision-making and free it from often parochial influences, then certainly it would 
be to Switzerland’s advantage to join. If, however, one sees the EU as a competition 
distorting organisation, driven by bureaucrats and politicians keen on harmonisation as a
112 See Borner and Porter et al. (1991).
113 See Vorort Annual Report (1996), p. 29.
114 See Koellreuter (1997).
115 Senti and Baltensperger (1991, pp. 44,147) have estimated that at least 300,000 civil servants have their 
freedom of movement restricted by the incompatibility of cantonal employment insurance schemes.
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means to cartelise the European economy in order to shield it from the pressures of global 
capitalism and to avoid socially disruptive structural adjustment measures (such as the 
deregulation of rigid labour markets), then Switzerland would certainly be better off staying 
outside the EU. It shall not be the task of this study to sort out this debate. However, it seems 
that a case can be made for both views. Having said that, it seems nevertheless clear that the 
no-vote in the December 1992 referendum on participation in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) was an opportunity missed. Borner and Porter have pointed out that joining the EEA 
would have allowed Switzerland to eliminate potential discrimination by the EU without 
having to join the Union with all its, to some extent questionable policies, i.e. the common 
agricultural policy116. Moreover, it would have presented Switzerland with an opportunity to 
adopt in one stroke some much needed reforms - without having to go through the usual 
painstaking and cumbersome decision-making process - as participation would have required 
the Swiss government to reform immigration policy, implement a more rigid anti-cartel 
policy and make public procurement policies more competitive117.
In short, an analysis of recent economic developments showed that state activities 
markedly increased as a structurally changing world economy began to threaten domestic 
employment and income distribution. Instead of responding to a structurally changing world 
economy with liberalisation and deregulation policies in order to facilitate adjustment, 
successive Swiss governments were more interested in trying to engineer market outcomes 
that were deemed socially desirable118. As the Vorort has argued,
"Over the last decades, successive Swiss governments were more interested in creating a 
large and extensive tool kit of economic instruments rather than establishing the necessary 
framework conditions for a free economic order"119.
Increasing state intervention has, however, not been the only defining characteristic of 
economic policy-making in Switzerland. Similar to Germany, Switzerland’s once quiet and 
stable policy-making process became increasingly confrontational and politicised as well- 
organised interest groups proliferated during the second half of the 1980s and the first half of 
the 1990s. In fact, Switzerland appears to have been no exception to Mancur Olson's claim 
that stable societies will over time produce a large number of distributional coalitions aligned
116 See Borner and Porter (1995), Chapter 10.
117 See Enright and Weder (1995), pp. 7f.
118 See Schwarz (1990,1997).
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against change120. The Vorort has observed many times, that Switzerland has produced 
powerful vested interests which are strongly opposed to change121. Indeed, a number of 
authors have argued that Switzerland’s traditional advantages -  low inflation, fiscal prudence, 
political stability and social peace - could now be found in a lot of other countries, while at 
the same time Switzerland failed to implement deregulation and competition promoting 
measures122. Instead, policies intended to cushion the effects of international competition
•  •  123frequently prevailed under the pressure of an emotionally charged public opimon . One 
indicator for the increasing politicisation of Swiss policy-making has been the increasing 
number of referendums. Kleinewefers has pointed out that there has not only been a strong 
increase during the last decade, but that the list of policy issues brought to a referendum has 
also become much longer.124. From animal testing to biotechnology regulations, the range of 
issues has been increasing steadily. At the same time, anti-market sentiments have 
increasingly featured among a growing number of interest groups (e.g. environmental 
groups), which appeared to be driven by a general scepticism of market processes and 
technological progress125.
Similar to Germany, the issue of how to adjust to globalisation has proven to be 
particularly divisive and led to confrontational discussions between the business community, 
government and a host of interest groups. While the internationally-oriented sector of the 
economy strongly advocated deregulation and liberalisation measures in order to facilitate the 
adjustment to a structurally changing world economy, the government and the vast majority 
of interest groups were, however, more sceptical and blocked a number of important reform 
initiatives through referendums. Examples included the 1991 referendum to replace 
Switzerland’s turnover tax with value-added tax126 and the 1992 referendum on Switzerland’s 
participation in the EEA. Similar as in Germany, this conflict was re-inforced by 
restructuring measures in Switzerland’s export-oriented companies, which contributed to a 
sense among the business community that while companies were trying to meet the new
119 Vorort Annual Report (1993), p .43.
120 See Olson (1982).
121 See for example Vorort Annual Report (1992), p. 29.
122 See for example Borner et.al. (1990) ,Borner (1996), Moser (1996) and Vorort Annual Report (1994), p. 21.
123 See for example Vorort Annual Report (1994), p. 25.
124 Kleinewefers (1997).
125 Ibid.
126 The turn-over tax has been particularly business unfriendly since it put a disproportionate burden on 
investments and intermediate goods. See Meier and Marthinsen (1996), p. 25.
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197challenges head-on, the government was somehow out of touch with reality . As a result, 
traditionally close govemment-industry relationships became less stable during the last 
decade as the business community became increasingly impatient with the government’s 
inability to deliver economic reforms. In the words of one official at the Vorort,
“Switzerland has not understood globalisation as a challenge, but rather as a threat and
19Rconfronted with the need for structural change, it has responded with denial” .
Within this context, the institution of the referendum has become increasingly 
controversial. While the referendum has certainly served Switzerland well in the past by 
providing stability and cohesion, doubts have arisen during the during the 1990s as to 
whether this particular policy-making system was well-suited for a global economy in which 
competition was increasingly between whole production locations and which, as a result, 
rewarded flexibility and swift adjustment. A number of authors have argued that due to direct 
democracy, small parties and interest groups could weaken Switzerland’s flexibility to adjust 
to outside changes by blocking policies which the vast majority of the voters did not reject129. 
Bomer has argued that instead of a source of civic rights, the referendum seemed to have 
become an instrument of special interests to preserve the status quo and to secure rents at the 
expense of the economy as a whole. According to him, the Schweiz AG system of incremental 
change had reached its limits130.
During the second half of the 1990s, this bleak outlook became, however, somewhat 
brighter. In 1995, the government ratified a comprehensive economic reform programme that 
corresponded largely to the preferences of the business community (see below), and starting 
in 1997 the economy began growing again, helped by an upswing in the business cycle and 
export-led growth fuelled by a strong US dollar.
127 Interviews. See also “Die Globalisierung als Herausforderung”, Peter Bockli in Basler Zeitung, March 22 
1998.
128 Interview.
129 See Brunetti (1997), Borner and Porter et.al. (1991), Borner, Brunetti and Straubhaaar (1990) and (1994), 
Brunetti and Straubhaar (1991) and (1996), Borner (1997), (1996) and Willemsen (1992).
130 Bomer (1996), p. 7. See also Bomer et al. (1990, p. 156). However, this view of direct democracy is not 
universally shared. Frey (1997, p. 183) has argued that the direct participation of the population in policy­
making is an important pre-condition for a modem, future-oriented society which aspires to be politically and 
economically successful. In his view, direct democracy ensures that policies correspond to the preferences of 
voters and limits the power of politicians (ibid., p. 184). Indeed, a number of studies have praised Switzerland's 
direct democracy as an example to be followed. See Beedham (1993) and von Amim (1993,1995).
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Implications for an Analysis of the Swiss MNEs’ Political Influence
During the 1990s it has become fashionable to argue that Switzerland’s business community 
had lost its famous hold over economic policy-making131. Despite the Vorort’s often voiced 
preference for deregulation and liberalisation, the state became increasingly interventionist 
over the last decade. Particularly in the aftermath of the no-vote in the referendum to join the 
EEA, commentators concluded that the Vorort had lost much of its political influence and 
capacity to organise a coherent and successful political strategy132. Such arguments appear to 
be, however, exaggerated. While Swiss firms may no longer be able to rely on their 
accustomed insider role in closed policy-making processes, they remain nevertheless 
influential. In 1995, the government passed an economic reform package, which included a 
revised competition policy, liberalisation of public procurement policies and 
telecommunications services and the elimination of a number of technical barriers to trade -  
reforms which largely conformed to the Vorort’s preferences. Moreover, the reform 
abolished Switzerland’s tum-over tax and replaced it by a value-added tax -  a reform that 
failed in 1991133. Maybe even more important was the absence of a referendum on the 
ratification of the Uruguay Round and Switzerland’s participation in the WTO. After the 
highly politicised debate about joining the EEA this was surprising and interesting at the 
same time. As Sherlock Holmes has observed, dogs that don’t bark give important clues. One 
Vorort executive commented that the Vorort had during this time been rather explicit to the 
Farmer’s Association about the negative consequences of a rejection for the Swiss export 
industry, which essentially foots the bill for agricultural subsidies and which had already been 
disadvantaged by the rejection of the EEA134.
Looking at these policy outcomes against the background of the evidence from the 
previous section, the implications for Swiss firms’ political influence appear to be somewhat 
different than in the German case. It was argued that while the Swiss federal government had 
certainly become more assertive over the last decade, this development was less advanced 
than in Germany. State spending was less in Switzerland (at least at the federal level), the 
economy was still less regulated than in Germany and the system of direct democracy has 
still preserved to a degree, the states' traditional role of sanctioning agreements between the
131 See for example Ratti (1996).
132 See for example Ratti (1996), p. 250.
133 See Vorort (1997).
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major domestic groups. As a result, it appears that political and economic circumstances are 
unlikely to be as important as in the German case for an explanation of policy outcomes. 
Instead, policies are likely to continue to be the kind of compromise solutions that 
Switzerland is famous for. In other words, institutions can be expected to remain an important 
explanatory factor. This observation fits in well with Schmitter and Grote’s argument that 
Swiss corporatist structures have remained stable in the 1990s135.
That does, however, not mean that interests and political and economic circumstances are 
not important. In fact, with the proliferation of organised interest groups, Switzerland’s 
economic policy- making institutions appear to have become a bit of a double-edged sword 
for Swiss firms. On the one hand, the institutional structure still guards against outright 
defeats, but on the other hand, as more groups became involved, compromises became more 
difficult to find and more interests had to be accommodated136. As a result, the degree of 
domestic opposition or the extent to which firms can use their internationalisation process for 
political leverage, can well be expected to make compromise policies more or less 
advantageous for firms. In other words, despite functioning institutions, interests and 
circumstances may still prove to be important explanatory factors.
Conclusion
Chapter 1 has argued that interests and institutions were important sources of political 
influence for MNEs. However, it was also argued that in order to account for variations in 
MNEs’ political influence across policy issues, these approaches had to be supplemented 
with an analysis of the economic and political circumstances in which policy-making took 
place. It was argued that circumstances affect institutions and perceptions of self-interest and 
thereby help to shape the preferences of the state, the degree of opposition from other 
organised interests and the extent to which MNEs’ could use their internationalisation process 
for political leverage. Hence an analysis of MNEs' political influence had to incorporate 
circumstances as an explanatory factor. The purpose of this chapter was to provide the 
foundations for such an analysis. To this end, it has mapped out the institutional structures of
134 Interview.
135 Schmitter and Grote (1997).
136 See Josef Ackermann “Eine Fitnesskur fur die Schweiz”, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Dec. 4/5 1993.
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the German and Swiss economic policy-making process and provided a general overview of 
the economic and political circumstances in which policy-making was taking place during the 
period from 1985 to 1995.
The analysis has shown significant similarities and differences between Germany and 
Switzerland. First, while MNEs in both countries are part of an institutional structure that 
links them through their trade associations to the economic policy-making process, 
institutional linkages in Switzerland are tighter, mainly due to the institutions of direct 
democracy and the relative weakness of political parties and the state. Moreover, while at 
least according to some authors, institutions in Germany are beginning to show cracks, this 
phenomenon was less developed in Switzerland. Hence it was suggested that institutions 
were likely to be of greater importance for an explanation of the Swiss MNEs’ political
influence than for the German MNEs’.
Second, despite the importance of institutions for structuring German and Swiss policy­
making processes, the preferences of federal governments appear to have become more 
important in both countries. It was shown that while neither state embraced heavy-handed 
government intervention, governments in both countries nevertheless intervened where 
increasing openness and market processes clashed with their desire for “fair” and “just” 
economic outcomes. In other words, while it may be fashionable in the 1990s to argue that 
markets have become all powerful and states have been condemned to eternal retreat, the last 
two sections have clearly shown that the case was not so unambiguous. In fact, in both 
Germany and Switzerland, state spending has increased significantly during the last decades 
and regulations have proliferated. This observation seems to support the argument of Chapter 
1 that MNEs" political influence is likely to be conditioned by the degree to which their 
preferences are congruent with those of the state. It was, however, noted that this
development was considerably more advanced in Germany. While the Swiss state has
certainly also become more active over the last decade, it is still significantly less active than 
the German state. In other words, in an analysis of MNEs’ political influence, state 
preferences might matter somewhat less in the Swiss case.
Finally, it was pointed out that while internationalisation may well have strengthened 
MNEs’ political influence in certain policy areas (i.e. collective wage bargaining), there has 
also been a countervailing trend in both countries. In line with Olson’s prediction that stable 
societies will over time produce distributional coalitions aligned against change, economic 
adjustment in both Germany and Switzerland has over the last decade been increasingly 
slowed down by vocal and well-organised interest groups. It was shown that in both countries
131
important economic reforms were opposed by organised interests, which seemed more keen 
on influencing the distribution of goods in their favour than on increasing the overall volume 
of output. Moreover, it appeared that the close identification of MNEs with the forces of 
globalisation exposed them substantially to the forces seeking to resist some of the 
consequences of that movement137. This study has deduced from these observations that the 
extent of opposition from other organised groups was likely to condition the political 
influence that MNEs were capable of exerting. However, clearly this opposition needs to be 
analysed within the context of MNEs’ on-going internationalisation process, since the threat 
of shifting production abroad may well be effective to override interest group pressure in 
some policy areas.
137 Vernon has observed that the discussion of the costs and benefits of openness have become inseparable from 
discussions of the costs and benefits of MNEs. See Vernon (1998), p. 150.
5The Political Influence of the Six German and 
Swiss Pharmaceutical MNEs
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the political influence of the six German and Swiss 
pharmaceutical MNEs with regard to the selected policy issues. The first step for such an 
analysis has been taken in Chapter 3, which has examined MNEs’ policy preferences. 
Comparing these preferences now with actual policy outcomes will provide a yardstick by 
which the extent of MNEs’ political influence can be analysed. However, such a comparison 
by itself is unlikely to explain MNEs’ political influence. Chapter 1 has argued that it is 
hardly plausible to assume that MNEs’ political influence is a neat function of their interests. 
Rather, political influence is also likely to be shaped by institutions and the economic and 
political circumstances under which policy-making took place.
Chapter 4 has pointed out that MNEs in both Germany and Switzerland are part of an 
institutional structure that has traditionally been regarded as a source of political influence for 
the business community. It was noted that in the German case the literature was not 
unanimous whether this was still true in the 1990s, while in the Swiss case it was argued that 
corporatist structures have largely remained intact. However, it was pointed out that in both 
countries it was also possible to identify developments relating to political and economic 
circumstances that might condition the extent to which MNEs could shape policies according 
to their preferences. In both states, governments became increasingly assertive over the last 
decades and policy-making processes became more politicised due to the activities of 
organised interest groups. Hence it was argued that MNEs' political influence was likely to be 
conditioned by the extent to which their preferences were compatible with those of the 
government and by the degree of opposition from other organised interests. Moreover, it was 
argued that the extent of MNEs' internationalisation process was, at least in some policy 
areas, likely to be a source of political leverage. The following sections will now analyse how 
all these explanatory factors came together to shape the political influence of the six MNEs 
with regard to the selected policy issues.
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The Three German MNEs: Hoechst, Bayer and BASF
Chapter 1 has pointed out that the policy issues of greatest significance for the three German 
MNEs were health care reforms, regulatory issues pertaining to biotechnology, intellectual 
property rights issues and parallel imports. However, not all of these issues will be covered in 
this chapter. In two of these four policy areas -  intellectual property rights issues and 
biotechnology regulations - decision-making authority increasingly shifted to the EU level 
during the late 1980s and 1990s. Hence the political influence of the three MNEs with regard 
to those issues will be analysed in chapter 7.
While intellectual property rights were considered to be a completely “European” policy 
issue -  in the sense that MNEs and their associations concentrated their interest 
representation efforts at the EU level1 -  the case with biotechnology regulations has not been 
so clear cut. Regarding the approval of production and research facilities, there was a division 
of labour between the European Commission and national governments: the Commission 
issued directives, on which basis national governments adopted regulations. However, EU 
directives leave member states considerable room for “interpretation” and, as a result, 
regulations vary significantly among EU member countries2. Hence regulatory issues 
pertaining to the approval of production and research facilities need to be analysed at both the 
national and the EU level as MNEs can be expected to try and influence both policy-making 
processes.
The second set of biotechnology regulations -  regulations pertaining to the approval of 
drugs -  increasingly shifted to the European level during the 1990s, a development that 
culminated in 1995 with the establishment of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency 
(EMEA). The Boston Consulting Group has noted that with the possibility of obtaining 
Europe-wide approval and registration through the EMEA, national approval and registration 
procedures have largely lost their significance3. Hence regulations for the approval of drugs 
will be analysed in Chapter 7.
1 Interviews.
2 Directives are addressed to the member states and must be transformed into national law; they
are binding as to the result to be achieved, but the choice of method is left to the member states. See Art. 189 (3) 
of the Treaty of Rome. For variations in biotechnology regulations among EU member countries see Szczepanik 
(1993), Hohmeyer et al. (1994), Levidow and Carr (1996) and European Commission (1992 a, b).
3 Boston Consulting Group (1995), p. 105.
134
Health Care Policy Issues
Health care policies largely determine the prices that pharmaceutical MNEs can charge for 
their products. Hence it is not surprising that executives at Hoechst, Bayer and BASF referred 
to health care policy as one of the most important policy issues for their industry. During the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Germany’s health care system changed significantly as a result of 
two major reforms - the Blum Act of 1989 and the Seehofer Act of 1993. The following 
section will now analyse the extent to which the three MNEs were able to shape these two 
policy outcomes.
Until the Blum Act, the three German MNEs had very little to complain about since 
Germany’s health care system provided them with relatively comfortable conditions. 
Producers were free to choose the price of their products and consumers were reimbursed by 
their health insurance, which usually covered pharmaceuticals with only minimal co­
payments. Higher prices were simply passed on to consumers via higher insurance 
premiums4. Moreover, the three MNEs were well-positioned to influence the policy-making 
debate: through their trade associations -  the German Association o f the Pharmaceutical 
Industry (BPI) and, after 1994, the Association of Research-Focused Pharmaceutical 
Producers (VFA) -  they are represented in the so-called "Concerted Action", a national forum 
that brings together the key decision makers of the health care system for the annual round of 
negotiations between health care providers and purchasers. Established in 1977, the 
Concerted Action meets twice annually and is convened by the Minister of Health. Over the 
years it has grown considerably and now has approximately 90 members from various 
organisations. Most prominent among them are the representatives of insurance funds and the 
associations of physicians, hospitals and industry. The Concerted Action has no regulatory 
powers but rather exerts its influence on the basis of “moral suasion“. Regulation and 
supervision of the provision of health care is the responsibility of the Lander, while the 
financing of the system is largely a matter for federal authorities. Although this system was 
originally designed so that the government did not need to interfere into the process, but only 
sanctioned bargaining outcomes between the major actors, mounting financing problems in 
recent years propelled the government to intervene ever more frequently5.
4 Hoffineyer and McCarthy (1993), para. 6.3.6.2.
5 For a more detailed overview see Hoffmeyer and McCarthy (1993), para. 6.6.
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A number of authors have linked these financing problems to highly distorted incentive 
structures6. Hoffmeyer and McCarthy have observed that the original intention of social 
solidarity has gradually been eroded.
“Today, there is a growing expectation that the costs of ever more services should be 
shared by society. Such expectations sometimes encourage abuse: instead of redistributing 
funds from the healthy to the sick, it is increasingly the healthy themselves who make use 
of entitlements, for reasons of availability, rather than for reasons of need”7.
In the words of one official from the BPI,
“the attempt to balance equity and efficiency resulted in incentives for doctors and 
hospitals to provide the most comprehensive treatments without any consideration for cost 
since constraints to offset the moral hazard problem resulting from health insurance 
programmes were largely absent. The result has been a strongly distorted incentive 
structure”8.
As long as the possibilities of medicine were limited, these incentive structures did not 
constitute a major problem. However, as rapid technological progress over the last decade 
dramatically increased the possibilities of medicine, costs began to explode9. In order to 
contain these costs, the government passed two major reform acts, the 1989 Blum Act and the 
1993 Seehofer Act.
In stark contrast to the competitive approach to health care described in Chapter 3, the 
Blum Act was a clear case of distorting market processes in order to engineer outcomes. 
Instead of adding market-comforming constraints to foster cost-consciousness among all 
market participants (such as, for example, significant co-payments), the centrepiece of the act 
was a system of reference prices on which the reimbursement price was based. While the 
market price remained free, health insurance did not cover the difference between the market 
price and the reference price, which was decided -  without industry participation - by the 
Federal Association o f Physicians and Sickness Funds. Only significantly innovative drugs
6 While in the 1960s most countries in Western Europe spent roughly 4 per cent of GDP on health car, this share 
had increased by the 1990s to between 8 and 11 per cent. In the United States it is 14.2 per cent. See Sommer 
(1997), p. 9.
See Hoffmeyer and McCarthy (1993), para. 6.6.
8 Interview.
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were excluded from regulation based on this scheme10. The result was strong downward 
pressure on drug prices as firms were practically forced to lower their prices to the reference 
price. By 1991 average drug prices in the regulated market had fallen by 4.3 per cent 
compared to 198911.
However, the reform was unsuccessful in bringing about sustained cost savings and was 
widely considered a failure. Savings were only substantial in the very early phase of the new 
system and tended to vanish quickly. In fact, between 1989 and 1992 pharmaceutical 
expenditures grew by about 30 per cent, approximately the same rate as before the reform. 
Hoffmeyer and McCarthy have argued that the reform was unsuccessful because firms (and 
doctors) responded to the distorted incentive structure with unanticipated compensating 
strategies so that the expected savings were largely offset. Since significantly innovative 
products were exempted from the reference price system, the definition of what constituted 
“true innovation” turned out to be rather difficult to establish12. An official at the Ministry of 
Economics remarked that firms were very skilled in interpreting to their advantage the 
endemic conflict between the regulatory logic, which tried to create the largest possible 
groups of products, and the medical logic, which insisted on biological and pharmacological 
differences. In fact, LePen has pointed out that while it was planned that references prices 
should apply to 80 per cent of the market, in the end only 30-40 per cent of available drugs 
were included. In addition, as the market was not fully covered by the system, large shifts in 
prescribing occurred towards the non-regulated sector where prices could be raised, resulting 
in an increase in total drug spending. The promotion policies of drug companies heavily 
supported this shift13.
The failure of the Blum Act prompted the coalition government of Chancellor Kohl to look 
yet again at health care reform and the newly appointed Minister for Health, Horst Seehofer, 
was given the task of proposing new reform measures. After much debate, Seehofer was able 
to strike a consensus among the main political parties of the federal parliament, as well as 
with the Lander governments for a reform act, which came into effect in January 1993. From 
an Ordnungspolitik point of view, the Seehofer Act was even worse than the Blum Act; the 
centrepiece of the reform was a budget for medicines prescribed by office-based doctors. In 
other words, the Act was based on the assumption that it was possible to estimate a fixed sum
9 See Sommer (1997).
10 See LePen (1994), p. 51.
11 Ibid., p.52.
12 Ibid.
13 See LePen (1994), p. 52.
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for annual health care expenditure and then spread this sum across different services. Sommer 
has likened this shift from control of prices to volume as comparable to a shift to a command 
economy14. Moreover, the Act ruled that if the medicine budget was exceeded by up to DM 
280m, physicians had to pay for the overrun in the following year by reducing their collective 
budget. If the budget was exceeded by more than that, the pharmaceutical industry would 
have to pay for the overrun. Finally, the Act decreed a price freeze for medicines not covered 
by the reference price system for 1993 and 199415.
Unsurprisingly, the results of the Seehofer Act were far more significant than those of the 
Blum Act. In fact, the threat to physicians’ personal income had spectacular effects: in 1993 
drug expenses by health insurance funds fell by DM 5bn as drug prescriptions by office- 
based physicians fell by more than 30 per cent. For the pharmaceutical industry the 
consequences of the Seehofer Act were drastic - depending on the company, sales were cut 
from 10 to 40 per cent16.
However, similar to the Blum Act, the market distortions created by the Seehofer Act 
triggered distortions elsewhere in the system and the reform did not result in sustained 
savings. In 1995, two years after the introduction of the Act, the statutory health insurance 
was again recording deficits17. In the case of the Seehofer Act, the compensating strategies 
came from doctors, who preferred to send patients needing high levels of medication to 
hospitals -  and thereby alleviate their budgets -  rather than treating them themselves. In fact, 
already in the first quarter of 1993, German hospitals recorded a 6.7 per cent increase in the 
number of patients18.
Turning now to the three MNEs’ political influence, both reforms were clearly far from 
MNEs’ preference for policies aimed at embedding all market participants in a market order 
with incentives for cost-conscious and responsible behaviour. Instead reforms were dirigiste 
in nature, ignored incentive structures and were essentially short-term policies tackling the 
symptoms of the underlying problem. Rather than adding constraints designed to foster 
greater cost-consciousness among all market participants, the government opted for market 
non-conforming instruments such as mandatory price freezes, reference prices and 
expenditure ceilings for physicians. Unsurprisingly, the three MNEs were highly critical of 
the two policy outcomes. As one executive has put it,
14 Sommer (1997), p. 2.
15 For an overview of the Act see Hoffmeyer and McCarthy (1993), para. 6.3.
16 See LePen (1994), p. 52.
17 See BPI Annual Report (1996/97), p. 35.
18 See report by the Association of German hospitals, quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 12 1993.
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“there are enormous dangers in administered pricing. It is very easy for governments to 
reduce drug costs on a short-term basis by administering the price of drugs. However, this 
creates tremendous market distortions. ...It also creates research dis-incentives because it
1Qseverely diminishes the rewards for innovation” .
Another executive added that
“both reforms were designed to cut expenditure in the short term and amounted to little 
more than treatment of the symptoms. Ultimately both reforms failed since they 
encouraged further distortions instead of generating greater efficiency”20.
The scale of the political defeat becomes even clearer when one looks at the share of drugs 
in overall health care costs and the contribution they have made to cost increases over the last 
decades. In 1994 drugs accounted for 12.5 per cent of overall health care costs, compared 
with 32 per cent for hospitals and 16 per cent for doctors. Moreover, the share of drugs had 
fallen in recent years -  in 1991 it amounted to 15.3 per cent. In addition, drug prices rose 
since 1970 more slowly than the general price index, while hospital costs have doubled since 
I96021. In other words, although the pharmaceutical industry contributed only insignificantly 
to the increase in health care expenditure, both reform acts focused cost saving measures 
disproportionately on the industry.
Indeed, the political defeat was so significant that the three MNEs no longer felt 
adequately represented by the BPI and set up their “own” sectoral association, the 
Association o f Research-Focused Pharmaceutical Producers (VFA) which deals exclusively 
with the concerns of research-intensive pharmaceutical MNEs. A s one executive has put it, 
“the BPI had simply become too heterogeneous and unwieldy as it also included generic drug 
and OTC producers whose interests were very different from ours [the research-focused 
pharmaceutical industry]”. Established in 1994 under the stewardship of a Bayer executive, 
the VFA became in the following years the main organisation through which the three MNEs 
articulated their policy preferences.
19 Interview.
20 Interview. Analysing both health care reform acts, Boersch- Supan (1997) has argued that cost-containment 
measures in Germany have wholly ignored productivity increases as an important potential factor for cost 
savings. Moreover, he noted that the German health care system had a relatively low level of productivity, 
which was caused by distorted incentive structures and a lack of competitive pressures.
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Regulations Relating to Biotechnology Issues
Biotechnology regulations are frequently analysed in terms of their impact on a country’s 
competitiveness22. Such concerns are, however, not the focus of this study. The goal here is 
to analyse the extent to which regulations conform to MNEs’ preferences for a market- 
conforming regulatory regime. As has been pointed out earlier, this section will be concerned 
with regulations pertaining to production and research facilities. The equally important 
regulations pertaining to drug approval procedures will be analysed in Chapter 7 as they 
originate with the European Commission and the EMEA.
Formal German biotechnology regulation is a rather recent phenomenon. Until 1990, the 
application of this technology was regulated through informal guidelines from the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. However, during the late 1980s a number of developments rendered 
this state of affairs increasingly unsatisfactory. First, it has been documented that during the 
second half of the 1980s, the state bureaucracy became increasingly keen to extend its 
regulatory competence to this new technology23. In 1987, a joint Bundestag and Bundesrat 
working group concluded a review of the issue and recommended that legislation should be 
passed to formally regulate safety requirements for research centres and production facilities. 
Second, a further impetus for formal regulation came from the European Commission, which 
started during the late 1980s to prepare directives for biotechnology regulation (see Chapter 
7). Since directives by the Commission have to be incorporated into national law, 
implementation of this directive would have required a formal regulatory regime. Third, by 
the late 1980s, the German population had become increasingly wary of biotechnology. 
Bandelow has pointed out that an increasing number of interest groups ranging from 
environmental and women’s organisations, to consumer protection groups and the church, 
were successful in promoting scepticism and distrust among the population and exerted 
pressure on the government to regulate biotechnology24. In fact, it was estimated that around 
40 per cent of the population had a negative attitude towards gene technology by the late 
1980s25. Finally, the pharmaceutical industry was not entirely opposed to formal regulation. 
Although the informality of the existing regulatory regime corresponded largely to their 
preferences, operating conditions had become increasingly unpredictable. In 1990, for
21 See Boston Consulting Group (1995), pp. 46-51.
22 See for example Peterson (1989), Sharp (1989), Szczepanik (1993) and Wheale and Me Nally (1993).
23 See for example Bandelow (1999), p. 107.
24 Ibid., p. 113.
25 See Hennen and Stockli (1992), p. 240.
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example, a high court in Hesse ruled that existing guidelines were not a sufficient legal basis 
to permit Hoechst the construction of a production facility for human insulin. Although this 
verdict was widely criticised for being ill conceived and misleading, it strengthened the 
impression that legal certainty and predictability was not possible without a specific law26.
However, industry’s support swiftly turned into opposition when the new law was passed 
in 1990. As it turned out, the new legislation was everything but market conforming and 
industry-friendly. First of all, the 1990 Gene Technology Act divided production and research 
facilities into four security categories, each with different application and approval 
procedures, and split approval responsibilities between the federal health care office (today
onthe Robert Koch Institute) and the Lander authorities . As a result some 30 agencies were 
dealing with the approval of gene technology-related work- something that made by itself a 
unitary interpretation unlikely and created uncertainties28. Second, while the 1990 Gene 
Technology Act was based on EU directives 90/219 and 90/220, the German interpretation 
differed in one crucial aspect from that of other European countries: in Germany, approval 
authorities were explicitly asked to consider larger societal concerns and interests in their 
decisions29. To this end, the act required mandatory public hearings preceding any decision. 
Several interviewees argued that this procedure led to tremendous delays and unpredictability 
for firms as organised interest groups jumped on this opportunity to voice their objections to 
biotechnology30. Indeed, the first public hearing attracted several thousands of objectors31. 
Moreover, the explicit reference to “larger societal interests” led to particularly strict 
interpretations of the law and further prolonged approval procedures32. Summarising the 
distinctive features of the 1990 Gene Technology Act, the Boston Consulting Group 
commented that German regulations distinguished themselves by excessive red tape, long 
waiting periods and uncertainty regarding the outcome33. In other words, the policy outcome 
clearly did not correspond to MNEs’ preference for a regulatory framework that was
26 See Vitzhum and Geddert-Steinacher (1990), pp. 77-86. See also Dolata (1996), pp. 165-166 and Boston 
Consulting Group (1995), p. 113.
27 In some cases, a federal commission for biotechnology safety (Zentrale Kommission fur die Biologische 
Sicherheit -  ZKBS) was also involved in the decision-making process..
28 Bandelow has observed significant variations in the approval record of individual Lander. Particularly,
Hesse has often been accused of intentional delays. See Bandelow (1999), pp. 123-125.
29 See Bandelow (1999), p. 118.
30 Interviews.
31 See Winnacker (1993).
32 Grand (1992) and Bauer (1993) have argued, that although approval procedures should not have taken longer 
than three months, they often took more than two years.
33 Boston Consulting Group (1995), p. 113. Bandelow (1999, p. 120) has noted that if, for example, a university 
wanted to conduct research involving gene technology of the first safety category, it had to fill out a 90-page
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transparent, predictable, based on scientific principles and flexible enough to swiftly 
accommodate technological changes.
It should also be noted in this context that the results of the Gene Technology Act had been 
thoroughly negative for the German pharmaceutical industry. Klodt and Stehn, for example, 
argued that the act prevented German industry from developing the same capacity for 
innovation that it has in other technology areas34, and the Boston Consulting Group observed 
that Germany’s global share of inventions in pharmaceuticals has dropped from 15 per cent in 
1975 to 5 per cent in 199435.
Unsurprisingly, the Act provoked strong opposition from the three MNEs. Under the 
umbrella of the BPI, the pharmaceutical industry started a nation wide advertising campaign 
to draw attention to Germany’s relatively low competitiveness in this growth industry and the 
need for a reform of the Gene Technology Ac?6. The centrepiece of this campaign was the 
industry-sponsored Initiative pro Gentechnik (Initiative for Gene Technology), which placed 
regular advertisements in magazines and newspapers37.
The initiative led to results. Already in 1993 the Gene Technology Act was substantially 
revised and the regulatory framework became more market conforming. Approval procedures 
for the lowest-risk category were turned into mere application procedures; public hearings 
were restricted to only important cases and approval procedures were shortened to an average 
of three to seven months. These measures led to a significant improvement of the regulatory 
framework in terms of its transparency and predictability38.
However, the positive effects of this revision should not be overstated. While the revision 
certainly went some way towards making Germany's regulatory framework more market 
conforming, uncertainties have remained. These appear to be, however, less the result of 
regulations than the result of interest group pressure, which led to a very restrictive 
interpretation of the act39. Hoechst, for example, had to wait for more than eight years for the 
approval of a production facility for genetically produced human insulin, while during the 
same period rival companies in Denmark and the United States were producing this product
application form, submit 15 copies and take blood samples of all involved personnel (including secretaries and 
cleaners), which then had to be stored for 20 years at minus 80 degrees.
34 Klodt and Stehn (1994), pp. 61, 65.
35 Boston Consulting Group (1995), p. 131.
36 See Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 57 and Boston Consulting Group (1995), pp. 64,122.
37 See for example Der Spiegel, No.50/1992 and Frankfurter Rundschau, Jan. 5 1993.
38 See Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 66.
39 Quoting evidence from the renowned Frauenhofer Institute, Klodt and Stehn (1994, p. 67) have argued that 
the interpretation of the Act has had a far more restrictive influence than the Act itself. For a similar view see 
Bandelow (1997), p. 162.
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and selling it in Germany. The comparison with Denmark is particularly significant since 
Danish regulations hardly differ from those in Germany40. Moreover, due to substantial 
interest group pressure it took two years (1993-1995) to find a solution for the loosening of 
gene technology safety requirements41 and in 1995 interest group pressure delayed the 
introduction of genetically modified maize42.
Parallel Imports
In recent years -  and as a result of the single European market -  parallel imports have 
emerged as one of the most important issues facing the German pharmaceutical industry. 
Chapter 3 has pointed out that these imports are the result of the single market that, on the 
one hand, encourages the free flow of drugs across countries but, on the other hand, leaves 
members states free to regulate their health care markets as they wish. As a result of these 
two policies, drug prices vary significantly across EU member countries and private dealers 
have discovered a lucrative trade reselling drugs bought in low-price regions to consumers in 
countries where prices are higher, such as for example Germany43.
Although parallel trade flows have been limited during the last decade - penetration rates 
in most European countries are low and even in the most affected market, the Netherlands, 
parallel imports have only reached around 10 per cent of sales -  the industry has been arguing 
that the threat is nevertheless real44. According to the three MNEs, actual trade flows greatly 
understate the potential impact of parallel imports since for a manufacturer faced with the 
threat of parallel imports, the loss-minimising strategy is to reduce the price differentials in 
order to eliminate arbitrage opportunity. Thus the mere threat of parallel trade may suffice to 
make the lowest price within a trading area the effective maximum price45.
Moreover, several developments during the last decade significantly increased the 
potential threat of parallel imports. While parallel trade used to be constrained by a number of
40 See Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 66.
41 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Jan. 12 1995 and Jan. 18 1995.
42 See Die Zeit, June 30 1995; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 8 1995 and June 21 1995.
43 The existence of significant price differentials for patented medicines among countries within the EU is well 
established. Research conducted by NERA confirms that there is a marked variation between countries in prices 
of currently patented medicines. For example, at the end of 1994 prices in the Netherlands were over 75 per cent 
higher than those in Spain, and there was a range of prices between these extreme values. See NERA (1996),
p. 5.
44 See also NERA (1996), p. 8.
45 Interviews. See also Danzon (1994), p. 10.
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factors such as, for example, the need to obtain parallel import product licenses and to 
establish the co-operation with pharmacists and wholesalers, industry believes that there are 
strong grounds for believing that the institutional barriers to parallel trade are crumbling46. 
First, since 1995 new medicines that are approved by the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency (EMEA) are automatically approved in all EU countries (see Chapter 7). It is widely 
held therefore that no parallel import product license will be required for such products47. 
Moreover, the resulting harmonisation of registration and labelling requirements is likely to 
reduce the costs of parallel importing and hence reduce the price differentials that can be 
sustained without inducing parallel trade48. Second, the potential impact of parallel trade has 
significantly increased with the accession to the EU of countries where prices are 
traditionally low, such as Spain and Portugal. An even bigger threat, however, is the possible 
accession of Eastern European countries.
Chapter 3 has argued that the three German MNEs were strongly opposed to parallel trade. 
They sustain that parallel trade is a means for importing the price regulations of other 
countries into Germany, and that trade under these circumstances is neither fair nor welfare- 
enhancing. While supporting the single European market, the interviewed executives argued 
that pharmaceuticals were a special case in which the single market did not yet function49. 
From their point of view, parallel trade should be restricted by policies that reinforced the 
segmentation of national health care markets.
Although the problem appears to be essentially a “European” one that one would expect to 
find in Chapter 7, the German pharmaceutical industry -  at least until recently -  concentrated 
its lobbying efforts on the German government, since the European institutions were 
generally unreceptive to the German industries’ complaints. The European Court of Justice, 
for example, has repeatedly upheld parallel trade as consistent with standard principles of free 
trade50. While acknowledging that price differentials for patented medicines largely resulted 
from the actions of governments, the ECJ found that such considerations were not relevant to 
the analysis and that the principle of free movement of drugs should take precedence over
46 See NERA (1996), p. 8.
47 Ibid., pp. 8f.
48 Previously, a 15-20 per cent price difference was necessary to cover the costs of complying with different 
regulations and other importing costs. See Danzon (1994), pp. lOf.
49 Interviews. See also VFA Annual Report (1996), p. 8.
50 When asked to rule on the rights accorded to a patent holder to prevent parallel trade, the Court has applied 
the principle of exhaustion of patent rights. If the owner of a patent right markets a patented product, or consents 
to it being marketed, in one member state, it has been argued that the patent right in another member state 
cannot be used to prevent parallel imports of the product concerned. See Danzon (1994), p. 7 and NERA (1996).
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industry’s fears that northern markets would be flooded by cheap medicines51. The European 
Commission has until recently taken a similar view and has been unreceptive to industry’s 
arguments. In 1994, Bayer was fined by the European Commission for restricting supplies of 
Adalat to parallel exporters52.
As a result of this failure to win support from the Commission or the ECJ, the BPI and 
after 1994, the VFA, lobbied the German government to apply political pressure on the 
Southern European countries to reform their health care systems or to introduce measures for 
segmenting drug markets along national lines. However, as one association official has 
conceded, “despite many complaints, there have not been any tangible results”53. In fact, 
during the first half of the 1990s, the German government has not been much kinder to the 
pharmaceutical industry than the European Commission and the ECJ. Far from trying to 
prevent parallel imports from entering the German market, the government actually promoted 
them until recently through a clause in the health care act that forced pharmacists to sell 
parallel imports. Also, a 1993 decision by the German High Court suggested that 
pharmaceutical wholesalers would be forced to stock parallel imports, which in the past they 
have refused to do54.
However, during the second half of the 1990s, amid fears about declining competitiveness 
and falling research, firms’ worries began to find a more sympathetic ear among the German 
government and the European Commission. In 1996, the German government dropped the 
clause in the health care act that forced pharmacists to sell parallel imports and the European 
Commission became also more receptive to industry’s concerns. While there have not been 
any tangible results so far, the Commission at least set up a round table forum under the 
chairmanship of Martin Bangemann, commissioner for industrial policy, to study the issue 
and possible solutions. The VFA has interpreted this development as a step towards a more 
co-operative future and a more industry-friendly dialogue55. Similarly, the ECJ has become 
more co-operative. Although it did not fundamentally revise its previous decisions, it did 
concede that national price controls of some member states led to trade distortions in the 
single market56.
51 See Danzon (1994), p. 8. See also “Problem of parallels”, Financial Times, March 16 1998
52 See NERA (1996), pp. 8f.
53 Interview.
54 See NERA (1996), p. 9.
55 See VFA Annual Report (1996), p. 17.
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The Political Influence of Hoechst, Bayer and BASF: An Analysis
An analysis of the three MNEs’ political influence during the last decade has shown both 
outright defeats and qualified successes. Regarding health care policies, the three MNEs were 
strongly in favour of less state intervention and more competition-promoting measures and 
got precisely the opposite. With regard to biotechnology regulation, they supported a 
predictable and transparent legal framework and had to settle, at least initially, for one that 
was characterised by large unpredictability and uncertainty. Finally, with regard to parallel 
imports, they unsuccessfully lobbied for policies to reinforce market segmentation in Europe.
Lately, however, there were also some qualified political successes: the highly 
disadvantageous Gene Technology Act of 1990 was substantially revised in 1993, which 
resulted in a markedly improved regulatory environment. Moreover, the German government 
has recently taken more seriously industry’s concerns regarding parallel imports. In 1996 it 
dropped a clause in the Health Care Act that forced pharmacists to sell parallel imports. On 
balance, however, the three pharmaceutical MNEs have been rather unsuccessful in shaping 
policy outcomes according to their preferences. The defeats have been substantial. How can 
one explain these policy outcomes?
Institutional explanations do not appear to be particularly helpful. Although the three 
MNEs were part of an institutional structure that provided them with strong linkages to the 
policy-making process, policy outcomes - with the exception of the 1993 revision of the Gene 
Technology Act - were highly disadvantageous for the three MNEs. Moreover, in the issue 
area where linkages to the policy-making process were strongest and most institutionalised -  
health care policy (see above) -  the defeats have been particularly grave.
In fact, the evidence from the pharmaceutical sector appears to fit in well with the 
literature reviewed in the previous chapter that diagnosed cracks in Germany’s institutions. 
However, the evidence was not entirely clear-cut. All three MNEs worked closely with their 
sector associations -  until 1994 the BPI and after that the VFA -  and relied on them for 
representing their interests in the policy-making process. In other words, the phenomenon of 
firms by-passing their associations was not visible in the pharmaceutical sector. Moreover, in 
contrast to other European countries, the German firms did not set up an association dealing 
exclusively with biotechnology issues -  something, which has been interpreted as a sign of
56 Ibid.
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faith in the existing organisational structure57. Apart from the BPI and VFA, the three MNEs 
have also occasionally relied on the VCI (Verband der Chemischen Industrie), which set up a
58 . ,jworking group for biotechnology staffed by executives from the three MNEs . The VCI 
represents a broad spectrum of industrial interests and has been particularly important for 
high-level negotiations since it has been for decades one of the most influential trade 
associations in Germany59.
However, it must be said that while the three MNEs have refrained from individual 
lobbying and continue to rely on collective efforts to advance their political interests, the 
establishment of the VFA has been a significant sign. Set up under the stewardship of a Bayer 
executive, the VFA is neither a member of the VCI nor the BDI and operates outside of 
Germany’s institutional structure. One interviewee has noted that the VFA looked more like a 
lobby group than an assistant to government60. In this sense the establishment of the VFA was 
not exactly an expression of faith in the traditional German institutional structure61.
Interests appear to be more helpful to make sense of the three MNEs* political influence. 
Essentially the three MNEs suffered three substantial political defeats -  the two health care 
reforms and the 1990 Gene Technology Act -  and scored one significant political success -  
the 1993 revision of the Gene Technology Act. What distinguished the success from the 
defeats was a highly visible, high profile public relations campaign that preceded the 
revision. In other words, rather than relying on traditional channels of interest representation, 
the industry went public with their complaints. In fact, Klodt and Stehn have explicitly 
argued that the pharmaceutical industry’s public campaign was a decisive factor in bringing 
about the revision of the 1990 Act62. While there appears to be some truth to this argument, it 
is not entirely convincing since it inevitably leads one to conclude that the MNEs could have 
also been more successful with regard to health care policy if they had only mounted a 
similar high profile campaign. However, for reasons shown below, this appears to be highly 
unlikely.
Chapter 1 has argued that the explanatory power of institutional and rational choice 
explanations could be enhanced by supplementing them with an analysis of the impact of
57 See Ronnit (1997), p. 84. In most European countries, the pharmaceutical industry set up associations 
exclusively for biotechnology-related issues: France -  Organibio (1984), Belgium -  BBA (1986), Italy -  
ASSOBIOTEC (1986), Great Britain -  BIA (1989), Spain -Bioindustrias (1989), Netherlands -  NIABA (1987).
58 Ibid.
59 See Teltschik (1992).
60 Interview.
61 Interview.
62 See Klodt and Stehn (1994), p. 62.
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changing economic and political circumstances on the preferences of the government, the 
degree of opposition that MNEs were facing from other domestic groups and the extent to 
which MNEs were able to use their internationalisation process for political leverage. Indeed, 
such an analysis goes a long way towards explaining variations in the three German 
pharmaceutical MNEs’ political influence.
With regard to health care, the three factors combined in a highly disadvantageous way for 
Hoechst, Bayer and BASF: first, the government had a strong interest in the issue and this 
interest was not exactly compatible with that of the three MNEs. All interviewees agreed that 
the determination of the government to contain rising health care costs and achieve instant 
results was the driving force behind the reforms of 1989 and 1993, while the concerns of the 
pharmaceutical industry were only of secondary importance. According to them, the 
government’s pre-occupation with quick results virtually ruled out market-oriented reforms, 
since letting market forces work through the system would have inevitably taken longer to 
produce results. In addition, interviewees noted that the Association o f Hospitals proved to be 
very skilful in exploiting populist sentiments to fight off attempts to spread cost saving 
measures more evenly among all participants in the health care sector63. One executive 
remarked that
“it’s one thing to introduce a price freeze which reduces firms’ profits and quite another to 
close a hospital bed. While both help to reduce health care costs, the former is likely to be 
applauded by the population at large, while the latter is political suicide”64.
In other words, popular opposition to health care policies that aimed to spread cost saving 
measures more evenly, was an important factor behind the three MNEs' failure to persist with 
their preferences.
Finally, the increasing extent of the three MNEs' internationalisation process was not a 
source of political leverage in this policy area since there was no direct link between drug 
prices and production conditions. As one executive put it, “even if we shift production 
abroad, we still need to sell drugs in Germany”65. In view of these factors, it seems unlikely
63 Interviews.
64 Interview.
65 Interview.
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that a high-profile public campaign similar to that in biotechnology, would have made much 
difference with regard to the two policy outcomes66.
Turning now to the 1990 Gene Technology Act, circumstances were also, at least initially, 
not particularly favourable for the three MNEs. A number of studies have noted that a highly 
negative public opinion regarding biotechnology prevailed in Germany during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s and that this factor played an important role in shaping the 1990 Gene 
Technology Act61. In fact, some authors have explicitly argued that the 1990 Act was driven 
by the government’s desire to respond to the critics of biotechnology68. The favourable 
economic climate prevailing at the end of the 1980s also influenced the policy-making 
debate: as economic growth seemed secure, industry’s concerns did not carry a lot of weight 
in the policy-making debate69. Also, by the late 1980s, the three MNEs could not credibly 
play the internationalisation card since most R&D and other high value-added activities were 
still pre-dominantly carried out in Germany (see Chapter 2). Hence the threat to shift 
production abroad did not seem particularly credible.
However, this state of affairs began to change in the first half of the 1990s. As the post­
unification boom gave way to recession and economic growth declined sharply, general 
concerns regarding the quality of the German production location prompted a re-evaluation of
70the chances and risks of biotechnology . In fact, a number of authors have argued that the 
economic crisis of the early 1990s created a “policy window” that the industry managed to 
exploit for the deregulation measures included in the 1993 revision of the Gene Technology 
Act11.
Of course, this raises the question why worsening economic conditions and 
competitiveness concerns did not create a similar window of opportunity for the three MNEs 
with regard to the 1993 health care reform. MNEs’ internationalisation process suggests a 
plausible answer. Chapter 2 has shown that starting in the early 1990s, the three MNEs began 
to increasingly internationalise production and R&D activities. Hence the possibility that 
industry might respond to unfavourable regulations with further production relocations 
became increasingly real. In fact, a number of authors have argued that during the early
66 Interviews.
67 See Winter (1992), Hoffmann (1997), pp. 235ff, EuropaBio (1997), p. 50 and Boston Consulting Group 
(1997), p. 115.
See for example Gottweis (1992), p. 28 and Lange (1994), pp. 143f.
69 See Bandelow (1999), p. 109.
70 See Binet (1997), p. 8.
71 See for example Binet (1997), p. 8, Bandelow (1997), pp. 161f, Bandelow (1999), pp. 134,128, Brauer 
(1993), pp. 121-124 and Winnacker (1993), p. 590.
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1990s both the government and the SPD -  the main opposition party - began to realise that a 
failure to improve regulatory conditions for biotechnology was likely to result in employment 
being shifted to foreign, more biotechnology-friendly production locations. As a result, 
domestic power constellations between industry, government and anti-biotechnology interest
nogroups began to change in favour of firms .
With regard to parallel imports, it was noted that the German government only undertook 
tentative measures to improve the situation in the second half of the 1990s; the most 
significant policy initiative was the 7th Amendment to Germany’s Social Code (SGB V), 
which repealed provisions for the promotion of imported medicines73. Explaining the three 
MNEs' failure to achieve somewhat more decisive measures has been complicated by an 
additional factor. One association official noted that the main problem with improving the 
situation in this policy area has been that decision-making competence was somewhat 
unclear74. In the words of another official,
“essentially the German government and the European Commission have been playing a 
blame game. The government took the line that the problem lay with the single market and 
hence with the Commission. However, the Commission argued that the problem 
originated with member states’ health care policies -  an issue area in which it has no 
policy mandate”75.
In short, an analysis of the political influence of Hoechst, Bayer and BASF has clearly 
shown that the explanatory power of interest- and institutions-based explanations can be 
enhanced by incorporating changing economic and political circumstances into the analysis.
It was shown that with regard to health care policies and biotechnology regulations, the 
impact of circumstances on government preferences, the opposition from other domestic 
groups and the extent to which MNEs' internationalisation process was a source of political 
leverage, significantly conditioned the political influence that MNEs were capable of 
exerting. Hence the evidence from the German pharmaceutical sector fits in well with the 
argument of Chapter 1 that institutional- and interest-based explanations need to be
72 See Dolata (1996), p. 164-180 and Bandelow (1999), pp. 107-110. See also Greenwood and Ronit (1994), 
Hey and Brendle (1994) and Greenwood (1995).
73 See VFA Annual Report (1997), p. 3f.
74 Interview.
75 Interview.
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supplemented by an analysis of the changing economic and political circumstances under 
which policy-making took place.
The Three Swiss MNEs: Roche, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, health care reforms, biotechnology regulation and 
intellectual property rights issues also topped the political agendas of Roche, Ciba-Geigy and 
Sandoz. As a non-member of the EU, Switzerland was less affected by parallel imports from 
EU countries and the issue was not mentioned in interviews as an area of major concern.
Intellectual property rights issues are a bit of an oddity in the Swiss context. Although 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the three MNEs chose to concentrate their political 
efforts with regard to these issues in Brussels. The interviewed executives argued that the 
European level was far more relevant in this issue-area since they preferred to register their 
patents at the European Patent Office in Munich (a European patent extends patent protection 
to all European countries and thus saves time and costs). Since Switzerland is a member of 
the European Patent Convention, a European patent is also upheld in Switzerland. Also, 
Swiss patent laws are expected to fall in line with policy decisions taken at the European 
level76. Hence the Swiss MNEs’ political influence in this issue area will be analysed together 
with the German MNEs in Chapter 7.
Health Care Policy Issues
As mentioned earlier, health care policies largely determine the prices that pharmaceutical 
MNEs can charge for their products. Hence it was not surprising that executives at Roche, 
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz all referred to health care policy issues as one of the most important 
policy areas affecting their industry77. Like Germany, Switzerland embarked on a
76 Interviews. Biichel and Brauchbar (1997, p. 9) have pointed out that by 1997 there were only 11 
biotechnology patents registered in Switzerland, since most companies preferred to register their patents with 
the European Patent Agency (EPA) in Munich.
77 Although all three MNEs sell only a minuscule share of their drugs in Switzerland, health care policy issues 
are nevertheless of great significance for them; many foreign countries use the Swiss price as a reference price 
and hence prices at home have a significant multiplying effect. See Hill (1992), p. 7.
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comprehensive health care reform during the last decade (in 1994) and the following section 
will now analyse the extent to which the three MNEs were able to shape this reform 
according to their preferences.
Operating conditions prior to the Reform Act were far less advantageous for the three 
Swiss MNEs than for their German counterparts. Unlike in Germany, drug prices were highly 
regulated in Switzerland. Until 1995, no fewer than three federal agencies were involved in 
the price-setting process: the Federal Office of Social Insurance (BSV), the Interkantonale 
Kontrollstelle fur Heilmittel (IKS), and the office of the “price watcher”, a federal agency 
overseeing prices . While it has often been pointed out that Swiss drug prices were in an 
international comparison high, it has much less often been mentioned that innovative drugs 
were severely disadvantaged by this pricing system since it benefited older drugs at the
7Q
expense of new ones . In fact, Hill has noted that
“the Swiss system of price controls had rather paradoxical consequences for a country 
with a strongly research-intensive pharmaceuticals industry: in an international 
comparison, prices for new and innovative drugs were relatively low, while prices of older 
drugs were comparatively high”80.
As a result, the Swiss pharmaceutical industry was strongly in favour of reforming the system 
so that innovation could be better rewarded81.
Like the German MNEs, the three Swiss MNEs were well positioned to exert political 
influence. In line with Switzerland's decentralised policy-making system, non-governmental 
actors feature prominently in the health care policy making-process. The three 
pharmaceutical MNEs are represented by the Association of the Swiss Chemical Industry 
(SGCI), which is a member of the Vorort, and by Interpharma, the association grouping the 
pharmaceutical divisions of the three MNEs. Apart from the industry associations, the health 
care policy-making process also includes the associations of insurance companies, hospitals
78 For a more detailed description see Hill (1992) and Leutenegger (1993), p. 35.
79 See Hill (1992), p. 7.
80 Ibid., p. 11. This phenomenon can be explained by three factors: prices of “me-too” products (drugs with a 
low degree of innovation) were determined with reference to already approved drugs, prices for generic drugs 
had to be only 25 per cent below the price of the original product and the modus vivendi of price adjustments 
allowed almost automatic periodical increases. See Hill (1992), p. 7.
81 See for example Humer (1997), p. 70.
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and pharmacists, as well as the BSV, IKS and representatives from the federal and cantonal
cyy
governments. The administration of the system is carried out by the cantons .
Although Switzerland’s health care system places considerably less emphasis on equity 
and solidarity than other European countries’ systems , Swiss health care costs nevertheless 
strongly increased in recent years. In 1990, Switzerland spent 7.5 per cent of its GDP on 
health care - a figure that had risen to 10 per cent by 1995. Without reform of the system, 
costs were estimated to increase to 15 per cent of GDP by the end of the 1990s 84. In fact, 
since the late 1980s, the federal government was unable to fulfil its constitutional obligation 
to finance the health care system through subsidies, which led to a significant rise in
Q C
insurance premiums . As in most other industrialised countries, this development can be 
traced back to strongly distorted incentive structures. Hill has observed that there was no real 
market for drugs since doctors were free in their prescription practices, patients bought a 
whole package of health care services with their premiums and insurance companies 
converted higher expenditures into higher premiums . Other authors have pointed out that 
the Swiss drug market’s incentive structure was characterised by almost unlimited growth 
incentives and that as a result consumers were increasingly defining their needs by what was 
available87. In order to tackle these problems and contain rising health care costs, the Swiss 
government submitted various reform proposals in 1992, which led to the 1994 Health Care 
Reform Act.
Switzerland’s Reform Act differed considerably from the two German reform acts. Unlike 
the German reforms, the Swiss Health Care Act avoided crude interventionist measures and 
policy-makers seemed to be aware that administered prices were unlikely to lead to sustained
Q Q
cost savings and would only trigger distortions elsewhere . Instead, the central feature of the 
Reform Act was a price-setting system for drugs based on a comparison with three countries 
with similar economic structures: Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. Rather than 
setting prices unilaterally, the BSV and IKS would henceforth orient themselves by average
82 See Hoffmeyer (1993), p. 16 and Hill (1992), p. 28.
83 Switzerland’s health care system allows insurance companies to calculate their premiums on the basis of 
individual risk. Rather than being related to income, as in other European countries, premiums are determined 
on the basis of, for example, age, regional cost differences and until recently sex. Federal and cantonal 
governments contribute to health insurance premiums, which in comparison with other countries reach 
substantial sums. Hoffmeyer has observed that in some ways the Swiss health care system was closer to the US 
model than to those of other European countries. See Hoffmeyer (1993), pp. 13, 28.
84 See Hoffmeyer (1993), p. 14.
85 Ibid., p. 15.
86 Hill (1992), p. 9.
87 See for example Brandt (1990), p. 17 and Sommer (1986), p. 235 and (1997), p. 8f.
88 See Sommer (1997), p. 14.
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prices from these three countries. The implications for the three MNEs were significant since 
the reform led to a substantial reduction of prices for "out of patent" drugs. Interpharma 
estimated that the pharmaceutical industry would lose SFr. 500m in sales over the next five 
years89. However, in return the Reform Act promised to improve innovation premiums for 
new drugs. Indeed, Roche’s CEO Humer observed that the health care reform did not only 
lead to lower prices but also to higher ones90.
Although the extent to which this reform was market-conforming is certainly debatable 
(after all, drug prices in all three reference countries are considerably distorted through their 
exposure to parallel imports and market non-conforming regulations), it is generally looked 
upon as more liberal and flexible than the German reforms. Interpharma’s general secretary, 
Thomas Cueni, commented that
“in comparion with dirigiste tendencies in Germany, France, Italy or the Netherlands, the 
Swiss model at least attempts to create market conditions through a price premium on 
innovation and through competitive pressure as a result of price comparisons with drug 
. prices in other countries”91.
However, the reform has nevertheless been only a mixed success for the three MNEs. On 
the positive side, they were able to fend off proposals from the Associations of Pharmacists 
and Pharmaceutical Importers to establish a price model along German lines92. Moreover, the 
incentive structure of the Swiss health care market was certainly improved since older drugs 
became cheaper and innovative ones more expensive93. However, the reform was far from a 
success for the pharmaceutical industry. While the three MNEs commented that the new price 
model was a step in the right direction, they also stressed that the reform could only be an 
intermediary step on the way towards a more market-oriented health care system. Although 
prices remained flexible, the reform, from their viewpoint, essentially amounted to an 
introduction of parallel imports through international price comparisons, albeit with countries 
with similar economic structures, traditionally high drug prices and governments supportive 
of R&D94.
89 S ts Interpharma (1996), p. 1.
90 Humer (1997), p. 61.
91 Sts Interpharma (1996), p.l.
92 See Interpharma (1996).
93 See Humer (1997), pp. 57-61.
94 Ibid., p. 65.
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Chapter 3 has noted that Roche, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz strongly favoured liberalisation 
measures that led to more competition, more choice for consumers and incentive structures 
that promoted cost-consciousness among all participants in the health care system. Put 
differently, they sought a reform that addressed the larger question of how health care 
services in general could be delivered more efficiently95. However, the reform did not address 
this major issue. The Swiss Reform Act, like the two German ones, focused cost saving 
measures disproportionately on the pharmaceutical industry even though drugs were neither 
the largest cost block in the health care budget nor the main cost driver. Not only did drugs 
account for a mere 8-10 per cent of overall health care expenditure over the last decade, but 
drug prices also rose more slowly than other expenditures. Between 1982 and 1992 
Switzerland’s drugs price index rose by only 24.7 per cent, while hospital costs in the same 
period increased by 93.1 per cent96.
Regulations relating to Biotechnology Issues
In the Swiss case, two sets of biotechnology regulations need to be considered; one relating to 
drug approval procedures and one relating to the approval of production facilities and 
research projects. The following section will analyse the extent to which policy outcomes in 
these two policy areas corresponded to the six MNEs’ preference for a regulatory framework 
that was predictable, transparent and based on scientific principles.
Swiss drug approval procedures were of central importance for Roche, Ciba-Geigy and 
Sandoz97. Although the three MNEs generally preferred"to have their drugs approved by the 
EMEA (see Chapter 7), interviewees emphasised the importance of the Swiss drug approval 
system, since in many non-European countries the registration of a drug in Switzerland was 
still a pre-condition for approval98. Until the early 1990s, however, Switzerland’s drug 
approval procedures were neither excessively predictable nor efficient. From the viewpoint of 
the three MNEs, approval procedures were over-regulated as new drugs had to be approved 
by two agencies, the IKS and the EAK (Eigenoessisiche Arzneimittelkommission). While the 
IKS generally accepted approval decisions taken at the EU level, the EAK proved to be more
95 See Interpharma (1997).
96 See Humer (1997), p. 70 and Interpharma (1996), p. 2.
97 For the importance of Swiss drug approval procedures for the pharmaceutical industry see SGCI Annual 
Report (1989), p. 23.
98 Interviews.
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problematic. The result were times losses and unpredictability". The decision-making 
process for setting prices was equally cumbersome as again two agencies were involved -  the 
IKS and the BSV -  with the result that new drugs could on average only be brought to the 
market one year after registration with the IKS and EAK100. Moreover, in 1989 the IKS 
introduced new guidelines for the approval of drugs, which were sharply criticised by the 
industry for being too unclear and too open to varying interpretations101.
However, during the 1990s there were significant improvements. In 1993, the IKS
reformed its requirements for clinical tests in order to make them compatible with the EU’s
Good Clinical Practice guidelines -  a reform that corresponded largely to industries’
preferences and created the pre-conditions for international recognition of IKS research
data102. Moreover, in 1995 the IKS gave up its role in the price-setting process in order to
10^focus exclusively on safety concerns relating to new drugs . As a result, approval processes 
were significantly speeded up. In 1997, Humer acknowledged that there had been tremendous 
improvements in the last couple of years and that with average approval procedures of six to 
seven months, the IKS belonged to the international top league104.
While the Swiss drug approval regime gradually improved during the 1990s, the opposite 
seems to have happened to regulations pertaining to the approval of production facilities and 
research projects. Until 1990 there was no formal legislation dealing with biotechnology in 
general and gene technology in particular as these issues were subject to self-regulation: 
firms and universities registered projects and production facilities voluntarily with the Swiss 
Interdisciplinary Committee on Biological Safety in Research and Technology (SKBS) -  a 
body made up of representatives from science, industry and the state bureaucracy -  which 
oriented itself by the guidelines from the OECD and the US National Institute of Health 105. 
This regulatory regime corresponded largely to the three MNEs’ preferences as it provided 
for transparency and involved only negligible levels of red tape.
However, during the late 1980s this lean regulatory structure became increasingly 
indefensible, as genetic engineering became politically highly controversial in Switzerland 
and the industry found itself the target of a broad spectrum of interest groups, ranging from
99 Interviews. See also Humer (1997), p. 67.
100 Interviews.
101 See SGCI Annual Report (1989), p. 23.
102 See SGCI Annual Report (1993), p. 27.
103 See SGCI Annual Report (1994), p. 29.
104 See Humer (1997), pp. 76f..
105 See Binet (1997), pp. 58-61. See also Interview with Andres Leuenberger in Basler Zeitung, Jan. 5 1991.
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consumer protection organisations to environmental groups and the church106. Particularly 
significant in this context was a large fire in 1986 at Sandoz’s Schweizerhalle, which caused 
large chemical spillages into the Rhine and led to widespread mistrust towards new 
technologies107. Interest groups opposed to biotechnology began to proliferate and 
parliamentary groups such as the progressive organisations in Basle’s cantonal parliament 
and the Social Democratic Group began demanding stringent restrictions on genetic 
engineering108. However, it was not just new interest groups such as the “Basler Appell gegen 
Gentechnologie”, established in 1988, that opposed biotechnology; increasingly other 
organisations such as WWF Switzerland and the Swiss Association for Nature Conservation 
discovered a new raison d'etre and jumped on the bandwagon 109.
The first visible sign of this new movement were the protests against Ciba-Geigy’s plan to 
build a Biotechnikum in Basle in 1990. The planning approval process was stretched out over 
two years due to numerous objections by individuals and interest groups, lodged with the 
building department of Basle City. Ciba won planning permission in July 1991, whereupon 
the Basler Appell went to court with the prospect of another three-year delay for Ciba. The 
company finally decided to cancel its plans for the Biotechnikum in Basle at the end of 1991. 
Arguing that the legal and political environment for genetic engineering was more favourable 
in France, Ciba decided to build the new facility just across the border in the Alsatian town of 
Huningue110. This incident was almost immediately followed by protests against experiments 
with genetically modified plants.
As legal uncertainty increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s, industry came round 
to accept formal regulation as a “necessary evil” to accommodate public opinion and to raise 
popular acceptance of biotechnology111. In order to minimise the disadvantages resulting 
from formal regulation, the three MNEs strongly stepped up their public relations efforts 
during this period. The centrepiece of this campaign was the GenSuisse, a foundation set up 
in 1991. Financed by Interpharma and composed of notables from the worlds of science and 
politics, the GenSuisse launched high-profile advertising and media campaigns to raise public 
acceptance of genetic engineering112.
106 For biotechnology-inspired popular fears and resistance see Straubli (1997), p. 5.
107 See Binet (1997), p. 25.
108 See Sally (1993), p. 572. For the politicisation of this issue due to popular mistrust see Cantley (1987).
109 See Binet (1997), p. 68.
110 See Sally (1993), pp. 572f. and Binet (1997), p. 66.
111 See Binet (1997), p. 152 and Humer (1997), p. 84.
112 See Sally (1993), p. 574 and Binet (1997), p. 153.
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Industry’s charm offensive was not without success. In contrast to Germany, Swiss 
regulations for the approval of production facilities and research projects turned out to be far 
less disadvantageous for the pharmaceutical industry. Although MNEs’ preference for a 
maximum of flexibility was strongly opposed by environmental groups, which demanded a 
comprehensive law with a maximum of binding regulations113, industry preferences were to a 
significant degree taken into consideration. Instead of a comprehensive gene technology act 
along German lines, the Swiss regulatory system turned out to be a patchwork of various laws 
and voluntary guidelines, which continued to be administered by the ZKBS and which left 
firms considerable flexibility114.
The cornerstone of the new regulatory framework was a constitutional article referring 
explicitly to biotechnology, which was approved by referendum in 1992 (Article 24 novies 
BV). Within this framework, biotechnology was formally regulated through three laws: the 
“Storfallverordnung” (Emergency Safety Act), the revised environmental protection law and 
the revised food safety law. Although these three laws were also based on EU directives 
90/219 and 90/220, their effects were very different compared to the German Gene 
Technology Act115. In stark contrast to Germany, the “Storfallverordnung’ -  the main legal 
device for the regulation of production and research facilities -  did not regulate individual 
projects, but only required firms to submit information regarding safety concerns, possible 
risks and preventive measures116. Registration of biotechnology production facilities and 
projects continued to be carried out according to SKBS guidelines and was not required by 
law117. Along similar lines, the revised environmental protection law required pharmaceutical 
firms to exercise “controlled self-responsibility” and to undertake all measures to reduce risks 
resulting from gene technology118. While the revised environmental protection and the food 
safety law did require approval for projects involving genetically modified organisms, the 
SGCI pointed out that both laws struck a good balance between the protection of humans, 
animals and the environment, on the one hand, and the concerns of industry on the other119. 
Moreover, Swiss biotechnology regulations did not have the same devastating effect that 
regulation had in Germany and Switzerland remained a world- class research location. In
113 For the demands of biotechnology opponents see Binet (1997), pp.l56ff. and “Kritik der Schweizerischen 
Arbeitsgruppe Gentechnologie (SAG) and den Eurolex Gesetzesanpassungen”, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, July 3 
1992
114 See Straubli (1997), p. 17.
115 Ibid., p. 19f.
116 Interviews. See also Binet (1997), p. 70.
117 See Straubli (1997), p. 17.
11S Ibid.
119 See SGCI Annual Report (1995), p. 34. See also Binet (1997), pp. 12-1 A.
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1997, an international comparative study ranked Switzerland first in immunology, molecular 
biology and pharmacology and second in biochemistry and microbiology.120
Nevertheless, problems have remained; a number of authors have pointed out that
191approval procedures were in practice slow and unpredictable . Indeed, while the formal 
regulatory framework was not too unfavourable for the three MNEs, its interpretation often 
turned out to be quite a different matter. Like their German counterparts, executives at the 
three Swiss MNEs complained that under the pressure of an emotionally charged public 
opinion, the application of the new regulations was very restrictive and did not always seem 
to follow consistent criteria.122. Moreover, interest groups frequently did not accept policy 
outcomes and launched -  or threatened to launch -  referendums, which created highly
•  19^unpredictable operating conditions for the pharmaceutical industry . As Leuenberger has 
observed,
“the problem is that the opponents of gene technology do not accept ratified policies, but 
already plan new referendums. Just as the sovereign has decided a particular issue, these 
. groups already start preparing new initiatives relating to the same issue. The fact that in 
Switzerland’s direct democracy one has to vote on everything not only once, but rather 
numerous times within a couple of years creates huge uncertainties”124.
For example, simultaneously with the 1992 ratification of Article 24 novies B V , the Groupe 
de Travail sur LeGenie Genetique, a coalition of 70 environmental protection, animal rights 
and other special interest groups with almost 500,000 members, launched the preparatory
19^process of a referendum that advocated draconian regulatory measures . Under the name 
"Genschutzinitiative" (Gene Protection Initiative), this initiative hung until its rejection in 
1998 like a Damocles’ sword above the three MNEs and created huge uncertainties regarding 
the future of the Swiss research and production location.
120 Quoted in Binet (1997), p. 92. See also Interpharma (1997).
121 See for example Enright and Weder (1995), p. 7, Humer (1997), p. 70 and Sally (1993), p. 573.
122 Interviews. See also “Der Standort Schweiz braucht die Gentechnologie”, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, June 24 
1995.
123 Binet (1997, p. 78) has argued that the problem for the pharmaceutical industry was not formal regulation, 
but rather public opposition and scepticism which resulted in referendums that created unpredictability. For 
example, in 1992, the Swiss population rejected a referendum on animal rights. However, this did not 
discourage the initiators to re-launch almost exactly the same referendum a year later. Although it was again 
rejected, it created delays and uncertainty for firms. See also SGCI Annual reports (1991,1992 and 1993).
Speech by Andres Leuenberger at the SGCI Annual Meeting 1992.
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The Political Influence of Roche, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz: An Analysis
Compared to the German MNEs, the political influence of the three Swiss MNEs has been 
more substantial. Unlike their German counterparts, they did not suffer a major political 
defeat similar in scale to the German 1990 Gene Technology Act or the two German health 
care reforms. Their influence appeared to have been more subtle: while they did not get it 
their way completely, policy outcomes were by and large compromise solutions which tried 
to accommodate all affected interests. In other words, in line with the analysis of Chapter 4, 
the Swiss policy-making system of incremental progress appeared to have been functioning 
well.
With regard to health care reform, Switzerland’s reform was essentially an attempt to 
control costs while simultaneously honouring innovation. While the cost-saving measures 
were certainly focused on the pharmaceutical industry, unlike the German MNEs, the three 
Swiss MNEs got something in return; the government promised to improve innovation 
premiums for new drugs. Commenting on this outcome, Humer pointed out that
“dialogue and search for a sensible compromise have a long tradition in Switzerland. 
Following this tradition, Swiss firms have agreed to massively reduce the price of 
numerous drugs, despite being unhappy about the nature of the new price comparison 
system...The industry, however, welcomes the promise of the government to honour 
innovation in the future with a premium”126.
Quite plausibly one could make the same argument with regard to biotechnology 
regulations. After all, the various laws that make up Switzerland’s regulatory framework 
were essentially all compromise policies, which tried to strike a balance between the concerns 
of industry and popular demands for formal regulation. Clearly, the new regulatory 
framework would not have been the three MNEs’ first choice. However, it could have gone 
worse: interest groups demanded severe legislative restrictions, and in many cases outright 
bans on genetic engineering research127.
125 See Straubli (1997), p. 18.
126 Humer (1997), p. 56.
127 See Sally (1993), p. 571.
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Having said that, however, there are limits to the extent to which these policy outcomes 
can be explained by Switzerland’s compromise-reinforcing institutions. While certainly 
policy outcomes in biotechnology and health care have been compromise solutions, the 
compromise in biotechnology has clearly been more to MNEs’ advantage than the health care 
compromise In fact, Humer has noted that the governments' promise for an innovation 
premium got off to a bad start - judged by the evidence from 1996, there was little to suggest
1 9Rthat innovation was rewarded with a premium . How can one explain then these variations 
in MNEs' political influence?
As in the German case, interest-based explanations offer a seemingly plausible answer. 
With regard to the regulatory framework for biotechnology, the three MNEs launched a high- 
profile public campaign to promote their interests and the outcome was significantly closer to 
their preferences than in the health care reform where the three relied on traditional 
institutional linkages to the policy-making process to articulate their preferences. However, 
such an explanation is not entirely convincing. Again similar to the German case, the impact 
of economic and political circumstances on government preferences, domestic opposition and 
the extent to which the three MNEs' internationalisation process was a source of political 
leverage, significantly shaped the political influence that the three MNEs were capable of 
exerting.
In fact, with regard to the health care reform, circumstances were highly unfavourable for 
Roche, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz. First, the Swiss governments’ preferences were not entirely 
compatible with those of the three MNEs. While compared to the German government, the 
Swiss government acted more like an arbiter than an actor in the negotiations, it nevertheless 
had a strong preference for quick results as health care costs were spiralling out of control129. 
Interviewees generally argued that the Swiss government probably understood better than the 
German government that administered prices were unlikely to lead to sustained cost savings, 
but the need for imminent results made cost-saving measures focused on drugs the most 
feasible solution. As one executive put it,
“although the two failed German reforms served as a powerful warning and underlined the 
need for market-based reforms, the Swiss government was primarily interested in quick 
results and not in designing new market orders”.
128 See Humer (1997), p. 60.
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Second, there was strong opposition against market-based reforms from the Association of 
Pharmacists and the Association of Pharmaceutical Importers, which preferred a dirigiste 
reform model along German lines130. Moreover, the Association of Hospitals strongly 
opposed any reforms to spread cost-cutting measures more evenly among all health care 
sector participants131. As in the German case, executives from the three MNEs conceded that 
although the hospital sector was the main cost-driver behind rising health care expenditure, it 
was a political non-starter to try to include this sector in reform measures. In the words of one 
interviewee,
“reducing hospital beds is always bad politics - no matter how large the over-capacity in
this sector is - while redistributing profits from the industry is always good politics”.
Finally, MNEs’ internationalisation process did not translate into increased political 
influence in this policy area since there was no direct link between drug prices and 
production conditions. Against this background, it seems somewhat implausible to argue that 
a more forceful articulation of interests - similar to that in biotechnology - would have led to 
a more industry-friendly policy outcome.
With regard to biotechnology regulations, circumstances were a lot more favourable for 
the three MNEs. A number of authors have argued that despite strong opposition from 
organised interests, economic considerations came increasingly to dominate the discussion 
surrounding biotechnology132. Binet noted that this development started with Ciba’s decision 
to build its Biotechnikum just across the border in France133; commenting on the political 
effects of Ciba-Geigy’s decision, one interviewee argued that “policy-makers began to 
recognise the mobility of this industry with all its implications for Swiss welfare”. Within this 
context, the three MNEs’ internationalisation process has been highly significant. Chapter 2 
has noted that starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, all three MNEs began to 
increasingly internationalise R&D and high-value added production activities. In parallel, 
overall economic growth in Switzerland stagnated, unemployment became a serious problem 
for the first time since World War II and general concerns regarding Switzerland’s long-term 
economic prospects began to emerge (see Chapter 4). As a result of these developments,
129 Interviews.
130 See Interpharma (1996).
131 Ibid.
132 See for example Binet (1996), SPP BioTech and Biotectra (1996), Arvanitis and Schips (1996) and Spaar
(1996).
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policy-makers became increasingly aware of the economic costs associated with strict 
biotechnology regulations134.
In short, compared to Germany, institutions played a more important role in the 
explanation of the three Swiss MNEs’ political influence. It was shown that policy outcomes 
in health care policy and biotechnology were essentially compromise solutions that tried to 
accommodate all affected interests. Nevertheless the nature of the two compromises differed 
considerably: the "biotechnology compromise" was more a lot more favourable for the three 
MNEs than the "health care compromise". An analysis of economic and political 
circumstances could explain why MNEs were capable of exerting more political influence 
with regard to biotechnology regulations than with health care policy. In this sense, the 
evidence from the Swiss pharmaceutical sector also fits in well with the argument of Chapter 
1 that institutional- and interest-based explanations need to be supplemented by an analysis of 
the circumstances under which policy-making took place.
Conclusion
A review of recent policy outcomes in the German and Swiss pharmaceutical sector clearly 
showed that sweeping statements about the supposedly overwhelming political power of 
MNEs in an age of globalisation are largely misplaced. All six MNEs are highly 
internationalised and yet policy outcomes in both countries were far from conforming with 
their preferences. This has been particularly true for the German MNEs, which suffered 
significant political defeats.
Generally, the findings of this chapter have supported the hypotheses raised in the 
previous chapters. Chapter 1 has argued that interests and institutions were important for an 
explanation of MNEs’ political influence. However, it was suggested that an analysis of the 
economic and political circumstances under which policy-making took place could enhance 
the explanatory power of the two approaches. It was argued that the impact of these 
circumstances on the preferences of the government, the extent of opposition from other 
domestic groups and MNEs' internationalisation process were important conditioning factors. 
The policy outcomes reviewed in this chapter have confirmed this hypothesis. Changing
133 Binet (1997), p. 65.
163
circumstances had indeed a significant impact on the political influence that MNEs were 
capable of exerting.
Moreover, Chapter 4 noted that some authors have recently diagnosed cracks in 
Germany’s institutional structure, while in the Swiss case it was generally argued that 
institutions had remained intact. On this basis, it was predicted that institutions were likely to 
be of greater importance for an analysis of the Swiss MNEs’ political influence, as they could 
still be expected to lead policy-making processes in the direction of compromise solutions. 
Indeed, that turned out to have been the case. Both in biotechnology and health care, the three 
Swiss MNEs did not have it entirely their way, but their interests were taken into 
consideration to a not insignificant degree and the final policy outcomes tried to balance the 
interests of all affected groups. In contrast, policy outcomes in Germany could hardly be 
labelled compromise solutions, but rather seemed to fit in well with the studies that were 
sceptical about the continued capacity of Germany’s institutions to shape policy-making 
processes.
134 Ibid., pp. 4,161.
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6The Political Influence of the Six German and
Swiss Banks
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and explain the political influence of the six German 
and Swiss banks with regard to the selected policy issues. Similar to the previous Chapter, the 
analysis will build on the findings of Chapter 3, which has analysed banks’ economic policy 
preferences. Comparing these preferences with actual policy outcomes will provide a 
yardstick by which the extent of banks’ political influence can be measured. However, just as 
in the case of pharmaceuticals, such a comparison is unlikely to explain banks’ political 
influence by itself since it is hardly plausible to assume that banks’ influence will be a neat 
function of their interests. Institutions that link banks to the policy-making process may also 
be a source of political influence. Chapter 4 has shown that the business community in both 
Germany and Switzerland is part of an institutional structure that provides firms and banks 
with strong linkages to the policy-making process. Moreover, as has been argued in chapter 1 
- and shown in chapter 5 -  changing economic and political circumstances may have an 
impact on the preferences of the government, the degree of opposition from other organised 
groups and the extent to which MNEs can use their internationalisation process for political 
leverage. The following sections will now analyse how all these factors have come together 
to shape the political influence of the six German and Swiss banks with regard to the selected 
policy issues.
The German Banks: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, executives at the three banks and the Federal 
Association of German Banks (FAGB) noted that the most important policy issues during the 
period from 1985 to roughly 1995 centred around market access issues, public ownership of
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banks and regulatory issues. However, not all of these issues will be analysed in this chapter. 
As a result of the Single Market programme’s goal to create a unified European capital 
market, market access issues became increasingly the subject of European directives and 
hence will be analysed in Chapter 7. The second market access issue -  the GATS Agreement 
for Financial Services -  also fits better in Chapter 7 as the European Commission was (at 
least partly) negotiating on member states’ behalf1.
Banking Regulation
Chapter 3 has argued that the nature of banking regulations profoundly affects the extent to 
which the allocation of capital and risks can be carried out according to market principles. In 
Germany, the banking regulatory framework is essentially market conforming; it regulates 
and supervises banks to ensure the safety and soundness of individual banks and of the 
system as a whole and does not deal with issues such as fair lending practices or community 
reinvestment records2. However, regulations have also been market non-conforming in the 
sense that they have made it difficult and expensive for banks (and firms) to adjust to the age 
of securitisation in which capital is raised directly from capital markets. As Fassbender has 
argued,
“historically the German financial markets relied on loans and not capital markets for the 
allocation of capital. Indeed for generations, banks and clients have shown a preference 
for intermediation. These preferences developed into habits and institutions, and into 
regulations and taxation policies with the result that the regulatory environment made it 
difficult and expensive for banks and companies to take advantage of the new trends of 
securitisation and disintermediation”3.
Seifert added that by the early 1990s Germany’s capital markets were still considerably over- 
regulated, which resulted in high transaction costs, discouraged companies from going public, 
prevented the introduction of new financial instruments and depressed domestic demand. 
Moreover, regulations dealing with transparency and disclosure requirements were not
1 While the EU Commission has exclusive competence on traditional GATT issues (i.e. trade in goods), it shares
negotiating competence with member-states on “new issues”.2
For the objectives of German banking regulations see Niethammer (1990).
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considered as en par with international best practices and were generally seen as undermining 
investor confidence. Finally, a central investor element -  the pension fund -  was (and still is) 
de facto non-existent4.
These inadequate framework conditions have been largely blamed for Germany’s failure 
to develop an investment culture similar to Anglo-Saxon countries and to adjust to the age of 
securitisation. In 1994, German households held only 24 per cent of their assets in securities 
and funds, compared to 39 per cent in the US. If one included indirect ownership of securities 
through life insurance and pension funds, Germany’s shared increased to only 37 percent 
compared with 64 per cent in the US and 60 per cent in Great Britain. Moreover, Germans 
predominantly invested in treasury bonds so that the share of stocks amounted to merely 5 
per cent of all private assets. In the US, this figure was 32 per cent in 1994 and in Great 
Britain 46 per cent. Unsurprisingly then, the market capitalisation of all German stock 
companies amounted to only 25 per cent of GDP, whereas in the US it amounted to 75 per 
cent. Moreover, it has been estimated that more than half of all German shares were not 
traded since the owners cared more about control of the respective company than adequate 
returns of investment5. The FAGB has complained many times that the failure to develop 
efficient capital markets has manifested itself in a lack of liquidity of the German capital 
market and, consequently, in prohibitively high capital costs for companies6.
Chapter 3 has argued that the increasing importance of securitisation gave the three banks 
a strong interest in policies aimed at the broadening and deepening of Germany’s capital 
markets. Essentially the banks were well placed to promote this interest. In line with 
Germany’s decentralised decision-making process, the German regulatory and supervisory 
structure consists of both public and private actors. The policy community includes the 
Federal Bank Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen), the 
Bundesbank, the Ministry of Finance and 14 banking associations. The three largest 
associations are those of the commercial banks (Federal Association of German Banks), the 
savings banks (German Savings Bank and Giro Association) and the co-operative banks 
(Federal Association of German Co-operative Banks)1. De jure, the Berlin-based FSBO is the 
primary German bank regulatory and supervisory authority. Only the FSBO may issue
3 See Fassbender (1995), p. 5.
4 Interview with Werner Seifert, CEO of Deutsche Borse, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 5 1996. See 
also "Der Finanzplatz muss attraktiv bleiben”, Borsenzeitung, March 1 1997 and "Kapitalmarktkultur 
entwickeln", Borsenzeitung, Dec. 4 1997.
5 See Fassbender (1995), p.7f. and “Kapitalmarktkultur entwickeln”, Borsenzeitung, Dec. 4 1997.
6 See for example FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 46.
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banking regulations, issue or revoke bank licenses, and take enforcement actions against 
banks8. As a government agency reporting directly to the Ministry of Finance, the FSBO is 
held accountable for its actions to the German parliament. However, the Bundesbank is also 
highly influential and one can observe a de facto sharing of regulatory responsibilities. As a 
briefing paper prepared by the Bundestag has pointed out,
"In practice, the opinions of the Bundesbank carry significant weight. We were told that 
the FBSO has never issued regulations with which the Bundesbank strongly disagreed.
This effort towards consensus can partially be attributed to a recognition of the importance 
of a united Bundesbank-FBSO position if particular regulations were to be challenged by 
the banking industry in the strong German administrative court system...Despite the 
difference in their legal responsibilities, the FSBO and the Bundesbank work closely 
together and are considered partners in the formulation of regulatory and supervisory 
policies”9.
The Bundesbank is also involved in the development of legislation. Although technically the 
Finance Ministry is responsible for developing banking related legislation, it often draws on 
the Bundesbank to help draft banking laws10.
However, the bank associations also play an important role in developing laws and 
regulations. Federal law stipulates that the Finance Ministry and the bank regulators must 
consult the bank association when changes to banking laws or regulations are being 
considered and before banking licenses are issued11. Moreover, the three largest bank 
associations administer three separate deposit insurance systems12 and act through the 
Liquidity Consortium Bank (LJKO) as the lender of last resort. In this context, the bank 
associations have the power to intervene in banking crises and to assist troubled banks or 
liquidate failed banks13.
7 See FBSO (1995), p. 10.
8 Ibid., p. 16
9 See FBSO (1995), p. 20.
10 Ibid., p. 39.
11 Ibid., p. 30.
12 The German deposit insurance systems are private and membership is optional. There is no federal deposit 
insurance program and no federal guarantee of the private systems. With very few exceptions, all banks in 
Germany are members of a deposit insurance system. See FBSO (1995), p. 29.
13 See FBSO (1995), p. 30.
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Turning now to policy outcomes regarding Germany’s regulatory framework, the first half 
of the 1990s differed strongly from the 1980s. While the 1980s were characterised by inertia 
when it came to reforms of Germany’s banking regulations, the early 1990s saw a flood of 
policy initiatives. Arguably of greatest significance were two Financial Market Promotion 
Laws (Finanzmarktforderungsgesetze), which went a long way towards adjusting Germany’s 
regulatory framework to the age of securitisation and disintermediation.
The first of these two laws (the Second Financial Markets Promotion Law or Zweite 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz) was ratified in 1994 and centred on improving investor 
confidence, creating a more innovation-friendly regulatory environment and adjusting 
German regulations to international standards14. A Bundesbank official noted that
“the law was driven by a realisation that German capital markets needed to attract foreign 
capital and hence required internationally oriented regulations. Our aim was to ensure that 
German capital markets had a regulatory structure that would enable them to compete with 
the world’s leading financial centres”15.
To this end, the law included several measures to improve transparency and to assure foreign 
investors of equal treatment. Particularly important in this respect were new rules for insider 
trading, which replaced the voluntary guidelines of the FAGB16. Transparency was further 
strengthened through the establishment of a new supervisory authority for the stock exchange 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Wertpapierwesen). Although the law formalised a number of 
previously informal guidelines administered by the FAGB, the three banks strongly supported 
it. One bank executive noted that “the increased involvement of the state in some areas was 
absolutely necessary for establishing an internationally competitive regulatory framework. In 
fact, during meetings with the regulators, the FAGB was strongly in favour of a more 
formalised regulatory structure”. Indeed, the FAGB referred to the law as a milestone on the 
way towards well-functioning capital markets17, and Seifert commented that the law gave
1 ftGerman capital markets by international standards an adequate supervisory structure .
See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 34.
15 Interview.
16 See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 30.
17 See FAGB Annual Report (1996), p. 65 and (1998), p. 30.
18 Interview with Werner Seifert, CEO of Deutsche Borse, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 5 1996.
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Shortly after passing this law, the German government ratified the Third Financial 
Markets Promotion Law, which centred on improving companies’ access to capital markets19. 
To this end, the law cut a lot of red tape in order to make it easier for companies to obtain 
stock market listings. For example, the requirement to hold annual meeting was abolished 
and regulations pertaining to the publication of prospectuses in official documents were 
significantly eased. As a result, issuing debt became a lot easier for companies. Trivial as 
these measures may sound, they abolished significant disadvantages compared to other 
European financial centres20. The law also included a provision to make it easier for German 
companies to raise capital on international markets (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz), 
as German regulators agreed - within limits - to accept international accountancy standards. 
Moreover, the act modernised German investment laws by allowing share buy-backs and the 
relatively swift approval of innovative financial instruments. Finally, the German stock 
exchange was allowed to significantly extend its range of derivatives by adding a whole 
range of new futures21. Bank and association executives noted that the FAGB commented
frequently on draft proposals of this law and that association input was incorporated to a
00significant extent . Moreover, the law sparked a discussion within the previous government 
of how to further deepen and broaden German capital markets; a Fourth Financial Markets 
Promotion Law will examine whether to allow Anglo-Saxon style pension funds23.
In addition to these two laws, Germany’s supervisory structure underwent significant 
changes during the 1990s. As has been pointed out above, and will be elaborated in Chapter 
7, the European Commission issued a number of directives during the late 1980s and early 
1990s to establish a common European supervisory structure as a precondition for a unified 
European capital market. These directives were incorporated into German banking laws 
through so-called Novellen (revisions). While previously such revisions had only rarely 
occurred (in 1961,1974 and 1984), the 1990s saw three Novellen: one in 1993, one 1996 and 
one in 1998. The purpose of these revisions was to address and modernise key supervisory 
issues such as the definition of capital and financial services firms, banks’ propriety trading, 
the extension of supervision to new financial products and risks, risk management models
19 For a detailed summary of the law see FAGB Annual Report (1998), pp. 53-58.
20 See FAGB Annual Report (1994), p. 33.
21 See FAGB Annual Report (1994), p. 32 and “Novelty of the short-term”, Financial Times, Sept. 26 1994.
22 Interview. The FAGB’s 1998 Annual Report explicitly praised the close co-operation between the FAGB, the
Finance Ministry, the Bundesbank and FBSO for the drafting of the two financial market promotion laws. See
FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 53.
23 See “Bonner Entwicklungshilfe fur den deutschen Kapitalmarkt”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 3 
1996.
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and measures against money laundering24. The intention behind these revision was, however, 
not just to comply with EU requirements for a unified European capital market, but also to 
adjust the German supervisory structure to the international norms and standards proposed by 
the Basle Committee (see Chapter 7). The FAGB noted that while previous revisions were 
motivated by purely national considerations, the revisions of the 1990s were a response to the 
increasing internationalisation of capital markets, which required an internationally oriented 
supervisory structure25. The three banks generally welcomed all of the revisions since they 
were explicitly aimed at ensuring distortion-free competition and the strengthening of the 
financial system26. An association official commented that the FAGB had been working 
closely together with the regulators on how EU directives were best incorporated into 
German laws.
Apart from these major initiatives, there were, however, also a number of other important 
measures that, taken together, significantly improved the functioning of the German capital 
market and improved efficiency and liquidity. First of all, after intensive lobbying by the 
FAGB, taxes on stock market transactions were abolished in 1990. One executive noted that 
this was a major success for the three banks as it removed a significant disadvantage 
compared to other financial centres27.
Second, the technical infrastructure of the German stock exchange in Frankfurt strongly 
improved during the 1990s. Germany’s futures exchange Deutsche Terminbdrse (DTB) began 
to offer remote membership and to develop a reputation as one of the world’s most
<no
sophisticated exchanges . The German stock exchange has with XETRA one of the world's 
leading electronic trading systems and forged during the second half of the 1990s alliances 
with the London Stock Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade29. Significant in this 
context has also been the establishment of Frankfurt’s Neuer Markt exchange, which has had 
some success in bringing young companies to the market and in attracting new equity 
investors. The market has stressed transparency, made companies publish prospectuses in 
English and used American accounting standards30.
24 See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 40.
25 ibid., p. 42.
26 See FAGB Annual Report (1994), pp. 54-59 and Annual Report (1996), pp. 96-102.
27 Interview.
28 Interviews.
29 See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 58. See also “No SECs please, we’re European”, The Economist, August 
21 1999, pp. 70f.
See “No SECs please, we’re European”, The Economist, August 21 1999, p. 70f.
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Reflecting on the reforms during the 1990s, the FAGB noted that during the last decade 
framework conditions improved strongly with the effect that the German financial centre 
became more dynamic and more attractive for foreign investors31. As a result, a substantial 
amount of business that German banks had shifted to London in the early 1990s, began to 
return to Frankfurt32. One bank executive commented that "framework conditions of 
Germany’s capital markets have continuously improved during the last years and have in the 
process become a lot more internationally- and market-oriented"33.
Public Ownership of Banks
A particular characteristic of the German banking sector is the relatively large market share 
of state owned banks. For historical reasons, mainly connected with the need to reconstruct 
Germany after the Second World War, the public sector plays an unusually prominent role in 
the German banking sector. The nation’s 13 Landesbanken alone command a share of about 
14 per cent in the market for domestic credit, while the almost 600 local public sector banks -  
known as the Sparkassen -  have another 23 per cent. In 1998, public sector banks accounted 
for half of the total turnover of Germany’s banking sector: Moreover, as the private sector 
banks have repeatedly stressed, these banks appear on the market with common products and 
common advertisements; in other words, they are everything but competitors. By contrast, the 
three Grossbanken -  Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank - compete fiercely 
against each other and together account for only 15 per cent of the turnover in the German 
banking sector 34.
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, Germany’s private banks have been repeatedly 
complaining to the German government about the competition distorting effects that result 
from these extensive state activities35. Their criticism has been particularly directed at the 
Landesbanken -  the traditional clearing banks for municipal savings banks and financiers of 
their state governments. As long as the Landesbanken kept off the turf of their commercial 
rivals and confined their business activities to their original task, criticism from the private
31 See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 53.
32 See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 58. See also “Finanzplatz Frankfurt hat sich stetig verbessert”, 
Borsenzeitung, Feb.l 1995.
33 Interview.
34 See FAGB Annual Report (1998), pp. 44f and "EU scrutiny of German public bank system arouses passionate 
defence”, Financial Times, August 17 1999.
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banks remained relatively muted. When, however, during the 1990s some of the 
Landesbanken expanded into investment banking and asset management and started to set up 
international branches , criticism from private banks in general, and the three Grossbanken 
in particular, increased sharply.
Two issues have been particularly contentious. First, the three banks complained that the 
state has provided the Landesbanken with capital on subsidised terms. In 1993 the EU ratified 
a directive for capital adequacy standards which significantly raised the standards for 
Germany’s banks. While the private banks were forced to issue more equity in order to raise 
additional funding, in six German Lander the state governments transferred funds from 
building agencies to their Landesbanken. For the banks in question the net effect was a 
subsidy totalling DM11.4bn37. One bank executive argued that “without this capital injection, 
most Landesbanken would have had to reduce the scope of their businesses”.
Second, the commercial banks complained that the Landesbanken enjoyed an unfair 
competitive advantage since they have unlimited financial guarantees from their owners -  the 
German Lander and ultimately the German government. This implicit public guarantee 
allows the public sector banks to raise capital cheaply and hence to refinance their lending at 
a lower cost than private sector banks. In fact, despite inadequate capital strength levels and 
wafer thin margins -  on average the Landesbanken make an average return of equity of 
around 5 per cent -  the Landesbanken generally carry the same credit rating as the states that 
back them, which is usually the highest one (AAA). By one estimate, it costs the biggest 
Landesbanken 15 basis points (hundredths of a percentage point) less than their private 
competitors to raise money. An internal study by the European Commission estimated the 
advantage at even DM 250m-500m for every DMloobn borrowed38.
Through the FAGB, the three Grossbanken have been intensely complaining that the 
activities of the state owned banks were highly competition distorting and had also negative 
implications for the creation of a European single market in financial services39. Indeed, it is 
often argued that the effect of state support for the Landesbanken is one of the most 
significant obstacles to the construction of a single European banking market as it skews the
35 See for example FAGB Annual Report (1998), pp. 44f.
36 The most prominent of the Landesbanken, West LB, owns a fully fledged investment bank.
37 See “Can Dachshunds be whippets?”, The Economist, Jan. 4 1997.
38 Quoted in “German banks under fire”, The Economist, May 22 1999. See also “Can dachshunds be 
whippets?”, The Economist, Jan. 4 1997.
See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 47.
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German market against foreign banks40. As has been pointed out in Chapter 3, the three banks 
have been strongly advocating legislation which would force the public sector banks to pay a 
market price for capital. These demands have, however, drawn an indignant response from 
the state-owned banks, which, in the words of one interviewee, contend
“that they are nothing like as inefficient as portrayed by their rivals and that they provide 
essential competition in the crowded German banking market. Moreover, they claim that 
public sector banks are an intricate part of Germany’s social market economy”41.
One bank executive countered that these arguments were not more sophisticated than the fear 
that losing the state guarantee would mean a sharp drop in credit rating and the loss of 
whatever franchise they still had42.
However, despite repeated criticism, the efforts of the FAGB to get the German 
government to level the playing field between Germany’s private and public sector banks 
were unsuccessful. The situation in 1995 did not differ from that in 1985. In the second half 
of the 1990s, the three Grossbanken stepped up their campaign and took the issue to the 
European level. In 1996, they launched a complaint with the European Commission on the 
basis of Article 92 of European competition law, which forbids state subsidies that lead to 
preferential treatment of particular firms, distortions of competition or negative implications 
for the single market43. As a result the Commission launched an investigation into the 
business affairs of West LB, the most prominent of Germany’s Landesbanken. With the 
investigation under way, other European banks increasingly joined the three German banks in 
their criticism of the Landesbanken and complained that as the Landesbanken ventured 
overseas, cheap finance on the back of their state guarantees gave them an unfair advantage. 
So far, however, the European Commission has avoided taking formal action in this 
politically sensitive area44.
40 See “EU attack on Germany set to create a furore”, Financial Times, Oct. 22 1999.
41 Interview.
42 Interview.
43 See FAGB Annual report (1998), pp. 44f.
44 See “German banks under fire”, The Economist, May 22 1999 and “Can dachshunds be whippets?”, The 
Economist, Jan. 4 1997.
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The Political Influence of Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank:
An Analysis
On balance, the three banks’ political influence was clearly not insignificant. Policy outcomes 
corresponded in a number of issue areas closely to banks’ preferences. While the three banks 
certainly suffered a political defeat by their failure to get the government to level the playing 
field between Germany’s private and public sector banks, they appeared to have been 
considerably influential when it came to reforms regarding the regulatory framework of 
Germany’s banking sector. The analysis has shown that reforms by and large corresponded to 
banks’ preference for measures that facilitated the development of efficient capital markets.
How can one explain these variations in banks' political influence? In line with the 
argument of this study, neither institutions nor interests can fully explain these policy 
outcomes by themselves. Rather changing economic and political circumstances played an 
important role in shaping the political influence that the three banks were capable of exerting.
Clearly, interest-based explanations are by themselves not up to the task. All interviewees 
agreed that both issues were pursued with the same energy and intensity and yet outcomes 
differed substantially. In other words, there was no hierarchy of importance between the two 
issues that might explain why banks' preferences in one area persisted and in the other not.
Institutions, on the other hand, appear to go some distance towards explaining banks’ 
varying political influence. With regard to regulatory issues, banks were part of a highly 
institutionalised policy-making network, while with regard to the issue of public sector banks 
no comparable network existed.
Moreover, in contrast to the pharmaceutical industry, policy-making in the financial 
services sector did not fit in well with the literature reviewed in Chapter 4 that diagnosed 
cracks in Germany’s institutions. All three banks chose to work exclusively through the 
Federal Association of German Banks, and with regard to regulatory reforms, policy-making 
processes were neither characterised by an increasing desire on part of the government to 
engineer economic outcomes nor by a proliferation of organised interest groups. As a result, 
the policy-making network was limited to elite groups and the FAGB could play a privileged 
“insider” role in negotiations with the Ministry of Finance, the Bundesbank and the FSBO. 
As one official from the FAGB remarked,
“in our sector, Germany’s famous decentralised decision-making structure is still very
much intact, in the sense that the associations play an important role in the policy-making
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In similar vein, a Bundestag briefing paper has argued,
"The top officials of the regulatory agencies and the bank associations told us that 
they were very satisfied with how the regulatory system operated. All agreed that the 
relationship between the Bundesbank, the Ministry of Finance, the FBSO and the FAGB 
was excellent and was characterised by co-operation and collegiality. They attributed this 
to the fact that each agency understood its role, that legal responsibility was clearly 
defined and that a united front helped contain outside criticism. Finally, they noted that 
communication was fluid, personality conflicts rare and turf battles virtually non­
existent"46.
Hence one could explain variations in banks' political influence by the differing nature of 
banks’ institutional linkages to the policy-making process. While there may be some truth to 
this line of argument, it is not entirely convincing. Following the same logic one would be led 
to conclude that if only institutions had been more conducive, the three banks would have 
also succeeded in levelling the playing field between private and public sector banks. 
However, for reasons shown below, this is highly implausible.
In fact, both policy outcomes fit in well with this study’s hypothesis that in order to 
adequately explain policy outcomes, interest- and institution-based explanations need to be 
supplemented by an analysis of the economic and political circumstances under which policy­
making took place. It was argued that these circumstances were likely to have a significant 
impact on the preferences of the government, the opposition from other organised groups and 
the extent to which banks could use their internationalisation process for political leverage. 
Hence they could be expected to condition banks' political influence.
With regard to the issue of the public sector banks, circumstances combined in a highly 
unfavourable way for the three banks. First, the government was strongly in favour of 
maintaining the public guarantee for the state sector banks since the issue was perceived to 
have direct implications for employment in the sector. Despite cheaper refinancing, the public 
sector banks are generally regarded as less profitable than the private banks. Hence
45 Interview.
46 See FBSO (1995). For a similar view see FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 53.
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withdrawing their privileges was likely to prompt a potentially nasty bout of consolidation 
resulting in job losses. As one interviewee put it,
"the argument that public sector banks are an inherent part of Germany’s social market 
economy and thus deserve their public guarantee, is not more sophisticated than being 
afraid of losing market share. The government knows this perfectly well and is highly 
concerned about the implications for jobs in the banking sector"47.
Second, domestic opposition in this policy area was significant since the government was 
under intense pressure from the Association o f Public Sector Banks -  a highly vocal and 
politically well connected association. Senior politicians from Germany's Lander, on whose 
support the government often depends, often sit on their Landesbanks' supervisory boards48. 
Moreover, as one executive has remarked, "politicians also like the power a bank brings to 
channel cheap credit to favoured businesses"49.
Finally, banks’ internationalisation process was not a source of political leverage in this 
policy area. After all, the "threat" to abandon domestic business in protest of the 
government’s failure to level the playing field was hardly credible. As a result, the three 
banks were unable to persist with their preferences. Despite complaining for years about the 
competition distorting effects of the public sector banks, there was no improvement during 
the last decade as the government turned a blind eye to the private banks’ complaints. In view 
of these highly unfavourable circumstances, it appears plausible to argue that even improved 
institutional linkages would have made little difference regarding the overall policy outcome.
With regard to reforms of the regulatory framework, matters were very different. In this 
policy area, the impact of circumstances on the preferences of the government, opposition 
from other domestic groups and banks' internationalisation process was much more 
favourable for the three banks. First, since the regulatory framework is neutral in its impact 
on employment and income distribution - obviously there is no link between, for example, 
increasing transparency or making easier for firms to go public and growing unemployment 
or a widening income distribution gap -  the government's interest was limited and the issue 
was free from the politicisation surrounding the public sector banks.
47 Interview.
48 See "Can dachshunds be whippets?", The Economist, Jan. 4 1997 and Financial Times, Oct. 22 1999.
49 Interview.
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Second, this state of affairs was further buttressed by the absence of organised domestic 
opposition. Since banking regulatory issues are of a highly technical nature, the issue did not 
generate much public interest. As a result, the policy-making process in this issue area 
remained relatively closed and the policy-making community remained confined to elite 
groups. Moreover, interactions were highly institutionalised and consensus-oriented (see 
above).
Third, banks’ internationalisation process combined with the increasing integration of 
global capital markets gave the three banks a significant bargaining chip. As has been shown 
in chapter 2, a lot of banks’ business in investment banking and asset management is highly 
mobile and can be relatively easily shifted between financial centres. As one executive noted,
"in investment banking and asset management, most business segments are very mobile. 
Compared with the manufacturing sector, it does not cost us very much to shift businesses 
between various financial centres in order to take advantage of regulatory differences"50.
In other words, the threat to shift business abroad was highly credible. Indeed, a Bundebank 
official conceded that “if we want to ensure the viability of Frankfurt as a financial centre, we 
have little choice but to make sure that banks find the same'framework conditions here as in 
other financial centres"51.
In view of these findings it is certainly very tempting to argue that internationalisation and 
lack of domestic opposition combined to give the three banks considerable political influence 
with regard to regulatory issues. However, one should not exaggerate this point. German 
regulators had an interest of their own to carry out the regulatory reforms analysed above. 
After all, these were not outlandish demands by banks seeking preferential treatment, but 
rather demands to harmonise German regulations with internationally recognised norms and 
standards relating to the proper and efficient functioning of capital markets. In this sense, the 
reforms clearly contributed to a strengthening of the German financial system. As a 
Bundesbank official argued,
“with the increasing integration of global capital markets it became more necessary than 
ever to establish international minimum standards. Our goal was to bring the German
50 Interview.
51 Interview.
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regulatory framework in line with international best practices”52.
In other words, while institutional linkages to the policy-making process, interests and 
favourable circumstances were all important explanatory factors, it is also important to note 
that there was a not insignificant element of congruence between the interests of the 
regulators and the three banks. Hence it is not entirely accurate to equate favourable policy 
outcomes in this issue area with political influence.
The Swiss Banks: Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzerland 
and Swiss Bank Corporation
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, the most important economic policy issues for the 
Swiss banks in the period from 1985 to 1995 concerned market access and regulatory issues. 
In contrast to Germany, public ownership of banks has not been a contentious issue in 
Switzerland. Hirszowicz has noted that cantonal banks have stuck to their traditional role of 
accepting deposits and granting loans in the local area and have not attracted criticism from 
Switzerland’s private banks53. In order to avoid repetition, the three banks’ role in the GATS 
Agreement for Financial Services will analysed in Chapter 7 together with the German banks.
Banking Regulation
Similar to Germany, Switzerland’s regulatory framework is essentially market conforming in 
the sense that banks are regulated and supervised only to ensure the safety and soundness of 
individual banks and of the system as a whole54. In contrast to Germany, however, 
Switzerland’s capital markets were by the mid-1980s already fairly developed and 
regulations were in general more flexible55. Daniker has observed that compared with other 
European countries, the process of issuing securities has always been largely deregulated in
52 Interview.
53 Hirzowicz (1996), p. 10.
54 For the objectives of Swiss banking regulations see Huang (1992), p. 4 and Eidgenossisches 
Finanzdepartment (1989), p. 13.
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Switzerland. For example, securities did not have to be registered with any governmental or 
self-regulatory agency before being issued and the prospectus prepared upon issuance of 
securities had not been subject to prior approval by any governmental authority56.
However, this very informality was increasingly perceived as a liability instead of an 
asset. One interviewee noted that “prior to the major reform acts of the early 1990s, the Swiss 
regulatory framework was hardly conducive to promoting efficiency”. Indeed, Chapter 3 has 
pointed out that market-conforming regulation in financial services was not synomonous with 
complete deregulation. Rather, market conforming regulations aimed to safeguard the 
functioning of the market and protected investors by making the largest possible amount of 
information available to them57. Seen from this perspective, Switzerland’s regulatory 
framework was somewhat problematic. Schenker has argued that until recently the Swiss 
capital market was in a large number of areas unregulated, or in an international comparison, 
under-regulated. As he put it,
“Markets were not very efficient, since disclosure requirements were insufficient. 
Moreover, investor protection was -  if at all implemented - predominantly practised 
through prohibitions. The Swiss Investment Fund Act, for example, strongly restricted 
fund managers’ choice of investments. Finally, shares were traded at three stock 
exchanges which caused a fragmentation of the market that depressed liquidity”58.
In other words, by the early 1990s the Swiss regulatory framework was far from being market 
conforming as a result of both too much and too little regulation.
Chapter 3 has pointed out that as a result of securitisation and banks' internationalisation 
process, regulatory and supervisory issues pertaining to the efficient functioning of the Swiss 
capital market featured prominently on the three banks’ political agenda during the 1990s. 
However, Chapter 3 has also argued that the preferences of the three banks were a bit of a 
conundrum. Prior to 1990 they were strongly in favour of administered competition through 
the Swiss Bankers’ Association (SBA). However, after the "big bang" in 1990 when the 
government abolished the conventions (see below), banks came round to accept the need for
55 See “Swiss Banks face the 1990s”, UBS International Finance, Winter 1991, pp. 1-8.
56 See Daniker (1998), p. 58. See also “Swiss Banks face the 1990s”, UBS International Finance, Winter 1991,
pp. 1-8.
See for example Schenker (1996), p. 14 and Huang (1992), p. 3.
58 Ibid., p. 15.
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a market-conforming regulatory framework that provided for a maximum of transparency and 
competition59.
Similar to the German banks, the Swiss banks were well placed to exert political influence 
in this policy area since the Swiss regulatory structure includes both public and private actors. 
Switzerland’s main regulatory and supervisory agency is the Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission (FBC), which is independent of both the central bank and the Ministry of 
Finance. However, a number of authors have pointed out that there are usually extensive 
consultations between the three agencies60. Most prominent among the various banking 
associations is the Swiss Bankers' Association (SBA), which represents, among other banks, 
Credit Suisse, SBC and UBS. In line with Switzerland’s decentralised, “private interest” 
government, the SBA is, however, not merely representing the interests of its members, but 
also fulfils regulatory functions. For example, during the last decade the SBA has issued 
numerous guidelines for member banks in order to prevent the proliferation of formal 
regulations61. Examples include guidelines for risk management62, internal control63 and -  in 
conjunction with the opening of the SOFFEX (Swiss Options and Financial Futures 
Exchange) -  guidelines for trade with options and financial futures64. Although self­
regulation became less important during the 1990s (see below), association officials argued 
that the relationship with the regulators had remained very close65. In the words of one 
official,
“association staff are always strongly involved during the drafting stage of new policies, 
meetings with the FBC are usually very constructive and consensus-oriented and our 
concerns are generally taken seriously”66.
Turning now to policy outcomes, Hirszowicz has observed that during the 1990s
f \ 7Switzerland showed a hitherto seldom displayed energy for revising legislation . During the 
first half of the decade, the government ratified a new law for stock exchanges and securities
CO
See for example SBA Annual Report (1990/91), p. 58.
60 See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 189, Daniker (1998), p. 26 and Rhinow and Bayerdorfer (1990), p. 11.
61 See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 454.
62 See SBA (1996b).
63 See Thevenoz and Zulauf (1995).
64 See SBA (1990).
65 Interviews.
66 Interview.
67 Hirszowicz (1996), p. 1.
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trading, significantly revised the Swiss Investment Fund Act, and ratified a revision of the 
Swiss Banking Act.
The Swiss Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading (Bundesgesetz iiber die 
Borsen und den Effektenhandel - BEHG) was ratified in 1994, seven years after deliberations 
for a reform of Swiss securities laws began. The goal of the Act was threefold. First, the Act 
aimed to improve investor protection and efficiency through a number of measures aimed at 
increasing transparency. To this end, the new law replaced a number of SBA guidelines by 
formal regulations in order to ensure all market participants of fair and equal treatment and 
thereby promote confidence in the market68. Second, the Act harmonised Swiss securities 
regulations -  prior to the Act exchanges and securities dealers were regulated exclusively by 
cantonal law -  and extended the supervisory function of the FBC to include the new rules for 
stock exchanges69. A final objective of the Act was to make Switzerland's regulatory 
framework compatible with international regulatory standards. Hirszowicz noted that to this 
end, the BEHG incorporated several EU directives into Swiss law70.
First steps towards this law date back to October 1987, when in the aftermath of the stock 
market crash, the Swiss Federal Council commissioned an expert report on the future of the 
Swiss securities market. The report was published in 1989 and recommended the introduction 
of a federal securities law. A first proposal -  presented in 1991 - provided for a substantial 
degree of state intervention in the activities of exchanges and securities dealers71. The Swiss 
Bankers' Association protested heavily and suggested various amendments to reduce the 
involvement of the government72. The SBA’s proposals were largely taken into consideration 
and the three banks broadly welcomed the final version of the Act. According to the SBA, the 
BEHG contributed significantly to the strengthening of the competitiveness of the Swiss 
financial centre by guaranteeing openness and increasing transparency73.
The new Swiss Investment Fund Act (IFA) completely revised Switzerland’s main piece of 
investment legislation, the 1967 investment law which regulated the activities of Swiss 
investment funds whose management was domiciled in Switzerland and of foreign 
investment funds that distributed their certificates in Switzerland. Ratified in 1994, the main 
goal of the revision was to make Swiss legislation compatible with EU guidelines in this
68 Ibid., p. 123.
69 See Daniker (1998), p. 26.
70 Hirszowicz (1996), p. 210.
71 See Schenker (1996), p. 100.
72 Sec SBA Annual Report (1991/1992), p. 49.
73 See SBA Annual Report (1996/97), p. 28.
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area74. Daniker observed that the IFA re-enacted many provisions of EU directives relating to 
the regulation and supervision of collective investments in transferable securities . Particular 
focus was on formalising publication requirements, which had hitherto been only informally 
regulated76. Hirszowicz has, however, pointed out that the IFA went also beyond merely 
incorporating EU directives in that it also provided for swift and flexible approval of new 
financial instruments and thereby, in effect, offered investors investment possibilities not 
available within the EU77.
The revision was completed in 1994 - after four years of deliberation - and the outcome 
largely conformed to the three banks’ preferences78. One executive commented that the IFA 
“amounted to a timely and adequate law”. However, the SBA was not successful in having all 
its proposals incorporated. While the provisions regarding EU compatibility, transparency 
and approval of new financial instruments were strongly welcomed by the SBA, taxation of 
transactions remained a problem79. Although the stamp duty and turn-over tax had been 
abolished for a large number of transactions during the early 1990s, they nevertheless 
remained in place for a few types of transactions (see below). In the eyes of the SBA this 
constituted a competitive disadvantage compared to EU countries80.
In addition to the BEHG and the IFA, the Swiss Banking Act -  Switzerland’s main piece of 
banking legislation -  was also significantly revised. Ratified in 1994, the main goal of the
Q1
revision was to ensure EU compatibility of Swiss banking laws . Of particular importance 
was a provision that authorised the Swiss State to conclude treaties with other states 
concerning the liberalisation of trade in financial services. This revision, in effect, enabled the 
Swiss government to offer automatic approval of banking licenses along the lines of the EU’s 
Second Banking Directive and was hence an essential pre-condition for Switzerland's 
participation in the GATS Agreement for Financial Services. The provision was based on a 
draft proposal submitted by the SBA82. Moreover, the revised Banking Act also adjusted 
Swiss banking legislation in a number of areas to international minimum standards proposed 
by the Basle Committee. For example, the Act incorporated the 1988 Basle Capital Accord
74 See SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 59.
75 Daniker (1998), p. 30.
76 See SBA Annual Report (1991/92), p. 54.
77 Hirszowicz (1996), p. 227.
78 See SBA Annual Report (1993/1994), p. 59.
7Q
See SBA Annual Report (1993/94), p. 59 and (1991/92), p. 55.
80 See SBA Annual Report (1991/92), p. 55.
Ol
See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 297 and SBA Annual Report (1993/1994), p. 39.
82 See SBA Annual Report (1993/94), pp. 39f.
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into Swiss law in order to adjust capital requirements to the increasing complexity of modern
o < i
banking and changed risk structures .
Apart from these major policy initiatives, there were also a number of other important 
measures that improved the regulatory framework. First, transaction costs were significantly 
reduced. Through the stamp duty (Stempelsteuer), Switzerland taxed until 1993 all stock and 
bond market transactions. From the viewpoint of the three banks, this tax constituted a grave 
competitive disadvantage -  by the late 1980s virtually all major financial centres had 
abolished taxes for securities dealing and with the liberalisation of capital markets and 
advances in information technology, investors began to handle their transactions in the centre 
with the lowest costs. As a result lucrative business, like the Eurobond business and large 
parts of the fund management business for institutional investors, left Switzerland84. In fact, 
already in 1986 an IMF paper argued that Switzerland’s comparatively high taxes on stock 
market transactions were seriously undermining the competitiveness of the Swiss financial
o r
centre . As a result of extensive lobbying by the SBA, the government agreed in 1993 to 
abolish the stamp duty tax for a large number of transactions. The reform was, however, only 
a partial success as it left the stamp duty intact for some transactions, such as for example 
domestic bonds86. The SBA repeatedly complained to the Swiss government in the following 
years that this incomplete reform represented a not insignificant competitive disadvantage 
and could lead to more business leaving Switzerland87.
Second, similar to Germany, the technical infrastructure of Switzerland’s financial centre 
improved strongly during the 1990s. By 1990, Switzerland’s stock market was highly 
fragmented due to the existence of seven exchanges (Zurich, Basle, Geneva, Lausanne, 
Neuchatel and St. Gallen). In 1991, the latter four were integrated into the former three and in 
1993 all of them were integrated into a new organisation called Schweizer Borse (Swiss Stock 
Exchange) domiciled in Zurich 88. Since 1990 futures can be traded on the SOFFEX (Swiss 
Options and Financial Futures Exchange), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Swiss Stock 
Exchange, which offers remote membership and has alliances with the German Futures 
Exchange (DTB) and the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Market efficiency and liquidity
83 See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 143.
84 See Schenker (1998), p. 108.
85 See Christensen (1986).
86 See SBA Annual Report (1996/97), p. 25, Annual Report (1993/94), p. 33 and Hirszowicz (1996), p. 241.
87 See for example SBA Annual Report (1996/97), p. 25.
88 See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 485.
184
were likely to be further improved by the Swiss Venture Capital Centre (SVCC), a market for
OQ
high-risk securities issued by medium sized companies .
Barriers to Entry
Switzerland’s banking sector is generally regarded to be open to foreign competition. Before 
the GATS agreement for financial services, access was granted on the basis of reciprocity and 
Huang has noted that there was no evidence that suggested that the reciprocity principle had 
been abused for protectionist purposes90. While prior to the GATS Agreement, foreign banks 
had to apply for a special license and had to conform with special safety requirements, these 
procedures were generally not considered to have been an impediment to market access91. 
Since the ratification of the GATS Agreements for Financial Services, access to 
Switzerland’s financial markets is granted on the basis of MFN (see Chapter 7). In 1995, 
market access for foreign banks was further eased through a measure, which allowed foreign 
banks operating in Switzerland to use home country accounting standards (Verordnung iiber 
auslandische Banken in der Schweiz). The Swiss Bankers' Association fully supported and 
welcomed this initiative and was involved in the drafting of the Act92.
However, the issue of market access and three Swiss banks’ liberalisation credentials were 
far from clear cut. As has already been pointed out in Chapter 3, the Swiss banks' attitude 
towards entry barriers has been somewhat ambivalent, at least prior to 1990. While the three 
banks have always been competing fiercely against each other in international markets, they 
openly colluded at home. Under the umbrella of the Swiss Bankers' Association, the three 
banks "administered” competition in the home market “in order to achieve smooth adjustment 
to sectoral change”93. Through several conventions, business activities were tightly regulated. 
From mortgage rates to TV advertisements, to the number of domestic branches each bank 
was allowed to operate, everything was decided by collusion rather than by arm's length 
competition94. The SBA justified these measures by arguing that limited and administered 
competition raised efficiency, improved transparency, led to a more robust financial system
89 See Daniker (199)8, pp. 18f.
90 See Huang (1992), p. 79. The IMF has noted that while the principle of reciprocity was liberal in principle, it 
nevertheless left room for protectionism through restrictive interpretations. See IMF (1989a).
91 See Huang (1992), p. 77.
92 See SBA Annual Report (1996/1997), p. 29.
93 See SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 73.94 _ _
See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 442. For a list of all conventions see SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 74.
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and allowed a soft adjustment process to structural change95. Citing the contestable market 
literature, the chief economist of the SBA argued that competition was not a goal in itself, but 
foremost an instrument to increase efficiency. What mattered was the result of competition - 
i.e. whether a particular market order produced competitively priced products and services 
and generated innovative products - and not competition itself96. In other words, critical for 
the analysis of a particular market order was only whether companies’ success was based on 
superior products and innovative strategies or protection and collusion. In the case of the 
Swiss banks, so the SBA, all indicators of efficiency -  i.e. return of equity, concentration and 
market share -  showed that Switzerland's financial sector was open and efficient97.
However, with the increasing integration of international capital markets, the Swiss 
banking sector’s unique way of conducting business became increasingly intolerable for the 
government and in 1986 the Swiss cartel office launched a comprehensive investigation into 
these practices. One interviewee remarked that
“with the increasing internationalisation in the financial services sector, foreign banks 
increasingly complained to the Swiss government about the somewhat unorthodox ways in 
which the banking sector operated”98.
During the first two years of the investigation it became relatively quickly clear that the 
conventions were not sustainable. Influential notables, such as the law professor Peter Bockli 
and the former president of the cartel office Schliip, argued in the classical liberal tradition of 
Adam Smith that the purpose of framework policies could only be the promotion of 
spontaneous processes through which a market order evolved99. In 1989, the Swiss cartel 
office published the report of the 4 year long investigation into the conventions. The report 
strongly condemned the prevailing practices and recommended an immediate breaking up of 
the cartel-like structures.
This verdict drew an initially defiant response from the three banks. Through a specially 
established working group at the SBA, the three banks launched a ferocious attack on the
95 See SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 98.
96 See Blattner (1991).
97 Ibid. See also Blattner et al. (1992). Chapter 3 has, however, noted that contestability indicators in the 
financial services sector were far from being unambiguous.
98 Interview.
99 See Bockli (l987)and Schliip (1989).
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cartel office100. Complaining that the arguments of the cartel office amounted to a 
glorification of competition, the three banks argued that internationalisation and the 
increasing integration of financial markets were sufficient to ensure the efficient functioning 
of the market and to prevent abuse of the conventions101. Moreover, the goal of the 
conventions was not monopolisation, but rather to increase efficiency and soften adjustment
1 0 9processes in the interest of the safety and quality of Switzerland’s banks .
However, these arguments failed to convince the government. In 1990 all conventions
1O'!were declared illegal and replaced by price competition for all banking services . One 
interviewee remarked that
“it was quite an extraordinary event to see the Swiss government acting so decisively 
against a major association [the SBA]. However, one has to recognise that the government 
was under strong international pressure to bring Switzerland’s banking practices in line 
with international norms and standards”104.
As mentioned earlier, during the early 1990s, the SBA and the three banks came round to 
accept the need for price competition and became strong advocates of market-conforming 
regulatory measures, which were compatible with international norms and standards.
The Political Influence of Credit Suisse, Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of
Switzerland: An Analysis
The reviewed policy outcomes fit somewhat uneasily with the argument of Chapter 4 that 
Switzerland’s institutions could be expected to guide policy-making processes in the 
direction of compromise solutions. Clearly in the banking sector this has not been the case. 
The government’s decision in 1990 to dismantle the conventions through which the Swiss 
Bankers* Association administered competition in the sector was an outright defeat for the 
three banks without any quid pro quo. Also, the policy outcomes regarding the regulatory
100 See SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 65. For a summary of the SBA position see Guyer (1990) and Blattner 
(1991)
101 See SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 68.
102 See Blattner (1991), p. 97.
103 See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 66.
104 tInterview.
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framework do not really fit the definition of compromise solutions. Similar to Germany, the 
Swiss reforms corresponded by and large to the three banks’ preferences. However, rather 
than representing a refutation of the arguments made in Chapter 4, these policy outcomes are 
better viewed as the result of unique circumstances (see below).
The first point to make, however, is that neither institutions nor interests can adequately 
explain these policy outcomes by themselves. In fact, interest-based explanations are 
particularly inadequate: during the late 1980s, the SBA mounted a high profile campaign 
against the government and the cartel office and lost the debate, while during the first half of 
the 1990s, low key and discreet interest representation through the SBA led to policy 
outcomes that largely corresponded to the three banks’ preferences. In other words, interest- 
based explanations clearly fail to explain the three banks’ differing political influence across 
the two policy areas.
Institutions appear to be more helpful in explaining banks’ varying influence. With respect 
to the policy outcomes that corresponded to the three banks’ preferences -  the regulatory 
reforms in the first half of the 1990s -  the three banks were part of a tightly knit policy­
making network. However, with regard to the banking conventions, other actors -  the cartel 
office and the government -  were involved with whom no such issue-specific policy 
networks existed. Hence one could explain the two policy outcomes by the degree to which 
institutions provided the three banks with access to the policy-making process. While there is 
some truth to this argument, it is, however, not entirely convincing. Inevitably, such an 
argument would lead to the conclusion that improved institutional linkages with regard to the 
conventions would have also helped the banks to obtain a more favourable policy outcome. 
For reasons shown below, this appears to be unlikely; in fact, just as in the German case, an 
analysis of the economic and political circumstances under which policy-making took place 
is indispensable for explaining variations in banks' political influence.
With regard to the conventions, circumstances were highly unfavourable for the three 
banks: first, and most importantly, the Swiss government was determined to bring 
Switzerland’s banking regulations in line with international best practices. One interviewee 
observed that
“with the increasing internationalisation of financial markets, the Swiss regulatory 
structure came to be seen as a rather outlandish way of running a banking sector and there 
was increasing pressure from foreign institutions on the Swiss government to bring the
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banking system in line with international norms and standards”105.
In similar vein, Hirszowicz has argued that against the background of financial liberalisation 
within the EU (see Chapter 7), the government began to view the banking conventions with 
increasing scepticism106.
Second, domestic opinion turned strongly against the banks during the late 1980s107. One 
interviewee noted that, “during the late 1980s the banking sector became increasingly the 
target of consumer groups, which were complaining about high fees and of less-than-friendly 
newspaper editorials that were questioning the wisdom behind restricting competition in the 
banking sector so drastically”108.
Finally, banks’ internationalisation process was not a source of political leverage in this 
policy area due to the immobile nature of banks’ domestic business. In view of these factors, 
it seems hardly plausible to argue that improved institutional linkages would have led to a 
more favourable policy outcome for the three banks.
With regard to reforms of the regulatory framework, however, circumstances were 
significantly more favourable for the three banks. Essentially the dynamics were the same as 
in the Germany. Since the issue was neutral in its effect on employment and income 
distribution, it remained free from the politicisation surrounding the issue of the conventions 
and institutions proved to be a source of political influence by providing for a relatively 
closed policy-making network made up of elite groups. One SBA official noted that
“the relatively small policy-community of technocrats made it a lot easier to reach 
agreements that were acceptable for all involved parties”109.
Banks’ influence was further buttressed by the mobility of much of their investment 
banking and asset management business, which - against the background of intensifying 
competition between financial centres - gave their interests considerable weight in the policy­
making debate. As one executive remarked,
“as competition between financial centres began to speed up, Swiss regulators became
105 Interview.
106 Ibid., p. 442.
107 Interviews.
108 Interview.
109 Interview.
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increasingly keen to promote the efficiency of the financial centre in order to make it more 
competitive and discourage banks from shifting business abroad”110.
However, as in the German case, policy outcomes in this issue area should not necessarily
be interpreted as evidence for the disproportionate political influence of banks. Like their
German counterparts, Swiss regulators also had a strong interest of their own to adjust the
domestic regulatory framework to international norms and standards. In fact, Schenker has
observed that as a result of the increasing integration of financial markets, Swiss regulators
became aware of the safety risks associated with failing to adjust domestic regulations to
111international best practices . In other words, there was a not insignificant congruence 
between the interests of banks and regulators that makes it somewhat problematic to equate 
favourable policy outcomes in this issue area with political influence.
Conclusion
The analysis has shown that in many cases policy outcomes in the German and Swiss 
banking sector corresponded to a significant degree to the six banks’ preferences. In fact, on 
balance, the six banks appeared to be more influential than the six pharmaceutical MNEs. 
While in both countries banks certainly suffered political defeats -  in Germany, the three 
banks did not succeed in getting the government to level the playing field between private 
and public sector banks and, in Switzerland, the state abolished the conventions of the Swiss 
Bankers’ Association -  the political successes were substantial. In both Germany and 
Switzerland, the regulatory framework underwent significant and far-reaching reforms, which 
largely corresponded to banks' preferences.
With perhaps one exception, all of these policy outcomes were within the reach of the 
explanatory framework outlined in Chapter 1. In line with the argument of this study, it was 
shown that the impact of changing economic and political circumstances on the preferences 
of the government, the degree of opposition from other organised groups and banks’ 
internationalisation processes, significantly shaped the political influence that the six banks
110 Interview. For a similar view see Huang (1992), p. 19 and Hirszowicz (1996), p. 226.
111 Schenker (1998), p. 15.
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were capable of exerting. Similar to the situation in the pharmaceutical sector, changing 
circumstances went a long way towards explaining variations in banks’ political influence.
The only policy outcome that did not entirely fit into this study’s framework of analysis 
was the Swiss government’s decision to abolish the conventions through which the Swiss 
Bankers' Association used to administered competition in the banking sector. There are two 
reasons why this policy outcome was somewhat difficult to explain. First, on the basis of 
Chapter 4’s analysis, one would not have expected the Swiss government to take on such an 
active role that strongly (although only briefly) antagonised a key domestic group. It was 
argued that Switzerland’s institutions could still be expected to guide policy-making in the 
direction of compromise solutions. In the case of the conventions, however, there was no 
quid pro quo, and the banks were the clear losers in the debate. Second, Chapters 1 and 4 
have argued that government preferences centre around engineering socially desirable 
economic outcomes. However, clearly this desire was not been behind the Swiss 
government’s decision to abolish the banking conventions. Rather the decision was motivated 
by the goal of bringing Switzerland’s regulatory framework in line with international norms 
and standards.
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7MNEs’ Political Influence at the European 
Level of Policy-Making
Chapters 5 and 6 have implicitly shown that over the last decade policy-making in a number 
of areas in the pharmaceutical and banking sector has shifted to the European level. 
Particularly significant in this context were the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) and the 
1991 Maastricht Treaty, which significantly extended the scope of European policies. Hence 
an analysis of the political influence of German MNEs in their home country would be 
somewhat incomplete without also analysing their political strategies at the European level. 
However, the European level is also likely to matter for the Swiss MNEs. Although 
Switzerland is not a member, all six Swiss MNEs have substantial business operations in the 
EU and are thus directly affected by EU policies. Moreover, as the previous two chapters 
have shown, in many cases Switzerland has been “autonomously re-enacting” EU laws and 
regulations. Trying to influence EU policies can thus for the Swiss MNEs also be a way to 
shape Swiss policies.
Before turning, however, to an analysis of the 12 MNEs" political influence at the EU 
level of policy-making, it is worthwhile to review briefly the major arguments of the existing 
studies on the role of organised interest groups at the European level in order to locate this 
Chapter's analysis within a larger context.
Traditionally the subject was studied within the context of European integration theory. 
Neo-functionalist theory, for example, anticipated that organised groups could play a 
significant role in propelling integration and that they would contribute to the “spillover” of 
integration into other domains and sectors1. However, starting in the 1980s, the study of non­
governmental groups operating at the European level became increasingly an issue in its own 
right. In fact, numerous studies have since then analysed the political influence that European 
associations or interest groups were capable of exerting and the strategies by which they were
1 See for example Haas (1958,1964).
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trying to influence European policy-making processes. The findings of these studies differ, 
however, considerably. While Kirchner and Schwaiger and Grant have emphasised the 
weakness of European associations , Greenwood and Ronnit have shown that in certain 
sectors they could be very influential3. Also, while some studies have emphasised, explicitly 
or implicitly, the strong role of national associations with regard to interest representation at 
the European level4, others have emphasised the autonomous character of European interest 
organisations5. Similarly with regard to the nature of influence seeking, there is little 
agreement within the existing literature. While some studies have argued that corporatist 
arrangements of policy-making were absent at the European level and have put forward the 
“pluralist” hypothesis6, others have argued that corporatist-style relationships do exist in 
certain sectors7.
The following sections will now try to shed some more light on these hypotheses by 
applying the analytical framework used in the previous two chapters to examine the extent to 
which the 12 MNEs were successful in shaping policy outcomes at the EU level. Part one 
will provide a brief overview of the institutional structure of the European policy-making 
process; parts two and three will then focus on the remaining policy issues in the 
pharmaceutical and banking sector, analyse the extent to which policy outcomes 
corresponded to MNEs’ preferences, and examine whether the political influence MNEs were 
capable of exerting can be explained by institutions, interests or economic and political 
circumstances. A final part will summarise the findings and draw some cross-sector and 
cross-country conclusions.
2 See Kirchner and Schwaiger (1981) and Grant (1989). Particularly Grant (1990) has been very sceptical about 
the effectiveness and coherence of European associations, asserting that they have little significance beyond a 
channel of fraternal contact for members.
3 See Greenwood and Ronnit (1992). See also Greenwood (1997).
4 See Kirchner and Schwaiger (1981), Schmitter (1990), Streeck (1989), Kohler-Koch (1993) and Eichener 
(1995).
See for example Eising and Kohler-Koch (1994), Scholz (1994), Eichener and Voelzkow (1994) and 
Greenwood (1997). Another strand of research has started to analyse the extent to which national systems of 
interest transmission were shaped by larger European developments. See Schmitter and Traxler (1994).
6 See for example Streeck (1989), Schmitter (1990), Streeck and Schmitter (1991). One should, however, not 
over-generalise Streeck and Schmitter’s (1991) famous argument that corporatism at the European level was 
absent. What these authors had in mind was macro-corporatism, involving peak exchange over high politics 
issues between business, labour and a bureaucracy with state-like properties, whereas they had little to say about 
meso (sectoral) corporatism.
7 See for example Greenwood and Ronnit (1992) and Greenwood (1997).
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Institutional Structure of the EU Policy-Making Process
Decision-making in the European Union is a complex process. From a legal point of view, all 
decision-making starts at the level of the Commission, where policy proposals are formulated 
by one, or more, of the twenty-three Directorates-Generales (DG). After adoption by the 
Commission, proposals are then passed to the so-called representative bodies: the European 
Parliament (EP), the Economic and Social Committee (ESC or Ecosoc) and, since the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Regional Committee (RC). While the latter two bodies are purely 
advisory, the EP possesses a variety of powers, depending on the decision-making procedure: 
only advisory in the “consultation procedure”, with potentially effective power of amendment 
in the “co-operation procedure” and with veto-power in the “co-decision procedure”. 
Proposals and responses from the representative bodies then come together at the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the lowest level of the Council of Ministers (CM). 
An agreement in the Coreper is automatically accepted in the CM. If no agreement is 
reached, negotiations shift to the related Council, or the higher level of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and, in the last resort, to the European Council (heads of state). Under the 
consultation procedure, the CM decides by unanimity and under two other procedures usually 
by qualified majority voting. Directly binding decisions (regulations and decrees) are 
implemented by the Commission, whereas indirectly binding ones (directives) are passed to 
the national governments for implementation. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
abjudicates and may settle conflicts8.
As a result of this complex decision-making structure, there are various points of access 
for interest groups seeking to participate in European public affairs. Of particular importance, 
however, is the European Commission. Although its powers have been somewhat eroded in 
recent years9, Commission officials preparing draft proposals remain the natural focus of 
interest groups seeking to influence the content of European policies10. Greenwood has 
argued that “the role of the Commission as the responsible agency for drafting legislation 
makes it the foremost institutional target for interest representation at the European level 
because it is in the early stages of initiatives that most influence can be exerted”11. In similar 
vein, Pedler and Van Schendelen have noted that “the Commission functions as a normal
8 For a detailed description of the EU’s policy making system see Pedler and Van Schendelen (1994), pp. lOff.
9 Since the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers can ask the Commission 
under articles 152 (for the Council) and 138b (for the Parliament) to bring forward proposals.
10 See Mazey and Richardson (1993), p. 10.
11 Greenwood (1997), p. 27.
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bureaucracy, in the sense that most of its proposals are substantially accepted: it casts the die
19of decision-making” .
Moreover, the Commission is generally regarded to be relatively open to interest groups 
and often even depends on outside policy input13. Greenwood has pointed out that the 
“European Commission is so small that there might be just one official with responsibility for
the affairs of an entire business domain It has therefore become dependent upon input
from specialist outside interests, sometimes to the extent that European business interest 
groups write Commission reports”14. Indeed, a recent report from the Commission recorded 
in its opening paragraph that
“The Commission has always been an institution open to outside input. The Commission 
believes this process to be fundamental to the development of its policies. This dialogue 
has proved valuable to both the Commission and to interested outside parties. Commission 
officials acknowledge the need for such outside input and welcome it”15.
External views can find their way into European policies principally through two types of 
advisory committees: expert committees and consultative committees, which total roughly a 
thousand in number. Expert committees consist of national officials and experts, whereas the 
second type, the consultative committees, involve sectional interests drawn from European- 
level aggregations of interests16. Although single-firm representations to the Commission are 
heard, the firm concerned is usually told that the Commission would wish to explore the issue 
further by talking to the interest group concerned in order to ensure that it gets a more 
representative opinion17.
Second in importance as an institutional target for interest representation is the European 
Parliament. Although the EP has since 1986 become a somewhat more influential actor, its 
influence arises principally from its right to amend certain pieces of legislation under the so-
1 ftcalled “co-operation” procedure . Bognata has argued that the practical effect of the co­
12 Peddler and Van Schendelen (1994), p. 12.
13 Ibid., p. 14.
14 Greenwood (1997), pp. If.
15 See European Commission (1992c), p. 3.
16 See Greenwood (1997), p. 41.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 27. Prior to the SEA the EP had no legislative powers and the Council of Ministers was under no 
obligation to take the views of MEPs into account. Since 1986, however, the European parliament has become a 
somewhat more influential actor. In an attempt to redress the so-called “democratic deficit” within the EC, the 
SEA introduced a new “co-operation procedure” which grants the EP the right to a second reading of all
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operation procedure has been to draw the parliament into the early stages of policy-making, 
so that compromises can already be negotiated in the first reading stage. For interest groups 
the EP has thus become a useful means to amend EU legislation19. However, Mazey and 
Richardson have argued that usually only interest groups which lack the resources to sustain 
continuous contact with Commission officials on technical matters centre their lobbying 
efforts at the EP20. Particularly environmental groups view the parliament as a very useful 
forum. Greenwood has argued that all environmental NGOs have a natural ally in the 
European Parliament, whose members are quick to take up concerns popular with their 
electorate. Producer groups, on the other hand, normally see the EP as very much a secondary 
arena for lobbying purposes21.
Finally, in third place as a target for interest representation is the Council of Ministers. 
Although being the most powerful decision-maker in the EU, the Council is generally not 
considered to be a natural institution for interest representation by non-governmental groups. 
In contrast to the Commission and the Parliament, which are “European bodies”, the Council 
is an intergovernmental body where national officials and ministers seek to secure the best 
possible deal for their government. The fact that the meetings are secret and closed - and that
interest groups have no direct access to it - has limited the degree to which lobbying is
00feasible . Moreover, Greenwood has argued that at this late stage in the decision-making 
cycle, it becomes more difficult to exert influence because policies have already been shaped, 
and interventions may require seeking changes to entrenched positions23.
As the scope of policies decided at the European level has been steadily increasing during 
the last decade, so too has the number of organised interest groups. In 1992 the Commission 
estimated that there were some 3000 interest groups in Brussels seeking to exert influence on 
European public affairs24. However, it is often argued that industry groups have traditionally 
dominated European-level interest representation - partly because of the history of the EU as 
an economic community25, and partly because they have more of the resources which public 
authorities need, i.e. information and expertise, economic muscle, status and power in
Community legislation relating to the establishment and functioning of the internal market, social and economic 
cohesion, technological research and development and certain aspects of EC social and regional policies. See 
Mazey and Richardson (1993), p. 11,
19 See Bognata (1989).
20 Mazey and Richardson (1993), p. 12.
21 See Greenwood (1997), pp. 43,191.
22 See Mazey and Richardson (1993), p. 14.
23 See Greenwood (1997), p. 27.
24 See European Commission (1992c).
25 Greenwood (1997), p. 101.
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implementation26. Organised business interests range from large, cross sectoral federations 
like UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), 
EUROCHAMRES (the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry), the ERT (the 
European Round Table of Industrialists) and the AMCHAM-EU (the EU Committee of the 
American Chamber of Commerce) to networks as informal as lunch clubs.
However, in recent years, other, non-business interest organisations have also been
onproliferating . Of particular importance have been environmental organisations, which 
discovered the European level during the late 1980s, as the European Commission became 
increasingly active in environmental policy-making28. The scope of environmental policy has 
since then grown steadily, comprising hundreds of directives and numerous environmental 
action programmes29. Young has pointed out that the number of environmental directives in 
the period from 1989 to 1991 exceeded those of the preceding twenty years30. During the 
period from 1986 to 1992, staff at DG XI (Environment) grew from 55 to 45031. By the early 
1990s there were about 150 environmental organisations active at the EU level, which were 
loosely grouped together by the European Environmental Bureau. In addition there are also 
environmental pressure groups, which form part of a wider environmental movement, which 
also includes political parties and other organisations with a direct interest in environmental 
policy, such as for example consumer protection groups32.
The Six German and Swiss Pharmaceutical MNEs
Chapter 5 has pointed out that policy-making at the European level has been of relevance for 
the six pharmaceutical MNEs with regard to biotechnology regulations and intellectual 
property rights. A further issue during the early 1990s concerned a planned directive for the 
regulation of industries’ marketing activities.
26 Ibid., pp. 16-20.
27 Mazey and Richardson (1993), pp. 3f.
28 Although environmental policy was not mentioned in the original treaty, Community action was taken first on 
the ground that national measures could act as trade barriers and disrupt the functioning of the Common Market, 
and second because environmental problems were of such as scale that they required a co-ordinated response. 
Community powers were enshrined in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) and subsequently expanded in the 
Maastricht Treaty. See Hildebrand (1993).
29 See Collier and Golub (1997), p. 236. The EU has adopted directives on eco-audits, energy efficiency and eco 
labels, and is considering framework legislation on eco-taxes. See Collier and Golub (1997), p. 242.
30 See Young (1995).
31 See Weale and Williams (1994).
32 See Grant (1993), p. 42 and Greenwood (1997), p. 191.
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Although the European Commission made tentative efforts to promote R&D co-operation, 
as it had in the electronics sector33, the six MNEs showed little interest in such policies. For 
example, none of them participated in the BRIDGE biotechnology research programme 
(Biotechnology Research for Innovation, Development and Growth in Europe) that the 
Commission initiated in 199034. Instead, the focus of the six MNEs was very clearly on 
improving framework conditions regarding biotechnology regulations and intellectual 
property rights, and making sure that the Commission did not get involved in the marketing 
practices of the industry. The following sections will now analyse the extent to which policy 
outcomes in these three issue areas corresponded to the six MNEs preferences and how one 
can explain the influence they were capable of exerting.
Biotechnology Regulation
With regard to biotechnology regulations, two sets of issues need to be analysed: regulations 
for the approval of production facilities and research projects, and regulations pertaining to 
the approval of drugs.
Approval of Production Facilities and Research Projects
With respect to the regulation of production facilities and research projects, the European 
Commission issued a number of directives to create a European minimum standard. The first 
two directives (90/219 and 90/220) were issued in 1990 and prescribed a relatively high 
safety level. Bandelow, for example, has pointed out that they prohibited a number of 
experiments, which were in the US already since 1981 exempted from regulation35. 
Moreover, the six MNEs complained that both directives did not correspond to their 
preference for transparency and predictability36. As one executive put it,
"essentially these two directives left national governments plenty of scope to set up a very 
strict regulatory regime that legitimised unpredictability, legal uncertainty and plenty of
33 See van Tulder and Junne (1988) and Peterson (1993).
34 See Bongert (1997), p. 128.
35 Bandelow (1999), pp. 105f.
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red tape. In the case of Germany, this has been clearly visible"37.
This negative policy outcome was somewhat surprising, since the main background work 
for the two directives took place in a relatively industry-friendly climate during the mid- 
1980s. Motivated by a desire to promote both the European integration process and the 
nascent European biotechnology industry, the Commission laid down a first framework for 
planned safety measures in 1986. This framework was based on a jointly drafted proposal by 
DG HI (Single Market and Industry Issues), VI (Agriculture), XI (Environment and 
Consumer Protection) and XU (Science and Technology) and leading experts from member
«5Q
countries . A number of authors have argued that at this early stage, the pro biotechnology 
lobby within the Commission clearly dominated the debate and that the Commission saw its
'I Q
main task in promoting the development and application of biotechnology . An important 
factor behind this positive attitude was that the project was under the supervision of DG HI -  
traditionally an industry-friendly Directorate-General -  which was between 1985 and 1988 
headed by the German Commissioner Naijes, a clear advocate of biotechnology40. Moreover, 
it has been noted that environmental and consumer protection groups played only a negligible 
role during this period41.
However, in the run-up to the final formulation of the two directives, this favourable 
environment changed rapidly as a result of several developments. First, supervision over the 
directives was transferred to the less industry-friendly DG XI (Environment and Consumer 
Protection) since DG HI was suffering from a heavy workload during the late 1980s. 
Bandelow has argued that this strongly shifted the emphasis from industry concerns to 
environmental concerns42. Second, in 1987 the Commission obtained formal regulatory 
powers for a common environmental policy43. This led to increased lobbying activities from 
environmental groups, which were strongly opposed to biotechnology and advocated strict 
and comprehensive regulations44. Finally, industry's interest representation activities in this
36 Interviews.
37 Interview.
38 See OECD (1986) and Gottweis (1995) pp. 430-432.
39 See for example Greenwood and Ronnit (1992), p. 92 and Bandelow (1999), p. 99.
40 See Naijes (1986).
41 See for example Bandelow (1999), p. 99.
42 Ibid., p. 156.
43 See footnote 21.
44 See Bandelow (1999), p.165.
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policy area were by the late 1980s highly ineffective45. Greenwood has noted that interest 
representation in this issue area was by the late 1980s at best patchy across member states -  
some of the national biotechnology associations were only formed as recently as 1990 - and 
hence there was no well-organised and coherent European lobbying46. Moreover, a number of 
studies have pointed out that the European pharmaceutical industry underestimated the 
significance of the two directives47.
With defeat looming, the European pharmaceutical industry finally reacted in 1989 when a 
number of MNEs, including Hoechst and Sandoz48, set up the Senior Advisory Group 
Biotechnology (SAGB). By 1994, the SAGB had 30 members including the six MNEs selected 
for this study. Operationally headed by a former Commission official from DG XII, the 
SAGB became during the 1990s an effective instrument for the articulation of the European 
pharmaceutical industry’s concerns49. Although it appeared too late on the stage to have an 
impact on directives 90/219 and 90/220, the SAGB was during the following years 
considerably successful with its efforts to improve the regulatory environment for 
biotechnology. Bandelow and Greenwood have observed that in 1991, the SAGB was 
instrumental for the establishment of a Biotechnology Co-ordination Group comprising DG 
El, VI, XI and XII50. A number of authors have argued that the practical effect of this group 
was to dilute the influence of DG XI and to promote the* concerns of the pharmaceutical 
industry51. In fact, in the same year the Commission announced a review of guidelines 90/219 
and 90/220 and involved the SAGB in the drafting of a comprehensive revision that centred 
on the de-bureaucratisation and streamlining of approval procedures52. The ratification of 
these proposals turned out to be difficult, however, since Germany was the only country that 
experienced highly negative consequences from directives 90/219 and 90/220; other 
European countries implemented much more pragmatically53. However, despite these delays, 
the regulatory framework for biotechnology was further eased during the mid-90s. In 1994,
45 During the late 1980s, industry representation for biotechnology issues was carried out by the European 
Biotechnology Co-ordinating Group (EBCG) -  a loose grouping of national associations without a permanent 
secretariat.
46 See Greenwood (1994), pp. 190f.
47 See for example Greenwood (1995,1997) and Greenwood and Ronnit (1992a, 1994).
48 The other MNEs were ICI, Monsanto, Unilever, Rhone-Poulenc and Ferruzzi
49 See Greenwood (1994), p. 193 and Bandelow (1999), p. 135.
50 Bandelow (1999), p. 135 and Greenwood (1994), p. 194.
51 See Gottweis (1995), p. 247, Dolata (1996), pp. 63f., Szczepanik (1993), p. 630 and Greenwood and Ronnit 
(1992), p. 92.
32 See Bandelow (1999), pp. 134ff. and Wheale and McNally (1993), p. 262.
53 See Bandelow (1999), p. 135.
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the Commission issued three directives, which lowered safety requirements and broadened 
the definition of the term “research purpose”54.
Approval Procedures for Biotechnology-Based Products
During the 1980s and 1990s the European Commission began to extend its regulatory powers 
to the approval of drugs and, particularly, to drugs involving biotechnology. First steps 
occurred in 1973 when directive 73/319 established the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products (CPMP) to oversee a system of partial mutual recognition of approval 
authorisations granted by one member state to some, or all other member states. Initially slow 
and cumbersome in its decision-making, the committee improved its decision-making 
procedures continually during the 1980s and early 1990s. Improvements included direct 
company representation on the CPMP and the introduction of an accelerated scheme for high 
technology products55. Greenwood and Ronnit have argued that these changes were the result 
of complaints from the EFPIA (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries’ 
Association), which was established in 1978 as the European association of national 
associations to ensure that “the conditions relating to the supply of medicines are appropriate 
to the production and development of medicines”56.
The increasing centralisation of drug approval procedures culminated in 1995 with the 
establishment of the London-based European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA). Its 
centralised procedure is mandatory for biotechnology products and optional for other new 
medicines. Once a product has been approved by the EMEA, it can then be put on the market 
in all member states of the Union. The Boston Consulting Group has noted that this has made 
it easier for new products to gain access to the European market and reduced the time needed 
for regulatory approval57.
All six MNEs strongly supported the centralisation of drug approval procedures, not least
CO
since they saw it as a means to bypass slow and unpredictable procedures at home . Through
54 See Directives 94/15, 94/730 and 94/211. See also Bandelow (1999), pp. 161f.
55 See Greenwood and Ronnit (1992), p. 82.
56 Ibid. See also EFPIA (1988), p. 16.
57 Boston Consulting Group (1995), p. 65.
58 Hoffmeyer has pointed out that during the late 1980s and early 1990s -  when the
German Health Office (Bundesgesundheitsamt) was primarily in charge of drug approval -  there was a backlog 
of approval admissions and the average approval period took several years. See Hoffmeyer (1993), para 6.3.6.5. 
Chapter 5 noted that Swiss approval procedures were also far from ideal for the three MNEs, although they 
steadily improved during the 1990s. See Hoffmeyer (1993), para 6.3.6.5.
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the EFPIA, they strongly lobbied for a centralised European agency, preferably in a 
biotechnology-friendly country. In this sense, the establishment of the EMEA in the UK -  
then considered to have been a biotechnology-friendly country - strongly corresponded to the 
six MNEs’ preferences and represented a considerable political success59. One executive 
commented that “the establishment of the EMEA in London was perceived at the time as a 
very constructive development”60.
However, it must be said that the EMEA has been far from an ideal regulatory body from 
the six MNEs’ viewpoint. Chapter 3 has argued that the six MNEs strongly favoured a 
regulatory regime that was based on scientific principles and that treated biotechnology like 
any other existing technology. Through the EFPIA, all six MNEs have been strongly arguing 
for an independent regulatory authority that -  similar to the FDA in the US -  regulated 
products derived from the application of biotechnology under existing, product-based 
regulations, regardless of the methods by which they were produced61. In other words, 
regulatory control should not revolve around the fact that an organism had been modified by 
any particular technique since, from the point of view of the six MNEs, this fact alone was 
not a sufficient indication of risk62. However, this principle has been flouted by the EMEA 
since the agencies’ regulations reflect the view that all recombinant DNA techniques require 
oversight and controls that are specifically designed for rDNA operations63. Rather than 
treating biotechnology like any other existing technology, European regulations were based 
on the view that biotechnology was distinct from conventional technologies and thus required 
biotechnology-specific, process-based regulations64. As two scientists from Bayer and 
Hoechst have argued,
"There have been continuous statements, particularly from the European Commission, that 
the European system is equivalent to the US regulatory system without considering the 
fundamental difference of both regulatory systems -  product-based in the US versus 
technology-based regulations in the EU”65.
59 Interviews.
60 Interview.
61 For the design of US regulations see Office of Science and Technology Police (1986).
62 The US National Research Council (1989) has extensively reviewed the potential risks of introducing 
genetically modified organisms into the environment. It reached the general conclusion that organisms that have 
been genetically modified are not per se of inherently greater risk then unmodified organisms.
63 See Bauer and Schlummberger (1994).
64 See Boston Consulting Group (1995), p. 64.
65 See Bauer and Schlummberger (1994), p. 1.
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The practical implication of this difference has been that once a product has been sent for 
approval to the EMEA, the final decision is based on politics rather than science -  something, 
which has created considerable uncertainties regarding the final outcome66. The Boston 
Consulting Group has noted that
“the European approach of letting a standing committee of representatives of the member 
states decide whether a product can be marketed has led to decisions being taken on non- 
scientific grounds, particularly in the agricultural and food sectors; it has also led to 
significant delays in the approval of products”67.
The implications of the EU’s approval system for biotechnology-based products reach, 
however, beyond creating difficulties for individual companies. In fact, Europe’s approval 
procedures are a prime example of how the design of national regulatory frameworks can 
lead to international trade conflicts. During the second half of the 1990s, the US - as a major 
exporter of genetically modified agricultural products -  has been increasingly complaining 
that the extensive involvement of politicians in the European approval process for products 
derived from the application of biotechnology clash with WTO rules that require decisions 
based on sound science68.
Intellectual Property Rights
Chapter 3 has pointed out that the protection of intellectual property was of critical 
importance for the six pharmaceutical MNEs. Despite the existence of national patent laws, 
both the German and the Swiss MNEs considered this issue-area to be a ’’European” one and 
centred their political activities at the European level of policy-making. This has mainly to do 
with European patent laws; a European agreement of 1963 established the foundations for 
Europe-wide patent laws. The European Patent Convention of 1973 built on this foundation 
and led to the establishment of the European Patent Organisation, which grants patents that 
are valid throughout the EU. Despite not being a member of the EU, Switzerland has always
66 See Boston Consulting Group (1995), p. 63.
67 Ibid., p. 64.
68 See for example Stuart Eizenstat “Why we should welcome biotechnology”, Financial Times, April 16 1999. 
See Chapter 3, footnote 2.
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participated in attempts to establish Europe-wide patent laws and is a member of the 
European Patent Organisation69.
With regard to intellectual property rights, three sets of issues need to be considered: the 
TRIPs Agreement, negotiated within the context of the Uruguay Round, a directive clarifying 
the patentability of biotechnological inventions and, finally, the more technical issues of 
grace periods and patent restoration terms.
TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights)
The TRIPS Agreement of the Uruguay Round was an attempt to establish global minimum 
standards for the protection of intellectual property and to bring disputes within the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the WTO. All six MNEs were strongly in favour of this US-led 
initiative. As Hoechst’s deputy general counsel for patents has argued,
"The immense costs of R&D can be recovered only if there is a limited but reasonable 
period of patent protection. Thus far, many countries have insufficient patent laws with no 
protection for new products, with the consequence that local companies make use of the 
most successful inventions made in other countries by counterfeiting and without 
investing in R&D. The TRIPS Agreement will improve this situation”70.
Before the conclusion of the TRIPS agreement, the international legal framework for the 
protection of intellectual property consisted of a patchwork of treaties. These were 
administered by, and negotiated under, the auspices of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), which aimed to protect intellectual property rights at the international 
level through agreed minimum standards71. The most important international treaty 
concerning the protection of industrial property before the TRIPS was the Paris Convention 
on the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, as amended from time to time and, in 
particular, in Stockholm in 1967. Although this regime went a considerable way towards 
providing a workable international system for intellectual property rights, there were several
69 See Biichel and Braucbar (1997), p. 28.
70 Schulze-Steinen (1996), p. 52.
71 The principal WIPO treaties are the Paris Convention (industrial property), the Berne Convention (copyright), 
the Rome Convention (neighbouring rights, jointly administered by WIPO, UNESCO and ILO) and the 
Washington Treaty (integrated circuits). For an overview see Yong d’Herve (1996), p. 8.
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problems -  most importantly the absence of enforcement and dispute settlement 
mechanisms72. The TRIPS was intended to make up for these shortcomings. Designed to 
complement and operate in harmony with existing WIPO-administered international 
conventions, the agreement defined minimum standards, which WTO member states had to
73incorporate into domestic law and provided international dispute settlement provisions . 
Fink and Primo Braga have noted that the TRIPS agreement represented the so far most far- 
reaching multilateral agreement towards global harmonisation of intellectual property 
rights74.
From the viewpoint of the six MNEs, the TRIPS agreement was, however, only a qualified 
success. While the agreement certainly improved worldwide protection of intellectual 
property rights75, there were also significant drawbacks. Article 27 recognised a number of 
very broad exclusions that, in the opinion of Interpharma, could be understood not only to 
allow the exclusion of certain pharmaceutical products and processes from patentability, but 
which also substantially limited protection for products derived from biotechnology . 
Moreover, definitions in general were vague. Schulze-Steinen has noted that “the terms 
‘shall’ and ‘may’ were carefully used”77. Moreover, the six MNEs strongly criticised the lack 
of pipeline protection in the TRIPS78. Pipeline protection would have required nations 
providing patent protection for drugs for the first time to extend this protection to such 
products already patented in other nations for the remainder of their patent terms. Finally, the 
TRIPS agreement granted developing countries transition periods -  either 5 or 10 years -  
which the industry considered too long79. Nevertheless both Interpharma and the VFA 
considered the TRIPs Agreement an important first step in obtaining effective international 
intellectual property protection. Schulze-Steinen noted that even if the present TRIPS
72 See Yong-d’Herve (1996), p. 9.
73 Ibid.
74 Fink and Prima Braga (1999), p.l. For a detailed evaluation of the TRIPs Agreement see Primo Braga (1996).
75 The patent section of the TRIPs provides a twenty year term of protection from time of filing and defines 
patentable subject matter as any invention, whether product or process, that is new, involves an inventive step, 
and is capable of industrial application. The agreement further strengthens the patent right by prohibiting patent 
discrimination based on the place of invention, the field of technology or whether the product is imported or 
domestically produced. Doane (1996, p. 479) has argued that this represents a significant step towards 
establishing basic patent standards in international law. Moreover, the TRIPs made some progress towards the 
international harmonisation of patent procedures. For example, the US system is based on a first-to-invent filing 
system rather than the first-to-file process in Europe and elsewhere. Under the US system, priority is granted on 
the basis of proof of invention. Until the TRIPs agreement, foreign inventors could not submit evidence of 
priority of invention in interference proceedings in the US. Now they are eligible to do so. See EuropaBio 
(1997), p. 66.
6 See Biichel and Brauchbar (1997), p. 16.
77 Schulze-Steinen (1996), p. 47.
78 Interviews. See also Doane (1996), p. 479.
79 Interviews. See also VFA Annual Report (1996), p. 16 and Biichel and Brauchbar (1997), p. 16.
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Agreement was not perfect and complete, it was a basis for further harmonising laws, legal 
decisions and regulations"80.
The role of the six MNEs in the negotiating process of the TRIPS was, however, a bit of a 
conundrum. Despite the importance of this agreement for the six MNEs, the EFPIA, as well 
as the German and Swiss national associations, were largely uninvolved in the negotiating 
process. A number of authors have pointed out that right from the beginning the US 
government and the US business community were the driving forces for getting the TRIPs on 
the agenda of the Uruguay Round and for pushing it through against the resistance of 
developing countries, which by and large believed that worldwide harmonisation of 
intellectual property protection exceeded the GATT’s mandate and would only widen the gap 
between industrialised and developing countries81.
Saylor and Beton have argued that since the US had the largest high-tech sector among 
industrialised countries, it was only natural that the US was the first country to recognise the 
increasing importance of intellectual property rights82. In fact, a study by the US International 
Trade Commission estimated that in 1986 worldwide losses to US industry from inadequate 
protection of intellectual property ranged from $43bn to $61bn83. As a response, the US 
evoked during the 1980s and early 1990s a "get tough" policy against unfair foreign 
competition that, according to a number of authors, significantly contributed towards 
overcoming developing nation’s resistance to include intellectual property rights in the 
Uruguay Round84. Moreover, the US business community was right from the start highly 
supportive of the US governments’ policy. Doane has noted that when the issue was on the 
agenda of the Uruguay Round, the US business community was instrumental in pushing it
Off
through, by, for example, offering inducements to developing countries . In contrast, the 
major industrial umbrella organisation in Europe (UNICE) was, at least initially, more 
sceptical about including intellectual property rights into an international trade regime that
80 Schulze-Steinen (1996), p. 53.
81 See Doane (1996), p. 467 and Saylor and Beton (1996), p. 15. See also "Bio-piracy under new fire",
Financial Times, November 30 1993.
82 Saylor and Beton (1996), p. 12. See also Doane (1996), p. 465 and Fink and Primo Braga (1999).
83 Quoted in Saylor and Beton (1996), p. 12.
84 See Doane (1996), p. 472. In 1984 Congress passed trade legislation which contained several provisions on 
intellectual property, basically making US market access and preferential trade arrangements subject to effective 
intellectual property protection by foreign countries. See Saylor and Beton (1996), p. 13. Measures included the 
instigation of Section 301 actions against nations with inadequate protection of intellectual property -  
particularly Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea - and the use of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which 
allows the seizure and destruction of infringed goods at the US border. During this period, South Korea,
Mexico, Brazil and Thailand had their tariff concessions extended to them under the Generalised System 
Preferences withdrawn. See Doane (1996), p. 468. For a more detailed analysis of US unilateralism during this 
period see Trebilcock and Howse (1999), pp. 317-319.
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had historically focused on traditional impediments to manufactured products86. However, 
these concerns vanished when in 1988 the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) - a forum 
representing US industry -  presented a detailed draft for an agreement for the international 
protection of intellectual property. The draft was well received by the European (and 
Japanese) business community and became the basis for a unified trilateral view on what a 
TRIPS Agreement should contain87. Saylor and Beton observed that, in the end, the TRIPS 
agreement provided minimum standards, which closely matched the initial proposal of the 
US88.
Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology Inventions
The issue of whether patents can be extended to biological inventions was a source of great 
controversy during the 1990s. Chapter 2 has pointed out that rapid advances in decoding the 
strings of letters, or nucleotides, that determine a gene's function were helping scientists to 
make the transition from merely describing a disease to understanding its mechanism. This 
could open up a new class of drugs with wide commercial applications. The question that 
remained, however, was who should own the genetic information underpinning this scientific 
discovery. For the six pharmaceutical MNEs the case was straightforward. All six firms 
argued that genes should not be treated differently than other inventions, meaning that if a 
process was novel and had "utility" it should be possible to obtain a patent. Countering the 
populist claim that a patent on a gene was somehow a patent on life itself, one interviewee 
noted,
“Nobody owns the genes in people, but if I invent a use for a certain gene, I can own that 
process for 20 years. It is quite routine and ordinary. In other words, the critique of ‘no­
patents on life’ misses the point. Biotechnological inventions can only be patented because 
the invention which is embodied in a living organism is new and invented and does not 
occur in this form in nature”89.
85 See Doane (1996), p. 478.
86 See Saylor and Beton (1996), p. 14.
87 See Doane (1996), pp. 473f. For a similar view see Saylor and Beton (1996), p. 14.
88 See Saylor and Beton (1996), p. 14.
89 Interview.
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Moreover, all six MNEs argued that extending patent protection to biotechnology inventions 
was of critical importance since without it, the incentive to innovate was undermined90.
Turning now to policy outcomes, the main policy issue in this area centred on the 
interpretation of European patent laws. While the six MNEs generally regarded European 
patent laws as adequate, they complained about uncertainties regarding their applicability to 
biotechnology inventions91. One interviewee explained that
“when the rules for patent protection were laid down, developments in modem 
biotechnology could not be foreseen. As a result, the application of patent law in this area 
is new legal territory for patent authorities and courts in the EU, with the result that there 
is uncertainty whether patents can be obtained on biotechnological inventions”92.
Interpharma has pointed out that there was no consensus among national patent authorities 
and the EPO regarding the patenting of biotechnology inventions93. Although the EPO has 
granted several hundred of biotechnology patents, public opposition and delays have fostered 
a general sense of uncertainty among companies94. This situation contrasts sharply with that 
in the US. Although there is little perceived difference between European and US patent 
protection, it is widely held that the US provides a more secure intellectual property 
environment. A number of studies have pointed out that the US has led the way in developing 
legal precedents to protect biotechnology inventions and has been generous in upholding 
biotechnology patents, which were diverse in nature and very broad in scope. Key decisions 
by US courts signalled to industry that it could expect strong and wide-ranging protection for 
new biotechnology products and processes95.
Keen to improve the situation and to catch-up with the US, the European Commission 
took up the issue in the late 1980s and began drafting a directive that was supposed to clarify 
the interpretation of existing patent laws by defining how narrow the criteria had to be 
interpreted so that patents on biotechnology inventions could be granted96. The European 
pharmaceutical industry strongly supported this initiative and both the EFPIA and the SAGB
90 See for example EuropaBio (1997), p. 65, Humer (1997), p. 83 and VFA (1997).
91 Interviews. See also Biichel and Brauchbar (1997), pp. 28f.
92 Interview.
93 See Biichel and Brauchbar (1997), p. 39.
94 See EuropaBio (1997), p. 67.
95 See EuropaBio (1997), p. 67 and US Congress, Government Office of Technology Assessment (1991).
96 See EuroaBio (1997), p. 12.
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were strongly involved in the drafting stage97. Greenwood has called the directive a “purely 
industry-inspired initiative”98. After seven years of deliberation, the Commission presented a 
draft directive in 1995. From the industry’s point of view, the outcome represented an 
acceptable compromise and both the VFA and Interpharma advocated quick enactment99. In 
the spring of 1995, the draft was, however, rejected by the European Parliament. All 
interviewees were unanimous that this political defeat could be squarely attributed to the 
activities of environmental interest groups, which succeeded in politicising the issue to such 
an extent that Euro MPs came under heavy pressure to veto the directive. While the rejection 
did not prevent the European Patent Office from granting biotechnology patents, it did, 
however, contribute to further unpredictability100.
Patent-Term Restoration and Grace Periods
The last two items on the six MNEs’ intellectual property rights agenda were patent 
restoration terms and grace periods. The former addressed the problem posed by increasing 
R&D periods for effective patent protection terms. As Fink-Anthe has noted, “the result of 
longer R&D periods has been that the usual 20 year patent terms have been reduced to an 
effective protection period of on average 8 years”101. In response, many countries extended 
the effective duration of protection periods. Leutenegger has pointed out that the US extended 
effective duration of patents to 14 years in 1984 and Japan in 1987. Within the EU, the 
introduction of a patent certificate in 1991 extended the patent protection period by 5 years to 
a maximum duration of 15 years of effective protection102. A number of authors have linked 
this policy outcome to a campaign by the EFPIA, which in their view was instrumental for 
getting the issue on to the agenda of the Commission, and for producing a draft proposal to 
update the European Patents Convention103.
The EFPIA was similarly successful with its efforts to get the Commission to introduce 
grace periods. Grace periods have long been in operation in the US, and the EFPIA argued 
that their existence gave US patent applicants a direct advantage over their European
97 Interviews.
98 Greenwood (1997), p. 192.
99 See VFA Annual Report (1996), p. 6 and Biichel and Brauchbar (1997), p. 39.
100 See EuropaBio (1997), p. 67.
101 Fink-Anthe (1990), pp. 1191f.
102 See Leutenegger (1993), p. 42.
103 See Greenwood (1994), p. 188, Greenwood and Ronnit (1992), p. 78 and Burstall (1990).
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counterparts. This mechanism, whereby inventors may delay filing by up to one year, is 
particularly useful for academic inventors who wish to publish their work. In Europe, prior 
disclosure of an invention through publication used to invalidate a European patent 
application104.
Regulations relating to the Marketing of Drugs
A final policy issue relates to the marketing of drugs in the EU. In the early 1990s the 
Commission proposed a directive that sought to curtail and regulate the product information 
that industry provided to physicians105. For the pharmaceutical industry such a directive 
would have had highly negative implications since a key factor of companies’ success has 
been their ability to influence the prescribing behaviour of physicians by controlling the flow 
of product information, particularly through the activities of its medical representatives106. 
The EFPIA reacted swiftly to this proposal by successfully establishing compliance among its 
members for a self-regulatory code for the industry’s marketing and information providing 
activities. This code now operates with the Commission’s blessing107.
A similar case involved the development and eventual passage of the “rational use 
packages” directive adopted in 1992 where the EFPIA made a significant impact upon issues 
of wholesale distribution, classification, labelling and advertising. This included undertaking 
a number of information studies on behalf of the Commission to establish the appropriate 
type of regulatory detail108.
The Political Influence of the Six Pharmaceutical MNEs
Both the three German and the three Swiss MNEs were politically highly active at the EU 
level. Through their European Associations - the SAGB and the EFPIA - the six MNEs 
participated intensively in European policy-making processes109. Although these associations 
are quite different in format -  the SAGB has individual MNEs as its members whereas the
104 See EuropaBio (1997), p. 67.
105 See Greenwood (1994), pp. 188f.
106 See Greenwood (1988).
107 See Greenwood (1994), p. 189.
108 Ibid.
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EFPIA is made up of national associations -  the six MNEs supported them equally 
strongly110. A German executive commented that “from a practical point of view, it does not 
make any difference that we are a direct member of the SAGB and only an indirect member 
of the EFPIA”. Moreover, there was no visible difference in the level of involvement between 
the Swiss and the German MNEs. Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, all three 
MNEs were highly active at the EU level of policy-making. Sandoz was a founding member 
of the SAGB and Switzerland is a permanent member of the five country executive committee 
of the EFPIA111. Executives from the three MNEs are not only represented in all committees, 
but also chair some of them. A Novartis executive, for example, chairs EFPIA’s important 
intellectual property rights committee.
With regard to policy outcomes, the picture for the six MNEs was arguably brighter at the 
European level than at the national level. While there have been political defeats - most 
notably directives 90/219 and 90/220 and the rejection of the directive for biotechnology 
patents - both the SAGB and the EFPIA were successful in a number of issue areas with their 
efforts to shape policy outcomes according to their preferences. Regarding biotechnology 
regulations, the SAGB's initiative for a biotechnology co-ordination group was effective in 
diluting the influence of DG XI and, together with the EFPIA, it was successful with its 
lobbying efforts for a centralised European approval agency in the UK -  then considered to 
have been a biotechnology-friendly country. The EFPIA has been no less successful. 
Although strangely quiet with regard to the TRIPS Agreement, it managed to get the 
Commission to drop its plan for an information directive in the late 1980s, and during the 
1990s, it succeeded with its proposals for an extension of effective patent protection periods 
and the introduction of grace periods. The only real defeat for the EFPIA and the SAGB was 
the European Parliament’s rejection of the biotechnology patent directive in 1995. A slightly 
modified version of that directive was, however, ratified by the EP in 1997.
Turning now to an explanation of these policy outcomes, it appears that at the European 
level interests and institutions were of critical importance for an explanation of MNEs’ 
political influence. In contrast to domestic policy-making processes in both Germany and 
Switzerland, economic and political circumstances were of lesser importance.
Interests must clearly feature prominently in an explanation of the two directives for the 
approval of production facilities and research projects. When in 1990 the industry-unfriendly
109 See VFA Annual Report (1996), pp. 18f and Ronnit (1997), pp. 87ff.
110 Interviews.
111 The four other countries are Germany, Italy, France and the UK
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directives 90/219 and 90/220 were passed, industry representation in this area was highly 
ineffective while environmental groups were vocal and well organised112. However, when the 
pharmaceutical industry improved the effectiveness of its interest representation in this policy 
area with the establishment of the SAGB, the situation changed significantly. A number of 
authors have argued that the SAGB was instrumental for the creation of institutional 
structures within the Commission that diluted the influence of environmental concerns113. 
However, there was also an institutional factor behind MNEs varying political influence in 
this issue area. As has been pointed out above, a number of authors have argued that the 
transfer of responsibility for the two directives from the industry-friendly DG ID to DG XI 
(Environment and Consumer Protection) has also been an important factor behind the 
negative policy outcome in 1990.
With regard to the political successes of the EFPIA -  the EMEA, grace periods, patent 
restoration terms and directives relating to the marketing of drugs -  it appears that these can 
be more attributed to institutional linkages. Greenwood has argued that EFPIA’s involvement 
in the governance of marketing standards bears all the hallmarks of neo-corporatism. By 
offering an alternative set of regulations, the EFPIA fended off a regulatory threat and 
became part of the policy implementation structure of the Commission114. Similarly, the 
EFPIA provided the blueprint for the extension of patent protection periods for in Europe, 
when the Commission had initially been reluctant to do so. It also gave encouragement to the 
idea of the creation of the EMEA to ensure recognition of medical products throughout 
member states and also to ensure faster approval processes. A number of studies have argued 
that the EFPIA became through these initiatives ingrained within the structures of policy 
implementation, so that, in effect, a neo-corporatist style, European “private interest 
government” relationship had been established, where the Commission delegated regulatory 
authority to the EFPIA115.
Finally, institutional structures were also an important factor behind industry's defeat over 
the directive for biotechnology patents. Unlike the just mentioned policy issues, this directive 
was drafted under a decision-making procedure that involved the European Parliament, the 
“traditional home” of environmental concerns. Greenwood has noted that as a result, the issue
112 See Bandelow (1997), pp. 155f and Bandelow (1999), pp. 99-107.
113 See for example Bandelow (1999), p. 135, Ronnit (1997), p. 92, Pedler and van Schendelen (1994) and 
Greenwood 1997, p. 123
114 See Greenwood (1997), p. 122.
115 For the argument that EFPIA’s successes were based upon clientilistic relationships with the relevant parts of 
the Commission see Greenwood and Ronnit (1992), p. 95, Greenwood (1994), pp. 185-189 and Greenwood 
(1997), Chapter 3.
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became highly politicised and the exclusive relationship between the Commission and the 
pharmaceutical industry was disrupted116. In the end, intense lobbying activities by 
environmental interest groups led Euro MPs to reject the industry-inspired Commission draft 
that would have clarified the conditions under which biotechnology inventions could have
1 1 7been patented . Moreover, it has been pointed out that the pharmaceutical industry had in 
the past enjoyed a somewhat ambivalent relationship with the parliament. Sassen, for 
example, has noted that the pharmaceutical industry had in the past caused considerable 
irritation by literally flooding the EP with amendments, and there were instances where 
committee rapporteurs refused to meet industry representatives118. However, it appears that 
the industry has recently experienced something of a learning curve in coming to terms with 
the Parliament’s increasing status. After losing the key debate in Parliament, the SAGB and 
EFPIA co-sponsored an EP/Biotechnology Forum in April 1996 to help promote mutual 
understanding119. One year later, in 1997, the European Parliament passed a slightly different 
version of the directive.
In short, similar to the national level, the six MNEs' political influence at the EU level has 
been varying across policy issues. However, unlike as in Germany and Switzerland, these 
variations could be explained by institutions and interests since at the European level these 
two explanatory factors varied across policy issues. First, it was argued that with regard to 
biotechnology issues, the effectiveness of the pharmaceutical industry's interest 
representation activities improved strongly during the 1990s, and that a number of authors 
have linked this development to more industry-friendly policy outcomes. Second, it was 
pointed out that European directives were passed under various policy-making procedures 
and that a number of studies have noted that when only the Commission was involved, the 
pharmaceutical industry was considerably influential. In other words, variations in the 
institutional arrangements of the policy-making process could indeed explain the political 
influence that the pharmaceutical industry was capable of exerting.
116 Greenwood (1997), p. 23.
117 Ibid., p. 192.
118 Sassen (1992).
119 See Greenwood (1997), p. 48.
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The Six German and Swiss Banks
Similar to the pharmaceutical sector, the European level of policy-making was also relevant 
for the six banks. In fact, during the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, a number 
of important policy initiatives were undertaken at the EU level to liberalise the European 
market for financial services. Externally, this involved the GATS Agreement for Financial 
Services and internally, a number of directives to establish a single European market for 
financial services. The following sections will now analyse the extent to which these policy 
outcomes corresponded to the six banks’ preferences and how one can explain the political 
influence that banks were capable of exerting.
Before, however, turning to these issues, a brief word about European Monetary Union is 
in order. Clearly this issue has been of pivotal importance for the German banks as it was 
sure to have profound implications for their business. These implications range from the 
outright loss of some business segments -  e.g. currency and government bond trading 
between members of the single currency - to more intangible, strategic issues, such as for 
example whether the single currency might erode banks' traditional retail funding bases (as a 
result of greater choice for depositors) or whether increased competitive pressures would lead 
to a new wave of IPOs and M&As. However, interviewees pointed out that the German banks 
did not enter the debate about the design of the EMU until 1996120. As one has noted, 
“although the Maastricht Treaty laid down a precise timetable for EMU in 1991, the German 
banks did only get politically involved in 1996 when it was becoming increasingly probable 
that EMU would happen”121. Hence this issue is clearly outside the timeframe of this study.
GATS Agreement for Financial Services
The GATS agreement for Financial Services - negotiated under the auspices of the Uruguay 
Round, but only concluded in 1997 - has so far been the most significant multilateral effort to 
put trade in financial services in a framework based on the principles of natural treatment 
(Annex XXII), market access (Annex XVI) and most favoured nation status (MFN) - the 
principle that concessions or access awarded to one country must be extended to all
120 Interviews.
121 Interview.
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signatories122. While the rules for merchandise trade served as a model, the GATS also had 
to break a lot of new ground since the “non-tradable” nature of many services required a 
considerably different approach. To be meaningful, an agreement on trade in services needed 
to cover both cross-border trade (external liberalisation) and establishment (internal 
liberalisation). As a result, the scope of the agreement was extended beyond border trade to 
investment and the GATS became one of the first multilateral frameworks to cover elements 
of investment rules. Furthermore, the agreement also contained provisions on capital 
transfers, which made the GATS also one of the first multilateral sets of rules on the capital 
account123. The six banks strongly supported the GATS negotiations and the attempt to 
extend the principles of MFN, natural treatment and market access to financial services. As 
thqFAGB put it,
“the GATS provides a valuable opportunity to commit to liberalisation in the multilateral 
context. Through the MFN principle, commitments made under the GATS have the 
particular advantage of guaranteeing non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO Member 
countries, small and large alike”124.
Prior to the agreement, market access was granted on the basis of bilateral reciprocity. 
While liberal in principle125, this framework became increasingly problematic for banks 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Kono has noted that as the scale of cross-border financial 
transactions and foreign direct investment grew rapidly during the last decade, some form of 
“internationalised intermediation” became increasingly necessary126. Moreover, banks were
122 Another significant attempt to liberalise capital movements was the OECD Capital Movements Code which 
required OECD Members to progressively abolish between one another, restrictions on movements of capital to 
the extent necessary for effective economic cooperation. See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 292.
123 See Sorsa (1997), p. 6. It should be noted in this context that trade liberalisation in financial services and the 
opening of the capital account are two distinct issues. The GATS focused upon seeking improvements in the 
terms of conditions of market access and non-discriminatory treatment for foreign suppliers of financial 
services, and not on the question of how far and how fast a government should liberalise capital account 
transactions. It is, of course, true that Members are required to allow international transfers and payments for 
transactions relating to their specific commitments under the GATS, some of which may involve capital account 
transactions. However, the GATS permits members to take prudential measures aimed to ensure, among other 
things, the integrity and stability of the financial system. See Kono (1997), p. 23.
124 FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 55. For a similar view see SBA Annual Report (1989/90), p. 106.
125 The IMF has noted that the principle or reciprocity represents a liberal outlook but nevertheless leaves room 
for protectionism as a result of restrictive interpretation. See IMF (1989a).
126 Kono (1997), p. 1. In 1995, worldwide capital exports exceeded US$50bn, which compares to less than 
US$15bn in 1985. See Kono (1997), p. 13).
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complaining that in many emerging and developing countries contestability indicators
1 9 7suggested that competition was significantly restricted .
Nevertheless it was neither the lobbying activities of the financial services industry nor 
these “narrow” financial services-specific concerns that led to the inclusion of financial 
services in the Uruguay Round. Rather it was the insistence of the US and the lobbying of its 
domestic service industry128. In fact, Trebilcock and Howse have noted that the inclusion of 
financial services was part of a larger US strategy to extend the multilateral trade framework 
to services in general129. A major motivation for the US initiative was the belief that unlike 
many basic manufacturing sectors where it was losing market share to NIC competitors, 
service sectors remained a strength of the US - especially sectors like financial services and 
telecommunications130.
Similar to the TRIPS agreement, the European Commission played only a passive role, at 
least in the initial stages. This changed, however, in the mid-1990s when the US abandoned 
its leadership role after an extension of the deadline for an agreement to December 1995 
failed to produce sufficient progress. The US took the view during the final period of 
negotiations that other countries had not offered sufficient liberalisation commitments to 
justify US adherence to a multilateral, MFN-based framework in financial services131. 
Although 29 countries had improved their schedule of comtnitments or reduced the scope of 
their MFN exemptions by 1995, the US was dissatisfied with the results and stated its intent 
to take a MFN exemption and to proceed with bilateral and regional negotiations132. With the 
US having effectively pulled out, the EU became instrumental in preventing the agreement 
from falling apart. In fact, it was the EU’s initiative that led to an interim agreement (to 
expire in 1997) and it was the EU that during this period persuaded developing countries to 
put forward further liberalisation measures133.
127 See Sorsa (1997), p. 28.
128 See Gelb and Sagari (1990), p. 1.
129 Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 278. In fact, as early as the 1982 GATT Ministerial Meeting, the US was 
pressing for GATT-based negotiations on services. See Drake and Nicolaidis (1992).
30 See Trebilcock and Howse (1997), p. 278. Although at the level of general principle the US espoused the 
idea that negotiations on services should have a comprehensive scope, the US position on the definition of 
services themselves had the effect of focusing the negotiations on those sectors of most export interest to the US 
and other developed countries (e.g. cross border transactions in sectors such as telecommunications and 
financial services), while excluding liberalisation of factor movements, especially labour, where developing 
countries might have a comparative advantage. See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 279.
131 With these principles WTO member countries would have had access to the US market, even if their own 
financial services markets were a lot less open. See Trebilcock and Howse (1999), p. 296.
132 See Trebilcock and Howse (1997), pp. 296ff.
133 See SBA Annual Report (1998), pp. 120f.
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The German and Swiss banks as well as the Swiss government, were during this period
strongly on the side of the EU. While both the German and Swiss banks agreed with the US
that developing countries’proposed liberalisation measures were not fully satisfactory and did
not go far enough in guaranteeing market access, they supported the stance of the EU. Both
the FAGB and the SBA made it clear during this period that the benefits of putting financial
services under MFN status clearly outweighed the negative effects of unsatisfactory
liberalisation measures of a few countries, and welcomed efforts by the EU to rescue the
agreement134. In the end, the EU’s initiative was not without success. By December 1997,
about two-thirds of WTO members had made some specific market access commitments in
financial services and the US withdrew its exception135.
The Swiss Bankers' Association noted that this success was preceded by intensive efforts
of European banks and insurance companies, which together with US financial institutions
approached developing countries in order to convince them to put forward more far-reaching 
1liberalisation policies . However, the final outcome was not welcomed as an unconditional 
success by the six banks. In fact, in their view the GATS framework - and the actual 
multilateral liberalisation undertaken - were disappointing since the GATS allowed for too 
much discretion in making liberalisation commitments137. One German executive commented 
that
“the GATS framework with country-specific reservations and many exceptions fails to 
meet many tests for a ‘good’ agreement. Market access is very conditional and temporary 
and many countries made MFN exemptions that maintain reciprocity and discrimination in 
market access”.
Indeed, Sorsa has pointed out that the agreement contained weak capital account provisions 
and security of market access was limited by many exceptions . However, while the six 
banks expressed disappointment that liberalisation results were only limited and not all
134 See FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 120f and SBA Annual Report (1995/96), pp. 102f.
135 See Sorsa (1997), p. 5.
136 See SBA Annual Report (1998), pp. 120f.
137 Trebilcock and Howse (1999, p.280) have pointed out that the GATS contains an MFN obligation that 
applies to services generally, subject to reservations taken by individual members. National treatment applies 
only where members have made specific commitments. In these areas, however, the GATS creates an 
institutional framework for service transactions, offers a neutral forum for dispute settlement and enforcement 
and increases security of market access by binding liberalisation. See also Sorsa (1997), p. 6.
138 Sorsa (1997), pp. 5f.
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developing countries agreed to the proposed liberalisation measures, they nevertheless noted 
that the agreement was a step in the right direction139. One Swiss executive argued that
“the agreement has the potential to consolidate financial sector reform and promote the 
efficient allocation of savings world-wide. Moreover, it forms a basis for future 
liberalisation in the sector”140.
Liberalisation of Financial Services in the EU
The EU level of policy-making has also been important for the six banks with regard to 
internal liberalisation measures aimed at creating a unified European banking sector -  one of 
the main goals of the Single European Act of 1986,
First attempts to create a single European financial market date back to the 1970s. At that 
time, some countries already removed restrictions on capital movements and the European 
Commission issued several directives141. Co-operation between the regulatory authorities of 
EU member states began in 1973 through the informal Contact Committee and was 
intensified in 1979 through the establishment of a formal Advisory Committee to the 
European Commission142.
These measures, while certainly important, failed, however, to make significant progress 
and it was only in the aftermath of the SEA that attempts at full-scale liberalisation were 
undertaken143. New momentum for the creation of a single market in financial services came 
particularly from a new approach to liberalisation: instead of trying to harmonise all 
European regulations -  something, which the experience of the 1970s and 1980s showed was 
very tedious and time-consuming -  liberalisation within the context of the SEA was based on
139 Interviews. See also FAGB Annual Report (1998), p. 50 and (1996), p. 127.
140 Interview.
141 Desirability of freedom of establishment was first mentioned in a directive in 1973 (73/183) and further
developed in 1977 by agreeing on common definitions of regulatory matters (77/780). Additionally, a number of
directives intended to facilitate the unification of Europe’s capital markets and to create common standards for 
investor protection were adopted, ie. directive 79/279 for the issuing of securities (revised through directive 
82/148), directive 80/390 for prospectuses relating to IPOs (revised through directives 82/148, 87/345 and 
94/18) and directives 83/350 for a consolidated supervision . See Huang (1992), p. 56 and Hirszowicz (1996), 
pp. 289ff.
^  See Huang (1992), p. 56.
143 Ibid., p. 67.
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the principles of mutual recognition, home country rule, and minimum regulatory 
harmonisation.
Mutual recognition entailed the granting of market access to an institution from another 
EU Member State, based on the institution’s compliance with regulatory requirements in its 
home country. The related principle of home country rule stipulated that the regulatory 
authorities in the home country retained responsibility for prudential supervision of the 
institution, even for business activities taking place in another EU country. Hence, as 
Hufbauer has observed, market access was not granted on terms of compliance with the 
regulation of the “importing country” (as with National Treatment) but on condition that the 
entity met relevant regulatory requirements in its own country144. However, since mutual 
recognition and home country rule necessarily entailed reliance on another state’s regulators 
and regulations, an essential quid pro quo was a set of minimum standards sufficient to 
provide even the country with the strictest regulatory requirements with the needed 
confidence in the regulatory regimes of the others. This was reflected in the third principle, 
minimum regulatory harmonisation.
The minimum standards to which EU Member States’ regulatory regimes must conform 
were set out in the 1989 Second Banking Directive, which came into force in 1993. Kim has 
noted that these standards covered a very wide range of regulatory requirements, including 
initial capital requirements, disclosure of credit institution’s major shareholders, limitations 
on the size of participation in non-financial undertakings, standard solvency ratios, and 
permissible activities145. The Third Life and Non-Life Insurance Directive in 1994 and the 
Investment Services Directive in 1996 -  complemented by a series of other directives 
defining key concepts and establishing essential prudential requirements146 - completed the 
regulatory framework. As a result of these directives, the EU regulatory framework granted 
EU financial institutions and incorporated foreign subsidiaries in the EU the right of 
operation in all EU countries when they were registered in just one - the so-called “single 
passport” 147.
144 See Hufbauer (1990).
145 See Kim (1993), p. 319. Harmonisation of these standards occurred principally through directives 89/646, 
89/647 and 89/299. See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 282.
146 Most importantly these were directives 93/22 and 93/6, which aimed at levelling the playing field with regard 
to securities trading according to the motto similar business, similar risks, similar rules. Insider trading rules 
were already harmonised in 1989 through directive 89/592. See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 297.
147 For a detailed discussion see Loheac (1991), WTO (1995,1997), Weidenfeld (1996), Huang (1992), p. 67, 
Hirszowicz (1996), p. 277, Kim (1993), pp. 318-321 and Kono (1997), p. 19.
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Chapter 3 has argued that the six banks strongly advocated the harmonisation of 
regulatory standards on a global scale in order to promote the development of efficient capital 
markets. Judged by this yardstick, recent liberalisation and harmonisation measures within 
the EU clearly corresponded to the six banks’ preferences. Indeed, Harris and Piggot have 
argued that liberalisation of financial services between EU member states showed significant 
positive effects on financial sector efficiency148.
However, despite these achievements, the six banks have been complaining that there was 
still a lot of unfinished business that was preventing a unified European capital market. One 
German executive argued that
“while the measures adopted by the European Commission in the late 1980s and early 
1990s certainly laid the foundation for a unified regulatory framework for traditional 
banking services, there is still considerable regulatory muddle when it comes to capital 
markets which is impeding progress towards a single market in financial services”149.
One frequently voiced criticism was the lack of a single European regulator with a clear 
mandate to standardise rules in the wholesale capital markets150. In the words of one 
executive,
“having to deal with 15 regulators is enormously time consuming and, in my view, does 
not help to overcome the fragmentation of Europe’s capital markets. Surely the absence of 
a single regulator has negative implications for market efficiency and liquidity”151.
In fact, a number of interviewees agreed that despite a number of directives that were 
intended to do the same for securities markets what the “single passport” rules did for 
banking, securities regulation and supervision continued to vary significantly across 
Europe152. There are wide variations in disclosure requirements for companies wanting to 
issue securities and there are significant differences in trading rules, accounting standards and 
tax treatment153. As one interviewee has put it,
148 See Harris and Piggot (1997).
149 Interview. See also “No SECs please, we’re European” The Economist August 21 1999 pp. 70f.
150 Interviews.
151 Interview.
152 Interviews.
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“retail investors still face a bureaucratic battle and high fees if they want to invest in 
foreign shares, which are typically listed on a foreign stock exchange and cleared and 
settled under local rules. Many European countries use bearer share certificates rather than 
maintain a shareholder register, reflecting different attitudes to shareholder rights and 
taxes. Companies are subject to different rules on accounting, information disclosure and 
the treatment of minority shareholders”154.
In other words, while the six banks welcomed the initiatives by the European Commission to 
unify Europe’s capital markets, they also argued that taxes, regulatory and supervisory 
standards, listing requirements and accounting rules required far greater harmonisation if this 
goal was to be achieved. By the mid-1990s, in their view, Europe’s capital markets were still 
considerably fragmented155.
The Political Influence of the Six Banks
In contrast to the pharmaceutical sector, all of the analysed policy outcomes largely 
corresponded to the six banks’ policy preferences. While' certainly both the GATS Agreement 
for Financial Services and the internal EU liberalisation measures were not optimal from the 
six banks’ point of view, both policy outcomes nevertheless went in the right direction and 
significantly improved the regulatory and supervisory framework. While the GATS 
Agreement established a rule-based system for trade in financial services and provided for 
internationalised dispute settlement mechanisms, EU liberalisation measures harmonised a 
substantial amount of national regulations and thereby improved market efficiency and 
liquidity.
Unlike as in the pharmaceutical sector, however, there was little interaction between the 
six banks and the institutions of the EU. With regard to the GATS, this might not be too 
much of a surprise since this was primarily an American initiative. When the US withdrew 
from the negotiations and the EU took over, the main obstacle for a conclusion of the 
agreement was developing countries’ resistance for further liberalisation. The Swiss Bankers’ 
Association pointed out that during the period when negotiations were in limbo, a large
153 Interviews.
154 Interview.
155 Interviews.
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number of European banks intensively lobbied the governments of developing countries to 
get them to agree to further liberalisation measures156. An official from the FAGB commented 
that the problem was not with the European Commission, but rather with developing 
countries’ governments, which were highly sceptical about extending their liberalisation
1 ^ 7commitments . Since this study is, however, about banks’ political influence in their home 
countries -  and not host countries -  it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse this 
additional aspect of banks’ political strategies further.
However, when it came to the liberalisation process within the EU, the six banks’ lack of
political action has been somewhat surprising. Chapter 6 has pointed out that EU directives
have been important for both German and Swiss regulatory reforms. It was shown that as a
result of EU directives, Germany’s supervisory structure changed considerably during the
1990s. Indeed, the FAGB noted that the supervisory framework in which German banks
1operate had been to a significant degree designed in Brussels . Similarly, Switzerland’s 
financial market reforms were strongly affected by EU directives. Hirszowicz has noted that 
although Switzerland was not a member of the EU, it still had to carefully study EU 
directives before implementing new laws in order to ensure compatibility159. In similar vein, 
Daniker has pointed out that liberalisation within the EU had a strong impact on Swiss 
reforms160. Yet despite the obvious impact that EU directives had on both the German and 
Swiss regulatory framework, neither the German nor the Swiss banks were politically active 
at the EU level.
Although both the FAGB and the SBA are members of the European Bank Federation 
(EBF), neither the German nor the Swiss Association described their working relationship as 
particularly intensive. As one official at the SBA has put it, “the Swiss Bankers* Association is 
a member of the EBF in order to receive first-hand information about policy developments of 
significance for the Swiss financial centre161”. Similarly, the FAGB has referred to the EBF as 
more of an “information providing agency” than an association for pro-active interest 
representation. One interviewee argued that
“certainly have there been important directives, but they did not get much attention here.
156 FAGB Annual Report (1996/97), p. 78.
157 Interview.
158 FAGB Annual Report (1996), pp. 53-60.
159 See Hirszowicz (1996), pp. 297f.
160 See Daniker (1998), pp. 5-7.
161 Interview. For a similar view see Hirszowicz (1996), pp. 457f.
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Our focus has been on the implementation stage of directives coming from Brussels”162.
How can one explain this reluctance of both the German and the Swiss banks to actively 
engage at the European level? Essentially there appear to be three explanations. First, unlike 
the SAGB and the EFPIA in the pharmaceutical sector, the EBF usually does not appear on 
the list of the most visible European Associations. While the literature on the activities of 
European business associations has been rapidly expanding during the 1990s, there has not 
yet been a major study analysing the activities of the European Bank Federation. Indeed, one 
official at the EBF noted that “many banks do not know that we exist. Maybe we do not have 
the desirable level of visibility” .
Second, since financial liberalisation was pursued through directives -  which are 
addressed to member states and implemented through secondary acts of legislation -  national 
governments retained a certain degree of decision-making power. This was apparently 
enough for the six banks to concentrate their political strategies at the national level. The 
previous chapter has pointed out that all three German banks were through the FAGB actively 
involved in the process of translating European directives into German law. Similarly, the 
SBA was strongly involved in the drafting of reform acts that were based on EU directives. 
Certainly also important in this respect has been that both national bank associations enjoyed 
excellent relationships with their national regulatory authorities, while the European Bank 
Federation has not been singled out for its close relationship with the European Commission.
A final explanation for the six banks' reluctance to politically engage at the European level 
has to do with the fact that during the last two decades regulatory and supervisory issues were 
also tackled in a larger international context, and hence the European Commission was not 
always the right institution for pro-active interest representation.
A large number of banking crises in both developed and developing countries since the 
early 1980s prompted central bankers and supervisory authorities almost everywhere to 
improve the quality of banking supervision by establishing international banking standards. 
Internationalisation and the growing integration of the world’s financial markets have been 
particularly significant in this context. Chapter 2 has pointed out that large parts of banks’ 
business were highly mobile and could be relatively easily shifted between financial centres. 
As a result, it became increasingly necessary for national regulators to agree on measures to
162 Interview.
163 Quoted in Josselin (1997), p. 154.
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guarantee the safety of the international banking system and to prevent competitive 
deregulation164.
Most influential on an international scale has been the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basle Committee), established by the central bank Governors of the G-10 in 
1974 in the aftermath of serious disturbances in international currency and banking 
markets165. As a part of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) -  the “central bank of 
central bankers”166 -  the Committee’s objective is to formulate broad supervisory standards 
and guidelines in order to close gaps in the supervisory net and to improve supervisory 
understanding and the quality of banking supervision167. Contrary to the liberalisation 
objectives of the GATT and the OECD, the Basle Committee is not primarily concerned with 
deregulation, but with an appropriate and up-to-date control of risks in the international 
banking business168. To this end, a number of core principles have been developed to promote 
effective banking supervision - the so-called Basle principles169. These principles propose 
minimum standards for supervision methods, information and disclosure requirements, 
licensing, ownership transfer and liquidation170. Moreover, they suggest prudential rules and 
requirements to help financial institutions to measure and manage their exposure to risk171. 
Although the Basle Committee does not have any supranational authority - and its 
recommendations have no binding power - the Committee is very influential172. In fact, a 
number of studies have pointed out that the EU directives for the completion of the single
164 See Huang (1992), pp. 51f. and Pohl (1990).
165 Additionally there are OECD codes for liberalisation - which are supervised by a standing committee 
(Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions) - aimed to facilitate the communication between 
national authorities and to agree on minimal standards for member countries.
166 The BIS was founded in Basle in 1930 as an international financial organisation to settle the problem of the 
German reparation payments after the First World War. The BIS evolved into a forum for central bankers to 
discuss and coordinate banking regulations and to promote international financial stability. See Kono (1997), 
p.30.
167 See BIS (1989), p. 1.
168 See Huang (1992), p. 55.
169 The Basle principles are voluntary minimum standards, which allow for considerable diversity. They can be 
tailored to meet country circumstances and to permit a degree of experimentation on "what works best". See 
Lewis (1993).
170 These recommendations include the 1983 Accord on minimum requirements for cross-border supervision 
(revised in 1990,1992 and 1994), the 1990 Accord in information exchange between national regulators and 
the 1988 Accord on capital requirements which include definitions for capital, risk measurement and standards. 
More recently, in 1996, the Basle Committee and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (which comprises 
supervisors of major offshore centres) released a report on the Supervision of Cross-Border Banking. In 1997, 
the Basle Committee, in close collaboration with supervisory authorities from 15 developing countries from 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia, released the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 
The document sets out 25 principles that represent the basic elements of an effective supervisory system, 
covering topics such as licensing, formal powers of supervisors and methods of banking supervision. See 
Hirszowicz (1996), pp. 293ff, Kono (1997), p. 30 and BIS (1996,1997a, 1997b).
171 The most-well known principle is the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 per cent. See Goldstein (1997).
172 See Huang (1992), p. 55.
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•  1 1 'Xmarket in financial services largely reflected recommendations by the Basle Committee . 
Unfortunately it is, however, beyond the scope of the present study to analyse if and how the 
six banks sought to influence the drafting of guidelines at the BIS.
Conclusion
Having analysed the political influence of German and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and 
banks at the EU level of policy-making, this study cannot really endorse wholeheartedly any 
of the hypotheses about political strategies of organised interests reviewed at the beginning of 
the chapter. Political influence and strategies varied considerably not only across the two 
sectors, but also within them174.
The first point to make, however, is that the differences were not between MNEs from 
Germany and Switzerland, but rather between the pharmaceutical and the banking sector. 
Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the three Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs were 
politically as active at the EU level as the three German pharmaceutical MNEs. Sandoz and 
Hoechst were" among the founding members of the SAGB, and both countries are represented 
in the executive council of the EFPIA. In turn, both associations have been very active. A 
number of studies have argued that both the EFPIA and the SAGB developed strong ties with 
the Commission, which included elements of neo-corporatism175. Moreover, it was shown 
that both the SAGB and the EFPIA were able to exert considerable political influence and as 
such defied caricatures of European groups as weak and ineffective. Greenwood and Ronnit 
have noted that “although the EFPIA has not had its own way in every instance, it has clearly 
had a considerable impact upon the regulatory flavour of EC action in the sector, to the extent 
that its major demands have been incorporated”176. In similar vein, Bandelow has referred to 
the SAGB as one of the most effective industry organisations in Brussels177.
In stark contrast to the pharmaceutical MNEs, the six German and Swiss banks were 
largely uninvolved at the European level of policy-making and continued to concentrate their 
political strategies on their time-tested domestic channels of political influence. It was argued 
that this phenomenon could be explained by three factors: first, European directives are
173 See Hirszowicz (1996), p. 207, Comet (1990), p. 279 and FAGB Annual Report (1994), pp. 54ff.
174 See for example Ronnit 1997, p. 83.
175 See for example Greenwood/ Ronnit (1992) and Greenwood (1997).
176 Greenwood and Ronnit (1992), p. 82.
177 Bandelow (1999), p. 108.
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implemented as secondary acts of legislation, and both the German and the Swiss banks 
enjoy excellent relationships with domestic regulators. Second, in contrast to the European 
associations of the pharmaceutical industry, the EBF has not been singled out as a 
particularly active and highly visible organisation. Finally, the fact that many EU directives 
were based on guidelines from the Basle Committee made the European Commission not 
necessarily the most appropriate level for pro-active interest representation.
However, differences in interest representation activities were not only between the two 
sectors but also within them. While in some issue-areas the pharmaceutical industry’s 
associations were able to build relatively exclusive relationships with the Commission -  what 
Greenwood has called “clientilistic relationships”178 - other policy areas were characterised 
by a more confrontational policy-making style, e.g. the failed directive for the patenting of 
genetic modifications.
In short, an analysis of the pharmaceutical MNEs’ and banks’ political strategies at the 
European level has clearly shown that there was no single pattern of firm political action. 
Instead, the nature of policy networks varied significantly and there was a whole spectrum of 
relationships between the various actors, which ranged from tightly integrated policy 
communities to looser and more fragmented issue networks179.
178 Greenwood (1994), p. 185.
179 For the argument that there are significant variations in the nature of policy networks at the European level 
see Mazey and Richardson (1993) and Greenwood (1997), pp. 15f.
8Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to analyse the economic policy preferences and political 
influence of six German and six Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and banks. To this end, the 
analysis has tried to synthesise various strands in the IPE literature: from Milner it 
incorporated the argument that MNEs’ trade policy preferences were shaped by the extent 
and nature of their internationalisation process; from Krueger, Bhagwati and others it took the 
insight that economic policy preferences could be price mechanism promoting, distorting or 
suspending; from the public choice literature the importance of interests and incentives for 
analysing political influence; and, finally, from the corporatist and neo-corporatist literature 
the centrality of institutions for explaining policy outcomes. It was argued that while these 
studies provided a useful starting point for the analysis, there were some gaps in the literature 
that became apparent when one tried to turn these insights into an explanatory framework for 
analysing MNEs’ economic policy preferences and political influence during the period from 
1985 to 1995.
First, it was argued that the functioning of price competition was not only affected by 
trade policies but also by domestic policies. Hence Milner and other’s explanatory framework 
excluded a number of important policy areas from the analysis. Moreover, it was pointed out 
that even within the category of trade policy, obstacles to freer trade began to shift during the 
1980s and 1990s from “at the border” to “behind the border” policy issues - domestic policies 
that mutated with the increasing integration of national economies into obstacles to 
international trade. In short, there was a strong case for incorporating domestic policies into 
the analysis, and the literature did not offer a method to explain MNEs' preferences with 
regard to those issues. This study argued that internationalisation was unlikely to be of much 
help in providing an explanation and suggested instead two other explanatory factors: MNEs’ 
business focus and sectoral characteristics. Put differently, this study did not seek to disprove 
the argument that MNEs' trade policy preferences were shaped by the extent and nature of 
their internationalisation process, but rather argued that there was a case for going beyond 
this framework of analysis in order to account for MNEs' preferences with regard to domestic
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policies. German and Swiss pharmaceutical MNEs and banks seemed to make good case 
studies for analysing the importance of internationalisation for MNEs’ policy preferences 
since the two sectors differed considerably in the extent and nature of their exposure to 
international markets. While pharmaceutical MNEs in both countries were always highly 
internationalised, banks tended, at least until recently, to be a lot less so.
Second, Chapter 1 noted that the two main approaches in the IPE literature to explain 
policy outcomes centred around interests and incentives on the one hand, and institutions on 
the other. It was argued that while both approaches were important for explaining MNEs’ 
political influence, they suffered from a similar shortcoming; both exclude the circumstances 
under which policy-making took place from the analysis and hence cannot explain their 
impact on perceptions of self-interest and institutions. In order to remedy this shortcoming, 
this study suggested that both approaches needed to be supplemented by an analysis of the 
changing economic and political circumstances under which policy-making took place. More 
precisely, it was argued that the impact of circumstances on the preferences of the 
government, the degree of opposition from other organised interests and the extent to which 
MNEs’ could use their internationalisation process for political leverage, was an important 
explanatory factor that was conditioning the political influence of MNEs. In other words, the' 
argument was again not to disprove existing theories, but rather to add more complexity. 
MNEs from Germany and Switzerland were chosen for the analysis since firms in both 
countries enjoy broadly similar institutional linkages to the policy-making process. 
Comparing their political influence should thus yield evidence of the importance of 
institutions for MNEs' political influence and the extent to which this influence can be 
conditioned by changing circumstances.
Certainly such an explanatory framework implied discarding a lot of simplifying 
assumptions and was unlikely to lead to a parsimonious theory. However, Chapter 1 has 
argued that the purpose of this study was not to develop a rigorous model, but rather to 
analyse the interactions of a number of explanatory factors that the more parsimonious 
theories had difficulty accounting for. Moreover, parsimony is not the only criteria by which 
a theory should be judged; there is also explanatory power and range. Did the findings then 
vindicate the chosen approach?
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The Economic Policy Preferences of the 12 MNEs
With regard to MNEs’ economic policy preferences, the answer appeared to be a cautious 
yes. It was shown that in both sectors the most important economic policy issues confronting 
the six pharmaceutical MNEs and the six banks were almost entirely domestic in nature, and 
there was evidence that in many cases internationalisation was only of little, or even no, help 
in explaining MNEs' policy preferences. Instead, as this study predicted, MNEs’ business 
focus and sectoral characteristics were important explanatory factors. In the pharmaceutical 
sector, MNEs’ policy preferences with regard to health care policies, intellectual property 
rights and parallel imports could be explained to a significant extent by their business focus 
and sectoral characteristics. Similarly in the financial services sector, the six banks’ 
preferences regarding reforms of the domestic regulatory framework were significantly 
shaped by their business focus.
However, the findings were not entirely straightforward. In both sectors one could point to 
domestic policy issues where -  apart from MNEs* business focus and sectoral characteristics - 
MNEs’ internationalisation process was also an important explanatory factor. In the 
pharmaceutical sector, this was the case with intellectual property rights. In the financial 
services sector, it was even more clearly the case with regard to reforms of the domestic 
regulatory framework. Moreover, in both sectors there were policy issues in which none of 
the three explanatory factors was decisive for shaping MNEs' policy preferences. This was 
the case with biotechnology regulations in the pharmaceutical industry and with the issue of 
public sector banks in the German financial services sector. In both cases, MNEs’ preferences 
were more the result of a general desire for a level playing field than of company- or sector- 
specific characteristics.
However, the clearest example of the potential importance of other explanatory factors 
was the case of the three Swiss banks’ pre-1990 preference for administered competition in 
the domestic banking sector. Even though the Swiss banks were more internationalised than 
the German banks (at least during the 1980s), had a roughly similar business focus and 
obviously were subject to the same sectoral characteristics, their preference was almost 
diametrically opposed to the German banks’ preference for free competition in the German 
banking sector. It was suggested that the three Swiss banks' preference for administered 
competition could be explained by national characteristics, or more precisely, Switzerland’s 
relatively lax competition policies. So clearly the proposed explanatory framework did not 
always hold up. But then again, neither did the traditional explanatory logic that explained
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MNEs’ trade policy preferences as the result of the extent and nature of their 
internationalisation process. While this was certainly a plausible explanation for the six 
banks’ support of the GATS Agreement in Financial Services, the three German 
pharmaceutical MNEs’ preference for restricting parallel imports from other European 
countries fitted somewhat uneasily with this argument. After all, these were highly 
internationalised MNEs -  both in terms of sales and production networks -  and yet they were 
supporting measures to segment national health care markets along national lines. It was 
argued that sectoral characteristics could explain this phenomenon.
Judging the extent to which these policy preferences were competition-promoting has not 
been a straightforward task. In fact, in both sectors there seemed to have been evidence for 
the argument that high levels of regulation were often likely to encourage rent-seeking 
behaviour. In the pharmaceutical sector, one could point to the six MNEs' preference for 
worldwide harmonisation of patent laws and the three German MNEs' preference for 
segmenting European health care markets along national lines. Yet it was also noted that 
sectoral characteristics complicated a definitive verdict in these cases. In the financial service 
sector, the obvious example was the three Swiss banks' pre-1990 preference for administered 
competition in the domestic banking sector. However, on balance, MNEs in both sectors 
appeared to be more often interested in promoting competition than in distorting or 
suspending it. In the pharmaceutical sector, all six MNEs strongly supported competition- 
promoting health care policies and a regulatory framework for biotechnology that was based 
on scientific principles and free from government meddling. In the financial services sector, 
all six banks supported open international markets for financial services and advocated 
measures to deepen and broaden domestic capital markets and to adjust domestic regulatory 
and supervisory standards to international best practices. Moreover, the German banks 
relentlessly campaigned for a level playing field between commercial and public sector 
banks, and strongly supported financial liberalisation measures within the context of the 
Single European Act.
The Political Influence of the 12 MNEs
The analysis clearly showed that interests and institutions were indispensable for an 
explanation of MNEs' political influence. In fact, it was possible to show that differences in 
the way and intensity in which MNEs articulated their interests had in some cases a visible
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impact on the political influence they were capable of exerting (e.g. the six pharmaceutical 
MNEs’ public campaign against overly strict and comprehensive biotechnology regulations). 
Similarly, institutions went in some cases a long way towards providing a satisfactory 
explanation of MNEs’ political influence. For example, both the German and Swiss banks’ 
political influence with regard to reforms of the domestic regulatory framework could be to a 
significant extent linked to institutional structures in these sectors. Moreover, differences in 
MNEs’ institutional linkages to the policy-making process also had an observable impact on 
their political influence. Despite significant similarities in the institutional structure of the 
German and Swiss economic policy-making process, Chapter 4 noted that institutional 
linkages were more tightly knit in Switzerland and that a number of authors had recently 
voiced scepticism about the robustness of Germany’s institutions in the face of economic 
change. Indeed, these observations from the macro level were visible in policy outcomes in 
the pharmaceutical sector: on balance, policy outcomes were a shade less negative for the 
three Swiss MNEs than for the three German MNEs, and there was evidence that these 
differences could, at least to an extent, be attributed to institutions linking MNEs to the 
policy-making process.
That said, however, the limitations of these two explanatory approaches became, quickly 
visible. It was shown that in both the German and Swiss pharmaceutical and financial 
services sector, MNEs" political influence varied considerably across a number of policy 
issues despite similarly strong interests and similar institutional linkages to the policy-making 
process. Hence it became necessary to go beyond interests and institutions and to add more 
complexity to the analysis. In fact, the explanatory power of both approaches increased 
substantially when they were supplemented with an analysis of economic and political 
circumstances and their impact on the preferences of the government, the degree of 
opposition from other organised interests and the extent to which MNEs’ internationalisation 
process could be used as source of political leverage. Indeed, when applied to the selected 
policy issues, this extended explanatory framework was able to plausibly explain variations 
in MNEs’ political influence.
In the pharmaceutical sector, it was shown that the political influence that the German and 
Swiss MNEs were capable of exerting not only varied considerably between health care 
policies and biotechnology regulations, but was also very limited: policy outcomes in both 
issue areas were far from MNEs' preferences, but changes in the regulatory framework for 
biotechnology were less negative in their effects than health care reforms. These policy 
outcomes were somewhat surprising - at least when looked at through the lens of interest- and
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institution-based explanations: Chapter 3 noted that all six MNEs had a strong interest in 
these two issue areas and plenty of incentives for political action; Chapter 4 pointed out that 
all six were part of an institutional structure that could be expected to award them 
considerable political influence. Moreover, it was noted that with regard to health care policy, 
MNEs in both countries were part of a highly institutionalised policy-making network while 
for biotechnology regulations no similar forum existed. Yet policy outcomes in health care 
were in both countries considerably more disadvantageous for the MNEs than were changes 
in the regulatory framework for biotechnology.
Admittedly, an interest-based explanation went some distance towards explaining these 
variations in MNEs’ political influence. With regard to biotechnology regulations, MNEs in 
both countries launched high-profile public relation campaigns, while with regard to health 
care policies they relied on traditional channels of interest representation. However, it was 
argued that such an explanation was not entirely satisfactory. First, it failed to explain the 
relatively limited extent of the six MNEs’ influence - both policy outcomes were far from 
MNEs’ preferences - and, second, the counter-factual did not appear particularly plausible. 
While a public campaign may indeed have helped the six MNEs with regard to biotechnology 
issues, it appeared unlikely that a similarly forceful articulation of interests would have 
achieved the same result with regard to health care policy.
An analysis of economic and political circumstances shed more light on these issues. 
Essentially the dynamics were the same in both countries. First, it was argued that an 
important factor behind MNEs’ inability to achieve more favourable policy outcomes was the 
incompatibility of their preferences with those of the state: regarding health care reforms, 
governments in both countries were more interested in instant cost savings than in 
redesigning market orders and with regard to biotechnology regulations, the German and 
Swiss government were keen to respond to popular safety and environmental concerns and to 
extend their regulatory competence to this important technology.
A second factor counting against MNEs was that in both policy areas MNEs’ preferences 
were strongly opposed by a variety of well-organised interest groups with plenty of populist 
appeal. In the health care sector, these were primarily the hospitals, the main cost driver 
behind rising health care expenditures, and with regard to biotechnology regulation, they 
were coalitions of organised interests ranging from environmental protection and consumer 
safety groups to women’s organisations and the church. It was argued that in both countries 
this domestic opposition was a significant factor behind the inability of the six MNEs to 
shape policy outcomes more to their preferences.
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However, while both policy outcomes were far from MNEs’ preferences, health care 
reforms in both countries were clearly more negative in their effects than biotechnology 
regulations. The crucial difference between the two issue areas was that with regard to 
biotechnology regulations, the six MNEs’ internationalisation processes became during the 
1990s increasingly a source of political leverage. It was shown that both Germany and 
Switzerland experienced significant economic problems during the first half of the 1990s 
while simultaneously the six MNEs moved an increasing share of their R&D and high value 
added production activities to foreign production locations with more biotechnology-friendly 
regulatory frameworks. In both countries a number of authors argued that these developments 
combined to increase the political influence of MNEs in this issue area.
In short, while interest- and institutions-based explanations provided a useful starting 
point for an explanation of the six pharmaceutical MNEs’ political influence, they 
nevertheless left many questions unanswered. Supplementing the analysis with an account of 
the economic and political circumstances under which policy-making was taking place turned 
out to be of significant importance.
Like the six pharmaceutical MNEs, the political influence of the six banks also varied 
considerably across issue areas. On balance, however, the six banks were considerably more 
influential. It was shown that in both countries reforms of the domestic regulatory framework 
closely matched the six banks’ preference for regulations that were compatible with 
international norms and standards, and that allowed for a broadening and deepening of capital 
markets. However, the six banks also suffered political setbacks. In Germany, they failed to 
get the German government to level the playing field between commercial and public sector 
banks; and in Switzerland, despite fierce opposition from the three banks, the government 
abolished in 1990 the conventions through which the Swiss Bankers' Association used to 
administer competition in the banking sector.
As in the pharmaceutical sector, interest- and institutions-based explanations provided a 
useful starting point to explain these policy outcomes and the political influence that the six 
banks were capable of exerting. In fact, advocates of public choice and corporatist theories 
would hardly find anything surprising in the German and Swiss regulatory reforms. After all, 
the six banks had strong incentives to lobby for these reforms and, as the analysis of Chapter 
6 showed, were part of a highly institutionalised policy-making network.
However, these explanations again left a lot unanswered. Chapter 6 pointed out that there 
was no hierarchy of importance among the six banks’ preferences that could explain why the 
banks were successful with their preference for regulatory reforms and unsuccessful with
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their preferences for a level playing field and the banking conventions. In fact, the Swiss 
banks launched a high profile campaign to defend the conventions and still lost the debate. 
Institutional explanations, on the other hand, appeared to be more helpful to explain the 
variations in the six banks’ political influence: with regard to regulatory reforms, the German 
and Swiss banks were part of highly institutionalised policy-making network, while in the 
case of the state-sanctioned privileges for public sector banks and the banking conventions, 
no comparable networks existed. Although there seemed to be some truth to this argument, it 
was nevertheless not entirely convincing since it implied that the six banks would have 
persisted with their preferences for a level playing field and the banking conventions if 
institutional linkages had been more conducive. An analysis of the economic and political 
circumstances under which policy-making took place showed, however, that this was highly 
improbable. In fact, as had occurred in the analysis of the pharmaceutical sector, such an 
analysis turned out to be of critical importance for an explanation of the political influence 
that the six banks were capable of exerting.
With regard to regulatory reforms, the circumstances in Germany and Switzerland were 
largely identical. First, in contrast to many policy areas in the pharmaceutical sector, there 
was a significant element of congruence between bank’s preferences and those of the state. It 
was noted that with the increasing internationalisation of financial services, regulators in both 
countries developed an interest of their own to increase the stability of domestic financial 
systems by bringing regulatory and supervisory standards in line with international norms and 
standards. Second, policy-making was free from interest group pressure since the issue did 
not have an impact on employment or income distribution. Moreover, banking regulations are 
of a highly technical nature and did not generate much public interest. As a result, policy­
making remained confined to a relatively small group of technocrats from the federal 
regulatory agencies and the banking community. Finally, the six banks’ internationalisation 
process was a source of considerable political influence in this policy area since much of the 
banks’ securities business was highly mobile and could be relatively easily shifted between 
financial centres.
However, circumstances were not always so favourable for the German and Swiss banks. 
In fact, with regard to the issue of state-sanctioned privileges for public sector banks (in 
Germany) and the banking conventions (in Switzerland), the circumstances under which 
policy-making took place were considerably less advantageous. Essentially the factors that 
were behind the six banks’ political defeats in these policy areas were similar to those that 
were behind the six pharmaceutical MNEs’ defeat with regard to health care policy: strong
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opposition from the government and other organised interests and an inability to use 
internationalisation as a source of political leverage. In the German case, domestic opposition 
came from the Lander governments, on whose support the government often depends, and 
the Association of Public Sector Banks. In the Swiss case, it came predominantly from the 
government, which was determined to adjust the Swiss regulatory framework to international 
best practices.
In short, as was the case in the pharmaceutical sector, interest- and institutions-based 
explanations provided a useful starting point for an explanation of the six banks’ political 
influence. However, both approaches left many questions unanswered, and supplementing 
these approaches with an analysis of economic and political circumstances turned out to be of 
significant importance.
Finally, this study also analysed the political strategies and influence of the 12 MNEs at 
the European level of policy-making. It was pointed out that again the main differences were 
not between MNEs from Germany and Switzerland, but rather between pharmaceutical 
MNEs and banks. While the six pharmaceutical MNEs were highly active at the EU level, the 
six banks continued to centre their political strategies at the national level -  at least until 
1995. It was shown that although Switzerland was not a member of the EU, the Swiss 
pharmaceutical MNEs were politically just as active as their German counterparts.
With regard to policy outcomes, the picture for the six pharmaceutical MNEs was, on 
balance, brighter at the European level than at the national level. It was shown that despite 
initial problems in the area of biotechnology regulations, the European associations of the 
pharmaceutical industry - EFPIA and SAGB -  managed to build up institutionalised 
relationships with the European Commission. Chapter 7 pointed out that a number of authors 
had argued that by virtue of these relationships, the European pharmaceutical industry had 
managed to secure favourable policy outcomes with regard to biotechnology regulations, 
intellectual property rights and marketing directives. Moreover, it was shown that the most 
significant defeat of the European pharmaceutical industry in recent years -  the rejection of a 
directive for the patenting of biotechnological inventions -  could be linked to a decision­
making process that involved the European Parliament, the "natural home” of environmental 
and consumer interest groups. In other words, institutional explanations went a long way 
towards explaining the political influence of the pharmaceutical MNEs at the European level 
of policy-making.
In the European banking sector, policy outcomes were even more favourable. Chapter 7 
noted that the GATS Agreement for Financial Services and EU liberalisation measures within
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the context of the SEA largely corresponded to the six banks’ preferences. Although banks 
complained that both policy initiatives did not go far enough, they were clearly a step in the 
right direction. However, as already noted, both the German and the Swiss banks were 
largely uninvolved in policy-making processes at the European level and continued to centre 
their political activities at the national level (at least until 1995).
In short, the analysis has clearly shown that interests and institutions were important for an 
explanation of MNEs’ political influence. However, in many cases these explanations were 
not sufficient by themselves. It was shown that economic and political circumstances often 
significantly affected the political influence of the 12 MNEs. Hence this study’s argument for 
an explanatory framework that went beyond interests and institutions appears perfectly 
justifiable. Certainly one might regret the loss of parsimony. However, parsimony is not the 
only criteria by which a theory is judged. There is also explanatory power and range -  and 
while the proposed framework may not have scored a lot of points on the first criterion, it 
scored considerably on the second and the third.
All Ad Hoc?
While the proposed explanations of MNEs' preferences and political influence appear to 
sound plausible, a question remains as to whether they are essentially all ad hoc in nature or 
whether there are any broader conclusions that can be drawn. Indeed, from a review of the 
principal findings, it appears possible to deduce a number of testable propositions. Naturally 
they should be treated with caution since they are only based on the evidence from 12 MNEs, 
two sectors and two countries.
With regard to MNEs1 preferences, there are four propositions that can be made. First, the 
finding that all three German MNEs strongly advocated measures to segment EU health care 
markets along national lines in order to prevent parallel imports suggests that the explanatory 
logic that explains MNEs’ trade policy preferences as the result of the extent and nature of 
their internationalisation process is not as water-tight as the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 
seems to suggest. After all, these MNEs are by all standards highly internationalised 
companies, and yet all of them supported measures that could be interpreted as protectionist.
Second, the argument that a business focus on innovation gave the six pharmaceutical 
MNEs a strong interest in competition-promoting health care policies might be applicable 
beyond the pharmaceutical industry. There appears to be no obvious reason why the
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assumption that, given free choice, consumers are unlikely to select second-best products 
should only be valid for the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, it appears to make sense for 
every company that is in the business of developing products that are superior to existing 
ones to support public policies that aim to establish open markets1. This hypothesis depends, 
however, strongly on the view one takes about the effects of intellectual property rights on 
the functioning of competition (see Chapter 3) since, as will be argued below, companies that 
are in the business of developing innovative products are also likely to be strong advocates of 
a maximum of intellectual property protection (particularly when R&D expenditure is 
substantial).
Third, the observation that a focus on research-intensive drugs that can be easily replicated 
was behind the six pharmaceutical MNEs’ strong preference for the protection of intellectual 
property is also likely to be applicable beyond the pharmaceutical industry. It seems self- 
evident that companies, which invest huge sums in the development of innovative and easily 
replicated products are always likely to support policies that provide for a maximum of 
intellectual property protection (e.g. computer software, films, music, etc.).
Fourth, the analysis of the six banks’ policy preferences showed that an important factor 
behind their preference for open international markets was the fact that the important bits of 
the investment banking and asset management business were clustered in a few financial 
centres. Quite conceivably the existence of clusters might have the same effect in other 
sectors. It appears only natural for a company whose production process is irrevocably tied to 
a certain location to support open international markets, since cross-border exchange is, under 
such circumstances, the only feasible strategy to serve foreign markets.
Turning now to MNEs’ political influence, there appear to be two testable propositions 
that can be deduced from the analysis. First, when the threat to move production abroad was 
credible and was directly linked to the policy issue at hand, internationalisation was indeed a 
considerable source of political leverage for the 12 MNEs. In the pharmaceutical sector, for 
example, MNEs’ increasing internationalisation of R&D activities was an important factor 
behind their relative "success" of preventing the government from giving in to populist 
demands for stringent and comprehensive biotechnology regulations. In fact, the difference 
that internationalisation can make for MNEs’ political leverage was particularly visible in the 
case of the German pharmaceutical industry. In 1990, when the three MNEs were only just
1 The recent anti trust case against Microsoft suggests, however, that matters can be very different when it 
comes to MNEs' business strategies.
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beginning to internationalise their R&D activities, the government ratified the highly 
disadvantageous Gene Technology Act. Only three years later, however, amid fears of a 
hollowing out of the German research location, the government significantly reformed this 
act. Similarly, in the financial services sector, banks’ internationalisation process was a source 
of political influence when it came to reforms of domestic regulatory frameworks.
Certainly this proposition might not come as too big a surprise, since it is widely assumed 
that globalisation has turned MNEs into powerful political entities. What was surprising, 
however, was that in a number of policy areas in both sectors, MNEs’internationalisation was 
not a source of political influence. In the pharmaceutical sector, for example, MNEs’ 
internationalisation process did not give them political leverage with regard to health care 
reforms. Similarly in the financial services sector, the increasing internationalisation of the 
German banks did not help them with their preference for a level playing field between 
commercial and public sector banks, and neither did the increasing internationalisation of the 
Swiss banks make a difference regarding the government’s decision to abolish the Swiss 
banking conventions. In all these cases, there was no direct link between the policy issue at 
hand and MNEs’ internationalisation process, and hence the threat to shift production abroad 
was simply not credible. In short, while the argument that internationalisation can be a source 
of political influence for MNEs is certainly valid, the precise extent of political leverage that 
can be derived from cross-border production networks varied considerably across policy 
areas.
The second observable pattern behind variations in MNEs’ political influence centred on 
the nature o f policy issues and the composition of policy-making communities: whenever a 
policy issue was of a technical nature and did not attract popular scrutiny, MNEs were able to 
exert considerable political influence. If, however, the policy issue involved other domestic 
groups and stirred popular emotions, MNEs invariably faced an uphill struggle in their 
attempts to shape policies according to their preferences and, most of the time, had to settle 
for policy outcomes that were far from their preferences. This phenomenon was visible in 
both the financial services and pharmaceutical sector.
It was noted that the six banks were considerably influential with regard to reforms of 
domestic regulatory frameworks - policy issues that did not attract much popular attention 
since they were neutral in their effect on employment and income distribution and did not 
affect any larger societal concerns such as health or safety concerns. It was also observed that 
in both countries policy-making processes in this issue area had remained confined to elite 
groups and were free of the politicisation that was so conspicuous in other issue areas. In
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contrast, when policy issues had a populist appeal and involved other organised interests - as 
in the case of the state-sanctioned privileges for German public sector banks and the Swiss 
banking conventions - banks were much less influential. A similar pattern could be observed 
in the pharmaceutical sector at the European level. With regard to technical issues that did not 
attract popular scrutiny - e.g. patent restoration terms, grace periods or directives for the 
marketing of drugs - policy outcomes closely corresponded to MNEs’ preferences, while in 
policy issues that attracted popular attention MNEs were a lot less influential, e.g. patents on 
biotechnology inventions.
German and Swiss biotechnology regulations are an interesting case in this context. This 
is an issue area in which MNEs’ internationalisation process should be expected to give them 
extra political leverage, yet as the last section suggests, MNEs’ political influence was likely 
to be held in check as a result of the high levels of politicisation that were surrounding this 
policy area. In both countries, these dynamics manifested themselves in essentially similar 
terms: nominally MNEs were relatively successful in preventing stringent and comprehensive 
regulations. Chapter 5 noted that the revision of Germany’s Gene Technology Act and 
Switzerland's new regulatory framework were not too unfavourable. At the same time, 
however, as a result of the activities of organised interest groups, the interpretation and 
application of these regulations turned out to be a very different matter; in both countries 
MNEs complained about delays and arbitrary interpretations.
It is this last scenario that might provide a glimpse of the future, since it involves the 
interaction of two defining trends of the last decade. On the one hand, the number of MNEs 
has increased strongly and these companies have begun to internationalise an ever growing 
array of production and managerial activities in order to tap the knowledge potential of 
various countries, exploit regulatory differences and design production processes in which 
each element is carried out in the best suited location. Market efficiency is paramount for 
such companies and as a result of the increasing complexity of their international production 
networks, many business segments can be relatively easily shifted between different 
production locations. Hence the “threat” to move production abroad has become real in an 
increasing number of policy areas. On the other hand, the last decade has also seen the 
emergence anti-market ideas and causes that have gained support from a number of 
developments. Examples include the growing influence of environmentalism in forms which 
involve condemnation of or disregard for market processes or, what Friedman has called, “an 
excessive drive to equality” manifesting itself in, for example, an ever-widening scope of
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labour market regulations or affirmative action programmes2. In fact, it appears that a 
growing number of interest groups share a vision of the world in which market-based 
economic systems are viewed in terms of patterns of oppression and abuses of power . Taken 
together these developments have provided a significant counter force against the demands 
for greater market efficiency from MNEs. It does not seem far fetched to suggest that the next 
decade will witness a clash of these two broad developments on more than one or two 
occasions. The concrete forms and shapes of these conflicts are likely to be the topic of 
numerous studies to come.
2 Quoted in Henderson (1998), p. 88.
3 For a more detailed analysis of these developments see Henderson (1998), pp. 88ff.
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